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Respondent was convicted of second degree murder in 
California. Evidence introduced included a gun seized incident 
to an arrest in Nevada pursuant to a statute found unconstitutional 
by CA 9. Although USDC had declined to apply the exclusionary rule 
in these circumstances, CA 9 granted 
habeas corpus. 
respondent's petition for 
~'( 
/.1,;~~ ...., ........... ~......_.. 




FAC'I'S: Respondent and three companions entered a 
San Bernardino, Cali'fornia, liquor store at about midnight 
on February 17, 1968. The owner, Mr. Parsons, saw respondent 
place a bottle of wine under his jacket. When Parsons approached 
him, respondent struck Parsons. Parsons went for his ,J8 caliber 
revolver, and respondent and the three other men left the store. 
Respondent returned a few minutes later, and a struggle ensued 
between him and Parsons over the gun. Respondent shot Parsons 
in the wrist. Parson retreated to obtain another gun from the 
back office. He heard a shot and heard his wife scream. Wheri 
he returned to the front of the store, he discovered his wife 
on the floor. One of respondent's companions was at the cash 
register. Parsons shot at the companion, and the men fled. 
('---' Mrs. Parsons died. 
_. Ten hours later, on a Sunday mo.jrning, an officer of 
the Henderson, Nevada, Police Department saw respondent and 
another man while on routine patrol in a shopping center 
parking lot. Respondent and his companion saw the patrol 
car and turned away quickly, walking now in the opposite 
direction, They looked back several times and continued 
walking rapidly. The officer made a U-turn and approached 
them. Respondent and the other man now split up, walking in 
different directions. The officer called out to respondent 
to stop, but respondent kept on going. The officer then drove 
up to respondent, jumped out of the car, and asked him to 
halt. Respondent stopped, and identified himself although 
he could supply no identification papers. He stated he had 
- J -
been staying with s ome fri ends in nearby l a s Vefa s , but he 
was unabl e to name them. He said he was en route to ~ichi gan, 
but Henders on was south of Las Ve gas and thus not on the route 
of someone going east from Ve gas to Michigan. The officer 
arrested respond ent for violating the Henderson vagrancy 
ordinance: 
"Every person is a vagrant who: 
Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from 
place to place without apparent reason or business 
and who refuses to identify hims elf and to account 
for his presence when asked by a police officer to 
do so if surrounding circumstanc es are such as to 
\
indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety 
demands such identification." 
The officer searched respondent and found a pistol with six 
expended cartridges in the cylinder. It is undisputed that 
the officer had no knowledge of the California mur_Q,er at the 
'-- time he arrested respondent. The pistol was the Parsons' .3 8 
caliber revolver. 
Respondent was charged with second degree murder. 
Mr . Parsons and at least two of the three companions (Buckley 
and Chaney) in the liquor store testified a gainst re spondent, 
A criminologi s t testified that the gun taken from r espondent 
was the same gun that had been used to kill f,·:rs. Parsons , 
Respondent was convicted, Cn appeal respondent attacked the 
constitutionality of the Nevada ordinance; the California 
Court of Appeal viewed this as an attack on the jurisdiction 
of the California courts to try him, which it rejected under 
Frisbie v, Collins, 342 u. s . 519. Insofar as respondent 
challenged the introduction of the gun, the court found this 




at the scene and the evidence re garding his possession of the 
gun in Nevada "was not required to establish any essential 
element of the charged crime." App. xxv. Habeas corpus 
relief was denied by the California Supreme Court. 
Respondent s ought federal habeas claiming that (1) the 
Nevada ordinance was unconstitutional or (2) the officer did not 
have probable cause to believe respondent was violating it. 
The USDC (Burke) denied relief on two alternative grounds. 
{~it held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied 
\ even if the Henderson ordinance was unconstitutional: ''The 
purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be advanced by ex 
post facto condemnation of an arrest which was apparently valid 
when made •••• [I~ the absence of a prior determination that 
the statute was unconstitutional, the officer was entitled to 
arres~ petitioner for violation of it if he had probable cause 
to believe that the offense had been committed in his presence 
and to make a reasonable search incident to that arrest." App. 
xvii. The court reviewe.d the facts and concluded that the 
~
officer did have probable cause.  the court concluded, 
for the same reasons expressed by the state courts, that the 
error if any was harmless. 
CA 9 reversed. It found the Henderson ordinance un-
~ 
constitutionally vague. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 
-------
405 U.S. 156 (1972). While exclusion of evidence would serve 
no legitimate deterrent purpose with regard to police officers 






be said with respect to those who enact such a statute 
authorizing such unconstitutional searches, The public 
interest , , , is served by deterring legislators from 
enacting such statutes," App, xi. The court cited as 
'-- -
7 
support for this reasoning four decisions of this Court .ex-
cluding evidence in the same case in which it struck down 
a statute that had been relied upon in good faith by police 
officers, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Sibron v. New 
York, 392 u.s. 40 (1968); Ber P,er v. New York, 388 u.s. 41 (1967). 
After an independent r~view of the evidence, the panel concluded 
that the admission of the gun was not harmless error because it 
supported the testimony of respondent's accomplices that 
respondent had killed Mrs. Parsons • 
./ CONTENTIONS: Petitioner advances four contentions, 
I 
three of which are quite important: (1) Kaufman v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), should be overruled. !\espondent 
had a fair opportunity to raise and have adjudicated his 
Fourth Amendment claims in state courts and should not be 
permitted to raise them in federal court via habeas. Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 251 (1973) (POWELL, J. con~urring ). 
(2) the exclusionary rule should not be applied to suppress 
the fruits of a search incident to an arrest pursuant to a 
then-valid ordinance since it makes no sense to speak of police 
deterrence in this setting .* Cf. Pierson v. ~ ay, 386 U. S . 547 
(1967); United States v. Peltier, No. 73-2000; (3) the Henderson 
ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague; and (4) the admission 
*Ptn at 19-20: "The crowning irony in the application of the 
exclusionary rul e in thi s case is that the l eFi s lators in the 
Henderson, Nevada City Council will hardly be deterred by the 
invalida tion of a conviction for murder committed in California." 
- 6 -
of the evidence, if error, was harmless ~eyond a reasonable doubt, 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
DISCUSSION: Just recently the Court has declined another 
invitation by California authorities to overrule Kaufman·:~- and 
Lefkowitz v. Kewsome leans in the other direction, The inter-
action between the exclusionary rule and a statute later found 
to be unconstitutional generated much interest in J'ones v. Florida, 
dismissec for want of a properly presented federal question, 
December 23, 1974~ in which the state had not raised the issue 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting at 2), The mechanical application of 
the exclusionary rule may be at odds with this Court's most 
recent articulation of a balancing test, United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.s. 338 ·tl974). Both parties seem to agree that the 
Henderson officer must have had probable cause to arrest respondent 
in or~er for petitioner's theory to prevail assuming, arguendo, 
that invalidation of the ordinance does not compel exclusion of 
the evidence. As might be expected, however, the parties disagree 
on the probable cause issue. Compare USDC opinion at App. xviii 
with Response at 6-11. CA 9 did not discuss the issue in probable 
cause terms since it viewed one of the deficiencies of the ordinance 
as the subversion of the probable cause requirement by its 
vagueness. 
If the Court is not interested in the Kaufman issue, then 
a limited grant would be advisable. If the Court were to reverse 
CA 9 on the constitutionality of the ordinance, then presumably 
it would be unnecessary to reach the petitioner's exclusionary 
rule contention; the respondent contends that the unconstitutionality 
{~solomon v. Enzensperger, No. 74-404, cert. denied, March 3, 1975. 
- 7 -
of the ordinance is so apparent that it wou~d be inappropriate 
to grant certiorari on this issue. Response at 11. If a grant 
were limited in this manner as well, only the exclusionary rule 
and harmless error contentions would remain. 
There is a response. 
J/22/75 Nannes Opns in Ptn App 
. ·~ 
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1. Summary: Resp was convicted in a jury trial in 
state court of first degree murder and was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Resp's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. 
188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972). Resp filed a 2254 petn 
in dist ct alleging that his conviction was based on illegally 
-i:.~ /"seized evidence. The dist ct (D.Neb.; Urbom, D.J.) granted 
-
-2-
habeas relief, and CA 8 affirmed.' The State of Nebraska 
seeks certiorari arguing that (a) resp failed to exhaust 
state remedies, (b) the search and seizure were reasonable, 
and (c) the exclusionary rule should be modified to allow JA 
introduction of the evidence. V( 
2. Facts: At approximately 2:00a.m., August 17, 
1970, the Omaha Nebraska Police Department received a tele-
phone call indicating that a woman was screaming in a vacant 
house at 2865 Ohio Street. Three patrol cars reported to 
the scene. As the officers were searching the house, one 
of them stooped to examine a suitcase lying in the doorway. 
\ 
The suitcase, which was boobytrapped with dynamite, exploded 
and killed the officer. In the investigation that ensued, 
the police soon learned that one Duane Peak had made the 
telephone call and had been seen shortly beforehand with a 
suitcase similar to the one that had been boobytrapped. 
I 
Peak was a member of the National Committee to Combat Fascism, 
an offshoot of the Black Panthers. The police also learned 
that Edward Poindexter, Chairman of the NCCF, was knowledgeable 
in handling explosives and was believed to be the person who 
had constructed the boobytrap. Warrants for the arrest of 
Peak and Poindexter were issued on the afternoon of Saturday, 
August 22nd. Late that aftenloon a police task force set out 
to execute the warrants. The police first searched the NCCF 
headquarters, which was deserted but did contain a large cache 




and Poindexter residences, with no success. The police then 
went to resp's house. According to police intelligence files, 
resp was the NCCF Mininister of Information and his house had 
served as a gathering place for NCCF members. When the police 
arrived at resp's house, the lights were on and the television 
set could be heard but no one answered the door. Two officers 
left to secure a search warrant and the remainder surrounded 
~esp ,. S; house. On the basis of an affadavit submitted by 
the two officers, a city magistrate issued a warrant for the 
search of resp's residence. The search was executed that same 
night. The police did not find anyone inside the house, but 
they did find 14 sticks of dynamite in a box in the basement 
as well as some blasting caps, wire, a battery, and a pair 
of long-nosed pliers. A warrant was issued for ~esp's ar-
rest on charges of possessing illegal explosives. Resp 
......______. 
surrendered four days later. The standard procedure of 
taking resp' s clothes and giving him jail clothes was followed. 
However, after the clothes were routinely inventoried, they 
were sent by the police to the FBI crime laboratory for analysis. 
The FBI tests revealed dynamite particles in the cuffs of the 
trousers. Resp and Poindexter were tried jointly for the mur-
der of the police officer. Duane Peak apparently came to terms 
with the prosecution. Peak admitted planting the suitcase and 
making the telephone call. Peak testified about his own parti-
cipation as well as that ofresp and Poindexter. The dyna-
mite and other paraphernalia seized at resp 's house was intro-
-4-
duced at the trial, as were the results of the FBI lab reports. 
Resp and foindexter were convicted of first degree murder. 
Peak was later processed as a juvenile. 
The dist ct v~~ed resp's claims as challenging ~ 
separate searches~he search of resp's house an~e search - ----~ 
of his trousers (by the FBI crime lab). The dist ct first 
examined the affadavit supporting the search warrant. The 
affadavit, which is reproduced at p. 34 of the petition, was 
the sole evidence presented to the magistrate who issued the 
search warrant~ The affadavit stated that the police officers 
believed dynamite was being kept in resp's residence because: 
(a) resp was an officer of NCCF, an organization that publicly 
advocated the killing of police; (b) a police officer had been 
killed and it appeared that NCCF members were involved; and 
(c) "We have been told in the past that [resp] keeps explosives, 
at his residence, and also illegal weapons, which he has said 
should be used against police officers." The eli st ct cone luded 
that resp's mere membership in NCCF was insufficient to give 
probable cause to believe that dynamite was hidden in the house. 
The court rejected the hearsay information that resp kept ex-
plosives in his home because the affadavit failed to satisfy 
either prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Aguilar v. Texas, 
~
378 U.S. 108; Spinelli v. u.s., 393 U.S. 410. The dist ct 
rejected the state's argument that the nature of the crime 
constituted an exigent circumstance that would justify the 





ct concluded that the act of going' for a warrant indicated 
the apsence of any exigent circumstances. The court also 
concluded that even if the dynamite had been found in plain 
view in resp's basement, the entry into resp's residence could 
not be justified on the basis of the valid arrest warrant for 
Peak because the police had no probable cause m believe that 
Peak was in the house. Finally, the dist ct concluded that 
the evidence found in resp's trousers was fruit of the poisonous 
tree, i.e. a direct product of the illegal search of resp's 
residence. The CA opinion basically follows the dist ct opinion. 
3. Contentions 
A. Failure to Exhaust. The state argues that the courts below 
should not have reached its argument that entry into resp's 
house was justified by the arrest warrant for Peak and the 
dynamite was then found in plain view. The state contends 
that resp failed to exhaust state remedies on this question. 
It is undisputed that resp attacked the search in state court . 
It is also undisputed that the state argued on appeal that the 
~t ~ search could be sustained on the arrest warrant/plain view 
~CSVV\l~ \o4..!:>.lS theory even if the warrant were invalid. Since the Neb. S. Ct 
b~ e.'J.~-h~ 
lt8i~\rto ~ sustained the search on different grounds, it did not address 
~e.:1J.~. ) itself to the arrest warrant/plain vie~.;r theory. The state 
oe~\).J\}\#6- ~ · . 
argues that the state courts should now be g~ven an opportunity 
to pass on that theory. The dist ct and CA held that petr had 
exhausted because he had raised the validity of the search. 
The dist ct and CA noted that the state courts had been con-
- 6 -
fronted with the argument. The dist ct and CA therefore held 
that resp should not be required to fight his claim in state 
court in a piecemeal fashion. Resp repeats the conclusions 
of the dist ct and CA. 
B. Reasonableness of the Search. The state apparently now 
concedes the invalidity of the search warrant because it 
makes no effort to argue that the affadavit was sufficient 
to establish probable cause. Instead, the state argues that 
the search was reasonable under the circumstances because (a) 
there were exigent circumstances; and (b) the police had infor-
their 
mation in / . possession at the time of the search that did 
establish probable cause to believe that dynamite was con-
cealed in resp's residence. Resp argues that the only cir-
~umstance advanced by the state--i.e., that a policeman had 
been killed five days earlier--did not amount to an exigency 
that would justify a warrantless search. Resp echoes the con-
clusion of the dist: ct and CA that lack of exigent circums tances 
is proven by the fact that the police went for a warrant. Resp 
questions whether the police in fact did have information that 
~~~ would have supported the issuance of the search warrant and 
~~ • argues that, whatever the information may have been, it is 
irrelevant because the police did not present it to the magis-
trate. 
C. Modifica tion of th e Exclusionary Rule . The state, playing 
heavily on the sensationalistic nature of the crime, argues that 
the exclusiona ry rule should be modified so that this defendant 
-7-
will not be turned loose despite the overwhelming evidence 
of his guilt. The state argues that the police made a good 
~
faith effort to satisfy fourth amendment requirements, an 
___.) 
effort that the Neb. S. Ct found to be adequate. The state 
contends that the lower court decisions will not result in 
the desired deterrence because the police were acting in 
good faith. Instead, according to the state, allowing the 
decisions below to stand will only demoralize the police 
and return a vicious criminal back to society despite the 
clear evidence of his guilt. The dist ct and CA acknowledged 
the state's arguments against the · exclusionary rule, but they 
concluded they were bound by Supreme Court precedent. Resp 
tracks the standard arguments in favor of the exclusionary 
rule. 
4. Discussion: The dist ct and CA seem clearly correct 
turn 
on the exhaustion issue. The position taken by the state would I 
~~ a valid collateral attack into an intolerably circuitous game. 
The reasonableness of the search, standing alone, was also 
correctly decided below. The question of modifying the exclu-
sionary rule, of course, is another matter. It may well be 
that the Court will want to hold this petn until the dust 
settles in u.s. v. Peltier, No. 73-2000. There is another 
attack on the exclusionary rule currently being held for 
Peltier. No. 74-1055, Stone v. Powell. This petn differs 
!
. from Stone in that it presents the tensions inherent in the 
exclusionary rule in much more dramatic terms. On the one 
-8-
hand·, automatic application of the' rule will probably free 
a. dangerous individual despite very strong evidence that he 
*I 
committed an extremely serious crime.- On the otl~r hand, 
failure to enforce the rule in this case would threaten to 
eliminate all deterrence against fourth amendment violations 
in the very type of case where it is most needed, the investi-
gation of a politically radical group concerning its involve-
ment in a very sensationalistic crime. 
There is a response. 
Gates 
5/7/75 
CA & DC ops 
in petn 
Resp suggests that application of the exclusionary rule is 
not very impo 1~ tant in this case because the prime evidence 
against resp was the testimony of Peak. It is unclear how 
important the evidence was, but it surely must have been vieHed 
by the jury as strong corroboration of the 15 year old Peak's 
testimony. 
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Potter indicated - as he has in the past - that he would 
be inclined to consider favorably my Bustamante position when- . 
ever as many as six Justices are in accord. Potter also ,, 
agrees that this .case presents an ideal "test" opportunity. 
You were quite perceptive in having the case held for 
Peltier. As Byron has joined in that decision, I would hope 
that after Peltier comes down, Byron will be willing to 
reexamine the unjustified extension of habeas corpus to 
Fourth Amendment claims which have been litigated in state 
courts and in which there is no claim of innocence. 
·~ ~} 
1; .. ; ' 
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this subject prior to further Conference consideration of 
the above petition.~ 
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Stone v. Powell, ~- 74-1055. \ Respondent was convicted 
of second degree murder in CalifiGrnia, and the evidence 
introduced at his trial included a gun seized incident to his 
arrest in Nevada for violation of a ·vagrancy ordinance of the 
City of Henderson, Nevada. Respondent and three companions 
entered a liquor store in San Bernardino, California, at about 
midnight of February, 1968. After a fracas between them and 
the owner, the wife of the owner was shot and killed. 
- 7 -
The following morning an officer of the Henderson, 
Nevada police department saw respondent and another man while 
on routine patrol in a shopping center parking lot. Respondent 
and his companion saw the patrol car and turned away 
quickly, walking now in the opposite direction. They looked 
back several times and continued walking rapidly. The 
officer called out to respondent to stop, but he kept going. 
The officer then jumped out of the car and asked re~ondent 
m halt, which he did. He could supply no idenuification 
papers, stated that . he had been staying with some friends 
in nearby Las Vegas, but he was unable to name them. He said 
he was en route to Michigan, but Henderson is south of Las 
-. one 
Vegas and thus not on the normal route which/would travel from 
Las Vegas to Michigan. The officer arrested respondent for 
violating the Henderson vagrancy ordinance which provides: 
"Every person is a vagrant who: 
Loiters or wanders upon the streets or 
from place to place without apparent 
reason or business and who refuses to 
identify himself and to account for his 
presence when asked by a police officer 
to do so if surrounding circumstances are 
such as to indicate to a reasonable man 
that the public safety demands such identifica-
tion." 
- 8 -
The officer searched respondent and found a pistol 
with six expended cartr:k9es in the cylinder. It is undisputed 
that the officer had no knowledge of the California murder 
at the time he arrested respondent. The pistol turned out 
to have been the .38 caliber revolver belonging to the 
owner of the liquor store which respondent had taken. 
Respondent was charged with second degree murder, and 
the owner and at least two of respondent's companions in the 
liquor store testified against him. A criminologist testified 
that the gun taken ~rom respondent was the same gun that 
had been used to kill Mrs. Parsons. Respondent was convicted. 
On appeal he attacked the constitutionality of the Nevada 
~ 
vagrancy ordinance, but the California Court of Appeals viewed 
fuis as an attaek on the jurisdiction of the California 
courts to try him, and rejected it under Frisbie v. Collins, 
342 u.s. 519. Insofar as respondent challenged the introduction 
of the gun, the court found this was harmless error at most 
since other people had placed him at the scene and the evidence 
regarding his possession of the gun in Nevada "was not 
required to establish any essential element of the charged 
crime." 
- 9 -
Respondent sought federal habeas claiming that (1) the 
Nevada ordinance was unconstitutional and (2) the officer did 
not have probable cause to believe respondent was violating 
it. The District Court denied relief on two alternative 
grounds. First it held that the exclusionary rule should not 
be applied even if the Henderson ordinance was unconstitutional: 
"The purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be advanced 
by ~ post facto condemnation of an arrest which was 
apparently valid when made · · [I]n the absence of a 
prior determination. that the statute was unconstitutional, 
the officer was entitled to arrest petitioner for violation 
of it if he had probable cause to believe that the offense 
-.. 
had been committed in his presence and to make a reasonable 
search incident to that arrest." App. xvii. The court 
reviewed the facts and concluded that the officer did have 
probable cause. The court also concluded, for the reasons 
~pressed by the state courts, that the error if any was 
harmless. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 
It found that the Henderson ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague by virtue of Papachrist~u v. City of Ja~ksonville, 405 
U.S. 156 (1972). While exclusion of evidence would serve no 
- 10 -
legitimate deterrent purpose with regard to police officers 
who were enforcing statutes in good faith, "the same [could] 
not be said with respect to those who enact such a statute 
authorizing such unconstitutional searches. The public 
interest ••• is served by deterring legislators from enacting 
such statutes." App. xi. After an independent review of the 
evidence, the Court of Appeals decided that the admission of 
the gun was not harmless error because it supported the 
testimony of respondent's accomplices that respondent had 
killed the wife of the owner of the liquor store. 
Petitioner Warden advances, inter alia, the following 
contentions: (1) Kaufman v. United States, 394 u.s. 217 (1969), 
~ 
should be overruled. Respondent had fair opportunity to 
raise and have· adjudicated his Fourth Amendment claims and state 
courts should not be permitted to raise them on federal 
habeas. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 u.s. 218, 250 (1973) 
(Powell, J., concurring): (2) the. exclusionary rule should not 
be applied to suppress the fruits of a search incident to an 
arrest pursuant to a then-valid ordinance since it makes no 
sense to speak of police deterrence in this setting: (3) the 
- 11 -
admission of the gun, if error, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
The court of· Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not 
discuss the issue of p10bable cause, since it viewed one of 
the deficiencies of the ordinance as its tendency to authorize 
arrest and conviction if there were reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the accused may have committed, or if left at 
large would commit, a more serious offense. 
I would grant certiorari, and request that counsel 
address, inter alia; the following question: 
"Whether, in light of the fact that the 
District Court found that the Henderson, 
Nevada police officer had probable cause 
to arrest respondent !br violation of an 
ordinance which at the time of the arrest 
had not been authoritatively determined 
to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim 
that the gun discovered as a result of 
a · search incident to that arrest violated 
his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution 
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Wolff v. Rice, ~ o. 74-122:) In August, 1970, an Omaha 
~ 
police radio dispatcher received an anonymous telephone call 
to the effect that someone had reported a woman screaming 
at a particular street address in Omaha. The dispatcher 
sent two police cars to that address, which turned out to be 
a vacant house. As the police entered the structure, they 
were forced to step over a suitcase lying on its side in the 
doorway; one of the policemen inspected the su~tcase when it 
exploded, instantly killing him. Subsequent investigation 
established that the suitcase had contained dynamite, which 
had been wired in such a manner that any movement of the 
suitcase would detonate the ~yn~ite. 
Police i~vestigation focused upon members of the 
National Committee to combat Facism, a political organization 
known in the community as the Black Panther Party. Respondent 
Rice was known to police as an o~ficer in the organization, and 
police arrived at his home at 10:30 PM in search of one 
Duane Peak, another member of the organization who had been 
in respondent's house some weeks previously. Lights of a 
television were on in the respondent's home when police 
arrived, but there was no response to the officers' knock 
at the door. The police decided not to forcibly enter the 
- 4 -
house on the basis of the arrest warrant for Peak, but instead 
made affidavits which they presented to a municipal court 
judge in a successful effort to obtain a search warrant for 
the premises. When police finally entered the house with 
this warrant close to midnight, they did so with the two-fold 
purpose of searching for and arresting Peak and searching for 
dynamite believed ' in the possession of the Black Panther 
organization. 
Peak was not in the house, but the police tound fourteen 
sticks of dynamite, blasting caps, wiring, a battery, and a 
pair of long-nosed pliers. Peak was subsequently arrested, 
and a few days later respondent voluntarily surrendered. 
~ 
The clothing respondent was wearing at the time of his arrest 
was seized by the police and subjected to chemical analysis 
for dynamite particles. 
At trial, Peak implicated respondent and one Poindexter 
in the bombing plot. As corroborative evidence, the state 
introduced many of the items seized at the petitioner's 
house during the search, and introduced the results of the 
chemical analysis of petitioner's clothing seized at the time 
of his arrest. The analysis indicated that dynamite granules 
were in the pockets of the trousers. Both respondent and his 
- 5 -
co-defendant were convicted by a jury in April, 1971, and 
respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
On appeal, the judgment of conviction was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of Nebraska in July, 1972. In September, 
1972, respondent filed a petition under 28 u.s.c. § 2254 
(habeas corpus} in the federal District Court claiming that 
his conviction was based upon evidence seized in violation of 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. The District Court granted the writ, directing 
release from custo~y unless respondent was accorded a new 
trial by the state. The District Court concluded (a} that 
the search warrant obtained by the police did not meet the 
~ 
tests laid down in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 u.s. 108 (1964} and 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 u.s. 410, 416-418 (1969}. 
The court went on to hold that there was no basis other than 
the warrant which would make the search of respondent's house 
lawful under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that 
therefore the evidence obtained from that search should have 
been suppressed. 
6 -
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed 
the order of the District Court, and petitioner Wolff (the 
warden!) seeks review here. 
Those who believe this to be a result mandated by the 
Constitution will probably want to deny. I would grant, and 
ask counsel to address, inter alia, the following question: 
"Whether, in light of the fact that the 
Omaha police officers had obtained a 
search warrant from a municipal court 
judge prior to entering respondent's 
premises, respondent's claim that such 
entry constituted an unlawful search 
of his premises was properly cognizable 
under 28 u.s.c. § 2254." 
$51tp'ttmt QJ:omi qf t4t 'Jittriftb ~bdeg 
' -ag~fmt. Ill. ~- 2ll&i'l~ 
CHAMBE RS OF fJ;J- ~ .~J_;p..._:.. 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 1·. ,_;. rv-
~:~ 
~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
June 24, 1975 
Re: No. 74-1222 - Wolff v. Rice. Heretofore 
Held for No. 73-200 - United States v. Peltier 
The substitute question for that set forth in page 6 
of my Hold memorandum, which I understand to have been agreed 
to by the four of us present at Con
1
ference this morning who 
voted to grant Wolff, is the following: ·• 
"Whether ,the entry of respondent's premises 
by Omaha police officers under the circumstances 
of this case constituted an unlawful search 
of his premises properly cognizable under 28 
u.s.c. § 2254." 
- Sincerely~ 
I\.___., 
October ·1 Oi 197 5 Conference 





Motion for Appointment 
of Counsel 
SUMMARY: Resp requests that J. Patrick Green, Esq. i of Om.aha, Neb., 
be appointed to represent him in this Court. The Court granted cert to CA 8 to 
review its disposition of resp 1 s §2254 challenge to the validity of the entry and 
search of re sp1 s premises by state police officers. The Court also granted re sp 1 s 
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 
Mr. Green represented resp on his direct appeal in Neb. SC and prepared 
briefs and made oral argument on resp 1s behalf in habeas actions in the DC and CA. 
However, other counsel, no longer associated with this case,was designated und e r 
the Crirn.inal Justice Act to rcpre sent re sp in the federal courts below. 
DISCUSSION: It appears that appointed counsel for an indige nt in a federal 
habeas proceeding is eligible for compensat~on under the Criminal Justice Act of 
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Mr. Justice Powell DATE: February 26, 1976 
Greg Palm 
Summary of arguments against permitting 
4th Amendment Claims under § 2254 
1. History and Language: Section 2254 provides that 
courts should have the power to grant habeas writs whenever 
a person is being held "in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States." As originally 
construed by this Court, this power was limited to an examination 
of the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. In the leading 
case of Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 203, the Court stated: 
An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be 
unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute 
nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court 
has general jurisdiction of the subject, although 
it should be erroneous. 
Over time the Court steadily expanded the scope of the writ 
(much of the early expansion was due to the fact criminal 
convictions were not generally reviewable by the Supreme Court 
until the latter part of the last century) culminating in the 
view developed in~ v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), that habeas 
petitioners might raise any constitutional claim, unless there 
has been a failure to exhaust or intentional waiver. This 
history is important in that it demonstrates that the operative 
phrase of the statute presents no immutable obstacle to the view 
that you first espoused in Scheneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 
218, 250 (1972). Moreover, read literally the language of 
2. 
the section would require a prisoner to be freed if confined 
in violation of any law. But it is my understanding that the 
Court has never pushed the writ that far. See Sunal v. Lange, 
332 u.s. 174 (1947). 
Also useful with respect to the literal language of the 
statute is the idea, adhered to in Fay, that habeas is an 
equitable remedy and discretion is therefore an important 
ingredient: 
"Discretion is implicit in the statutory conunand 
that the judge •.. 'dispose of the matter as 
law and justice require,' 28 U.S.C, § 2242 .•.. " 
372 U.S., at 438. 
Justice Black emphasized the equitable ' nature of habeas in 
his dissent in Kaufman. Of course, when Fay talked of discretion 
it was quite clear that this discretion was not meant to include 
the right~consider 4th Amendment claims. But the 
principle that heabeas is equitable in nature has recently 
been applied by Justice Stewart in Francis v. Henderson to say 
that a state prisoner can't challenge the composition -~,the 
(w\.fM \..4. .W...\U ~no.~~ c:W- '"' ~·~ c::..-·" 
grand jury on habeasf Consequently the principle may be of 
some use here. Justice Black made the argument that the 
possibility of the applicant's innocence must be an important 
factor in the equitable balance. In Bustamante you opted for 
a similar position. The innocence position is useful in that 
it permits a balance to be drawn against allowing ca. particular 
habeas claim: the arguments in favor of finality of state 
court judgments outweigh the need for habeas relief in the 
context of 4th Amendment claims since the evidence is often 
3. 
the most probative available and there is no question of 
innocence. (There is a problem with the innocence rationale 
to the extent that Justice Stewart declined to join Justice 
Black's reliance on that idea in Kaufman; he was willing, 
however, not to permit 4th Amendment claims in § 225~ petitions; 
perhaps his only point was to limit the scope of his dissent 
to the Fourth Amendment.) 
In Bustamonte you examined the legislative history of the 
1966 Amendments to § 2254 and concluded that there was nothing 
there which is inconsistent with the innocence rationale. I 
agree that there is no compelling evidence that the innocence 
rationale is wrong. But I do not think that that history is 
very relevant to the issue here. It is true that the amendments 
were designed to limit habeas in certain respects, but Congress 
was not concerned with the kind of claims that might be asserted. 
Moreover, the House and Senate Reports recognize that 
this Court's cert jurisdiction does not permit adequate review 
· of federal claims. Finally, I think that the reliance placed 
on the state of the law regarding § 2255 cases at the time of 
the 1966 Amendments is misplaced. It is true that 8 of 10 
Circuit Courts of Appeal did not permit 4th Amendment claims 
by federal prisoners under § 2255. It is also true, however, 
that many, if not most, of the circuits that did not permit 
such claims to be raised in § 2255 permitted them to be raised 
by state prisoners under § 2254. Thus, to the extent that 
statistic is relevant, it ~ in fact cuts the other way. 
2. Policy: 
A. Federalism Principle: friction between state and 
federal courts (Bustamonte): 
4. 
The weight accorded this factor, as well as the side of 
the scale on which it is placed, turns entirely on the 
perceptions one has regarding the need to have federal courts 
pass on federal constitutional claims. The argument will be 
that whenever the State affords the individual an adequate 
process for presenting his constitutional claims there is no 
need to have them re-tried in a federal forum. This assumes 
that state court judges will be as vigilant as federal court 
judges in adhering to the Constitution and that any slippage 
can be caught on review by this Court. (A related notion is 
the idea thathaving one more court pass on a claim does not 
assure that the final result reached is correct; it only 
increases the likelihood of a different result). 
B. Finality: Balance between finality interests and interest 
in freeing those convicted because of evidence seized in violation 
of the 4th Amendment weighs in favor of the former. These 
finality interests include: 
1. duplication of judicial effort 
2. delay in setting the criminal proceeding to 
rest 
3. postponed fact limitation; inherently less 
reliable: (a) respecting the postconviction claim 
itself; (b) respecting the issue of guilt if the 
.. 
ss 
collateral attack succeeds in a form which allows 
retrial. These finall~ interests outweigh the interest 
in freeing a person whose guilt is not in question. 
The only real interest under this Court's recent 
decisions is the deterrence value of the exclusionary 
rule as a protector of 4th Amendment values. The 
5. 
argument will be that the federalism and finality interests 
identified above outweigh the marginal deterrent effect 
* of applying the exclusionary rule in this context. 
G.P. 
lfp/ ss 2/26/76 Bustamante Analysis 
28 U.S.C. 2254 provides for federal habeas review on 
behalf of a state prisoner "only on the ground that he is in 
custody in violation of the Constitution • • . of the United 
States". 
A prisoner who has had a fair opportunity to assert his 
Fourth Amendment claim in a state trial and on appeal to a 
state court is not in custody in violation of the Constitution. 
He may be in custody in violation of the Exclusionary Rule, 
but we have said three times (since ~) that this Rule is not 
a personal constitutional right. See Calandra, Tucker and 
Peltier. 
The Exclusionary Rule was developed by this Court as a 
means of implementing the constitutional protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. There can be no doubt 
that Congress could modify the Rule (for example, as suggested 
by the American Law Institute) or substitute some other means 
of implementing the constitutional provision. 
Unless this is true, a good many extremely thoughtful 
scholars and judges have been wasting a lot of time in considering 
the problem of the societal injury resulting from the mechanical 
or absolutist application of the Exclusionary Rule. See, for 
example, articles by Friendly, Oaks and - most recently - by 
Professor Monaghan i~:~ivember 
Review; the protracted by t e ALI, 
" 
issue of the Harvard Law 
and the like. 
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Attys., were on the brief, submitted on 
the brief for appellee. 
Before BASTIAN, Senior Circuit Judge, 
and WRIGHT and LEVENTHAL, Circuit 
Judges. 
LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge: 
[1] In this case we are asked to re-
consider our doctrine 1 that ordinarily a 
claim of iiiegal search and seizure may 
not be raised collaterally under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255. Our prior holdings (supra, note 
1) are in accord with the opinions of 
most of the other circuits, which have 
ruled that collateral review is not avail-
able, either on the law or by way of evi-
dentiary hearing.2 However, there have 
been recent statements to the contrary-
technically in dicta-in circuit opinions 3 
based on views believed to be inherent in 
and required by recent Supreme Court 
opinions. Accordingly we have reexam-
ined our earlier position. We confirm 
that generally a claim by a federal pris-
oner that evidence admitted at his trial 
was the fruit of an unconstitutional 
search or seizure is not properly the 
ground of a collateral attack on his con-
viction. As further noted below, this 
rule is subject to an exception for special 
circumstances which are not present in 
this case. 
On June 1, 1960, appellant Charles J. 
Thornton was arrested at his home by 
Federal narcotics agents. After indict-
1. E.g., Plummer v. United Stutes, 104 U.S. 
App.D.C. 211, 260 F.2d 729 (1958); 
Jones v. United Stutes, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 
326, 258 F.2d 420, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 
932, 78 S.Ct. 1377, 2 L.Ed.2d 1374 
(1958) ; Edwards v. United Stutes, 103 
U.S.App.D.C. 152, 256 F.2d 707, cert. 
denied, 358 U.S. 847, 79 S.Ct. 74, 3 L.Ed. 
2d 82 (1958); Wilkins v. United Stutes, 
103 U.S.App.D.C. 322, 258 F.2d 416, cert. 
denied, 357 U.S. 942, 78 S.Ct. 1396, 2 L. 
Ed.2d 1557 (1958); White v. United 
States, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 235 F.2d 
221 (1956). 
2. E.g., United Stutes v. De Fillo, 182 F. 
Supp. 782 (S.D.N.Y.1959), uff'd per cur-
ium on opinion below, 277 F.2d 162 (2d 
Cir. 1960); United Stutes v. Jenkins, 281 
F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1960); Nash v. United 
Stutes, 342 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1965); 
Armstead v. United Stutes, 318 F.2d 725 
ment on thirty-seven counts of conspirac, 
and substantive violations of the dru. 
laws, he and four co-defendants wer 
tried and found guilty on all counts. Ar 
pellant was sentenced on January 1, 1961 
to eighteen years in prison, but this tern 
was later reduced to the eight year con 
finement he is presently serving. An ap 
peal was taken from the judgments o 
conviction, and in the course of a brief o 
over eighty pages, eleven major ground 
for reversal were urged. Although thi 
court found errors as to two of the de 
fendants, appellant's conviction was af 
firmed, sub nom. Brown v. United State1 
112 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 299 F.2d 43 
(1962). Certiorari was denied. 370 U.~ 
946, 82 S.Ct. 1593, 8 L.Ed.2d 812 (1962: 
In the intervening years, appellan 
filed several motions and petitions, seek 
ing various kinds of relief on numerou 
grounds. The present proceeding bega; 
when, on January 18, 1965, he filed 
motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacat 
or set aside his sentence, alleging firE 
that evidence illegally obtained by the a1 
resting officers had been admitted a 
his trial, in contravention of the Fourt 
Amendment; and, second, that tri~ 
counsel neglected to file a pre-trial rna 
tion to suppress the purportedly uncon 
stitutionally seized evidence, and this cor. 
stituted ineffective assistance of coun 
sel, violative of the Sixth Amendment.4 
The District Court appointed counsE 
and held an evidentiary hearing at whic: 
(5th Cir. 1963); Eisner v. United Stutes, 
351 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1965); Thompson 
v. United States, 315 F.2d 689 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 843, 84 S.Ct. 93, 
11 L.Ed.2d 70 (1963); Kapsulis v. Unit-
ed Stutes, 345 F.2d 392 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 382 U.S. 946, 86 S.Ct. 406, 15 L. 
Ed.2d 354 (1965) ; Sinks v. United States, 
318 F.2d 436. (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 
U.S. 946, 84 S.Ct. 355, 11 L.Ed.2d 279 
(1963); Cox v. United States, 351 F.2d 
280 (8th Cir. 1965); Warren v. United 
Stutes, 311 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1963); 
Williams v. United Stutes, 307 F.2d 366 
(9th Cir. 1962). 
3. United Stutes v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221 
(4th Cir. 1963); Gaitan v. United Stutes, 
317 F.2d 494 (lOth Cir. 1963). 
4. At the hearing appellant abandoned the 
claim that he never received a prelim-
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Cite as 368 F.2d 822 (1966) -appellant was pei·mitted to testify. Be- fendants did most of the questioning; 
cause of the intimate relationship be- that although the suppression motion was 
tween the illegal search and inadequate not made by appellant's lawyer, yet that 
counsel points the court allowed counsel attorney concurred in the motion of coun-
to probe the circumstances of the arrest sel for co-defendants, who indeed served 
and search without ruling whether this as lead counsel during the entire trial. 
kind of issue might properly be raised on The court held that the failure to file an 
a Section 2255 motion. Appellant testi- independent motion in appellant's behalf 
fied that he was awakened at 4 :30 A.M. to suppress the evidence in question did 
on June 1, 1960, by a loud rapping at his not under the circumstances amount to a 
front door. While he arose to answer the constitutional inadequacy of counsel. We 
knock, he heard someone "busting" or affirm this ruling, and do not consider 
"kicking" in the porch door. When he the point to require further discussion. 
opened the door, his visitors identified Insofar as the motion rested on the 
themselves as federal officers and claim- unreasonableness of the search and sei-
ed they had a warrant for his arrest. zure, it was denied with a ruling by the 
They were invited · in, and proceeded to court that as a matter of law the admis-
search appellant and his apartment. In sion in evidence of the fruits of an illegal 
the course of their examination, they dis- arrest, search, or seizure cannot serve as 
covered and seized personal effects, and the basis of a motion under § 2255. 
in addition an address book and a slip of [3, 4] The extent of relief and review 
paper linking appellant to some of his co- available on a § 2255 motion is the same 
defendants. The admission of these two as that 'open to a petitioner seeking vindi-
items in evidence at the trial is the basis cation of his right3 by the habeas corpus 
of appellant's Fourth Amendment claim. route.5 The only difference is that Con-
The Government did not cross-examine gress enacted § 2255 in the 1948 Judicial 
appellant on the circumstances of the ar- Code in order to provide a less cumber-
rest. 
some remedy, through consideration by 
On the issue of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, appellant testified that his 
counsel had not queried him about the de-
tails of the arrest, and despite assurances 
that he would recover appellant's personal 
effects made no motion to that end. Ap-
pellant admitted that he might not nave 
requested his counsel to recover the ad-
dress book and slip of paper, or mention-
ed their incriminating potential. 
[2] Appellant's former counsel, called 
to the stand, had no recollection of the 
details of the consultations and proceed-
ings of five years ago. The court and the 
parties agreed to let the record speak for 
itself. The transcript of the original 
trial revealed that counsel for the co-de-
inary hearing before a United States 
Commissioner, and was thus not accorded 
due process of law. 
5. A fed eral prisoner may not seek habeas 
-if a motion to the sentencing court is 
"authorized." 28 U.S.C. § 2255, V 7 
(1964). 
368 F.2d-52 '1z 
the sentencing court rather than the dis-
trict of confinement. United States v. 
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219, 72 S.Ct. 263, 
96 L.Ed. 232 (1952); Hill v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 424, 427- 428, 82 S.Ct. 
468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). 
[5, 6] Many opinions declare that col-
lateral attack, as by habeas corpus, is 
available to correct the denial of a con-
stitutional right.a This is the general 
rule but it is not an a!llioiute. 'these rx-
pressrO'Iis d o not ofi'Ifterate the doctrine 
that the normal and customary method 
of correcting trial errors, even as to con-
stitutional questions, is by appeal, and 
that habeas corpus cannot serve as a sub-
stitute for the regular judicial process of 
trial and appeal in the absence of cir-
6. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 409, 
83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); Hill 
v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 
S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962); Hawk 
v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 274, 66 S.Ct. 116, 
90 L.Ed. 61 (1945). . 
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cumstances indicating collateral attack is 
needed to provide an effective mean's of 
preserving constitutional rights. Sunal 
v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 179- 180, 67 S.Ct. 
1588, 91 L.Ed. 1982 (1947); Waley v. 
Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-105, 62 S.Ct. 
964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942); United 
States v. Sobell, 314 F.2d 314, 321- 323 
(2d Cir.) cert. denied, 374 U.S. 857, 83 
S.Ct. 1906, 10 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1963). 
[7, 8] As noted in Smith v. United 
States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 85, 187 F.2d 
192, 197 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 
927, 71 S.Ct. 792, 95 L.Ed. 1358 (1951): 
"Where the alleged error of the trial 
-court is in the admission of evidence sub-
ject to correction on appeal, and there 
is representation by counsel, habeas cor-
pus is not the appropriate remedy." Col-
lateral review is available, however, for 
the denial of a constitutional right ac-
companied by "weakness in the judicial 
process which has resulted in the 'convic-
tion", such as lack of counsel, perjury un-
·discovered, mob domination, etc. ld. at 
.86, 187 F.2d at 198. 
[9] Whether collateral attack is per-
missible depends on the nature of the 
-constitutional claim, the effectiveness of 
the direct remedies, and the . need for 
-choices among competing considerations 
in quest of the ultimate goal of achieve-
ment of justice. The decision is not pre-
determined by the absolute availability of 
judicial power, but reflects the need to 
fathom and delineate the claims and cir-
-cumstances that make the exercise of 
power appropriate.' The courts are called 
·on to evolve and provide procedures and 
remedies that are effective to vindicate 
-constitutional rights. However, where 
effective procedures are available in the 
direct proceeding, there is no imperative 
to provide an additional, collateral review, 
leaving no stone unturned, when explora-
tion of all avenues of justice at the behest 
of individual petitioners may impair judi-
·cial administration of the federal courts, 
.as by making criminal litigation inter-
minable, and diverting resources of the 
7. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27, 59 
S.Ct. 442, 83 L.Ed. 455 (.1939). 
federal judiciary. Sunal v. Large, supra, 
332 U.S. at 182, 67 S.Ct. 1588. 
[10] Our rejection of the availability 
of collateral review for claims of unrea-
sonable search and seizure (in the ab-
sence of exceptional circumstances) is 
not attributable to a low regard for the 
significance of the Fourth Amendment 
in our times and civilization. On the con-
trary; the magnitude of the Fourth 
Amendment in our constitutional con-
stellation has prompted unusual remedies 
by Congress, as well as the courts. For 
more than fifty years, evidence secured 
by unconstitutional means has been held 
inadmissible at trial.s Exclusion at trial 
was supplemented, not in time but in ef-
fectiveness, by unusual remedies permit-
ting pre-trial suppression of the items 
unlawfully seized. These remedies were ' 
developed both through the 12ower of 
~ to forestall injury, and through a 
dynamic jurisdiction built on an inherent 
supervisory authority over the prosecu-
tion, an authority construed to embrace 
not only the attorney in court but to reach 
back to the previous activity of the en-
forcement agents underlying the prosecu-
tion. This judicial fountainhead of au-
thority is now crystallized in and sur-
vives Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Smith v. Katzen-
bach, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 117-119, 351 
F .2d 810, 814- 816 (1965). 
Thus the diligence and dynamism of 
the federal courts have provided remedies 
to maximize protection of these particu-
lar constitutional rights. Remedies are 
available not only during the trial, but at 
its commencement and indeed prior to 
the inception of the trial and if need be 
the indictment. The corollary, however, 
is a contraction of the need for enlarging 
collateral review in order to assure ef-
fective vindication of the constitutional 
interests involved. 
At the same time it becomes appro-
priate to consider the substantial dis-
advantages of collateral review in terms 
of judicial administration. First in time 
8. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 38.'1, 
34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). ~ 
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there is the reasonable anticipation of a 
larger number of hearings on petitions 
that will prove to be insubstantial in fact . 
We would resolutely breast a flood of 
frivolity to rescue the stray meritorious 
claim if that were needed for effective 
vindication of constitutional protection, 
and there were no comprehensive proce-
dure available at and before trial. Com-
pare Machibroda v. United States, 368 
U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 
(1962). Here as already observed that 
effort is not required to vindicate the 
rights involved, and on the contrary this 
use of the courts would defer other cases 
that do present substantial claims and 
calls on judicial time.9 Second is the dif-
ficulty of belated determinations. The 
ascertainment of what constituted "prob-
able cause," typically a subtle and indeed 
elusive question, is made incomparably 
more difficult and often artificial as rec-
ollections dim and witnesses are unavail-
able.10 The difficulty is not eradicated 
by noting that the accused would have 
the burden of proof. The narration of 
the events which he now provides, after 
protracted and intense rumination, may 
unwarrantedly overshadow the cloudy re-
call of officers for whom this was but 
one case among hundreds. When the in-
quiry is made at trial or seasonably or-
dered on direct appeal, there is enough 
proximity to the problem to permit at 
least the probabiiity of a searching in-
quiry. But postpone the adjudication 
Until some collateral proceeding years 
9. For n recent article commenting on the 
difficulty faced by Fede ral courts in 
keeping up with the volume of judicial 
business, see 'Vright, The Federal Colt1·ts 
-.1 Century After Appomattox , 52 A.B. 
A.J. 742. 743 (1966). 
We appreciate that the adminis trative 
considera tions outlined in this paragraph 
apply to collateral review generally, and 
specifically indeed to collateral attack on 
this ground of ineffective assis tance of 
counsel, which may be intertwined with a 
search and seizure contention. But as 
this case illus trates the evidence as well 
as the determination may be diffe rent 
when the court is considering only inef-
fe<'tive assistance of counsel; here, for 
example, there was no need to cull the 
arresting officers as witnesses. The 
hence and the examination is likely to 
be phantasmic. See generally Linkletter 
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637, 85 S.Ct. 
1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965); Hodges v. 
United States, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 375, 377, 
282 F.2d 858, 860 (1960) (en bane), cert. 
dismissed, 368 U.S. 139, 82 3.Ct. 235, 7 
L.Ed.2d 184 (1961). Last but by no 
means least is the fact that the court can 
take timely corrective action without jet-
tisoning the trial if a valid search and 
seizure claim is presented at or before 
trial. But if the claim were entertained 
on collateral attack it would not only 
scrap the completed trial but also, taking 
into account the possible subsequent un-
availability of witnesses present or avail-
able at the original trial, might well im-
peril the public interest in securing a just 
convict! on. 
Courts should be reluctant to let gen-
eral considerations of administration re-
quire injustice in the particular case. 
That reluctan::e is overcome by the 
weighty consideration, diluting the fear 
of particular injustice, that the claim of 
unreas:.mable search and seizure does not 
weaken the probative value of the evi-
dence against the accused. It is partly 
because the rule of exclusion is not a 
truth-protecting device that the Supreme 
Court decreed last year that Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 
2d 1081 (1961), would be given only 
prospective effect in State convictions. 
Linkletter v. Walker, supra. Collateral 
attack is negatived not only by the rule 
heavy burden resting on the appellant 
claiming ineffective assis tance of counsel 
is not likely to be ignored. Hence inef-
fective assistance of counsel is not likely 
to be tole rated as a backdoor for arguing 
search and seizure claims. In any event 
the balancing of interes ts involved leads 
to different conclusions as to availability 
of collateral review for these different 
contentions. 
10. There is a corresponding "increased 
difficulty of proving perjury" when testi-
mony about the disputed event comes 
years afterward. See Wright & Sofaer, 
F edeml Habeas Corpus tor State Pris-
oners: The Allocation of Fact-Finding 
Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 920-21 
(1966). 
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against retrospectivity, which is relevant 
but not controlling, but by the considera-
tion that collateral attack would be of lit-
tle if any weight in achieving the pattern 
of lawful conduct by enforcement offi-
cials which is the objective of the exclu-
sionary rule. Enforcement officials 
know that evidence unreasonably seized 
is subject to exclusion by resort to a 
variety of motions. There is no basis 
for supposing that their conduct will be 
substantially influenced by the additional 
possibility of an inquiry years hence.11 
Compare Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, 
and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U.Pa. 
L.Rev. 378, 389- 90 (1964), who suggests 
that additional deterrence, if any, has 
passed the point of diminishing returns, 
and inflicts disproportionate harm on the 
public interest in confinement and re-
habilitation of wrongdoers. That courts 
will not pursue ad infinitum the objective 
of deterring a blundering constabulary 
is vividly illustrated by the rule that pro-
hibits an accused from objecting to evi-
dence obtained by the unreasonable 
search of another, so long as his own 
property or privacy was not disturbed, 
even though the evidence incriminates 
him and may be a critical ingredient in 
the prosecution's case against him. 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
491- 492, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 
(1963). 
In our view the rule here applied is 
fully consonant with the spirit as well as 
holdings of recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. Nothing in Sanders v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed. 
2d 148 (1963), points in the opposite di-
rection. The Court there merely recon-
firmed the principle th:;tt notions of res 
judicata have no bearing on habeas or § 
2255 inquiries. Therefore the fact that 
a point was not raised in the first col-
lateral petition is no bar to later con-
sideration. Accordingly if a point could 
have been considered if it had been pre-
sented in the first collateral motion or 
II. If it is hypothesized that an officer 
might be ready to cope with an inquiry 
at trial but unwilling to grapple with a 
post-trial hearing when his memory has 
petition, its omission from the first peti-
tion is not by itself a bar to its considera-
tion in a subsequent application. Here, 
however, the type of error is one, we 
think, that is not appropriate for con-
sideration in any § 2255 motion. 
One Circuit has focused on a reference 
in Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 
428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962), 
that an error was "neither jurisdictional 
nor constitutional," as a declaration that 
a claimed violation of any constitutional 
right is subject to collateral review under 
§ 2255. See United States v. Sutton, 321 
F.2d 221, 222 (4th Cir. 1963). We do not 
interpret this isolated remark in HiU to 
reflect a radical extension of relief under 
§ 2255. It is noteworthy that this phrase 
was immediately qualified by the more 
traditional standard, when the Court 
noted that the deficiency was not "a 
fundamental defect which inherently re-
sults in a complete miscarriage of justice, 
nor an omission inconsistent with the 
rudimentary demands of fair procedure." 
368 U.S. at 428, 82 S.Ct. at 471. 
Nor is our result contrary to the re-
cent Supreme Court opinions markedly 
extending the power of federal courts to 
inquire by habeas corpus into the validity 
of state convictions assailed on the 
ground that federal constitutional rights 
have teen violated. See, e. g., Fay v. 
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L. 
Ed.2d 837 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 
372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 
(1963). We assume for present purposes 
that federal habeas corpus will lie, at 
least to some extent, to consider the claim 
of a state prisoner that he was convicted 
on the basis of the fruits of an uncon-
stitutional search and seizure. Compare 
Henry v. State of Mississippi, 379 U.S. 
443, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965). 
We do not read these cases, however, as 
portending a change by which federal 
convictions would be laid vulnerable to 
collateral attack. Rather they recognize 
a different and fundamental concern, and 
dimmed, that would suggest he might be 
likewise deterred by such prospect from 
making even searches and seizures he 
considers reasonable. 
THORNTON v. UNITED STATES 
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reflect the principle that except in the 
most flagrant cases of waiver or default, 
such as "deliberate bypassing" of the 
state forum, a state prisoner is entitled to 
a federal forum on his federal constitu-
tional claims. The significance of fact 
finding in a federal forum on the all-im-
portant constitutional facts has resulted 
in the unique, and at first encounter 
startling, consequence that ·federal collat-
eral review is apparently preferred over 
direct appeal (to the Supreme Court) as 
providing optimum federal judicial con-
sideration.12 In any event, the recent 
decisions broadening collateral review as 
an assurance of the federal judicial proc-
ess to state accused afford no comparable 
collateral machinery to federal prisoners 
who have already had access to the fed-
eral judicial process: access to a federal 
trial judge- indeed undei· § 2255 to the 
same federal judge if available; access 
to an array of effective federal remedies 
for rooting out the fruits of unreasonable 
searches; and access to the federal ap-
pellate system. 
The exceptional circumstances that 
may warrant reference to § 2255 for the 
claim of unconstitutional search and sei-
zure would include instances of "weak-
ness in the [Federal] judicial process 
12. The exaltation of collateral review re-
flects the disadvantages in direct federal 
appeal from state courts-practical limi-
tations on shaping and review of the fac-
tual record, as well as the Supreme 
Court's staggering case load. 
As to the need that a federal court be 
involved in the details of discovery and 
determination of "constitutional facts," 
it has been suggested that it is because 
state courts have not adequately per-
formed their role that the Supreme 
Court has called upon the federal district 
courts as a back-stop 'for the vindication 
of federal rights. See Wright and So-
faer, supra note 10, at 898, quoting 
Professor Bator's "thoughtful comment 
on why federal judges may be better suit-
ed to pass on federal issues." Bator, 
Finality in Criminal Law and Federal 
Habeas Corpus 101- State P1·isoncrs. 76 
HARV.L.REV. 441, 510 (1963). 
It may be noted that at the state trial 
of Billie Sol Estes the judge, in reject-
which resulted in the conviction." Smith 
v. United States, supra. Such instances 
would include claims of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel resulting in a denial 
of Sixth Amendment rights. The proper 
limits of such a claim need not be defined 
here. It suffices that the Sixth Amend-
ment claim by appellant has not prevail-
ed.13 We do not undertake to consider 
what other "exceptional circumstances" 
may warrant an evidentiary hearing in a 
collateral review based on unreasonable 
search or seizure.u In this case there 
was access to the federal court system, no 
showing of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, and no other allegations indi-
cating that appellant was frustrated 
from presentation of the claim of unrea-
sonable search or seizure at or before 
trial. We see no exceptional circum-
stances leading us to stretch an excep-
tion to the general rule against collateral 
review. 
Affirmed. 
J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge 
(dissenting) : 
This appeal from denial of a motion 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 presents two 
questions. The first, whether counsel at 
Thornton's trial was ineffective, is easily 
disposed of. It is based almost entirely 
ing defendant's claim that his rights un-
der the Federal Constitution were being 
violated, remarked that the case was "not 
being tried under the Federal Constitu-
tion." Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 
532, 556, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1639, 14 L.Ed.2d 
543 (1965) (Warren, C. J., concurring). 
The Supreme Court may be concerned 
that other state judges, though not say-
ing so overtly, likewise fail to provide 
an understanding and objective considera-
tion of Federal constitutional claims. 
13. Appellant does not contend that the 
failure to appeal the denial of the sup-
pression motion establishes ineffective 
assistance of counsel. We examined the 
record on the original appeal, and found 
a number of substantial points ably pre-
sented. Of course even a strong point 
at trial may be weak on appeal if the is-
sue is one of fact and there is evidence 
both ways_ 
14. See Amsterdam, supra, at 391 n. 60. 
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Fourth Amendment Claims under 
§ 2254 
Three years ago in Bustamante I concluded: 
"I would hold that federal collateral review 
of a state prisoner's Fourth Amendment claims -
claims which rarely bear on innocence - should 
be confined solely to the question of whether the 
petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to 
raise and have adjudicated the question in state 
courts." 
Four members of this Court agreed with the foregoing 
Court 
view. A majority of the/concluded in Bustamante, however, 
that it was unnecessary then to confront this issue. 
Argument in favor of 4th Amendment Claims 
Few people - judges or scholars - argue that societal 
interests are served - on balance - by the absolute, mechanical 
rule that is now followed. This rule authorizes federal 
collateral review, usually years after the crime, of a prisoner's 
claim. He will have presented this claim to a state trial 
court, it will have been reviewed by the state appellate 
court and perhaps certiorari denied by this Court. Often 
many years later, a single district judge will find some 
defect in the search warrant and order an admittedly guilty 
defendant released. At this time, the state may not have 
the evidence to retry him. 
The end result: a single federal judge has overruled 
two state courts; a defendant, not entitled under our 
2. 
Constitution even to a right of appeal, in effect has had 
three or four chances - not to show his innocence but to prove 
some technical fault by law enforcement; judicial systems, 
federal and state, further have been burdened; the convicted 
defendant, rather than focusing on rehabilitation while in 
prison, is filing habeas corpus petitions; the objective of 
finality in the law is frustrated; the defendant, often a 
professional criminal, is put back on the street; and public 
respect for the law understandably suffers. No one possibly 
could sustain the affirmative of an argument that this 
mechanical, blind type of justice, serves society. 
But the argument for continuing what I deeply believe is 
an injustice to societal interests also seems to me to be 
mechanical rather than rational. 
It starts with a ruling by four Justices in ~' 
applying a rule of evidence - the Exclusionary Rule - to the 
states in constitutional terminology. The issue had not been 
argued in~ nor discussed in Conference. Without ever 
reexamining the issue, the Court has now followed ~ for more 
than a decade. It is said that ~ now controls these cases. 
The Statute - § 2254 
§ 2254 provides for federal habeas review on behalf of 
a state prisoner "only on the ground that he is in custody 
in violation of the Constitution". The argument goes that 
~ constitutionalized the Exclusionary Rule, and therefore 
3. 
§ 2254 compels habeas review. 
Recent Authority to the Contrary 
Three times within the l ast two years, a majority of this 
Court (six Justices in one instance) have said - in effect -
that ~ cannot be read as creating a personal constitutional 
right in the Exclusionary Rule. Nothing in the 4th Amendment 
itself supports the Rule, and certainly nothing supports an 
absolute, unbending rule. In any event, we have decided -
unless the Court now wishes to change its mind - that the Rule 
itself is not a constitutional right. Calandra, Tucker and 
Peltier. 
Distinction between Trial and Habeas Corpus 
One may concede some tension between what was said in 
~ and what has been said in Calandra, Tucker and Peltier. 
But the tension can be resolved in several ways, without 
overruling ~· May I say here that I have no disposition 
to abolish the Exclusionary Rule in trials and direct appeals, 
although I would read some rationality into the Rule. We 
need not address this issue today. 
The Exclusionary Rule is simply a means - one means -
of implementing the constitutional protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. In effect, it is a 
rule of evidence - and certainly one not engraved in marble. 
4. 
This Court has never expressly held, in an opinion addressing 
the issue, that the Rule must be applied in habeas corpus. 
There is a footnote in Kaufman, but this is dictum. To be 
sure, courts have applied it in habeas, but without confronting 
or addressing the reason for doing so. As stated in my 
Bustamonte opinion, I would not extend the Rule to collateral 
review - certainly of 4th Amendment claims that have been 
reviewed in the state courts. But it is unnecessary, perhaps, 
to go as far as I would be willing. 
Habeas Corpus has characteristics of an equitable remedy 
As noted in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 438: 
"Discretion is implicitr in the statutory command 
that the judge 'dispose of the matter as law and 
justice require' 28 U.S. § 2242 ... " 
Justice Black emphasized the equitable nature of habeas 
in his dissent in Kaufman. Justice Stewart, recently, in 
Francis v. Henderson, recognized the equitable nature of habeas 
in holding that a state prisoner cannot challenge the composition 
of the grand jury on habeas. 
There are few equities on the side of a defendant 
who asserts a 4th Amendment claim on habeas, usually years 
after his conviction. The deterrence rationale of the 
Exclusionary Rule is virtually non existent at that time. 
There are powerful equities on the other side: the interest 
of finality of judgments; federalism; and the overwhelming 
public interest of compelling guilty defendants to serve 
their terms. 
But there can be cases - even 4th Amendment cases -
when the equities would justify applying the Exclusionary 
Rule on habeas review. 
I suggest that reverting to equitable principleswould 
be consistent with history, justice, common sense and the 
public interest. 
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Three years ago in Bustamonte I concluded: 
"I would hold that federal collateral review 
of a state prisoner's Fourth Amendment claims -
claims which rarely bear on innocence - should 
be confined solely to the question of whether the 
petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to 
raise and have adjudicated the question in state 
courts." 
Four members of this Court agreed with the foregoing 
Court 
view. A majority of the./concluded in Bustamonte, however , 
that it was unnecessary then to confront this issue. 
Argument in favor of 4th Amendment Claims 
Few people - judges or scholars - argue that societal 
interests are served - on balance - by the absolute, mechanical 
rule that is now followed. This rule authorizes federal 
collateral review, usually years after the crime, of a prisoner's 
claim. He will have presented this claim to a state trial 
court, it will have been reviewed by the state appellate 
court and perhaps certiorari denied by this Court. Often 
many years later, a single district judge will find some 
defect in the search warrant and order an admittedly guilty 
defendant released. At this time, the state may not have 
the evidence to retry him. 
The end result: a single federal judge has overruled 
two state courts; a defendant, not entitled under our 
2. 
Constitution even to a right of appeal, in effect has had 
three or four chances - not to show his innocence but to prove 
some technical fault by law enforcement; judicial systems , 
federal and state, further have been burdened; the convicted 
defendant, rather than focusing on rehabilitation while in 
prison, is filing habeas corpus petitions; the objective of 
finality in the law is frustrated; the defendant, often a 
orofessional criminal, is put back on the street; and public 
respect for the law understandably suffers. No one possibly 
could sustain the affirmative of an argument that this 
mechanical, bli nd type of justice, serves society. 
But the argument for continuing what I deeply believe is 
an injustice to societal interests also seems to me to be 
mechanical rather than rational. 
It starts with a ruling by four Justices in ~, ~ 
applying a rule of evidence - the Exclusionary Rule - to the 
states in constitutional terminology. The issue had not been 
argued in M!22 nor discussed in Conference. Without ever 
reexamining the issue, the Court has now followed ~ for more 
than a decade. It is said that ~ now controls these cases. 
The Statute - § 2254 
§ 2254 provides for federal habeas review on behalf of 
a state prisoner ''only on the ground that he is in cus~tody 
in violation of the ~onstitution". The argument goes ·that 
~ constitutionalized the Exclusionary Rule, and therefore 
3. 
§ 2254 compels habeas review. 
Recent Authority to the Contrary 
Three times within the .!Last·· •tw® years, a majority of this 
Court (six Justices in one instance) have said - in effect -
that ~ cannot be read as creating a personal constitutional 
right in the Exclusionary Rule . Nothing in the 4th Amendment 
itself supports the Rule, and certainly nothing supports an 
absolute, unbending rule . In any event, we have decided -
unless the Court now wishes to change its mind - that the Rule 
itself is not a constitutional right. Calandra , Tucker and 
Peltier. 
Distinction between Trial and Habeas Corpus 
One may concede some tension between what was said in 
~ and what has been said in Calandra, Tucker and Peltier . 
But the tension can be resolved in several ways, without 
overruling ~· May I say here that I have no disposition 
to abolish the Exclusionary Rule in trials and direct appeals, 
although I would read some rationality into the Rule. We 
need not address this issue today. 
The Exclusionary Rule is simply a means - one means -
of implementing the constitutional protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. In effect, it is a 
rule of evidence - and certainly one not engraved in marble . 
4. 
This Court has never expressly held, in au opinion addressi~ 
the issue, that the Rule must be applied in habeas corpus. 
There is a footnote in Kaufman, but this is dictum. To be 
sure, courts have applied it in habeas, but without confronting 
or addressing the reason for doing so. As stated in my 
Bustamante opinion, I would not extend the Rule to collateral 
review - certainly of 4th Amendment claims that have been 
reviewed in the state courts. But it is unnecessary, perhaps, 
to go as far as I would be willing. 
Habeas Corpus has characteristics of an equitable remedy 
As noted in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 438: 
' 'Discretion is implicity in the statutory command 
that the judge 'dispose of the matter as law and 
justice require' 28 U.S. § 2242 ••. " 
Justice Black emphasized the equitable nature of habeas 
in his dissent in Kaufman. Justice Stewart, recently, in 
Francis v. Henderson, recognized the equitable nature of habeas 
in holding that a state prisoner cannot challenge the compositio~ 
of the grand jury on habeas. 
There are few equities on the side of a defendant\V'ho 
who asserts a 4th Amendment claim on habeas, usually years 
after his conviction. The deterrence rationale of the 
Exclusionary Rule is virtually non existent at that time. 
There are powerful equities on the other side: the interest 
of finality of judgments; federalism; and the overwhel~ing 
public interest of compelling guilty defendants to serve 
their terms. 
But there can be cases - even 4th Amendment cases -
when the equities would justify applying the Exclusionary 
Rule on habeas review. 
I suggest that reverting to equitable principleswould 







I assumed Conference was to begin at 10:~~. 
In any case I was not able to locate a whole 
lot. Att~hed is the portion of Stewart's 
opinion to whic~ I referred. Also attached are 
relevant parts~ Fa~ where the x equitable 
principle is referred~to. Obviously Fah used xkl 
this in a more limited sense. Stewart as 
exoanded the concept in Henderson.(Also the 
oortion of Blacks dissent in Kaufman that is 
relevant.). Greg 
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practice in this area has been far from uniform,38 and even 
greater divergency has characterized the practice of the 
lower federal courts.37 
For the present, however, it suffices to note that rarely, 
if ever, has the Court predicated its deference to state pro-
cedural rules on a want of power to entertain a habeas 
application where a procedural default was committed by 
the defendant in the state courts. Typically, the Court, 
like the District Court in the instant case, has approached 
the problem as an aspect of the rule requiring exhaustion 
of state remedies, which is not a rule distributing power 
as between the state and federal courts. See pp. 417-420, 
supra. That was the approach taken in the Spencer and 
Daniels decisions, the most emphatic in their statement 
of deference to state rules of procedure. The same con-
siderations of comity that led the Court to refuse relief to 
one who had ~t yet availed himself of his state remedies 
likewise prompted the refusal of relief to one who had in-
excusably failed to tender the federal questions to the state 
courts. Either situation poses a threat to the orderly 
administration of criminal justice that ought if possible to 
be averted. Whether in fact the conduct of a Spencer or 
36 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, is the most striking example 
of the Court's seeming refusal to give effect to a state procedural 
ground, though the Court's language is ambiguous. 261 U. S., at 
91-92. 
37 Compare, e. g., United States ex rel. Kozicky v. Fay, 248 F. 2d 
520 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1957); Whitley v. Steiner, 293 F. 2d 895 (C. A. 
4th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel . Stewart v. Ragen, 231 F. 2d 312 
(C. A. 7th Cir. 1956); and United States ex rel. Dopkowski v. Ran-
dolph, 262 F. 2d 10 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1958), with, e. g., Ex parte Hough-
ton, 7 Fed. 657, 664, 8 Fed. 897, 903 (D. C. D. Vt. 1881); Pennsyl-
vania v. Cavell, 157 F. Supp . 272 (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1957), aff'd 
mem., 254 F. 2d 816 (C. A. 3d Cir. 1958); Johns v. Overlade, 122 F. 
Supp. 921 (D. C. N. D. Ind. 1953); Morrison v. Smyth, 273 F. 2d 
544, 547 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1960); United States ex rel . Rooney v. Ragen, 
158 F . 2d 346, 352 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1946). 
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Opinion of the Court. 372 u.s. 
a Daniels was inexcusable in this sense is beside the point, 
as is the arguable illogicality of turning a rule of timing 
into a doctrine of forfeitures. The point is that the Court, 
by relying upon a rule of discretion, avowedly flexible, 
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, yielding always to "excep-
tional circumstances," Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 
27, has refused to concede jurisdictional significance to 
the abortive state court proceeding. 
III. 
We have reviewed the development of habeas corpus 
at some length because the question of the instant case 
has obvious importance to the proper accommodation of 
a great constitutional privilege and the requirements of 
the federal system. Our survey discloses nothing to sug-
gest that the Federal District Court lacked the power 
to order Noia discharged because of a procedural for-
feiture he may have incurred under state law. On the 
contrary, the nature of the writ at common law, the 
language and purpose of the Act of February 5, 1867, and 
the course of decisions in this Court extending over nearly 
a century are wholly irreconcilable with such a limita-
tion. At the time the privilege of the writ was written 
into the Federal Constitution it was settled that the writ 
lay to test any restraint contrary to fundamental law, 
which in England stemmed ultimately from Magna 
Charta but in this country was embodied in the written 
Constitution. Congress in 1867 sought to provide a 
federal forum for state prisoners having constitutional 
defenses by extending the habeas corpus powers of the 
federal courts to their constitutional maximum. Obedi-
ent to this purpose, we have consistently held that federal 
court jurisdiction is conferred by the allegation of an 
unconstitutional restraint and is not defeated by anything 




































438 OCTOBER TERM, 196~. 
Opinion of the Court. 372 u.s. 
edies available to him when he applies for federal habeas 
corpus relief gives state courts the opportunity to pass 
upon and correct errors of federal law in the state pris:-
oner's conviction. And the availability to the States of 
· eventual review on certiorari of such decisions of lower 
federal courts as may grant relief is always open. Our 
function of making the ultimate accommodation between 
state criminal law enforcement and state prisoners' consti-
tutional rights becomes more meaningful when grounded 
in the full and complete record which the lower federal 
courts on habeas corpus are in a position to provide. 
v. 
Although we hold that the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts on habeas corpus is not affected by procedural de-
faults incurred by the applicant during the state court 
proceedings, we recognize a limited discretion in the fed-
eral judge to deny relief to an applicant under certain 
circumstances. Discretion is implicit in the statutory 
command that the judge, after granting the writ and hold-
ing a hearing of appropriate scope, "dispose of the matter 
as law and justice require," 28 U. S. C. § 2243; and dis-
cretion was the flexible concept employed by the federal 
courts in developing the exhaustion rule. Furthermore, 
habeas corpus has traditionally been regardea as ioverned 
by eguitable principles. United States ex rel. S · v. 
Baldi, 344 U. S. 561, 573 (dissenting opinion). Among 
them is the principle that a suitor's conduct in relation to 
the matter at hand may disentitle him to the relief he 
seeks. Narrowly circumscribed, in conformity to the his-
torical role of the writ of habeas corpus as an effective and 
imperative remedy for detentions contrary to fundamen-
tal law, the principle is unexceptionable. We therefore 
hold that the federal habeas judge may in his discretion 
deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately by-passed 
the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing 









































232 OCTOBER TERM, 1968. 
BLACK, J., dissenting. 394 u.s. 
decision had become what is generally considered 
"final"- he filed in the Federal District Court the present 
motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, asking that his sen-
tence be vacated on the ground, among others, that 
the trial court had committed error in not suppressing 
the evidence against him because the articles had been 
obtained by an unlawful search and seizure. Despite the 
fact that he has never, either in his trial or in this pro-
ceeding, asserted that he had not actually physically com-
mitted the robbery with a pistol, and despite the fact that 
this plainly reliable evidence clearly shows, along with the 
other evidence at trial, that he was not insane, the Court 
is reversing his case, holding that he can collaterally 
attack the judgment after it had become final. I dissent. 
My dissent rests on my belief that not every conviction 
based in part on a denial of a constitutional right is 
subject to attack by habeas corpus or § 2255 proceedings 
after a conviction has become final. This conclusion is 
supported by the language of § 2255 which clearly sug-
gests that not every constitutional claim is intended to 
be a basis for collateral relief.l And, as this Court has 
said in Fay v. N oia, with reference to habeas corpus, 
"Discretion is implicit in the statutory command 
that the judge . . . 'dispose of the matter as law 
and justice require,' 28 U. S. C. § 2243 .... " 372 
u. s. 391, 438. 
Of course one important factor that would relate to 
whether the conviction should be vulnerable to collateral 
1 "If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without 
jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law 
or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such 
a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner 
a.s to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court 
shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the pris-
oner or resentence him or grant a new trial or · correct the sentence 
as may appear appropriate." 28 U. S. C. § 2255. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
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attack is the possibility of the applicant's innocence. 
For illustration, few would think that justice requires 
release of a person whose allegations clearly show that 
he was guilty of the crime of which he had been convicted. 
I agree with the Court's conclusion that the scope of 
collateral attack is substantially the same in federal 
habeas corpus cases which involve challenges to state 
convictions, as it is in § 2255 cases which involve chal-
lenges to federal convictions. The crucial question, how-
ever, is whether certain types of claims, such as a claim 
to keep out relevant and trustworthy evidence because 
the result of an unconstitutional search and seizure, 
should normally be open in these collateral proceedings. 
This question was fully and carefully considered by the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 
368 F. 2d 822 (1966), and I agree substantially with the 
opinion of Judge Leventhal for the majority of that 
court, which states: 2 
"[G]enerally a claim by a federal prisoner that evi-
dence admitted at his trial was the fruit of an 
unconstitutional search or seizure is not properly 
the ground of a collateral attack on his conviction. 
As further noted below, this rule is subject to an 
exception for special circumstances . . . . 
"Many opinions declare that collateral attack, as 
by habeas corpus, is available to correct the denial 
of a constitutional right. This is the general rule 
but it is not an absolute .... 
"The courts are called on to evolve and provide pro-
cedures and remedies that are effective to vindicate 
constitutional rights. However, where effective pro-
cedures are available in the direct proceeding, there 
2 125 U. S. App. D. C., at 116-118, 368 F. 2d, at 824-826. 
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As these two cases present the same issue, we 
deal with them in a single opinion. Both come from U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, on~ from the Sixth and the other from 
the Ninth Circuit. 
Each of the respondents was convicted of murder 
in trials in California and Nebraska state courts, and 
their convictions were affirmed on appeal . Thereafter, 
each sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254. 
They contended that evidence seized during illegal 
searches and seizures - the murder weapon in one case, and 
dynamite particles in the defendant's pocket in the other -
should have been excluded from evidence under the exclusionary 
rule. The federal courts of appeals agreed , and granted 
the writs of habeas corpus. 
Petitioners here, wardens of the state prisons, 
contend that the exclusionary rule - at least in Fourth 
Amendment cases - should not be applied in federal habeas 
corpus proceedings. Although this Court, in several prior 
cases, has assumed the application of the rule, we have 
never heretofore specifically addressed this issue. 
The primary justification for the Exclusionary Rule 
is the deterrence of unlawful police conduct. The rule 
·. 
2. 
was created by this Court as a'means of effectuating 
the important rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. 
For many years the rule was not deemed applicable in state 
courts. But 15 years ago, in~ v. Ohio, the Court extended 
the rule to trials and appeals in the state courts. 
Decisions subsequent to ~ have established that 
the Exclusionary Rule is not a personal constitutional 
right. 
Even at trial and on direct review the cost of 
applying the Exclusionary Rule are not insubstantial: the 
focus of a trial is diverted from the ultimate question of 
guilt or innocence, that should be the central concern in 
a criminal proceedings. 
Moreover, the physical evidence sought to be excluded 
under the rule often is the most probative information bearing 
on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Kaufman v. United 
States (1969), eight years after~' stated: 
'~ claim of illegal search and seizure is 
crucially different from many other 
constitutional rights; ... often [the 
evidence seized] . . . alone establishes 
beyond virtually any shadow of a doubt that 
the defendant is guilty." 
Application of the rule thus deflects the truth-
finding process, and often frees the guilty. 
3. 
These costs of the Exclusionary Rule apply with 
special force when, following conviction and appeal in a state 
court, the issue is again presented on ha4eas corpus. 
Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of the rule 
is to deter police misconduct, we conclude that the contribution 
of the rule toward restraining police misconduct is minimal 
when applied on collateral attack - long after trial and appeal. 
We make clear the limited scope of our decision. 
We do not consider in this case the habeas corpus 
statute as a means for relitigating constitutional claims 
generally. We hold only that a federal court need not apply 
the Exclusionary Rule, on a Fourth Amendment claim, absent a 
showing that the state prisoner was denied an opportunity 
for a full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and 
on direct review. 
In short, the application of the rule on habeas 
is limited to cases in which there has been both such a showing 
and a Fourth Amendment violation. 
The Chief Justice has filed a concurring opinion. 
Mr. Justice White also has filed a dissenting opinion. 
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which Mr. Justice Marshall has joined. 
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'" t ~·,.\4, Do you think there should be any cross reference in 
our cases to Justice Blackmun's opinion Janis? 
.iu:pTttttt <!fcurt cf tqt ~ttittb .ita;ttg 
~agqmgtmt. ~. Of. 2ll&TJ!.' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
June 4, 1976 
Re: Nos. 74-1055 & 74-1222 - Stone v. Powell 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall write separately in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
j 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u:.prtntt <!}ouri ltf tqt ~b ~taftg 
Jfa:slfi:nghtn. ~. <!}. 2ll.;t'!!~ 
June 11, 1976 
PERSONAL 
Re: 74-1055 -Stone v. Powell 
Dear Lewis: 
/ 
I write you without copies to the Conference at this 
time because if you are not prepared to make the suggested 
change, there is no point in adding to the "paper flood." 
Page 24 for me puts more "glue and gloss" on the 
exclusion rule. It is unnecessary dictum. At most, no one 
has a right to ask any more than something like: "This case 
does not present any question as to the validity of the 
exclusionary rule as applied at trial • • . . " in place of 
the first two lines, second paragraph, page 24. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Nos. 74-1055 and 74-1222 -- Stone v. Powell 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. J uatice Brennan 
Mr. Justice St3\'Jn.rt 
Mr. Justice lh:rshall 
Mr Justice Bl J.c- kmun 
~r. Justice Po·.':e ll 
Mr. Ju~; tice TI .;hncpis t 
Mr. J usti ce Stevens 
From: Mr . Justice ~hite 
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MR. JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
For many of the reasons stated by 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, I cannot agree that the 
writ of habeas corpus should be any less 
available to those convicted of state crimes 
where they allege Fourth Amendment violations 
than where other constitutional issues are 
presented to the federal court. Under the 
amendments to the habeas corpus statute, which 
were adopted after Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
(1963), and represented an effort by Congress 
to lend a modicum of finality to state criminal 
judgments, ~cannot disti~uish be~een ~u:fh ~ 
Amendment and other constitutional issues. _dJA -.f-A ----- ' ~
--.:___----
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Suppose, for example, that two confederates 
I 
in crime, Smith and Jones, are tried separately for 
I 
a state crime and convicted on the very same evidence, 
tO~ including evidence seized incident to their arrest al-
\ ~ legedly made without probable cause. 1 Their con;titutional 
claims are fully aired, rejected and preserved on appeal. 
Their convictions are affirmed by the State's highest court. 
Smith, the first to be tried, does not petition for certi-
orari, or does so but his petition is denied. Jones, whose 
conviction was considerably later, is more successful. His 
petition foi certiorari is granted and his conviction re-
versed because this Court, without making any new rule of 
law, simply concludes that on the undisputed facts the 
arrests were made without probable cause and the challenged 
......._. -----
evidence was therefore seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. The State must either retry Jones or release ---....... 
him, necessarily because he is deemed in custody in violation 
of the Constitution. It turns out that without the evidence 
illegally seized, the State has no case; and Jones goes 
free. Smith then files his petition for habeas corpus. 
He makes no claim that he did not have a full and fair 
hearing in the state courts, but asserts that his 
Stone v. Powell 
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Fourth Amendment claim had been erroneously decided 
and that he is being held in violation of the 
federal Constitution. He cites this Court's decision 
in Jones' case to satisfy any burden placed on him by 
§ 2254 to demonstrate that the state court was in 
error. Unless the Court's reservation, in its present 
opinion, of those situations where the defendant has 
not had a full and fair hearing in the state courts is 
intended to encompass all those circumstances under 
which a state criminal judgment; may be reexamined under 
§ 2254 -- in which event the opinion is essentially 
meaningless and the judgment erroneous -- Smith's 
petition would be dismissed, and he would spend his 
life in prison while his colleague is a free man. I 
cannot believe that Congress intended this result. 
Under the present habeas corpus statute, neither 
Rice's nor Powell's applications for habeas corpus 
should be dismissed on the grounds now stated by the 
Court. I would affirm the judgments of the Courts of -
Appeals as being acceptable applications of the ex-- ~......--~s:u~,.,..._,pqw ......_~"""'-'"'-•------------'=' clusionacy _!'ll.le applicable in state criminal trials by 
• ._............, ,..., .......... ...... 01= 
virtue of~ v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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I feel constrained to say, however, that I 
would join four or more other Justices in substantially 
limiting the reach of the exclusionary rule as presently 
administered under the Fourth Amendment in federal and 
state courts • .. 
W~ther I would have joined the Court's opinion 
in~ v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), had I then been 
a member of the Court, I do not know. But as time went 
on after coming to this bench, I became convinced that 
both Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and 
~ v. Ohio had overshot their mark insofar as they 
aimed to deter lawless action by law enforcement personnel 
and that in many of its applications the exclusionary rule 
was not advancing that aim in the slightest and in this 
respect was a senseless obstacle to arriving at the truth 
in many criminal trials. 
The rule has been much criticized and suggestions 
have been made that it should be wholly abolished, but I 
would overrule neither Weeks v. United States nor ~ v. 
Ohio. I am nevertheless of the view that the rule should 
~ - ~- ~ ----- -be substantially modified so as to prevent its application 
in those many circumstances where the evidence at issue 
Stone v. Powell 
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was seized by an officer acting in the good faith 
~ ,..., -- ~ ~
belief that his conduct comported with existing law 
and having reasonable grounds for this belief. These 
are recurring situations; and recurringly evidence is 
excluded without any realistic expectation that its 
exclusion will contribute in the slightest to the 
purposes of the rule, even though the trial will be 
affected or the indictment dismissed. 
An officer sworn to uphold the law and to 
apprehend those who break it inevitably must make 
judgments regarding probable cause to arrest: is there 
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been 
committed and that a particular suspect has committed 
it? Sometimes the historical facts are disputed or are 
otherwise in doubt. In other situations the facts may 
be clear so far as they are known, yet the question of 
probable cause remain. In still others there are special 
worries about the reliability of secondhand information 
such as that coming from informants. In any of these 
situations, which occur repeatedly, when the officer is 
convinced that he has probable cause to arrest he will 
very likely make it. Except in emergencies, it is 
probable that his colleagues or superiors will participate 
Stone v. Powell 
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in the decision, and it may be that the officer will 
secure a warrant, although warrantless arrests on 
probable cause are not forbidden by the Constitution 
or by state law. Making the arrest in such circum-
stances is precisely what the community expects the 
police officer to do. Neither officers nor judges 
issuing arrest warrants need delay apprehension of the 
suspect until unquestioned proof against him has ac-
cumulated. The officer may be shirking his duty if he 
does so. 
In most of these situations, hopefully the 
officer's judgment will be correct; but experience tells 
us that there will be those occasions where the trial or 
appellate court will disagree on the issue of probable 
cause, no matter how reasonable the grounds for arrest 
appeared to the officer and though reasonable men could 
easily differ on the question. It also happens that 
after the events at issue have occurred, the law may 
change, dramatically or ever so slightly, but in any 
event sufficiently to require the trial judge to hold that 
there was not probable cause to make the arrest and to 
seize the evidence offered by the prosecution. It may 
also be, as in the Powell case now before us, that there 
-
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is probable cause to make an arrest under a particular 
criminal statute but when evidence seized incident to 
the arrest is offered in support of still another 
criminal charge, the statute under which the arrest and 
seizure were made is declared unconstitutional and the 
evidence ruled inadmissible under the exclusionary rule 
as presently administered. 
In these situations, and perhaps many others, 
excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the 
exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is 
painfully apparent that in each of them the officer is 
acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in 
similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no 
way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him 
less willing to do his duty. It is true that in such 
cases the courts have ultimately determined that in their 
view the officer was mistaken; but it is also true that 
in making constitutional judgments under the general 
language used in some parts of our Constitution, including 
the Fourth Amendment, there is much room for disagreement 
among judges, each of whom is convinced that both he and his 
colleagues are reasonable men. Surely when this Court 
Stone v. Powell 
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divides five to four on issues of probable cause, 
I 
it is not tenable to conclude that the officer was 
I 
at fault or acted unreasonably in making the arrest. 
When law enforcement personnel have acted 
I 
mistakenly, but in good faith and on reasonable 
grounds, and yet the evidence they have seized is 
later excluded, the exclusion can have no deterrent 
effect. The officers, if they do their duty, will 
act in similar fashion in similar circumstances in 
the future; and the only consequence of the rule as 
presently administered is that unimpeachable and 
probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact and 
the truth-finding function of proceedings is sub-
stantially impaired or a trial totally aborted. This 
makes the law a fool. 
Admitting the evidence in such circumstances 
does not render judges participants in Fourth Amendment 
violations. The violation, if there was one, has 
already occurred and the evidence is at hand. Furthermore, 
there has been only mistaken, but unintentional and fault -
less, conduct by enforcement officers. Exclusion of the 
evidence does not cure the invasion of the defendant's 
rights which he has already suffered. Where an arrest has 
Stone v. Powell 
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been made on probable cause but the defendant is 
acquitted, under federal law the defendant has no 
right to damages simply because his innocence has 
been proved. "A policeman's lot is not so unhappy 
that he must choose between being charged with 
dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he 
has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if 
he does." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). 
The officer is also excused from liability for "acting 
under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid 
but that was later held unconstitutional, on its face 
or as applied." Id. There is little doubt that as 
far as civil liability is concerned, the rule is the 
same under federal law where the officer mistakenly but 
reasonably believes he has probable cause for an arrest. 
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Court announced generally that 
officers of the Executive Branch of the Government should 
be immune from liability where their action is reasonable 
"in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-
faith belief." 416 U.S. 232, 247-248 (1974). The Court 
went on to say: 
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"Public officials, whether governors, 
I 
mayors or police, legislators or 
I 
judges, who fail to make decisions when 
they are needed or who do not act to 
implement decisions when they are made 
do not fully and faithfully perform 
the duties of their offices. Implicit 
in the idea that officials have some 
immunity--absolute or qualified--for 
their acts, is a recognition that they 
may err. The concept of immunity 
assumes this and goes on to assume that 
it is better to risk some error and 
possible injury from such error than not 
to decide or act at all." Id., at 
241-242 (footnote omitted). 
The Court has proceeded on this same basis in other 
contexts. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
If the defendant in criminal cases may not 
recover for a mistaken but good faith invasion of his 
privacy, it makes even less sense to exclude the 
Stone v. Powell 
- 11 -
evidence solely on his behalf. He is not at all 
recompensed for the invasion by merely getting his 
property back. It is often contraband and stolen 
property to which he is not entitled to in any 
event. He has been charged with crime and is seeking 
to have probative evidence against him excluded, al-
though often it is the instrumentality of the crime. 
There is very little equity in the defendant's side 
in these circumstances. The exclusionary rule, a 
judicial construct, seriously shortchanges the public 
interest as presently applied. I would modify it 
accordingly. 
To: Mr. Justice P~.:rz-~ 
, Mr. Just1c, ~·~ · 
Mr. Ju ·;~· . '~· ~1.rt 
< "'' • 1 .:;e 




v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 441 (1971), it seems 
clear to me that the exclusionary rule has been operative long enough to 
demonstrate its futility and that the time has come to modify its reach if 
no more. Over the years, the strains imposed by reality have led the 
Court to vacillate as to the rationale for deliberate exclusion of truth from 
the fact-finding process. The rhetoric has varied with the rationale, to the 
point where it has now become a doctrinaire result in search of validating 
reasons. 
The exclusionary rule now rests solely upon its purported tendency to 
deter police misconduct. United States v. Janis, Slip opinion, at 13 (1976); 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). Other rhetorical 
generalizations, including the "imperative of judicial integrity," have not 
withstood analysis. 
- 2 -
Proof is lacking that the rule, a judge-created device, serves the 
purpose of deterrence and, of course, as to inadvertent conduct it is hardly 
relevant. Despite Herculean efforts, no empirical study has been able to 
demonstrate that the exclusionary rule does in fact have any deterrent 
effect. United States v. Janis, Slip opinion, at 16 and n. 22. To vindicate 
the continued existence of this judge-made rule, it is incumbent upon those 
who seek its retention to demonstrate that it serves its avowed purpose, 
outweighing its heavy cost• See, e.g. , 
Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (1962). The burden rightly rests 
upon those who ask society to ignore trustworthy evidence of guilt, at the 
expense of setting the guilty free. It is, in my view, an abdication of our 
responsibility to exact such excessive costs from society if we do so on the 
basis of totally unsubstantiated assumptions. Judge Henry Friendly has 
observed: 
"[T]he same authority that empowered the Court to supplement 
the [fourth] amendment by the exclusionary rule a hundred and 
twenty-five years after its adoption, likewise allows it to modify 
that rule as the 'lessons of experience' may teach." Friendly, 
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. 
L.Rev. 929, 952-953 (1965). 
In Bivens, I suggested that, despite its grave shortcomings, perhaps 
the rule need not be abandoned until some meaningful alternative could be 
developed to protect innocent persons damaged by police action. With the 
passage of time, it now appears that the continued existence of the rule, 
-
- 3 -
as presently implemented, actually inhibits the development of any alterna-
tives. The reason is quite simple: incentives for developing new procedures 
or remedies must remain minimal or nonexistent so long as the exclusionary 
rule is retained in its pre sent posture. It can no longer be assumed that 
other branches of government will act while judges cling to this draconian
1 
discredited device. Legislatures are unlikely to act at all so long as persons 
charged with serious crimes continue to reap the enormous benefits of the 
exclusionary rule. With this extraordinary 11 remedy11 for Fourth Amend-
ment violations, legislatures might assume that nothing more should be 
done, even though a grave defect of the exclusionary rule is that it offers 
nothing to victims of overzealous police work who never appear in court. 
Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the Person, 64 Nw. U .L. 
Rev. 1, 14 (1969). And even if legislatures were inclined to experiment 
with alternative remedies, they have no assurance that the judicially created 
rule will be modified or abolished in response to such legislative remedies. 
The unhappy result, as I see it, is that alternatives will inevitably be stymied 
by rigid adherence on our part to the exclusionary rule. I venture to predict 
that overruling this judicially invented doctrine -- or limiting its scope to 
egregious police conduct -- would inspire a surge of activity toward providing 
statutory remedies for innocent victims. 
- 4 -
The Court• s opinion today eloquently recounts the dismal social costs 
occasioned by the rule. Ante, at 21-23. And Mr. Justice White observes 
today that, in many instances, the exclusionary rule constitutes a 11 senseless 
obstacle to arriving at the truth in many criminal trials. 11 Post, at __ . 
He therefore suggests that the rule be substantially modified 11 so as to 
prevent its application in those many circumstances where the evidence at 
is sue was seized by an officer acting in the good faith belief that his conduct 
comported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief. 11 
Post, at His view has much to commend it. 
The exclusionary rule had its genesis in the natural desire to 
protect private papers. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) 
(dictum). From this origin, the rule has now been carried to the point of 
excluding from evidence the body of a homicide victim. See Mitchell v. 
New York, __ N.Y. 2d __ (1976), petition for cert. pending. Cf. 
Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (1962). 
It is time to change . 
~u.vttutt Q}llUrl ¢f tlft ~b .itates 
Jtas!p:ttgt.cn. !fl. <!l· 211&',.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
June 16, 1976 
PERSONAL 
Re: (74-1055 - Stone v. Powell 
(74-1222 - Wolff v. Rice 
Dear Lewis: 
In the rush of these days you may not get to 
my problems with the "endorsement" of the 
exclusionary rule at p. 24. If you find it 
possible to adopt something along the Hnes 
of my suggestion I can join the opinion. 
Meanwhile I am circulating a concurring 
opinion calling for the end or modification 
of the exclusionary rule-- one of the great 
hoaxes on the public in its present form. 





74-1055 - Stone v. Powell 
74-1222 -Wolff v. Rice 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER 
I concur in the judgment. 
~~ ce Bre""'n 
,I.f...... .;r 1- i c':l f " t't 
Pr. < • ~ C'O 
Mr. T 
M~ . <r 
Hv•, 
H • L 
lC· . 
' . ' 
From: ~ G... " J J _, U 'J ) 
Circp la t'"'rl: Ju l v ~/6 ------
RecirculatGd : ------
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 441 (1971), it seems 
clear to me that the exclusionary ru1e has been operative long enough to 
demonstrate its futility and that the time has come to modify its reach if 
no more. Over the years, the strains imposed by reality have led the 
Court to vacillate as to the rationale for deliberate exclusion of truth from 
the fact-finding process. The rhetoric has varied with the rationale, to the 
point where it has now become a doctrinaire resu1t in search of validating 
reasons. 
The exclusionary rule now rests solely upon its purported tendency to 
deter police misconduct. United States v. Janis, Slip opinion, at 13 (1976); 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). Other rhetorical 
generalizations, including the ''imperative of judicial integrity," have not 
withstood analysis. 
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Proof is lacking that the rule, a judge-created device, serves the 
purpose of deterrence and, of course, as to inadvertent conduct it is hardly 
relevant. Despite Herculean efforts, no empirical study has been able to 
demonstrate that the exclusionary rule does in fact have any deterrent 
effect. United States v. Janis, Slip opinion, at 16 and n.22. To vindicate 
the continued existence of this judge-made rule, it is incumbent upon those 
who seek its retention to demonstrate that it serves its avowed purpose, 
outweighing its heavy cost• See, e.g., 
Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (1962). The burden rightly rests 
upon those who ask society to ignore trustworthy evidence of guilt, at the 
expense of setting the guilty free. It is, in my view, an abdication of our 
responsibility to exact such excessive costs from society if we do so on the 
basis of totally unsubstantiated assumptions. Judge Henry Friendly has 
observed: 
"[T)he same authority that empowered the Court to supplement 
the [fourth) amendment by the exclusionary rule a hundred and 
twenty-five years after its adoption, likewise allows it to modify 
that rule as the 'lessons of experience' may teach." Friendly, 
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. 
L.Rev. 929, 952-953 (1965). 
In Bivens, I suggested that, despite its grave shortcomings, perhaps 
the rule need not be abandoned until some meaningful alternative could be 
developed to protect innocent persons damaged by police action. With the 
passage of time, it now appears that the continued existence of the rule, 
- 3 -
as presently implemented, actually inhibits the development of any alterna-
tives. The reason is quite simple: incentives for developing new procedures 
or remedies must remain minimal or nonexistent so long as the exclusionary 
rule is retained in its pre sent posture. It can no longer be assumed that 
other branches of government will act while judges cling to this draconian
1 
discredited device. Legislatures are unlikely to act at all so long as persons 
charged with serious crimes continue to reap the enormous benefits of the 
exclusionary rule. With this extraordinary 11 remedy" for Fourth Amend-
ment violations, legislatures might assume that nothing more .should be 
done, even though a grave defect of the exclusionary rule is that it offers 
nothing to victims of overzealous police work who never appear in court. 
Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the Person, 64 Nw. U .L. 
Rev. 1, 14 (1969). And even if legislatures were inclined to experiment 
with alternative remedies, they have no assurance that the judicially created 
rule will be modified or abolished in response to such legislative remedies. 
The unhappy result, as I see it, is that alternatives will inevitably be stymied 
by rigid adherence on our part to the exclusionary rule. I venture to predict 
that overruling this judicially invented doctrine -- or limiting its scope to 
egregious police conduct -- would inspire a surge of activity toward providing 
statutory remedies for innocent victims. 
• 
6/17/76 Rider A, p. 25 (Stone v. Powell) 
Consider adding a footnote along the following lines 
(possibly note 32a) 
32a. The Chief Justice, in his concurring opinion, 
addresses generally the application of the exclusionary 
rule. Ante at Mr. Justice White, although dissenting 
in this case, states that he would join four or more other 
Justices "in substantially limiting the reach of the 
Exclusionary Rule". Ante at We find no occasion 
in this habeas corpus case to question the application 
of the rule at trial and on direct appeal, as we think it 
unnecessary to reach the broader issues addressed by the 
Chief Justice and by Mr. Justice White. 
6/17/76 Rider A, p. 25 (Stone v. Powell) 
Consider adding a footnote along the following lines 
(possibly note 32a) 
32a. The Chief Justice, in his concurring opinion, 
addresses generally the application of the exclusionary 
rule. Ante at Mr. Justice White, although dissenting 
in this case, states that he would join four or more other 
Justices "in substantially limiting the reach of the 
Exclusionary Rule". Ante at We find no occasion 
in this habeas corpus case to question the application 
of the rule at trial and on direct appeal , as we think it 
unnecessary to reach the broader issues addressed by the 
Chief Justice and by Mr. Justice White. 
LFP/gg 6-18-76 Rider A, p. 24 (Stone v. Powell) 
We assume that the continued vitality of these 
assumptions justifies the application of the Exclusionary 
Rule at trial and its enforcement on direct appeal of state 
. . 32a b h d . court convLctLons, ut t ey o not support Lts 
application on collateral review. The additional contribution, 
if any, of the 
LFP/gg 6-18-76 Rider A, p. 25 (Stone v. Powell) 
32a. The Chief Justice, in his concurring 
opinio~ and Mr. Justice White in his dissent, address 
generally the application of the exclusionary rule. Ante 
at and But we find no occasion in this habeas 
corpus case to question the application of the rule at trial 
and on direct appeal, as we think it unnecessary to reach 
the broader issues addressed by the Chief Justice and by 
Mr. Justice White. See n. 16, supra. 
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the convenience of the render. See Unttea 8tate8 v. Detroit Lumber 
Co., 200 u.s. 821, 887. 
Anothe1' copy of page proof OJ 
syllabus as approved to 
show-
- Lineup, which has now 
· been added. 
BUPBEME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEl- f'.dditional changes 
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Syllabus 
STONE, WARDEN v. POWELL 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
No. 74-1055. Argued February 24, 1976-Decided June -, 1976* 
Respondent in No. 74-1055, was convicted of murder in state court, 
in part on the basis of testimony concerning a revolver found on 
his person when he was arrested for violating a vagrancy ordi-
nance. The trial court rejected respondent's contention that the 
testimony should have been excluded because the ordinance was 
unconstitutional and the arrest therefore invalid. The appellate 
court affirmed, finding it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of 
the arrest and search because of the court's conclusion that the 
error, if any, in admitting the challenged testimony was harmless, 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent then applied for habeas 
corpus relief in the Federal District Court, which concluded that 
the arresting officer had probable cause and that even if the va-
grancy ordinance was unconstitutional the deterrent purpose of 
the exclusionary rule did not require that it be applied to bar 
admission of the fruits of a search incident to an otherwise valid 
~trrest. The court held, alternatively, that any error in admission 
of the challenged evidence was harmless. The Court of Appeals 
reversed, concluding that the ordinance was unconstitutional; that 
respondent's arrest was therefore illegal; and that, although ex-
clusion of the evidence would serve no deterrent purpose with re-
gard to officers who were enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion 
would deter legislators from enacting unconstitutional statutes. 
The court also held that admission of the evidence was not harm-
less error. In No. 74-1222, respondent was also convicted of mur-
der in a state court, in part on the basis of evidence seized pur-
suant to a search warrant which respondent on a suppression 
*Together with No. 74-1222, Wolff, Warden v. Rice, on appeal to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 
I 
HENRY PuTzEL, jr. 
Reporter of Decisions. 
li STONE v. POWELL 
Syllabus 
motion claimed was invalid. The trial court denied respondent's 
motion to suppress, and was upheld on appeal. Respondent then 
filed a habeas corpus petition in Federal District Court. The 
court concluded that the warrant was invalid, and rejected the 
State's contention that in any event probable cause justified the 
search. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Where the State, 
as in each of these cases, has provided an opportunity for full and 
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may 
not be granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence 
obtained through an unconstitutional search and ·seizure was intro-
duced at his trial. In this context the contribution of the exclu-
sionary rule, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment 
is minimal as compared to the substantial societal costs of applying 
the rule. Pp. 7-26. 
(a) Until these cases this Court has had no occasion fully to 
examine the validity of the assumption made in Kaufmah v. United 
States, 394 U. S. 217, that the effectuation of the Fourth Amend-
ment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth, requires 
the granting of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been con-
victed in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in an ille-
gal search or seizure since those Amendments were held in 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, to require exclusion of such evi-
dence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review. 
P. 13. 
(b) The Mapp majority justified application of the exclusionary 
rule chiefly upon the belief that exclusion would deter future un-
lawful police conduct, and though preserving the integrity of the 
judicial process has been alluded to as also justifying the rule, 
that concern is minimal where federal habeas corpus relief is 
sought by a prisoner who has already been given the opportunity 
for full and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at 
trial and on direct review. Pp. 16-18. 
(c) Despite the broad deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule, it has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction 
of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons; 
in various situations the Court has found the policies behind the 
rule outweighed by countervailing considerations. Pp. 18-21. 
(d) The ultimate question of guilt or innocence should be the 
central concern in a criminal proceeding. Application of the exclu-
sionary rule, however, deflects the truthfinding process and often 
frees the guilty. Though the rule is thought to deter unlawful police 
activity, in part through nurturing respect for Fourth Amend-
STONE v. POWELL III 
Syllabus 
ment values, indiscriminate application of the rule may well gen-
erate disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. 
Pp. 21-23. 
(e) Despite the absence of supportive empirical evidence, the 
assumption has been that the exclusionary rule deters law enforce-
ment officers from violating the Fourth Amel).dment by removing 
the incentives to disregard it. Though the Court adheres to that 
view as applied to the trial and direct-appeal stages, there is no 
reason to believe that the effect of applying the rule would be ap-
preciably diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not be 
raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. Even 
if some additional deterrent effect existed from application of the 
rule in isolated habeas corpus cases, the furtherance of Fourth 
Amendment goals would be outweighed by the detriment to the 
criminal justice system. Pp. 24-26. 
No. 74-1055, 507 F. 2d 93; No. 74-1222, 513 F. 2d 1280, reversed. 
74-1055 and 74-1222 Stone and Rice 
Dear Chief: 
Here is a copy of my opinion (second draft) in the above 
cases, with riders attached which incorporate changes which I 
hope you will find satisfactory. 
As you will recall, we took these cases because they 
clearly presented the issue whether the exclusionary rule 
should apply on a collateral attack based on the Fourth Amend-
ment. This i was the issue I addressed in my concurring opinion 
· in Bustamante, which you joined. At that time, Potter also 
was willing to join five other Justices, but was unwilling 
then to make the fiftli"Vote. Pr .i.or to granting the above 
cases, Bill Rehnquist and I conferred with Potter to see 
whether he considered them appropriate vehicles to reconsider 
the issue. I think I kept you advised of this. 
At our Conference, Byron expressed a willingness to adopt 
, a "good faith" modification of the exclusionary rule even as 
, applied to trial and appeal, a position which both Bill 
Rehnquist and I have expressed sympathy for in the past. But 
Potter and John flatly stated their unwillingness to join an 
opinion going so far, or expressing any dissatisfaction with 
' .the rule at trial and on direct appeal. 
MJ distinct understanding at Conference, therefore, was 
that there were six firm votes to dispose of these cases solely 
on the applicability of the exclusionary rule to Fourth Amend-
ment issues raised on habeas corpus. The or.inion was written 
that way. Footnote 16 (p. 14) states that 'we find it unneces-
sary to consider the. other issues concerning the exclusionary 
, rule raised by the parties". 
It was against this background that I found your "con-
curring in result only" opinion so surprising. In any event, 
I have gone back to Potter and cleared with him the riders 
now attached to pages 24 and 25. They say two things: (i) 
that we merely assume the continued vitality of the assumptions 
that have been relied upon to support the rule; and (ii) in 
the new footnote on page 25, we make crystal clear that we 
need not and do not reach the question of the application of 
the rule at trial and on direct appeal. 
The footnote, and the change in the text, allow you to 
join the opinion and also file your concurrence without 
substantial change of any kind. You will be perfectly free 
in the future, as will all of us, to advance the view you 
have advocated for some time. 
I have not gone back to John Stevens, as I will be in 
a stronger position with him if I have prior approval .by both ' 
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June 2 1 , 1 9 7 6 
PERSONAL 
Re: ( 74-1055 - Stone v. Powell 
( 74-1222 -Wolff v. Rice 
Dear Lewis: 
Confirming our telephone conversation: 
1. I find the previous (print) version on p. 24 more 
tolerable than your proposed typed version. 
2. With some slight changes I will let my concurring 
opinion stand. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
~u.pr.tm:t ~ltllrl of tltt J:nitt~ .jtzdtg 
'~lhtsftinght~ ~. ~· 20~~~ 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
June 21 , 1 9 7 6 
Re: (74-1055 - Stone v. Powell 
(74-1222 -Wolff v. Rice 
Dear Lewis: 
I have concluded to join your opinion in the above 
case. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
.. 
To: The Chle:r J US"t; lOS 
Mr o Justice Stt'lwart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Just ice Mar .,;hall 
Mr . Justice Bl::1ekmun 
Mr . Justice Pown11 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Mr. Just lee R:hnq'li s t 
Mr o Justice Stevens 
Nos. 74-1055 & 74-1222 
W.T. Stone, Warden, Petitioner 
v. 
Lloyd Charles Powell 
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Charles L. Wolff, Jr •• Warden, 
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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
Reo1rcu1ated: 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court o: Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit. 
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
The Court today holds "that where the State has provided 
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment 
claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus 
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional 
search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Ante, at 26. To 
be sure, my brethren are hostile to the continued vitality of the 
exclusionary rule as part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, as today' s 
decision in United States v. Janis, post, at __ , confirms. But 
this case, despite the veil of Fourth Amendment terminology em-
ployed by the Court, does not involve any question of the right of a 
defendant to have evidence excluded from use against him in his 




rights ostensibly secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Rather, it involves the question of the availability of a 
federal forum for vindicating those federally guaranteed rights. 
Today' s holding portends substantial evisceration of federal habeas .... ........ .... 
corpus jurisdiction, and I dissent. ______..._.__ 
.. 
The Court's opinion does not specify the particular basis on 
which it denies federal habeas jurisdiction over claims of Fourth 
Amendment violations brought by state prisoners. In light of the 
?:_I 
explicit language of 2 8 U.S. C. § 22 54, significantly not even - .... ...F1"t ..._.,-.., -
mentioned by the Court, I can only presume th:1t the Court intends 
to be understood to hold either that respondents are not "in custody 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, 11 or that 
"considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration 
- II -
of justice, 11 ante, at n. 11, are sufficient to allow this Court to re-
writf! jurisdictional statutes enacted by Congress. Neither ground of 
.... 
decision is tenable; the former is simply illogical, and the latter is 
an arrogation of power committed solely to the Congress. 
I 
Much of the Court's analysis implies that respondents are not 
entitled to habeas relief because they are not being unconstitutionally 
detained. Although purportedly adhering to the principle that the 
- 3 -
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments "require exclusion 11 of evidence 
seized in violation of their commands, ante, at 13, we are told that 
there has merely been an "assumption" in our cases that "the effectua-
tion of the Fourth Amendment ..• requires the granting of habeas 
relief when a prisoner has been convicted in state court on the basis 
of evidence obtained in an illegal search and seizure •• 11 Ante, a t 
i/ 
13. Applying a "balancing test, 11 see, ~·, ante, at 19, 20, 21, 26, 
the Court then concludes that the "assumption" is unfounded and that 
the policies of the Fou.rth Amendment would not be implemented if 
claims to the benefits of the exclusionary rule were cognizable in 
~./ 
collateral attacks on state court convictions. 
Understandably the Court must purport to cast its holding in 
constitutional terms, because that avoids a direct confrontation w l th 
the incontrovertible facts that (a) the habeas statutes have heretofore 
I I ' • I ,, I . . J .J- ( 
always been construed to grant jurisdiction to entertain Fourth Amend- l..{)"l.t.lt.A , 
:;: z:;: ---' .. --- ..._--, ... ~ _.,., ~ 
ment claims of both state and federal prisoners, that (b) Fourth 
-------~ ,... .....,......., .... ......__....... ....... ~.-...... ..... 
Amendment principles have been enforced in numerous cases on 
collateral review of final convictions, and that (c) Congress has 
legislatively accepted our interpretation of congressional intent as 
to the necessary scope and function of habeas relief. Indeed, the 
Court reaches its result without explicitly overruling any of our 
plethora of precedents inconsistent with that result or even discussing 
- 4 -
principles of stare decisis. Rather, the Court simply asserts, in 
essence, that the Justices joining those prior decisions or reaching 
the merits of Fourth Amendment claims overlooked the obvious 
constitutional dimension to the problem in m.erely "assuming" that 
granting collateral relief when state courts erroneously decide Fourth 
Amendment issues would effectuate the principles underlying that 
&_I 
Amendment. But shorn of the rhetoric of "interest balancing" used 
to o~cure what is at stake in this case, today' s attempt t:::. rest the 
.......................... 
decision on the Constitution must fail so long as Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643 (1961), remains undisturbed. 
Under Mapp, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a state ~ 
court ~exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence from the trial 
of an individual whose Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 
violated by a search or seizure that directly or indirectly resulted in 
the acc;uisition of that evidence. As Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 
338, 34 7 ( 1974), said, 11 evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth 
'(~ 
Amendment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim 
]_I 
of the illegal search and seizure. 11 When a state court admits st:('h 
evidence, it has committed a constitutional error, and unless that 
error is harmless under federal standards, see, ~·, Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), it follows ineluctably that the defendant 






comprehension of 28 U.S. C. § 2254. In short, it escapes me as 
to what logic can support the assertion that the defendant's uncon-
stitutional confinement obtains during the process of direct review, 
'§_/ 
no matter how long that process takes, but that the unconstitutionality I 
then suddenly dissipates at the moment the claim is asserted in a 
collateral attack on the conviction. 
The only conceivable rationale upon which the Court's "con-
stitutional" thesis might rest is the statement that "the [exclusionary] 
rule is not a person::1.l constitutional right . • . . Instead, 'the rule is 
a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect. ' 11 Ante, at 18, quoting 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S., at 348. Although my dissent in ____....._, 
Calandra rejected, in light of contrary decisions establishing the role 
of the exclusionary rule, the premise that an individual has no con-
stitutional right to have unconstitutionally seized evidence excluded 
J_/ 
from all use by the government, I need notdispute that point here. 
For today' s holding is not su ortable in logic even under Calandra. 
However the Court reinterprets Mapp, and whatever the rationale now 
attributed to Mapp' s holding or the purpose of the exclusionary rule, 
the prevailing constitutional rule is that unconstitutionally seized evi-
dence cannot be admitted in the criminal trial of a person whose federal 
constitutional rights were violated by the search or seizure. The 
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erroneous admission of such evidence is a violation of the Constitution 
(Mapp inexorably means this at least, or there would be no basis for 
applying the exclusionary rule in state criminal proceedings), and an 
-----------------~--~----~ accused against whom such evidence is admitted has been convicted 
in derogation of rights mandated by, and is "in custody in violation of," 
the Constitution of the United States. Indeed, since state courts vio · 
late the strictures of the federal Constitution by admitting such evidence, 
then even if federal habeas review did not directly effectn:tte Fourth 
'--.. ~ ~..... ..._ r.. ..-_ '"r.w ~ 
Amendment values, a proposition I deny, that review would nevertheless 
~
serve to effectuate what is concededly a constitutional principle con-
......... ......... ..... ---~ ~...,.,....,...- ~..... ~ ...-,/ 
cerning admissibility of evidence at trial. 
The Court, assuming without deciding that respondents were 
convicted on the basis of unconstitutionally obtained evidence erron-
eously admitted against them by the state trial courts, acknowledges 
that n;spondents had the right to obtain a reversal of their convictions 
on appeal in the state courts or on certiorari to this Court. Indeed, 
since our rules relating to the time limits for applying for certiorari 
in criminal cases are non-jurisdictional, certiorari could be granted 
respondents even today and their convictions be reversed, despite 
today' s decision. See also infra. And the basis for 
reversing that conviction would of course have to be that the State, in 
rejecting respondents' Fourth Amendment claims, had deprived them 
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of a right in derogation of the Federal Constitution. It is simply 
inconceivable therefore that that constitutional deprivation suddenly 
------~---_.~--~------------ ~ 
vanishes after the appellate process has been exhausted. And as 
.. ~- ~,..._.,_ ~-- ,_,_ ._ .................. 
between this Court on certiorari, and federal district courts on 
habeas, it is for Congress to decide what the most efficacious method 
is for enforcing federal constitutional rights and asserting the primacy 
of federal law. See infra. The Court, however, simply 
ignores the settled principle that for purposes of adjudicating consti-
tutional claims Congress, which has the power to do so under Article 
~-----
I II of the Constitution, has effectively cast the distri courts sitting 
in habeas in the role of surrogate Supreme Courts ,. ,, 
Today' s opinion itself starkly exposes the illogic of the Court's ~ 
seeming premise that the rights recognized in Mapp somehow suddenly~ 
evaporate after all direct appeals are exhausted. For the Court would 
not bar assertion of Fourth Amendment claims on habeas if the defendant 
was not accorded "an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his claim 
in the state courts. 11 Ante, at 1. See also id., at 12, quoting 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., ~;.;on-
curring); ante, at 18, 21, 23, 26 & n. 16. But this "exception" is -
impossible if the Court really means that the "rule" that Fourth Amend--
ment claims are not cognizable on habeas is constitutionally based. 
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For if the Constitution mandates that "rule" because it is a "dubious 
assumption that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal 
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure that went 
_!_!_/ 
undetected at trial or on appeal, '' ante, at 25, it is not equally a 
''dubious assumption'' that those same police officials would fear that 
federal habeas review might reveal that the state courts had denied 
the defendant an opportunity to have a full and fair hearing on his 
claim that went undetected at trial or on appeal. And to the extent 
the Court is making the unjustifiable assumption that our certiorari 
jurisdiction is adequate to correct ''routine'' condonation of Fourth 
Amendment violations by state courts, surely it follows ~ forUori 
that our jurisdiction is adequate to redress the "egregious" situation 
in which the state courts did not even accord a fair hearing on the 
Fourth Amendment claim. The "exception" thus may appear to make 
the holding more palatable, but it merely highlights the lack of a 
~
"constitutional" rationale for today' s constriction of habeas jurisdiction. 
Thus, the constitutional "interest balancing" approach to this 
case is untenable, and I can only view the constitutional garb in which 
the Court dresses its result as a disguise fQr rejectiQn ai th~~ong-
-.... ,..,.,. ............... -we 
standing principle that there are no 11 second class" constitutional rights 







even more troubling ground of today' s decision 
ortent for habeas 'uris diction generally -- may be 
read the statute as requiring the District Courts routinely to deny 
--- w ,. -- _____.....,._- -- --
prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the .. ~ 
United States" habeas relief as a matter of 'udicial "discretion" 2_ 
/ 
a "discretion" created today contrary to the expre statutory 
language -- because such claims are "different in kind" from other 
constitutional violations in that they "do not 'impugn the integrity of 
the fact-finding process," ~. at 12, and because application of 
such constitutional strictures "often frees the guilty." Ante, at 22. 
Much in the Court's opinion suggests that a construction of the habeas 
statutes to deny relief for non-"guilt-related" constitutional violations, 
based on vague notions of comity and federalism, see, ~·, ante , at 
n. 11, is the actual premise for today' s decision. This is a harbinger 
of future eviscerations of the habeas statutes that plainly does violence 
-------~ ...._ ....... -
to Congressional power to frame the statutory contours of habeas 
jurisdiction . If today' s decision were only that erroneous state 
.... -
court resolutions of Fourth Amendment claims did not render the 
defendant's resultant confinement "in violation of the Constitution" 
its premise of comity and federalism, even though exposed primarily 
in footnotes, would have been unnecessary, I am justified therefore 
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in apprehending that the groundwork is being laid today for a drastic 
......... . ~~
......... 
withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all grounds, then ......... - ~ "'=:=:-== ~ -
at least for claims -- for example, of claims of unconstitutional 
detention, of double jeopardy, self-incrimination, Miranda, invalid 
D.. I 
identification procedure, or entrapment -- which this Court later 
decides are not "guilt-related. 11 For we are told that "[r]esort to 
habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to assure that no 
innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty, results in 
serious instrusions on values important to our system of government, 11 
including waste of judicial resources, lack of finality of criminal con-
victions, friction between the federal and state judiciaries, and 
incursions on "federalism. 11 Ante, at n. 30. We are told that federal 
determination of Fourth Amendment claims merely involves 11an issue 
that has no bearing on the basic justice of [the defendant's] incarcera-
tion, 11 ibid., and that "the ultimate question [in the criminal process 
should invariably be] guilt or innocence. 11 Ante, at 22; see also id., at 
n. 29; id. ,'at 22, quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237 
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting). We are told that the "policy arguments" 
of respondents to the effect that federal courts must be the ultimate 
arbiters of federal constitutional rights, and that our certiorari juris-
diction is inadequate to perform this task, "stem from a basic mistrust 
of the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication of 
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federal constitutional rights 11 ; the Court, however, finds itself 
"unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appro-
priate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate 
courts of the several States", and asserts that it is 11unpersuaded 11 
by "the argument that federal judges are more e?Cpert in applying 
federal constitutional law" because "there is 1nointrinsic reason 
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should 'make him more 
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to tha applica-
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse. 11 Ante, 
at n. 34. Finally, a revisionist history of the genesis and growth 
of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction is attempted, something wholly 
irrelevant, if today 1 s decision were actually constitutionally rather 
than statutorily based. Ante, Part I I. 
To the extent the Court is actually premising its holding on 
an interpretation of 28 U.S. C. § 2243 or § 2254, it is overruling the 
,....... --
heretofore settled principle that federal habeas relief is available to 
~ '-----~~ ......,. ~ 
redress any denial of asserted constitutional rights, whether or not 
denial of the right affected the truth or fairness of the fact-finding 
process. As MR. JUSTICE POWELL recognized in proposing that 
the Court reevaluate the scope of habeas relief as a statutory matter 
in Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 251 (1973) (concurring 
opinion), "on petition for habeas corpus on collateral review filed in 
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a federal district court, whether by state prisoners under 28 U.S. C. 
§ 2254 or federal prisoners under § 2255, the present rule is that 
Fourth Amendment claims may be asserted and the exclusionary rule 
must be applied in precisely the same manner as on direct review." 
This Court has on numerous occasions accepted jurisdiction over 
collateral attacks by state prisoners premised on Fourth Amendment 
violations, often over dissents that as a statutory matter such claims 
should not be cognizable. See, ~·, Lefkowitz v. Newsor~1.e, 420 U.S. 
283, 292-293 & nn. 3, 9 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); 
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Adam~ v. Williams, 407 U.S. 
143 (1972); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969); 
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 
U.S. 234 (1968); Wardenv. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Consideration 
of the merits in each of these decisions reaffirmed the unrestricted 
scope of habeas jurisdiction, but each decision must be deemed over-
.!.!/ 
ruled by today' s holding. 
~ ..... ..,.. 
Federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amendment claims of 
state prisoners was merely one manifestation of the principle that 
"conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be per-
mitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional 
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rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest 
opportunity for plenary federal review." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 301, 
424 (1963). This Court's precedents have been "premised in large 
part on a recognition that the availability of collateral remedies is 
necessary to insure the integrity of proceedings at and before trial 
where constitutional rights are at stake. Our decisions leave no do'.Abt 
that the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that 
unconstitutionally seized evidence was admitted against them." Kaufman 
v. United States, sup~~· at 225. Some of those decisions explicitly 
considered and rejected the "policies" referren. to by the Court in 
footnote 30 ante. ~·, Brown v. Allen, supra; Fay v. Noia, supra; 
Kaufman v. United States, supra. There were no "assumptions" with 
respect to the construction of the habeas statutes, but reasoned decisio::.::; 
that those policies were an insufficient justification for shutting the 
federal habeas door to litigants with federal constitutional claims in 
light of such couptervailing considerations as "the necessity that federal 
....... --- -
courts have the 'last say' with respect to questions of federal law, the 
____ .... ----~----------------~--------~--~----------------~ --------~~ ~ ~awa 
inadequacy of state procedures to raise and preserve federal clajms, 
the concern that state judges may be unsympathetic to federally created 
' . . 
rights, [and] the institutional constraints on the exercise of this Court's 
certiorari jurisdiction to review state convictions," id., at 225-226, as 
well as the fundamental belief "that adequate protection of constitutional 
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rights relating to the criminal trial process requires the continuing 
availability of a mechanism for relief. 11 Id., at 226. See generally, 
~·, Fay v. Noia, supra; Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
As Mr. Justice Harlan, who had dissented from many of the cases 
initially construing the habeas statutes, readily recognized, habeas 
jurisdiction as heretofore accepted by this Court was "not only con-
cerned with those rules which substantially affect the fact-finding 
apparatus of the original trial. Under the prevailing notions, Kaufman 
v. United States, supra, at 224-226, the threat of habeas serves as a 
necessary additional incentive for trial and app~llate courts throughout 
the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with 
established constitutional standards. 11 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 
244, 263-264 (1969) (dissenting opinion) (emphasis supplied). The avai!-
ability of collateral review assures "that the lower federal and state 
courts toe the constitutional line. 11 Id., at 264. "[H]abeas lies to in-
quire into every constitutional defect in any criminal trial, where the 
petitioner remains 1in custody 1 because of the judgment in that trial, 
unless the error committed was knowingly and deliberately waived or 
constitutes mere harmless error. That seems to be the implicit premise 
of Brown v. Allen, supra, and the clear purport of Kaufman v. United 
States, supra • . . . The primary justification given by the Court for 
extending the scope of habeas to all alleged constitutional errors is that 
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it provides a quasi -appellate review function, forcing trial and appellate 
courts in both the federal and state system to toe the constitutional 
mark." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 685-687 (1971) (opinion 
of Harlan, J. ). See also Brown v. Allen, supra, at 508 ("[N]o binding 
weight is to be attached to the State determination. The congressional 
requirement is greater. The State court cannot have the last say wl:len 
it, though on fair consideration of what procedurally may be deemed 
fairness, may have misconceived a federal constitutional right.'~; Fay v. 
Noia, supra, at 422. In effect, habeas jurisdiction is a deterrent to 
unconstitutional actions by trial and appellate judges, and a safeguard 
to ensure that rights secured under the Constitution and federal laws 
are not merely honored in the breach. "[I]ts function has been to pro-
vide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to 
be intolerable restraints." Id., at 401-402. "[T]he historical role 
of the writ of habeas corpus [is that of] an effective and imperative 
remedy for detentions contrary to fundamental law. 11 Id., at 438. 
At least since Brown v. Allen, supra, detention emanating 
from judicial proceedings in which constitutional rights were denied 
has been deemed "contrary to fundamental law, 11 and all constitutional 
claims have thus been cognizable on federal habeas corpus. There is 
no foundation in the language or history of the habeas statutes for dis-
criminating between types of constitutional transgressions, and efforts 
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to relegate certain categories of claims to the status of ''second-class 
15/ 
rights" by excluding them from that jurisdiction have been repulsed. 
To~nion, however, marks the triumph of those who have sought 
to establish a hierarchy of constitutional rights, and to deny for all 
practical purposes a federal forum for review of those rights con-
Without even the slightest deference 
\ 
sidered less worthy or important. 
to principles of stare decisis or acknowledging Congress' failure for 
two decades to alter the habeas statutes in light of our interpretation 
of congressional iPtent to render all federal constitutional contentions 
cognizable on habeas, the Court today rewrites Congress' jurisdictional 
statutes as heretofore construed and bars access to federal courts by --
state prisoners with constitutional claims distasteful to a majority of 
my Brethren. But even ignoring principles of stare decisis dictating 
that Congress is the appropriate branch for embarking on such a funda-
mental shift in the jurisdiction of the federal courts, I can find no 
adequate justification elucidated by the Court for concluding that habeas 
relief for all federal constitutional claims is no longer compelled under 
the reasoning of Brown, Fay, and Kaufman. 
I would address the Court's concerns for effective utilization of 
scarce judicial resources, finality principles, federal-state friction, 
and notions of "federalism" only long enough to note that such concerns 
carry .no more force with respect to non-"guilt-related" constitutional 
claims than they do with respect to claims that affect the accuracy of 
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the fact-finding process. Congressional conferral of fe:deral habeas 
jurisdiction for the purpose of entertaining petitions from state 
prisoners necessarily manifested a conclusion that such concerns 
could not be controlling, and any argument for discriminating among 
constitutional rights must therefore depend on the nature of the con-
stitutional right involved. 
The Court, as it must to justify such discrimination, focusing 
on Fourth Amendment rights, argues that habeas relief for non- 11 guilt-
related 11 constitution.al claims is not mandated because such claims do 
not affect the 11basic justice•• of a defendant 1s detention, see ante, at 
n. 30; this is presumably because the "ultimate goal 11 of the criminal 
JJ?j 
justice system is "truth and justice. 11 ~·, ante, at 22-23 & n. 2 9. 
This denigration of constitutional guarantees and constitutionally man-
dated procedures, relegated by the Court to the status of mere 
utilitarian tools, must appall citize__g,s taught to expect judicial respect 
> = :=- = =-
and support for their constitutional rights. Even if punishment of the 
11 guilty•• were society• s highest value -- and procedural safeguards 
I 
denigrated to this end -- in a constitution that a majority of the mem-
I 
hers of this Court would prefer, that is not the ordering of priorities 
under the Constitution forged by the Framers, and this Court• s sworn 
duty is to uphold that Constitution and not to frame our own. The pro-
cedural safeguards mandated in the tramers 1 Constitution are not admonitions 
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to be tolerated to the extent they serve functional purposes that ensure 
that the "guilty" are punished and the "innocent" freed; rather, every 
guarantee enshrined in the Constitution, our basic charter and the 
guarantor of our most precious liberties, is by it endowed with an 
independent vitality and value, and this Court is not free to curtail 
those constitutional guarantees even to punish the most obviously g1'..llty. 
Particular constitutional rights that do not affect the fairness of fact-
finding procedures cannot for that reason be denied at the trial itself. 
What possible justification then can there be for denying vindication 
of such rights on federal habeas when state courts do deny those rights 
at trial? To sanction dis respect and dis regard for the Constitution in 
the name of protecting society from lawbreakers is to make the govern-
ment itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our ultimatf> 
1]_1 
freedom and liberty depends. "The history of American freedom 
is, in no small measure, the history of procedure, 11 Malinski v. New 
York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J. ), and as 
Mr. Justice Holmes so succinctly reminded us, it is ••a less evil that 
some criminals should escape than that the Government should play an 
ignoble part. 11 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1927) 
(dissenting opinion). 11 [I]t is an abuse to deal too casually and too lightly 
with rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, even though they 
involve limitations upon State power and may be invoked by those morally 
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unworthy. 11 Brown v. Allen, supra, at 498. Enforcement of federal 
constitutional rights that redress constitutional violations directed 
against the 11 guilty 11 is a particular function of federal habeas review, 
lest judges trying the 11morally unworthy 11 be tempted not to execute 
the supreme law of the land. State judges popularly elected may have 
difficulty resisting popular pressures not experienced by federal judges 
given tenure designed to immunize them from such influences. The 
federal habeas statutes reflect the Congressional judgm.ent that such 
detached federal r eview is a salutary safeguard against any detention 
of an individual 11in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States. 11 
Federal courts have the duty to carry out the congressionally 
assigned responsibility to shoulder the ultimate burden finally to 
adjudge whether detentions violate federal law, and today• s decision 
substantially denies that duty. The Court does not, because it cannot, 
dispute that institutional constraints totally preclude any possibility 
that this Court can adequately oversee whether state determinations 
J&l 
properly apply to federal law. However, although I fully agr~e that 
state courts 11have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal 
liberties and to uphold federal law, 11 and that there is no 11 generallack 
of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and 
appellate courts of the several states, 11 and further may assume that 
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federal judges are not 11 more expert in applying federal constitutional 
law;• ante, at n. 34, I cannot agree that it follows that, as the Court 
today holds, federal court determination of almost all Fourth Amend-
ment claims of state prisoners should be barred, and state court 
resolution be insulated from the federal review Congress intended. 
For as Mr. Justice Frankfurter so aptly framed the issue in rejecting 
similar contentions in construing the habeas statutes in Brown v. Allen, 
supra: 
11 Congres s could have left the enforcement of federal 
constitutional rights governing the administration of 
criminal justice in the States exclusively to the State 
courts. These tribunals are under the same duty as the 
federal courts to respect rights under the United States 
Constitution. • . . It is not for us to determine whether 
this power should have been vested in the federal courts. 
[T]he wisdom of such a modification in the law is 
for Congress to consider, particularly in view of the effect 
of the expanding concept of due process upon enforcement 
by the States of their criminal laws. It is for this Court 
to give fair effect to the habeas corpus jurisdiction as 
enacted by Congress. By giving the federal courts that 
jurisdiction, Congress has imbedded into federal legis-
lation the historic function of habeas corpus adapted to 
reaching an enlarged area of claims. 
11
• • • But the prior State determination of a claim 
under the United States Constitution cannot foreclose 
consideration of such a claim, else the State court would 
have the final say which the Congress, by the A'"t of 186 7, 
provided it should not have. 11 Id., at 499-500. 
11State adjudication of questions of law cannot, under the 
habeas corpus statute, be accepted as binding. It is 
precisely these questions that the federal judge is com-
manded to decide. 11 Id., at 506. 
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••congress has the power to distribute among the 
courts of the States and of the United States juris-
diction to determine federal claims. It has seen 
fit to give this Court power to review errors of 
federal law in State determinations, and in addition 
to give to the lower federal courts power to inquire 
into federal claims, by way of habeas corpus •... 
But it would be in disregard of what Congress has 
expressly required to deny State prisoners access 
to the federal courts. 
11 
••• Insofar as this jurisdiction enables federal 
district courts to entertain claims that State Supreme 
Courts have denied rights guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution, it is not a case of a lower court 
sitting in judgment on a higher court. It is merely_ 
one aspect of respecting the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution '"'hereby federal law is higher than State 
law. It is for the Congress to designate the member 
in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary to express 
the higher law. The fact that Congress has authorized 
district courts to be the organ of the higher law rather 
than a Court of Appeals, or exclusively this Court, 
does not mean that it allows a lower court to overrule 
a higher court. It merely expresses the choice of 
Congress how the superior authority of federal law 
should be asserted. 11 Id. , at 508-510 (emphasis 
supplied). 
Congress• action following Townsend v. Sain, supra, and Fay 
v. Noia, supra, emphasized 11the choice of Congress how the superior 
authority of federal law should be asserted 11 in federal courts. Townsend 
v. Sain outlined the duty of federal habeas courts to conduct fact-finding 
hearings with respect to petitions brought by state prisoners, and Fay v. 
Noia defined the contours of the ••exhaustion of state remedies•• pre-
requisite in § 2254 in light of its purpose of according state courts the 
first opportunity to correct their own constitutional errors. Congress 
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expressly modified the habeas statutes to incorporate the Towns end 
standards so as to accord a limited and carefully circumscribed 
~judicata effect to the factual determinations of state judges. But 
Congress did not alter the principle of Brown, Fay, and Kaufman that 
collateral relief is to be available with respect to any constitutional 
claim and that federal district judges, subject to review in the Courts 
of Appeals and this Court, are to be the spokesmen of the supremacy 
of federal law. Indeed, subsequent congressional efforts to amend 
those jurisdictional statutes to effectuate the result that my Brethren 
accomplish by judicial fiat have consistently proved unsuccessful. 
There remains, as noted before, no basis whatsoever in the language 
or legislative history of the habeas statutes for establishing such a 
hierarchy of federal rights; certainly there is no constitutional war ran~ 
in this Court to override a Congressional determination respecting 
federal court review of decisions of state judges determining constitu-
tional claims of state prisoners. 
In any event, respondents' contention that Fourth Amendment 
claims, like all other constitutional claims, must be cognizable on 
habeas, does not rest on the ground attributed to them by the Court 
that the state courts are rife with animosity to the constitutional man-
dates of this Court. It is one thing to assert that state courts, as a 
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general matter, accurately decide federal constitutional claims; it 
is quite another to generalize from that limited proposition to the 
conclusion that, despite congressional intent that federal courts 
sitting in habeas must stand ready to rectify any constitutional 
errors that are nevertheless committed, federal courts are to be 
judicially precluded from ever considering the merits of whole 
categories of rights which are to be accorded less procedural pro-
tection merely because the Court says they do not affect the accuracy 
or fairness of the fact-finding process. 11 Under the guise of fashioning 
a procedural rule, we are not justified in wiping out the practical 
efficacy of a jurisdiction conferred by Congress on the District Courts. 
Rules which in effect treat all these cases indiscriminately as frivolous 
do not fall far short of abolishing this head of jurisdiction. 11 Brown v. 
Allen, supra, at 498-499. To the extent state trial appellate judges 
faithfully, accurately, and assiduously apply federal law and the con-
stitutional principles enunciated by the federal courts, such determina-
tions will be vindicated on the merits when collaterally attacked. But 
to the extent federal law is erroneously applied by the state courts, 
there is no authority in this Court to deny defendants the right to have 
11_/ 
those errors ameliorated by way of federal habeas. Furthermore, 
some might be expected to dispute the academic 1 s dictum seemingly 
accepted by the Court that a federal judge is not necessarily more skilled 
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than a state judge in applying federal law. See ante, at n. 34. For 
it may well be argued that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 
proceeds on a different premise. 
If proof of the necessityof the federal habeas jurisdiction were 
required, the disposition by the state courts of the underlying Fourth 
Amendment issues presented by these cases supplies it. In No. 74- 1055, 
respondent was arrested pursuant to a statute which obviously is un-
constitutional under Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 
( 1972). Even apart irom its vagueness and concomitant potential for 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, the statute purports to 
criminalize the presence of one unable to account for his presence in 
a situation where a reasonable person might believe that public safety 
demands identification. See ante, at n. 1. It is no crime in this countr ~; 
not to have 11identification papers 11 on one 1 s person, and the statute is 
a palpable effort to enable police to arrest individuals on the basis of 
mere suspicion, and to facilitate detention even when there is no probable 
cause to believe a crime has been or is likely to be committed. See 
405 U.S., at 168-170. Without elaborating on the various arguments 
buttressing this result, including the self-incrimination aspects of the 
ordinance and its attempt to circumvent Fourth Amendment safeguards 
in a situation that, under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ( 1968), would at 
most permit law enforcement officials to conduct a protective search 
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for weapons, I would note only that the ordinance, due to the Court's 
failure to address its constitutionality today, remains in full force 
and effect, thereby affirmatively encouraging further Fourth Amend-
ment violations. Moreover, the fact that only a single state judge 
ever addressed the validity of the ordinance, and the lack of record 
evidence as to why or how he rejected respondent's claim, gives me 
pause as to whether there is any real content to the Court's "exception" 
for bringing Fourth Amendment claims on habeas in situations in which 
state prisoners were not accorded an opportunity for a full and fair 
state court resolution of those claims; that fact also makes irrelevant 
the Court's presumption that deterrence is not furthered when there is 
federal habeas review of a search-and-seizure claim that was erron-
eously rejected by "two or more tiers of state courts." Ante, at 23. 
Even more violative of constitutional safeguards is the manner 
in which the Nebraska courts dealt with the merits in respondent Rice's 
case. Indeed, the method in which Fourth Amendment principles were 
applied in the Nebraska Supreme Court is paradigmatic of Congress' 
concern respecting attempts by state courts to structure Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence so as not to upset convictions of the "guilty" or the 
"unworthy. " As Judge Urbom fully detailed in two thorough and thoughtful 
opinions in the District Court on Rice's petition for habeas, the affidavit 
upon which the Omaha police obtained a warrant and thereby searched 
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Rice's apartment was clearly deficient under prevailing constitutional 
standards, and no extant exception to the warrant requirement justified 
the search absent a valid warrant. Yet the Nebraska Supreme Court 
upheld the search on t·he alternative ai!td .obviously untenable ground 
that there is no Fourth Amendment violation if a defective warrant is 
supplemented at a suppression hearing by facts that theoretically co'.J.ld 
have been, but were not, presented to the issuing magistrate. Such a 
construction of the Fourth Amendment would obviously abrogate the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and the principle that 
its "protection consists in requiring that those inferences [as to whether 
the data available justify an intrusion into a person 1 s privacy] be drawn 
by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the 
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). Yet the 
Court today even casts doubt on that heretofore unquestioned precept of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by reserving the question whether 
such supplementation can retrieve official action from the realm of 
unconstitutionality. See ante, at n. 3. Particularly in an area such as 
the Fourth Amendment, where principles guiding police behavior should 
be as simple and unambiguous as possible, . this novel suggestion is totally 
unacceptable. Indeed, it would even permit police officials to escape 
liability in such situations when damage actions are brought by innocent 
- 27 -
victims of a search, since the officers could claim they believed in 
reasonable good faith that all evidence need no longer be presented 
to a neutral magistrate. It is disturbing that the Court simply ignores 
the statement of Mr. Justice Har!an, speaking for the Court in rejecting 
a similar contention in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n. 8: 
"Under the cases of this Court, an otherwise insufficient affidavit 
cannot be rehabilitated by testimony concerning information possessed 
by the affiant when he sought the warrant but not disclosed to the issuing 
magistrate. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1. A contrary 




Other aspects of today• s decision are deserving of comment but 
one particularly merits special attention. Respondents, relying on the -------
explicit holding of Fay v. Noia, supra, that a petition for a writ of 
certiorari is not a necessary predicate for federal habeas relief, and 
accepting at face value the clear import of our prior habeas cases that 
all unconstitutional confinement may be challenged on federal habeas, 
contend that any new restriction on state prisoners 1 ability to obtain 
• ,e,,.., ~~- ...... '-' ,_ 
ever, dismisses respondents 1 effective inability to have a single federal 
court pass on their federal constitutional claims with the remark that 
- 28 -
11 respondents were, of course, free to file a timely petition for 
certiorari prior to seeking federal habeas relief.'' Ante, at 36. 
Of course, federal review in this Court is a matter of grace and 
is grace seldom bestowed? The failure to limit today' s ruling to 
prospective application stands in sharp contrast to recent cases that 
have so limited decisions expanding or affirming constitutional 
rights. To be sure, the fact that the time limits to seeking relie£ 
under our certiorari jurisdiction with respect to criminal cases emanating 
from state courts are EEE.- jurisdictional would dictate that respondents 
are at least free to file out-of-time certiorari petitions; under the 
Court's "direct review 11 distinction delineated today, we would still 
have authority to address the substance of respondents 1 eminently 
meritorious Fourth Amendment claims. But I have little confidence 
that four Justices would agree which only underscores Congress' wisdom 
in mandating a broad federal habeas jurisdiction for the District Courts. 
These respondents are owed at least review in this Court since it shuts 
the doors of the District Courts in decisions which mark such a stark 
break with our precedents on the scope of habeas relief. 
IV 
In summary, while unlike the Court, I consider that the exclusion-
~~
arx: rule...is a constitutional ingredient of the Fourth Amendment, any 
i¢L ._......~~ ......,..,......, ...... ~~ 
modification of it requires a justification not provided today. The Court 
- 29 -
does not disturb the holding of Mapp v. Ohio that, as a matter of 
federal constitutional law, illegally obtained evidence must be ex-
eluded from the trial of a criminal defendant whose rights were 
transgressed during the search that resulted in acquisition of the 
evidence. In light of that constitutional rule it is a matter for 
Congress, not this Court, to prescribe what federal courts are to 
review claims of state prisoners of error by state courts. Until 
this decision, our cases have never departed from the construction 
of the habeas statutes as embodying a congressional intent that, 
however substantive constitutional rights are delineated or expanded, 
those rights may be asserted as a procedural matter under federal 
habeas jurisdiction. Employing the transparent tactic that today' s is 
.......___ --- ~ 
a decision construing the Constitution, the Court usurps an authority 
vested by the Constitution in the Congress to reassign federal judicial 
~
resRonaibility to review state prisoners' claims of failure of state courts -
to redress violations of their Fourth Amendment rights. Our jurisdic-
tion is eminently unsuited for that task, and as a practical matter the 
only result of today' s holding will be that denials by state courts of 
claims by state prisoners of violations of their Fourth Amendment rights 
will go unreviewed by a federal tribunal. I fear that the same treatment 
ultimately will be accorded state prisoners 1 claims of violations of other 
constitutional rights; thus the potential ramifications of this case for 
- 30 -
federal habeas jurisdiction generally are ominous. The Court no 
longer is content just to restrict the constitutional rights of the 
citizenry, it now is embarked on a campaign to water down all such 
rights by the device of foreclosing resort to the federal habeas remedy 
for their redress. 
------------1 would affirm the judgments of the Courts of Appeals. 
FOOTNOTES 
I/ 
I say "ostensibly" secured both because it is clear that 
the Court has yet to make its final frontal assault on the exclusionary 
holding that the Fourth Amendment has no substantive content whatso-
ever, See, ~' United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, -- U.S. 
( 1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), and cases cited therein. 
2/ 
28 U.S. C. § 2254 provides: 
§ 2254. State custody; remedies in State courts. 
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a 
circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an 
applicat~ for a writ of habeas corpu.s in behalf of 
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a 
State court only on the g_ro~ that he is in S:!,Stody 
in violation or the consti~tion or la;-; or treaties --of the nit tates. 
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus 
in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless 
it appears that the applicant has exhausted the rem-
edies available in the courts of the State, or that 
there is either an absence of available State correc-
tive process or the existence of circumstances 
rendering such process ineffective to protect the 
rights of the prisoner. 
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have 
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of 
the State, within the meaning of this section, if he 
has the right under the law of the State to raise, 
by any available procedure, the question presented. 
At r • 
~~~ 
FN- 2 
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal 
court by an application for a writ of habeas corpus 
by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of 
a State court, a determination after a hearing on 
the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court 
of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which 
the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer 
or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a 
written finding, written opinion, or other reliable 
and adequate w:r:itten indicia, shall be presumed to 
be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or 
it shall otherwise appear, or the respondent shall 
admit --
( 1) that the merits of the factual dispute 
were not resolved in the State court hearing; 
( 2) that the factfinding procedure employed 
by the State court was not adequate to afford 
a full and fair hearing; 
(3) that the material facts were not adequately 
developed at the State court hearing; 
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of 
the subject matter or over the person of the 
applicant in the State court proceeding; 
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the 
State court, in deprivation of his constitutional 
right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him 
in the State court proceeding; 
( 6) that the applicant did not receive a full, 
fair, and adequate hearing in the State court 
proceeding; or 
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied 
due process of law in the State court proceeding; 
(8) or unless that part of the record of the 
State court proceeding in which the determination 
of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a 
determination of the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support such factual determination, is produced 
as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court 
on a consideration of such part of the record as a 
whole concludes that such factual determination is 
not fairly supported by the record: 
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the 
Federal court, when due proof of such factual determina-
tion has been made, unless the existence of one or more 
FN- 3 
of the circumstances respectively set forth in 
paragraphs numbered (I) to (7), inclusive, is 
shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or 
is admitted by the respondent, or unless the 
court concludes pursuant to the provisions of 
paragraph numbered (8) that the record in the 
State court proceeding, considered as a whole, 
does not fairly support such factual determina-
tion, the burden shall rest upon the applicant 
to establish by convincing evidence that the 
factual determination by the State court was 
erroneous. 
(e) 1f the applicant challenges the sufficiency 
of the evidence adduced in such State court 
proceeding to support the State court's determina-
tion of a factual issue made therein, the applicant, 
if able, shall produce that part of the record 
pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support such determination. If the 
applicant, because of indigency or other reason is 
unable to produce such part of the record, then 
the State shall produce such part of the record and 
the Federal court shall direct the State to do so 
by order directed to an appropriate State official. 
If the State cannot provide such pertinent part of 
the record, then the court shall determine under 
the existing facts and circumstances what weight 
shall be given to the State court's factual deter-
mination. 
(f) A copy of the official records of the State 
court, duly certified by the clerk of such court to 
be a true and correct copy of a finding, judicial 
opinion, or other reliable written indicia showing 
such a factual determination by the State court 
shall be admissible in the Federal court proceeding. 
3/ 
§ 2243. Issuance of writ; return; hearing; decision. 
A court, justice or judge entertaining an application 
for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the 
writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show 
cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it 
FN- 4 
appea:rs from the application that the applicant 
or person detained is not entitled thereto. 
The writ, or order to show cause shall be 
directed to the person having custody of the 
person detained. It shall be returned within 
three days unless for good cause additional time, 
not exceeding twenty days, is allowed. 
The person to wh0m the writ or order is 
directed shall made a return certifying the true 
cause of the detention. 
When the writ or order is returned a day shall 
be set for hearing, not more than five days after 
the return unless for good cause additional time 
is allowed. 
Unless the application for the writ and the 
return present only issues of law the person to 
whom the writ is directed shall be required to 
produce at the hearing the body of the person 
detained. 
The applicant or the person detained may, 
under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the 
return or allege any other material facts. 
The return and all suggestions made against 
it may be amended, by leave of court, before 
or after being filed. 
The court shall summarily hear and deter-
mine the facts, and dispose of the matter as 
law and justice require. 
4/ 
See also, ~·, ante, at 18 ("the Court [in Kaufman v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969)] assumed that implementation of 
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration of search-and-
seizure claims upon collateral review of state convictions 11 ); id. , at 
21 (11 [t ]he answer [to the question whether Fourth Amendment claims 
may be raised by state prisoners in federal habeas corpus proceedings] 
is to be found by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against 
FN - 5 
the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth Amendment 
claims"); id., at 25 ([the additional contribution, if any, of the 
consideration of search-and- seizure claims of state prisoners on 
review is small in relation to the costs .... The view that the 
deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations would be furthered rests 
on the dubious assumption that law enf9rcement authorities would 
fear that federal habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or 
seizure that went undetected at trial and on appeal. "); id., at 26 ("in 
this context the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the 
effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the substantial 
societal costs of application of the rule per sis with special force"). 
5/ 
To the extent the Court is rendering a constitutional 
holding, there is obviously no distinction between claims brought by -
s:ate pris~ers under 28 U.S. C. § 2254 ~d tho~ brought ~y fede :-1 '2 '2. f!:" 'j-
prisoners under 28 U.S. C. § 2255. - ---............~ Thus, the Court overrules not 
only a long line of cases concerning availability of habeas relief to 
state prisoners, but also a similarly long line of cases concerning 
availability of counterpart § 2255 relief for federal prisoners. 
6/ 
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Kaufman v. United States, 




of the exclusionary rule Fourth Amendment claims should not, as a ? 
matter of statutory construction, be cognizable on federal habeas. 
~ . 
However, he never made the suggestion, apparently embraced by the ? 
Court today, that such claims cannot as a constitutional matter be 
entertained on habeas jurisdiction, even though Congress fashioned 
that jurisdiction at least in part to compensate for the inadequacies 
inherent in our certiorari jurisdiction on direct review. C£. ante, 
at 22 & n. 15. Indeed, Kaufman did not ignore the dissenting Justices• 
arguments; rather, it noted that habeas jurisdiction, apart from any 
effect on police behavior, serves the independent function of "insur[ing] 
the integrity of proceedings at and before trial where constitutional 
rights are at stake. 11 394 U.S., at 225. See also infra. 
As to the argument that our prior cases do not resolve the issue decided 
today because "only in the most exceptional cases will we consider 
issues not raised in the petition, 11 see ante, at n. 15, that claim is 
only valid to the extent the issue is one of construing congressional 
intent as to when with respect to cases properly withing the district 
court• s power to grant relief, habeas relief should nevertheless be 
denied as a matter of discretion. But the extent a person against whom 
unconstitutionally seized evidence was admitted at trial after a full and 
fair hearing is not "in custody in violation of the Constitution, 11 there 
would be no jurisdiction even to entertain a habeas petition, see note 2, 
supra, and such subject matter questions are always open -- and must 
FN- 7 
be resolved -- at any stage of federal litigation. See, ~·, Louisville 
& Nashville R. R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(h). 
$ 
It borders on the incredible to suggest that so many Justice for 
so long merely "assumed" to answer to such a basic jurisdictional 
question. 
7/ 
See also id., at 351, noting"inadmissibility of the illegally 
seized evidence in a subsequent prosecution of the search victim. " 
8/ 
Only once does the Court advert to any temporal distinction 
between direct review and collateral review as a possible reason for 
precluding the raising of Fourth Amendment claims during the former 
and not during the latter proceedings. See ante, at 25 (arguing that 
deterrence would not be "enhanced" by the risk "that a conviction 
obtained in state court and affirmed on direct review might be over-
turned in collateral proceedings years after the incarceration of the 
defendant"). Of course, it is difficult to see how the Court could 
constitutionalize any such asserted temporal distinctions, particularly 
in light of the differential speed with which criminal cases proceed 
even on direct appeal. 
9/ 
It is unnecessary here to expand upon my reasons for 
FN- 8 
my disagreement which are stated fully in my dissents in United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355 (1974) and United States v. 
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 544 (1975). 
10 I 
The failure to forthrightly to 
obviously a core defect in the Court's analysis. 
....... ---------- _,_, -
Congress has accorded the federal district courts a role in our 
constitutional scheme functionally equivalent to that of the Supreme 
Court with respect to review of state court resolutions of federal 
constitutional claims, it is evident that the Court's direct/ collateral 
review distinction for constitutional purposes simply collapses. 
Indeed, logically extended, the Court's analysis, which basically 
turns on the fact that law enforcement officials cannot anticipat e a 
second court finding constitutional errors after one court has fully 
and fairly adjudicated the claim and found it to be meritless, would 
preclude any Supreme Court review on direct appeal or even state 
appellate review if the trial court fairly addressed the Fourth Amend -
ment claim on the merits. The proposition is certainly frivolous 
if Mapp is constitutionally grounded. Yet such is the essential thrust 
of the Court's view that the unconstitutional admission of evidence is 
tolerable merely because police officials cannot be deterred from 
unconstitutional conduct by the possibility that a favorable "admission" 
FN- 9 
decision would be followed by a later unfavorable 11 exclusion 11 decision. 
The Court's arguments respecting the cost/benefit analysis 
of applying the exclusionary rule on collateral attack also have no 
merit. For all of the 11 costs 11 of applying the exclusionary rule on 
habeas should already have been incurred at the trial or on direct 
review if the state court had not misapplied federal constitutional 
principles. As such, these 11 costs 11 were deemed to be outweighed 
when the exclusionat•y rule was fashioned. The only proper question 
on habeas is whether federal courts, acting under congressional 
directive to have the last say as to enforcement of federal constitutional 
principles, are to permit the states free enjoyment of the fruits of a 
conviction which by definition were only obtained through violations 
of the constitution as interpreted in Mapp. Whether any 11 educative 11 
function is served by such habeas review, see ante, at 25, is a lesson 
that, tragically for an individual's constitutional rights, will not be 
lost on state courts after today' s decision. See infra. 
Another line of analysis exposes the fallacy of treating today' s 
holding as a constitutional decision. Constitutionally, no barrier bars 
a state defendant from immediately seeking a federal court's injunction 
against any state use of unconstitutionally seized evidence against him 
at trial. However, equitable principles have operated to foreclose 
cutting short the normal initial adjudication of such constitutional 
defenses in the course of a criminal prosecution, Dombrowski v. 
FN- 10 
Pfister, 380 u. 's. 479, 485 n. 3 (1965), subject to ultimate federal 
review either on direct review or collaterally through habeas. See, 
also, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 ( 1971). Moreover, considera-
tions of comity, now statutorily codified as the exhaustion requirement 
of § 2254, and not lack of power, dictate that federal review by delayed 
pending the initial state court determination. But delay only was the price, 
"else a rule of timing would become a rule circumscribing the power of 
the federal courts on habeas, in defiance of unmistakable congressional 
intent." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420 (1963); see id., at 417-426. 
The Court today, however, converts this doctrine dictating the timing 
of federal review in a doctrine precluding federal review; such action 
is in keeping with the regrettable recent trend of barring the federal 
courthouse door to individuals with meritorious claims. See, ~·, 
Warth Rizzo, E. Ky., Francis. Although the federal courts could 
have been the forum for the initial "opportunity for a full and fair 
hearing" of Fourth Amendment claims of state prisoners that the Court 
finds sufficient, non- constitutional concerns dictated temporary absten-
tion; but have so abstained, federal courts are, as a constitutional 
matter, now ousted from ever determining the claims, since the 
courts to which they initially deferred are all that this Court deems 
necessary for protecting rights essential to preservation of the Fourth 
Amendment. Such hostility to federal jurisdiction to redress violations 
of rights secured by the federal Constitution is profoundly disturbing. 
FN- 11 
11/ 
In arguing in the Court's "deterrence" idiom, I 
emphasize that I am accepting the Court's assumptions concerning 
the purposes of the exclusionary rule, only to demonstrate that on 
its own premises, today' s decision is insupportable. 
12/ 
Today' s decision is only another that overrides decisions 
construing the habeas statutes in order to cabin the scope of habeas 
' 
relief for criminal defendants. See, ~~ Francis v. Henderson, 
U.S • . __ , Estelle v. Williams, U.S. 
13/ 
Others might be claims of official surveillance of 
attorney- client communications, government acquisition of evidence 
through unconscionable means, see, ~·, Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165 (1952), denial of the right to a speedy trial, government 
administration of a "truth serum, see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 
( 1963), or the obtaining of convictions under statutes that contravene 
First Amendment rights when a properly drawn statute could have been 
applied to the particular defendant's conduct. 
14/ 
The overruling of Lefkowitz v. Newsome, decided only 
last Term, is particularly ironic. That case held that a state defendant 
FN- 12 
could file a federal habeas corpus petition asserting Fourth Amend-
ment claims, despite a subsequent guilty plea, when the state provided 
for appellate review of those claims. Three Justices dissented and 
would have held, as a statutory matter, that Fourth Amendment claims 
are not cognizable on federal habeas, but none suggested the "consti-
tutional'' thesis suggested by the Court as the ostensible ration decided 
for today' s cases. 
Although not expressly overruling Kaufman v. United States, 
394 U.S. 217 (1969) and its progeny involving collateral review of 
Fourth Amendment claims of federal prisoners (indeed, the Court 
accomplishes today' s results without expressly overruling or distinguish-
ing any of our diametrically opposed precedents), Kaufman obviously 
does not survive. This tactic has become familiar in earlier decisions 
-------~~----~----~--~ 
this Term. Cf. also, Hudgens v. NLRB, u.s. --· Francis v. 
Henderson, u.s. --· Greer v. Spock, u.s. 
15 I 
My Brother White's hypothetical of two confederates in 
crime, see post at , fully demonstrates the type of discrimination 
that Congress clearly sought to avoid if, out of the full universe of 
constitutional rights, certain rights could be vindicated only by resort 
to this Court• s certiorari jurisdiction; indeed the anomaly of today' s 
holding would be even more clear if, in that hypothetical situation, 
FN- 13 
the first defendant had sought, and we had denied, certiorari. 
16/ 
The Court also notes that ''attention . is diverted'' 
when trial courts addtess exclusionary rule issues, ante, at 22, and 
with the result that application of the rule ''often frees the guilty.'' 
Ibid. Of course, those ''arguments'' are true with respect to every 
constitutional guarantee governing administration of the criminal 
justice system. 
17/ 
''Experience should teach us to be most on our 
guard to protect liberty when the Government's 
purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom 
are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty 
by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to 
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. 11 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 
(1928). Seealsoid., at483, 485. 
"We are mindful of the reliance that society must 
place for achieving law and order upon the enforcing 
agencies of the criminal law. But insistence on 
observance by law officers of traditional fair 
procedural requirements is, from the long point of 
view, best calculated to contribute to that end. 
However much in a particular case insistence upon 
such rules may appear as a technicality that inures 
to the benefit of a guilty person, the history of the 
criminal law proves that tolerance of short- cut 
methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring 
effectiveness. 11 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 
301, 313 ( 1958). See also Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 
232 u.s. 383, 392-394 (1914). 
FN- 14 
18/ 
These considerations were powerfully articulated in 
Brown v. Allen, supra, at 491-494. Cf. also Fay v. Noia, supra, 
at 432-433; England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-417 
(1964). 
19/ 
See Brown v. Allen, supra, at 497-499. 11 The meri-
torious claims are few, but our procedures must ensure that those 
few claims are not stifled by undiscriminating generalities. 11 Id., 
at 498. 
20/ 
And, the Nebraska Supreme Court fell into patent error 
in citing Whiteley for the proposition that ''the affidavit may be 
supplemented by testimony of additional evidence known to the police. 11 
199 N. W. 2d 480, 488. 
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Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Holds for Stone v. Powell, No. 74-1055 and 
Wolff v. Ric, No. 74-1222 
Two cases are being held for Powell & Rice. 
1. United States v. Karathanos, No. 75-1402. 
The issue in this case is whether the exclusionary rule 
should be applied in circumstances where the federal officers 
executed a search warrant bot in compliance with Aguilar-
&pinelli. Federal agents obtained a warrant to search a 
restaurant basement for illegal aliens. The warrant was based 
on an affidavit of a •ederal investigator indicating: 
(i) many aliens had been arrested at the restaurant in the · 
past; (ii) a named informant, himself an illegal alien who 
had been employed by and resided in the restaurant basement 
for the previous year and a half, had informed the investigator 
that there were a number of illegal aliens living in the 
basement. The search revealed 7 aliena and respondents were 
indicted for harboring and concealing them. 
The DC granted respondent's motion to suppress 
the evidence derived from the search on the ground the affidavit 
2. 
failed to specify adequately the source of the informant's 
conclusion that the aliens were illegally in the country. 
CA 2 affirmed, rejecting the government's contention that 
the exclusionary rule should not be invoked where federal 
agents in good-faith attempt to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The S.G. raises the good faith issue here, expressly 
declining to seek review of CA 2's conclusions regarding the 
sufficiency of the warrant. There was no finding below that 
government agents acted in good faith since in the DC the 
government litigated only the question of whether the 
affidavit established probable cause. I will vote to grant, 
however, as the good faith issue is otherwise squarely 
presented. 
2. LaVallee v. Mungo, No. 75-696. 
In this case CA 2 ordered the granting of a writ 
of haeeas corpus upon the petition of a state prisoner who 
cla~ed that his arrest was without probable cause. I will 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Greg Palm DATE: June 24, 1976 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Stone and Powell 
" 
made a preliminary review of Justice Brennan's ' 
dissent, I record some random thoughts and questions that 
we may, or may not, think important or relevant enough to · 
justify changes in or additions to our opinion. 
1. Kaufman. As we anticipated, the dissent states that 
the effect of our decision is tooverrule Kaufman, and criticizes 
us for lacking the candor to concede this. In footnote 5, the 
dissent states that if our decision is a constitutional holding 
"there is obviously no distinction between claims brought by 
state prisoners until § 2254 and those brought by federal 
prisoners under § 2255. There is much to the view that Kaufman 
has been undercut. Subject to conferring with you, we might 
simply state in a note that although the holding in Kaufman 
under 2255 is not directly implicated in this case, our 
decision today necessarily undercuts the rationale of Kaufman. 
2. Perbaps the most telling point in the dissent is 
the argument that, by enunciating a constitutional rule, we 
hold in effect that federal courts do not have jurisdiction 
on habeas corpus to review the action of state courts with 




we should answer this argument. I do not view our decision 
as jurisdiction. It is clear, of c'ourse, that a federal court 
on habeas may decide whether there was a full and fair opportunity 
to present the claim in a state court. 
brings to mind Justice Stewart's inquiry whether 
there was room, under our rationale, for habeas review of some 
egregious blunder by a state court. I would like to try writing 
a note, as a reply to the dissent's assertion that we are 
denying habeas jurisdiction (denying the superior right of 
federal courts to review state judgments). We can say that 
the dissent apparently misconceives both the rationale and 
the scope of today's decision; that it is clear from the opinion 
that the fairness of the state courts'review of the Fourth 
Amendment claim is subject to federal scrutiny on habeas 
corpus. 
The difficulty would be in attempting to articulate 
or elaborate on what we mean by a "full and fair" opportunity. 
This sounds''procedural", and I would so interpret it in most 
situations. But procedural and substantive matters frequently 
are blurred and indistinguishable in fact. If a trial court 
declined, on a motion to suppress, to hear evidence as to ',, 
the Fourth Amendment violation, we would have a clear denial 




TO: Greg Palm 'nATE: June 24, 1976 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Stone and Powell 
Having made a preliminary review of Justice Brennan's 
dissent, I record some random thoughts and questions that 
we may, or may not, think important or relevant enough to 
justify changes in or additions to our opinion. 
1. Kaufman. As we anticipated, the dissent states that 
the effect of our decision is tooverrule Kaufman, and criticizes 
us for lacking the candor to concede this. In footnote 5, the 
dissent states that if our decision is a constitutional holding 
"there is obviously no distinction between claims brought by 
state prisoners until § 2254 and those brought by federal 
prisoners under § 2255o There is much to the view that Kaufman 
has been undercut. Subject to conferring with you, we might 
simply state in a note that although the holding in Kaufman 
under 2255 is not directly implicated in this case, our 
decision today necessarily undercuts the rationale of Kaufman. 
2. Perhaps the most telling point in the dissent is 
the argument that, by enunciating a constitutional rule, we 
hold in effect that federal courts do not have jurisdiction 
on habeas corpus to review the action of state courts with 
respect to Fourth Amendment claims. I'm inclined to think 
l. 
we should answer this argument. I do not view our decision 
' 
as jurisdiction. It is clear, of course, that a federal court 
on habeas may decide whether there was a full and fair opportunity 
to present the claim in a state court. 
This brings to mind Justice Stewart's inquiry whether 
there was room, under our rationale, for habeas review of some 
egregious blunder by a state court. I would like to try writing 
a note, as a reply to the dissent's assertion that we are 
denying habeas jurisdiction (denying the superior right of 
federal courts to review state judgments). We can say that 
the dissent apparently misconceives both the rationale and 
the scope of today 1 s decision; that it is clear from the opinion 
that the fairness of the state courts'review of the Fourth 
Amendment claim is subject to federal scrutiny on habeas 
corpus. 
The difficulty would be in attempt i ng to articulate 
or elaborate on what we mean by a"full and fair" opportunity. 
This sounds'procedural", and I would so interpret it in most 
situations. But procedural and substantive matters frequently 
are blurred and indistinguishable in fact. If a trial court 
declined, on a motion to suppress, to hear evidence as to 
the Fourth Amendment violation, we would have a clear denial 
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MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring. 'i/f.~ 
I concur in the Court's opinion. By way of dictum, and ;orr:/z( ' 
what hesitantly, the Court notes that the holding in this case le~ 
undisturbed the exclusionary rule as applied to criminal trials. For 
reasons stated in my dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 441 (1971), it seems clear to me that the 
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exclusionary rule has been operative lon,g enough to demonstrate its 
futility. The time has come to modify its reach, even if it is retained 
for a small and limited category of cases. 
Over the years, the strains imposed by reality, in terms of 
the costs to society and the bizarre miscarriages of justice that have 
been experienced because of the exclusion of reliable evidence when 
the "constable blunders", have led the Court to vacillate as to the 
rationale for deliberate exclusion of truth from the fact-finding process. 
The rhetoric has varied with the rationale to the point where the rule 
has become a doctrinaire result in search of validating reasons. 
In evaluating the exclusionary rule, it is important to bear in 
mind exactly what the rule accomplishes. Its function is simple --the 
exclusion of truth from the fact-finding process. Cf. Frankel, The 
Search for Truth-- An Umpireal View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. 
Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York, Dec. 16, 
1974. The operation of the rule is therefore unlike that of the Fifth 
Amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimination. A con-
fession produced after intimidating or coercive interrogation is in-
herently dubious. If a suspect's will has been overborne, a cloud 
hangs over his custodial admissions; the exclusion of such statements 
is based at least in part on their lack of reliability. This is not the 
case as to reliable evidence -- a pistol, a packet of heroin, counterfeit 
money, or the body of a murder victim-- which may be judicially 
declared to be the result of an "unreasonable" search. The 
reliability of such evidence is beyond question; its probative value 
is certain. 
This remarkable result, virtually unknown to the common-
law tradition, had its genesis in a case calling for the protection of 
private papers against governmental intrusions. Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See also Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 ( 1914). In Boyd, the Court held that private papers were 
inadmissible because of the Government's violation of t ,he Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments. In Weeks, the Court excluded private letters 
seized from the accused's home by a federal official acting without a 
warrant. In both cases, the Court had a clear vision of what it was 
seeking to protect. What the Court said in Boyd shows how far we 
have strayed from the original path: 
"The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited 
goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to 
avoid the payment thereof, are totally different 
things from a search for and seizure of a man's 
private books and papers for the purpose of obtain-
ing information therein contained, or of using them 
as evidence against him. The two things differ 
toto coelo." 116 U.S., at 623. (Emphasis added). 
In Weeks, the Court emphasized that the Government, under settled 
principles of common law, had no right to keep a person's private 
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papers. The Court noted that the case d~d not involve "burglar's 
tools or other proofs of guilt ...• 11 232 U.S., at 392 (Emphasis 
added). 
From this origin, the exclusionary rule has been changed in 
focus entirely. It is now used almost exclusively to exclude from 
evidence articles which are unlawful to be possessed or tools and 
instruments of crime. Unless it can be rationally thought that the 
Framers considered it essential to protect the liberties of the people 
to hold that which is unlawful to possess, then our constitutional 
course has taken a most bizarre tack. 
The drastically changed nature of judicial concern -- from 
the protection of personal papers or effects in one's private quarters 
to the exclusion of that which the accused had no right to possess --
is only one of the more recent anamolies of the rule. The original 
incongruity was the rule 1 s inconsistency with the general proposition 
that "our legal system does not attempt to do justice incidentally and 
to enforce penalties by indirect means. 11 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2181, 
at 6 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961). The rule is based on the hope that 
events in the courtroom or appellate chambers, long after the crucial 
acts took place, will somehow modify the way in which policemen 
conduct themselves. A more clumsy, less direct means of imposing 
sanctions is difficult to imagine, particularly since the is sue whether 
~~----------------~---~5 -
the policeman did indeed run afoul of the Fourth Amendment is often 
not resolved until years after the event. The "sanction" is par-
ticularly indirect when, as in No. 74-1222, the police go before a 
magistrate, who issues a warrant. Once the warrant issues, there 
is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply 
with the law. Imposing an admittedly indirect ••sanction" on the 
police officer in that instance is nothing less than sophisticated non-
sense, 
Despite this anamoly, the exclusionary rule now rests solely 
upon its purported tendency to deter police misconduct,
1 
United States 
v. Janis, __ U.S. __ (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 
338, 347 (1974), although, as we know, the rule has long been applied 
to wholly good-faith mistakes and to purely technical deficiencies in 
warrants. Other rhetorical generalizations, including the 11imperative 
of judicial integrity••, have not withstood analysis as more and more 
critical appraisals of the rule 1 s operation have appeared. See Oaks, 
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 665 ( 1970). Indeed, settled rules demonstrate that the 11 judicial 
integrity11 rationalization is fatally flawed, First, the Court has refused 
to entertain claims that evidence was unlawfully seized unless the 
claimant could demonstrate that he had standing to press the contention. 
- 6 -
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 16? ( 1969). If he could not, the 
evidence, albeit secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment, is 
admissible. Second, as one scholar has correctly observed: 
"[I]t is difficult to accept the proposition that 
the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence 
is necessary for 'judicial integrity' when no 
such rule is observed in other common law 
jurisdictions such as England and Canada, whose 
courts are otherwise regarded as models of 
judicial decorum and fairness. " Oaks, supra, 
at 66 9. 
Despite its avowed deterrent objective, proof is lacking that the ex-
clusionary rule, a purely judge-created device based on "hard cases", 
serves the purpose of deterrence. Notwithstanding Herculean efforts, 
no empirical study has been able to demonstrate that the rule does in 
fact have any deterrent effect. In the face of dwindling support for 
the rule some would go so far as to extend it to civil cases. United 
States v. Janis, supra. 
To vindicate the continued existence of this judge-made rule, 
it is incumbent upon those who seek its retention -- and surely its 
extension, to demonstrate that it serves its declared deterrent purpose 
and to show that the results outweigh the rule's heavy costs to rational 
enforcement of the criminal law. See, ~·, Killough v. United States, 
315 F. 2d 241 (1962). The burden rightly rests upon those who ask 
society to ignore trustworthy evidence of guilt, at the expense of setting 
obviously guilty criminals free to ply their trade. 
--------------------~~---- 7~-------------~ 
In my view, it is an abdication of judicial responsibility to 
exact such exorbitant costs from society purely on the basis of 
speculative and unsubstantiated assumptions. Judge Henry Friendly 
has observed: 
"[T]he same authority that empowered the Court 
to supplement the [fourth] amendment by the ex-
clusionary rule a hundred and twenty-five years 
after its adoption, likewise allows it to modify 
that rule as the 'lessons of experience' may 
teach. " Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929, 
952-953 (1965). 
In Bivens, I suggested that, despite its grave shortcomings, 
the rule perhaps need not be abandoned until some meaningful alter-
native could be developed to protect innocent persons aggrieved by 
police misconduct. With the passage of time, it now appears that the 
continued existence of the rule, as presently implemented, actually 
inhibits the development of any alternatives. The reason is quite 
simple: incentives for developing new procedures or remedies must 
remain minimal or nonexistent so long as the exclusionary rule is 
retained in its present form. 
It can no longer be assumed that other branches of government 
will act while judges cling to this draconian, discredited device in its 
present absolutist form. Legislatures are unlikely to create statutory 
alternatives or impose direct sanctions on errant police officers or on 
the public treasury by way of tort actions, so long as persons who commit 
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serious crimes continue to reap the enqrmous and undeserved 
benefits of the exclusionary rule. And of course, by definition 
the direct beneficiaries of this rule can be none but persons guilty 
of crimes. With this extraordinary "remedy" for Fourth Amend-
ment violations, however slight, inadvertent or technical, legis-
latures might assume that nothing more should be done, even though 
a grave defect of the exclusionary rule is that it offers no relief 
whatever to victims of overzealous police work who never appear in 
court. Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the 
Person, 64 Nw. U. L. Rev. l, 14 ( 196 9). And even if legislatures 
wer.e inclined to experiment with alternative remedies, they have no 
assurance that the judicially created rule will be abolished or even 
modified in response to such legislative innovations. The unhappy 
result, as I see it, is that alternatives will inevitably be stymied by 
rigid adherence on our part to the exclusionary rule. I venture to 
predict that overruling this judicially contrived doctrine -- or limit-
ing its scope to egregious, bad faith conduct -- would inspire a surge 
of activity toward providing some kind of statutory remedy for persons 
injured by police mistakes or misconduct. 
The Court's opinion today eloquently reflects something of the 
dismal social costs occasioned by the rule. Ante, at 21-23. As 
Mr. Justice White correctly observes today in his dissent, the 
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exclusionary rule constitutes a "senseless obstacle to arriving at the 
truth in many criminal trials. 11 Post, at __ . He also suggests that 
the rule be substantially modified "so as to prevent its application in 
those many circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by 
an officer acting in the good faith belief that his conduct comported 
with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief. 11 Post, 
at 
From its genesis in the desire to protect private papers, the 
exclusionary rule has now been carried to the point of potentially 
excluding from evidence the traditional corpus delicti in a murder or 
kidnapping case. See Mitchell v. New York, __ N.Y. 2d __ (1976), 
petition for cert. pending. Cf. Killough v. United States, supra. 
Expansion of the reach of the exclusionary rule has brought Cardozo 1 s 
grim prophecy in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 12, 150 N. E. 585, ~88 
( 1926), nearer and nearer to fulfillment: 
"A room is searched against the law, and the 
body of a murdered man is found. If the place 
of discovery may not be proved, the other 
circumstances may be insufficient to connect 
the defendant with the crime. The privacy of 
the home has been infringed, and the murderer 
goes free. • . . We may not subject society 
to these dangers until the Legislature has spoken 
with a clearer voice. 11 
Cassandra 
In view of the ~RKRRHxa-l~ke 
some comment is indicated. The dissent 
Court's opinion as laying the groundwork for a "drastic ~ 
withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all 
II grounds, then at least [for many] • 0 • Infra, at 
It refers variously to our opinion as a "novel reinterpre-
tation of the habeas statute", infra at_; as a "harbinger 
of future eviscerations of the habeas statutes", infra at 
. __ , as "rewrit l ing] Congress' jurisdictional statutes 
• . . and [barring] access to federal courts by state 
prisoners with constitutional claims distasteful to a 
majority" of the Court, infra at _ , 
10 or more prior decisions, infra at 
as overruling some 
. _, and as a 
"denigration of constitutional guarantees [that] must 
appall citizens taught to expect judicial respect" of 
constitutional rights. Infra at - · 
Despite these modest assessments of the Court's 
opinion the Republic still stands. We have said only 
that the judicially created exclusionary rule is not a 
personal constitutional right; that there is a difference, 
-
we think a critical one recognized for centures, between 
the function of courts at trial and on habeas corpus review; 
that this difference has peculiar force, as Mr. Justice 
Black noted, with respect to Fourth Amendment claims where 
"ordinarily the evidence seized can in no way have been 
untrustworthy . . • and indeed often . . . alone establishes 
beyond virtually any shadow of a doubt that the defendant 
is guilty", infra at 22; and that § 2254 does not require 
a federal court to apply the exclusionary rule on habeas 
corpus review absent a showing that the state prisoner was 
denied an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the 
Fourth Amendment claim. We do not say that the federal 
court lacks jurisdiction; we do hold that its acknowledged 
jurisdiction should be exercised only upon this showing. 
The dissent's perception of the violence we are 
asserted to have done to history and precedent applies 
a remarkably truncated view of both. If one looks to 
history and precedent, it would be difficult ·to find any 
support for the various charges made in the dissenting 
opinion. As scholars have observed (Bator, supra at . _, 
3. 
corpus - upon which the dissent relies as if it were 
written in the Magna Carta dates primarily from Mr. 
Justice Brennan's decision in Fay v. Noia, supra, decided 
only 13 years ago. These scholars also noted that the 
operative language of § 2254, that the dissent asserts we 
ignore, dates back to the 1867 Act when it was transparently 
clear that Congress intended only "to incorporate the 
common law uses and functions" of habeas corpus. See 
Oaks, supra at The dissent now criticizes the 
"revision" of Fay without the slightest acknowledgment of 
that easel 's sweeping revision of the relevant history. 
As to precedents, we have overruled none. It is fair 
to say that Kaufman, a decision under § 2255 that - only 
seven years ago - did overrule a number of decisions by 
Courts of Appeals, is now of limited ~~il~~y. At 
least the dictum therein with respect to the applicability 
of the exclusionary rule in § 2254 cases is indeed 
disapproved. To be sure, the language in some of our 
relevant cases over the past two decades has not always 
been consistent, but this is the first occasion on which 
the Court - after requested briefing and argument on the 
4. 
issue - has specifically and c~refully addressed the 
appropriate scope of federal habeas corpus review of 
Fourth Amendment claims. 
Our system of criminal justice, even prior to Fay and 
Kaufman, afforded a broader spectrum of carefully 
k;J 
articulated and applied rights ~ persons accused of crime 
than any other country in the world. This is conceded to 
be true even with respect to Great Britain, the country 
from whence we derived the common law, the writ of habeas 
corpus and most of the fundamental provisions of the Bill 
of Rights. 
The facts of the two cases we here decide illustrate 
H..,..,_J.~~~..aJ 
that no one fairly can BR say that ~ were deprived of 
their "day in court" with the full JUIRapa.i~ panoply of 
rights accorded under due process. Powell's claim of 
Fourth Amendment violation was reviewed before it reached 
us by no less five courts: the California trial court, 
the California Supreme Court (denying state habeas corpus), 
the United States District Court and the Court of Appeals. 
Rice's claim was considered by the trial and Supreme 
Courts of Nebraska, and - on habeas corpus - by the federal 
5. 
District Court and Courts of Appeals. The evidence that 
each defendant was guilty of murder is overwhelming. No 
assertion is seriously made that the Fourth Amendment 
claims were not fully and fairly considered by the state 
courts . There must be some limit, even under our most 
generous system, to repetitive review of the issue presented 
by these cases. 
In view of the Gasandra-like tone of the dissent, 
some comment is indicated. The dissent characterizes the 
Court's opinion as laying the groundwork for a "drastic 
withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all 
grounds, then at least [for many] ••• " Infra, at_. 
It refers to a "novel reinterpretation of the habeas 
statute", infra at -· As a "harbinger of future 
eviscerations of the habeas statutes", infra at_; "the 
Court today rewrites Congress' jurisdictional statutes 
• • 0 and bars access to federal courts by state prisoners 
with constitutional claims distasteful to a majority" of 
the Court, infra at ___ ; lists some 10 or more prior 
decisions which "must be deemed overruled by today's 
holding", infra at_; and concludes that this "denigration 
of constitutional guarantees [are] . • • relegated by the 
Court to the status of mere utilitarian tools [and] must 
appall citizens t .aught to expect judicial respect'' of 
constitutional rights. Infra at -· 
Despite these modest assessments of the Court's 
opinion the Republic still stands. We have said only 
2. 
that the judicially created ex~lusionary rule is not a 
personal constitutional right that there is a difference, 
we think a critical one recognized for centuries, between 
the function of courts at trial and on collateral review; 
that that difference has peculiar force, as Mr. Justice 
Black noted (infra at 22), with respect to Fourth Amendment 
claims where 11ordinarily the evidence seized can in no way 
have been untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and 
indeed often this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually 
any shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilt"; and 
that § 2254 does not require a federal court to ap~ly the 
exclusionary rule on habeas corpus review absent a showing 
that the state prisoner was denied an opportunity for 
full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment claim. 
We do not say that the federal court lacks jurisdiction; 
we do hold that its acknowledged jurisdiction should be 
exercised only upon this showing. 
The dissent's perception of the violence we are 
asserted to have done to history and precedent applies 
a "foreshortened" view of both. If one looks both to 
history and precedent, it would be difficult to find any 
support for the various charges made in the dissenting 
opinion. As scholars have noted (Bator, supra at . _, 
Oaks, supra at ___ ) the expansion of the scope of habeas 
corpus - upon which the dissent relies as if it were 
written in the Bill of Rights - dates primarily from Mr. 
Justice Brennan's decision in Fay v. ~. supra, decided 
3. 
only 13 years ago. These scholars noted that the operative 
language of § 2254, that the dissent asserts we ignore, 
dates back to the 1867 Act when it was transparently clear 
that Congress intended only "to incorporate the connnon law 
uses and functions" of habeas corpus. See Oaks, supra at 
Despite this history, the dissent now criticizes 
the "revision" of Fay's sweeping revision of the relevant 
history. As to precedents, we have overruled none. It is 
fair to say that Kaufman, a decision under 2255 that -
only seven years ago - did overrule a number of decisions 
by Courts of Appeals, is not of limited applicability. At 
least the dictum therein with respect to the applicability 
of the exclusionary rule in § 2254 cases, is indeed 
4. 
disapproved. To be sure, the language in some of our 
relevant cases over the past two decades has not always 
been consistent, but this is the first occasion on which 
the Court - after requested briefing and argument on the 
issue - has specifically and carefully addressed the 
appropriate scope of federal habeas corpus review of Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
Our system of criminal justice, even prior to Fay and 
Kaufman, afforded a broader spectrum of carefully 
. articulated and applied rights of persons accused of crime 
than any other country in the world. This is conceded to 
be true even with respect to Great Britain, the country 
from whence we derived the common law, the writ of habeas 
corpus and most of the fundamental provisions of the Bill 
of Rights. The decision today - indeed 
.. -
4. 
disapproved. To be sure, the language in some of our 
relevant cases over the past two decades has not always 
been consistent, but this is the first occasion on which 
the Court - after requested briefing and argument on the 
issue - has specifically and carefully addressed the 
appropriate scope of federal habeas corpus review oj Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
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articulated and applied rights of persons accused of crime 
than any other country in the world. This is conceded to 
be true even with respect to Great Britain, the country 
from whence we derived the common law, the writ of habeas 
corpus and most of the fundamental provisions of the Bill 
of Rights. The decision today - indeed 
Mr. Ju~tice M~rshall 
Mr. Just Lee Bl:.wkmun 
~Justice PJwell 
Mr. Justice R0hnquis t 
Mr. JusLice Stevens 
From : Mr . Just ice W:11 te 
~ 
Circulated: ________ ~_ 
lstfDRAFT Recirculated: ~ r?-~ \1, -
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 74-1055 AND 74-1222 
W. T. Stone, Warden, l . . h 
Petitioner, On Writ of Certwrar1 to t e 
74-1055 v. United St~tes Co_urt ?f Appeals 
for the Nmth C1rcmt. 
Lloyd Charles Powell. 
Charles L. Wolff, Jr., 
Warden, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the 
74-1222 v. United States Court of Appeals 
David L. Rice, 
for the Eighth Circuit. 
[June -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
For many of the reasons stated by MR. JusTICE BREN-
NAN, I cannot agree that the writ of habeas corpus should 
be any less available to those convicted of state crimes 
where they allege Fourth Amendment violations than 
where other constitutional issues are presented to the 
federal court. Under the amendments to the habeas 
corpus statute, which were adopted after Fay v. N oia, 
372 U. S. 391 ( 1963), and represented an effort by Con-
gress to lend a modicum of finality to state criminal 
judgments, I cannot distinguish between Fourth Amend-
ment and other constitutional issues. 
Suppose, for example, that two confederates in crime, 
Smith and Jones, are tried separately for a state crime 
and convicted on the very same evidence, including evi-
dence seized incident to their arrest allegedly made with-
out probable cause. Their constitutional claims are fully 
aired, rejected and preserved on appeal. Their convic-
tions are affirmed by the State's highest court. Smith, 
the first to be tried, does not petition for certiorari, or 
does so but his petition is denied. Jones, whose convio-
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tion was considerably later, is more successful. His peti-
tion for certiorari is granted and his conviction reversed 
because this Court, Without making any new rule of law, 
simply concludes that on the undisputed facts the arrests 
were made without probable cause and the challenged 
evidence was the~efore seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. The State must either retry Jones or re-
lease him, necessarily because he is deemed in custody 
in violation of the Constitution. It turns out that with-
out the evidence illegally seized, the State has no case; 
and Jones goes fr~e. Smith then files his petition for 
habeas corpus. He makes no claim that he did not have 
a full and fair hearjng in the state courts, but asserts that 
his Fourth Amendment claim had been erroneously de-
cided and that he is being held in violation of the Federal 
Constitution. He cites this Court's decision in Jones' 
case to satisfy any burden placed on him by § 2254 to 
demonstrate that the state court was in error. Unless 
the Court's reservation, in its present opinion, of those 
situations where the defendant has not had a full and 
fair hearing in the state courts is intended to encompass 
all those circumstances under which a state criminal 
judgment may be re-examined under § 2254-in which 
event the opinion is essentially meaningless and the judg-
ment erroneous-Smith's petition would be dismissed, 
and he would spend his life in prison while his colleague 
is a free man. I cannot believe that Congress intended 
this result. 
Under the present habeas corpus statute, neither Rice's 
nor Powell's applications for habeas corpus should be 
dismissed on the grounds now stated by the Court. I 
would affirm the judgments of the Courts of Appeals as 
being acceptable applications of the exclusionary rule 
applicable in state criminal trials by virtue of M app v .. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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I feel constrained to say, however, that I would join 
four or more other· Justices in substantially limiting the 
reach of the exclusionary rule as presently administered 
under the Fourth Amendment in federal and state crim-
inal trials. 
Whether I would have joined the Court's opinion in 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), had I then been· 
a Member of the Court, I do not know. But as time 
went on after coming to this bench, I became convinced 
that both Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), 
and Mapp v. Ohio had overshot their mark insofar as 
they aimed to deter lawless action by law enforcement 
personnel and that in many of its applications the ex-
clusionary rule was not advancing that aim in the slight-
est and that in this respect it was a senseless obstacle to 
arriving at the truth in many criminal trials. 
The rufe has been much criticized and suggestions 
have been made that it should be wholly abolished, but 
I would overrule neither Weeks v. United States nor 
Mapp v. Ohio. I am nevertheless of the view that the 
rule should be substantially modified so as to prevent 
its application in those many circumstances where the 
evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the 
good-faith belief that his conduct comported with exist-
ing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief. 
These are recurring situations; and recurringly evidence 
is excluded without any realistic expectation that its ex-
clusion will contribute in the slightest to the purposes of 
the rule, even though the trial will be seriously affected 
or the indictment dismissed. 
An officer sworn to uphold the law and to apprehend 
those who break it inevitably must make judgments 
regarding probable cause to arrest: is there reasonable 
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and 
that a particular suspect has committed it? Sometimes 
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the historical facts are disputed or are otherwise in 
doubt. In other situations the facts may be clear so 
far as they are known, yet the question of probable 
cause remain. In still others there are special worries 
about the reliability of secondhand information such as 
that coming from informants. In any of these situa-
tions, which occur repeatedly, when the officer is con-
vinced that he has probable cause to arrest he will very 
likely make the arrest. Except in emergencies, it is 
probable that his colleagues or superiors will participate 
in the decision, and it may be that the officer will secure 
a warrant, although warrantless arrests on probable cause 
are not forbidden by the Constitution or by state law. 
Making the arrest in such circumstances is precisely 
what the community expects the police officer to do. 
Neither officers nor judges issuing arrest warrants need 
delay apprehension of the suspect until unquestioned 
proof against him has accumulated. The officer may be 
shirking his duty if he does so. 
In most of these situations, it is hoped that the offi-
cer's judgment will be correct; but experience tells us 
that there will be those occasions where the trial or 
appellate court will disagree on the issue of probable 
cause, no matter how reasonable the grounds for arrest 
appeared to the officer and though reasonable men could 
easily differ on the question. It also happens that after 
the events at issue have occurred, the law may change, 
dramatically or ever so slightly, but in any event suffi-
ciently to require the trial judge to hold that there was 
not probable cause to make the arrest and to seize the 
evidence offered by the prosecution. It may also be, 
as in the Powell case now before us, that there is prob-
able cause to make an arrest under a particular criminal 
statute but when evidence seized incident to the arrest 
is offered in support of still another criminal charge, the 
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statute under which the arrest and seizure were made 
is declared unconstitutional and the evidence ruled in-
admissible under the exclusionary rule as presently 
administered. 
In these situations, and perhaps many others, exclud-
ing the evidence will not further the ends of the exclu-
sionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully 
apparent that in each of them the officer is acting as a 
reasonable officer would and should act in similar cir-
cumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way 
affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less 
willing to do his duty. It is true that in such cases the 
courts have ultimately determined that in their view the 
·officer was mistaken; but it is also true that in making 
constitutional judgments under the general language 
used in some parts of our Constitution, including the 
Fourth Amendment, there is much room for disagree-
ment among j;udges, each of whom is convinced that 
both he and his colleagues are reasonable men. Surely 
when this Court divides five to four on issues of prob-
able cause, it is not tenable to conclude that the officer 
was at fault or acted unreasonably in making the arrest. 
When law enforcement personnel have acted mis-
takenly, but in good faith and on reasonable grounds, 
and yet the evidence they have seized is later excluded, 
the exclusion can have no deterrent effect. The officers, 
if they do their duty, will act in similar fashion in 
similar circumstances in the future ; and the only con-
sequence of the rule as presently administered is that 
unimpeachable and probative evidence is kept from the 
trier of fact and the truth-finding function of proceed-
ings is substantially impaired or a trial totally aborted. 
Admitting the evidence in such circumstances does not 
render judges participants in Fourth Amendment viola-
tions. The violation, if there was one, has alrea.dy 
I 
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occurred and the evidence is at hand. Furthermore, 
there has been only mistaken, but unintentional and 
faultless, conduct by enforcement officers. Exclusion of 
the evidence does not cure the invasion of the defend-
ant's rights which he has already suffered. Where an 
arrest has been made on probable cause but the defend-
ant is acquitted, under federal law the defendant has no 
right to damages simply because his innocence has been 
proved. "A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he 
must choose between being charged with dereliction of 
duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, 
and being mulcted in damages if he does." Pierson v. 
Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 555 (1967). The officer is also 
excused from liability for "acting under a statute that 
he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later 
held unconstitutional, on its face or as applied." Ibid. 
There is little doubt that as far as civil liability is con-
cerned, the rule is the same under federal law where the 
officer mistakenly but reasonably believes he has prob-
able cause for an arrest. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the 
Court announced generally that officers of the Executive 
Branch of the Government should be immune from 
liability where their action is reasonable "in light of all 
the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief." 416 
U. S. 232, 247-248 (1974). The Court went on to say : 
"Public officials, whether governors, mayors or 
police, legislators or judges, who fail to make de-
cisions when they are needed or who do not act to 
implement decisions when they are made do not 
fully and faithfully perform the duties of their 
offices. Implicit in the idea that officials have some 
immunity-absolute or qualified-for their acts, is 
a recognition that they may err. The concept of 
immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that 
it is better to risk some error and possible injury 
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from such error than not to decide or act at all." 
!d., at 241- 242 (footnote omitted) . 
The Court has proceeded on this same basis in other 
contexts. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975); 
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975) . 
If the defendant in criminal cases may not recover for 
a mistaken but good-faith invasion of his privacy, it 
makes even less sense to exclude the evidence solely on 
his behalf. He is not at all recomponsed for the invasion 
by merely getting his property back. It is often contra-
band and stolen property to which he is not entitled to 
in any event. He has been charged with crime and is 
seeking to have probative evidence against him excluded, 
although often it is the instrumentality of the crime. 
There is very little equity in the defendant's side in these 
Circumstances. The exclusionary rule, a judicial con-
struct, seriously shortchanges the public interest as; 
presently applied, I would modify it accordingly_ 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Holds for Stone v. Powell, No. 74-1055 and Wolff 
v. Rice, No. 74-1222 
Three cases are being held for Powell and Rice. 
1. United States v. Karathanos, No. 75-1402. The issue 
in this case is whether the exclusionary rule should be applied 
in circumstances where the federal officers executed a search 
warrant not in compliance with Aguilar-Spinelli. Federal 
agents obtained a warrant to search a restaurant basement 
for illegal aliens. The warrant was based on an affidavit of 
a federal investigator indicating: (i) 11 aliens had been 
arrested at the restaurcnt in the past five years; and (ii) 
a named informant, himself an illegal alien who had been 
employed by and resided in the restaurant basement for the 
previous year and a half, had informed the investigator that 
there were a number of illegal aliens residing in the 
restaurant basement. The search revealed seven aliens. 
Respondents were indicted for harboring and concealing them. 
The DC granted respondent's motion to suppress the 
evidence derived from the search on the ground the affidavit 
failed to specify adequately the source of the informant's 
conclusion that the aliens were illegally in the country. 
CA2 affirmed (2-1), rejecting, inter alia the government's 
contention that the exclusionary rule should not be invoked 
where federal agents in good-faith attempt to comply with the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The S.G. raises the good faith issue here, expressly 
declining to seek review of CA2 1 s conclusions regarding the 
sufficiency of the affidavit as establishing probable cause 
for the search. Although there was no finding below with 
respect to whether government agents acted in good faith, 
that issue is otherwise squarely presented. I could join 
three to Grant. 
2. 
2. Lavallee v. Mungo, No. 75-696., In this case 
CA 2 ordered the granting of a writ of habeas corpus upon 
the petition of a state prisoner who claimed that his arrest 
was without probable cause. Since the prisoner was afforded 
an opportunity for full and fair litigation of this claim 
at trial and direct review, I will vote to grant, vacate 
and remand in light of Rice and Powell. 
3. Meeks v. Havener, No. 75-5416. Petitioner, 
an escapee, was convicted in state court of bank robbery 
after a warrantless search of his apartment turned up 
evidence that was not introduced at trial but which led to 
his indictment. 
The DC denied habeas corpus relief and CA 6 
affirmed. 
Under Rice and Powell, since petitioner was afforded 
an opportunity ~full and fair consideration of his Fourth 
Amendment claim in the state courts, I would vote to deny 
on this issue. 
The case, however, is also currently being held 
for Do~le and Wood. Petitioner contends there was constitutional 
error 1n a line-0! questioning during the state's case. 
The officer who interrogated petitioner testified that he 
had given Miranda warnings, and that petitioner had refused 
to sign a wa1ver and refused initially to speak about the 
case. At this point the court sustained defense counsel's 
objection. The state proffered evidence that petitioner 
later (how much later is unknown) had made voluntary 
incriminating statements. The DJ held that the voluntary 
statements would have been admissible, and that as a 
"predicate" to their admission the prosecutor could elicit 
a description of the Miranda warnings and petitioner's 
immediate reaction. As indicated in the hold memorandum 
for Doyle and~' Nos. 75-5014 and 75-5015, the situation 
presented by the officer's testimony is a bit unusual and 
is not governed by Do~le. If the officer had been permitted 
to continue and petit1oner's later statements had proved 
voluntary and been admitted, there would seem to be no 
constitutional error in the officer's "lead-in" concerning 
3. 
petitioner's initial silence. As things stand, however, 
we have nothing except the testimony about petitioner's 
silence, and that testimony was given in the state's case-
inl chief. I will vote to grant, vacate and remand in light 
of Doyle, although I recognize this disposition may be 
a little confusing. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
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MR. CHIEF JuSTICE BuRGER, concurring. 
I concur in the Court's opinion. By way of dictum, 
and somewhat hesitantly, the Court notes that the hold-
ing in this case leaves undisturbed the exclusionary rule 
as applied to criminal trials. For reasons stated in my 
dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 
403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971), it seems clear to me that the 
exclusionary rule has been operative long enough to 
demonstrate its fwtilit~·. The time has come to modify .f'lct.\AJS. 
its reach, even if it is retained for a small and limited 
category of cases. 
Over the years, the strains imposed by reality, in terms 
of the costs to society and the bizarre miscarriages of 
justice that have been experienced because of the exclu-
sion of reliable evidence when the "constable blunders," 
have led the Court to vacillate as to the rationale for 
deliberate exclusion of truth from the factfinding process. 
The rhetoric has varied with the rationale to the point 
where the rule has become a doctrinaire result in search 
of validating reasons. 
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In evaluating the exclusionary rule, it is import&nt 
to bear in mind exactly what the rule accomplishes. Its 
function is simple-the exclusion of truth fr:om the fact~ 
finding process. Cf. Frankel, The Search for Truth-An 
Umpireal View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lee~ 
ture, Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York, Dec. 16, 
1974. The operation of the rule is therefore unlike that 
of the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled 
self-incrimination. A confession produced after intimi~ 
dating or coercive interrogation is inherently dubious. 
If a suspect's will has been overborne, a cloud hangs 
over his custodial admissions; the exclusion of such state-
ments is based ~ leasb in pttt ~ on their lack of reliability. 
This is not the case as to reliablt; evidence-a pistol,- a 
packet of heroin, counterfeit money, or the body of a 
murder victim-which may be judicially declared to be 
the result of an "unreasonable" search. · The reliability 
of such evidence is beyond question; its probative value 
is certain. 
This remarkable rQiilwU,.-, ir~ftaU, unknown to the com-
mon-law traditionc;h~td its genesis in a case calling for 
the protection of private papers against governmental 
intrusions. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 ( 1914). 
In Boyd, the Court held that private papers were inad-
missible because of the Government's violation of the-
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In Weeks, the Court 
excluded private letters seized from the accused's home· 
by a federal official acting without a warrant. In both 
cases, the Court had a clear vision of what it was seeking-
to protect. What the Court said in Boyd shows how 
far we have strayed from the original path: 
"The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited 
goods, or goods liable to duties and conce~:~.led t() 
avoid the payment thereof, are totally different 
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things from a search for and seizure of a man's pri-
vate books and papers for the purpose of obtaining 
information therein contained, or of using them M 
evidence against him. The two things differ toto 
coelo." 116 U. S., at 623. (Emphasis added.) 
In Weeks, the Court emphasized that the Government, 
under settled principles of common law, qad no right to 
keep a person's private papers. The Court noted that 
the case did not inv()lve "burglar's tools or other proof8 
of guilt .... " 232 U.S., at 392 ,(~phasis added). 
From this origin, the eJ.;clusion~ry rule has been 
changed in focus entirely. It is now used almost ex-
clusively to exclude from evidence articles which are 
unlawful to be possessed or tools and instruments of 
crime. Unless it can be rationally thought that the 
Framers considered it essential to protect the liberties of 
the people to hold that which,is unlawful to possess, 
then our constitutional course has taken a most bizarre ;~ 
tack~ 
The drastically changed nature of judicial concern-
from the protection of personal pj:tpers or effects in one's 
private quarters1 to the exclusion of that which the ac-
cused had no right to possess-is only one of the more 
recent anamolies of the rule. The original incongruity 
was the rule's inconsistency with the general proposition 
that "our legal system does not ~ttempt to do justice 
incidentally and to enforce pen~Jties by indirect means." 
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2181, at 6 (McNaughten rev. ed. 
1961). The rule is based on the hope that events in the 
courtroom or appellate chambers, long a.fter the crucial 
acts took place, will somehow modify the way in which 
policemen conduct themselves. A more clumsy, less di-
rect means o,f imposing sanctlons is difficult to imagine, 
particularly since the issue whether the policeman did 
indeed rim afoul of the Fourth Amendment is often not 
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resolved until years after the event. The "sanction"· is· 
particularly indirect when, as in No. 74-1222, the police 
go before a magistrate, who issues a warrant. Once the 
warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the police-
man can do in seeking to comply with the law. Impos" 
ing an admittedly indirect "sanction" on the police officel" 
in that instance is nothing less than sophisticated 
nonsense. 
Despite this anamoly, the exclusionary rule now rests· 
upon its purported tendency to deter police misconduct, 
United States v. Janis, - U. S. - (1976); United· 
States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347 (1974) , although, 
as we know, the rule has long been applied to wholly 
good-faith mistakes and to purely technical deficiencies 
in warrants. Other rhetorical generalizations, including 
the "imperative of judicial integrity," have not with-
stood analysis as more and more critical appraisals of the 
rule's operation have appeared. See Oaks, Studying· 
the Exclusionary Rule in Selch and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 665 (1970). Indeed, settled rules demonstrate· 
that the "judicial integrity" rationalization is fatally 
flawed. First, the Court has refused to entertain claims 
that evidence was unlawfully seized unless the claimant 
could demonstrate that he had standing to press the 
contention. Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165. 
(1969). If he could not, the evidence, albeit secured in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, is admissible. Sec- . 
ond, as one scholar has correctly observed: 
"[I] t is difficult to accept the proposition that the· 
exclusion of improperly obtained evidence is neces-
sary for 'judicial integrity' when no such rule is ob-
served in other common law · jurisdictions such as· 
England and Canada, whose courts are otherwise· 
regarded as models of · judicial decorum and fair:.. 
ne.ss~" Oaks, supra, at 66.9. .. 
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Despite its avowed deterrent objective, proof is lacking 
that the exclusionary rule, a purely judge-created device 
based on "hard cases," serves the purpose of deterrence. 
Not)lwithstanding Herculean efforts, no empirical study 
has been able to demonstrate that the rule does in fact 
have any deterrent effect. In the face of dwindling sup-
port for the rule some would go so far as to extend it to 
civil cases. United States v. Janis, supra. 
To vindicate the continued existence of this judge-
made rule, it is incumbent upon those who seek its re-
tention-and surely its extension, to demonstrate that 
it serves its declared deterrent purpose and to show that 
the results outweigh the rule's heavy costs to rational 
enforcement of the criminal law. See, e. g., Killough v. 
United States, 315 F. 2d 241 (1962). 'The burden rightly 
rests upon those who ask society to ignore trustworthy 
evidence of guilt, at the expense of setting obviously 
guilty criminals free to ply their trade. 
In my view, it is an abdication of judicial responsi-
bility to exact such exorbitant costs from society purely 
on the basis of speculative and unsubstantiated assump-
tions. Judge Henry Friendly has observed: 
11 [T] he same authority that empowered the Court 
to supplement the [fourth] amendment by the ex-
clusionary rule a hundred and twenty-five years after-
its adoption, likewise allows it to modify that rule· 
as the 'lessons of experience' may teach." Friendly, 
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure,. 
53 Cal. L. Rev. 929, 952-953 (1965). 
In Bivens, I suggested that, despite its grave short-. 
comings, the rule ~s need not be"'abandoned until ~-h.ll1 
some meaningful alterpative could be developed to pro-
tect innocent persons aggrieved by police misconduct. 
With the passage of time, it now appears that the con-
: tinued existenee of the rule, as presently implemented,. 
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actually inhibits the development of ~ alternatives. 
The reason is quite simple: incentives for developing 
new procedures or remedies ~remain minimal or 
nonexistent so long as the exclusionary rule is retained 
in its present form. 
It can no longer be assumed that other branches of 
government will act while judges cling to this Draconian, 
discredited device in its present absolutist form. Legisla-
tures are unlikely to creatstatutory alternatives pr im-
pose direct sanctions on errant police officers or on the 
public treasury by way of tort actions, so long as persons 
who commit serious crimes continue to reap the enor-
mous and undeserved benefits of the exclusiona.ty rule. 
And of course, by definition the direct beneficiaries of 
this rule can be none but persons guilty of crimes. With 
this extraordinary "remedy" for Fourth Amendment vio-
lations, however slight, inadverteht or technical, legis-
latures might assume that nothing more should be done, 
even though a grave defect of the exclusionary rule is 
that it offers no relief whatever to victims of overzealous 
police work who never appear in court. Schaefer; The 
Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the Person, 64 
N w. U. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1969). And even if legislatures 
were inclined to experiment with alternative remedies, 
they have no assurance that the judicially created rule 
will be abolished or even modified in response to such 
legislative innovations. The unhappy result, as I see it, 
is that alternatives will inevitably be stymied by rigid 
adherence on our part to the exclusionary rule.. I ven-
ture to predict that overruling this judicially contrived 
doctrine--or limiting its scope to egregious, bad-faith. 
conduct-would inspire a surge of activity toward pro-
viding some kind of statutory remedy for persons in-
jured by police mistakes or misconduct. 
'The Court's opinion today eloquently reflects some-
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thing of the dismal social costs occasioned by the rule. 
Ante, at 21-23. As MR. JusTICE WHITE correctly ob-
serves today in his dissent, the exclusionary rule consti-
tutes a "senseless obstacle to arriving at the truth in 
many criminal trials." Post, at -. He also suggests 
that the rule be substantially modified "so as to prevent 
its a.pplication in those many circumstances where the 
evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the 
good-faith belief that his conduct comported with exist-
ing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief." 
Post, at-. 
From its genesis in the desire to protect private papers, 
the exclusionary rule has now been carried to the point 
of potentially excluding from evidence the traditional 
corpus delicti in a murder or kidnapping case. See 
Mitchell v. New York, - N. Y. 2d - , cert. denied, 
- U. S. - (1976). Cf. Killough v. United States, 
supra. Expansion of the reach of the exclusionary rule 
has brought Cardozo's grim prophecy in People v. De-
fore, 242 N. Y. 12, 150 N. E. 585, 588 (1926), nearer 
&MJ: iiCMOit to fulfillment: 
"A room is searched against the law, and the body 
of a murdered man is found. If the place of dis-
covery may not be proved, the other circumstances 
may be insufficient to connect the defendant with 
the crime. The privacy of the home has been in-
fringed, and the murderer goes free. . . . We may 
not subject society to these dangers until the Legis-
l~;~.tur~ has SJ?oken witb. a cl_E)Q.re:c voice," 

To: Justice Powell March 11, 1976 
From: Greg Palm 
Re: No. 74-1055 Stone v. Powell 
No. 74-1222 Wolff v. Rice 
This memorandum summarizes my thoughts as to how we 
should proceed in these cases. In my view we have ....... ,_., two 
basic options: (1) ~interpret the habeas statute to not 
include 4th Am. claims, or (2) re-cast the scope of the 
exclusionary rule not to be cognizable in habeas proceedings 
since the "right of exclusion" is limited to areas where the 
general deterance value exceeds the costs. 
I. Option I: 
There are two sub-options within this option. The first 
is to simply re-cast your Bustamante opinion into a majority 
opinion. The advantages of this approach are two: (1) consistary 
with your expressed views and (2) "innocense" is a sound 
touchstone upon which to differentiate 4th Am. claims(there 
obviously is some runover to Miranda). The disadvantages 
of this approach are: (1) unless one wanted to cont inue to 
allow habeas claims by federal prisoners(a silly result) we 
will have to overrule a statutory cons~ruction only 6 years 
old, (2) Stevens and Stewart refuse to accept an approach 
focusing on "innocen.e", (3) the roots of the Kaufman holding 
run directly back to Brown v. Allen , a 1953 Frankfurter 
opinion, and make it very difficult to argue that CongEess 
has not accepted this Court's expansive view of the habeas 
statute(the § 2255 argument in Bustamante that a majority of 
the CAs did not permit habeas claims by federal prisoners at 
the time of the last revisions is not very helpful since in 
fact a majority of those·same courts allowed state prisoners to 
bring such claims. 
A second approach would basically follow .the first except 
that innocence would not be emphasized, Instead, we would 
have to rely on the notions of comity, federalism, and equity 
that recently surfaced in Stewart's opinion in Francis v. 
Henderson. The problem with applY-i~g Fran~is here is that 
ft dealt with a procedural matter, while we are here dealing 
with a constitutional right(unless Option II is adopted). 
Moreover, Francis in fact creates the equity-comity notion 
almost out of thin air. That is, although there is language 
in Fay and some prior opinions to the effect that the writ 
is equitable, until Francis all that has meant is that re-
quirements such as exhaustion could be created. Of course, 
if Francis issues first, once the great leap has been made 
there is no reason for us not to rely on it. 
In any event, under either of these options the opinion 
would proceed in the following way: 
1. Issue 
2. Facts of Each Case: useful in showing:a. review of 2 
state court decisions by a federal district court; b. relia-
bility of evidence seized. 
3. History of Writ: A combination of the views expressed by 
you in Bustamante, Harlan and Black in their dissents 
(respectively in Fay and Kaufman), Bator,Oaks, and a couple 
other sources I have discovered. All this would lead to thw 
conclusion that the Court arguably has expanded the writ 
greatly. There is, however, no strong historical support for 
any differentiation out of 4th Am. Claims. 
4. The Francis Equitable Notion: At this point the notion of 
permitting the courts to flexibly awly the writ comes in. There 
isn't much direct support for the notion, but it• could be 
done. ((But if we can't rely much on the innocense notion 
it is still hard to say why 4th Am. claims are different from 
others)). 
5. Balance All the Reasons for not Permitting Such claims: 
Federalism, finality, etc .. The arguments are in Bustamante, 
Batmr's and Friendly's articles, and elsewhere. 
II. Option II: 
Option II 
That is, as our recent cases 
have demonstrated the exclusionary rule is based on the 
principle of deterrance. The questiOn to be asked is thus 
whether the incremental value of permitting 4th Am. claims 
in habeas outweighs the cost. This balancing would be very 
similar to the approach you adopted in Calandra. The 
argument would be that the contributtion to deterrance from the 
application of the rule in ~ habeas is minimal in comparison 
with its costs((the costs cited would be the same as those 
discussed in 85. of Option I)). The advantages of this 
approach are obvious: (1) we avoid re-interpreting a statute 
(2) the analytic approach applied--deterrance v. cost-- is 
one which the Court has recently opted for in several cases 
and one which the Court will certainly argue from in a later 
case adopting the "good faith" exception((This analysis will 
set the statge for tm t opinion)). The only problems in 
this approach are the tension between this view and the 
view of the 4th Am. advanced in ... certain ~ past cases--
This is not really aXE significant problem,however, since 
I think it is quite clear after Calandra and other 
general deterrance is the moving force 
behind! the rule. 
In choosing between these options some other factors 
should be considered: (1) Option I clearly gives Congress the 
option to amend the statute and EE overrule the Court if it• 
is unhappy (2) Under Option II, it is not clear that there 
would be any way Congress could force an exclusionary rule in 
habeas for xxx State prisoners (3) Under HE either approach 
there are implications for other types of Constitutional claims. 
Option II, 
Under ~~MXKKXXX¥ for example, the rationale might be 
extended to Miranda warnings. 
As to the mechanics of Option II the prime difference iE 
that it would contain a brief history of the exclusionary 
rule to demonstrate that deterrance is the basis. Also, the 
history of habeas would be very brief since our conclusion 
would be even accepting the Fay - Kaufman view of history, 
4th am. exclsuionary rule claims are not cognizable. As 
I indicated above, I lean xxxx strongly in favor of Option II 
since I think its the most defensible of the two((the dissent 
{ 
lt.)Q ~ ~ .J..\e ~ 





Mr. Justice Powell 
Russell R. Wheeler {Jr 
RE: Your Request for Research on Habeas Corpus Petitions 
DT: March 18, 1976 
This responds to your March 18 letter asking if I would be 
able to undertake some research for you on federal habeas corpus 
review of state decisions. I would be pleased to do what I can for you 
but would appreciate clarification on two points: 
I. Is there a deadline and if so, what? 
I am rather heavily involved in work for the forthcoming 
J 
"Pound Conference" (April 7-9), but the demands are somewhat 
episodic and I could perhaps complete your project, if not by April 
7, then closely thereafter. If I could not, I would be quite happy to 
take the assignment with me when I begin working at the National 
Center for State Courts on Apri116. I know that there--as here--
the work is such that I could find time to complete your project 
relatively soon. I am relatively sure that I could complete it by 
May, if you want these data for your address to the Fifth Circuit. 
If, on the other hand, the information must be in by April 1, 
or April 15, I perhaps should decline the invitation. 
II. I know that you are suggesting reference to published 
data rather than original research. However, at least some of this 
information may well be readily available albeit in unpublished form 
either at the Administrative Office or at the Federal Judicial Center. 
- 2 -
If you want me to undertake the inquiry, may I have your 
permission, when asking if such unpublished data exist, to say that 
"I am making this inquiry for Justice Powell"( or, alternatively, 
for a "member of the Court, 11 or for 11a judge")? 
Such an inquiry sometimes tends naturally and I think under-
standably to provoke a faster response than a simple request for 
information--but you may wish that!. not refer to you directly, or 
indirectly. 
Again, I would be pleased to find out what I can for you on 
these matters, and I hope that your deadline is not so immediate as 
to preclude my doing so. 
RRW/bb 
cc: Mark W. Cannon 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
.:§uvutttt <!fo-tni of flrt 2ltnitt~ .:§taftg 
'~htiT!rtttgfott. ~. <!f. 206t'-t~ 
March 18, 1976 
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State 
Decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
Dear Russell: 
I wonder if you would be willing to help me with some 
statistics if they are available. 
In my concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 
412 U.S. 218, at 260, note 14, I included some figures -
obtained from the 1972 report of the Administrative Office -
on petitions for federal habeas corpus filed by state 
prisoners. I am now interested in some refinements of 
similar statistics if the data is available. 
It is believedby some that the two cases that did most 
to stimulate petitions under § 2254 were Fay v. Noia, 372 
U.S. 391, 426, decided March 18, 1963, and~ v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, decided June 19, 1961. Fay (at least as I view it) 
took a more expansive view of habeas corpus than the history 
of the writ warranted. ~ extended the exclusionary rule 
to the states as a means of effectuating the Fourth Amendment. 
As my note in Bustamante indicates, federal habeas 
petitions increased from 1,020 in 1961 to 7,949 in 1972, 
tapering down from 9,063 in 1970. I would like to have these 
figures brought down to the latest year available. They are 
readily obtainable, I believe, from the Administrative Office 
in the tables it publishes annually. 
The refinements which interest me include the following: 
(i) Is there statistical support for the view expressed 
above as to the effect of Fay and ~? Or, putting it 
differently, is there a probable correlation between these 
cases, or either of them, and the sharp rise in habeas corpus 
petitions. 
- 2 -
(ii) Does the available data identify the federal habeas 
corpus petitions according to the ground asserted for relief? 
My impression is that a large majority of these cases that 
ultimately reach us assert Fourth Amendment claims, invoking 
the exclusionary rule. 
(iii) As indicated in my Bustamante note, all filings 
in United States District Courts have been increasing 
substantially, although at a far less rapid rate than the 
habeas corpus increase. Again, if the data is available I 
would be interested in comparative percentage rates of 
increase in (a) civil filings (which in gross would include 
habeas corpus), (b) habeas corpus filings under § 2254, and 
(c) criminal filings. You would have to select a base year. 
I suppose it would be desirable to go back earlier than 1961 
for a comparison reflecting the possible effect of the cases 
mentioned. 
(iv) If the habeas corpus cases can be identified as 
such, does the available information indicate (by gross 
numbers or percentages) the success of state prisoners who 
have invoked federal habeas successfully. In Fay, the Court 
opinion stated (372 U.S., at 440) that: "Our decision today 
swings open no prison gates."'" In note 45, on the same page, 
it is stated that a study in 1958 covering a nine-year period 
indicated that a total of only 24 federal habeas petitioners 
had won release from state penitentiaries. If there are any 
similar subsequent studies, I would be most interested in 
seeing the result. 
There also has been an upsurge in the filing of § 1983 
civil actions in the federal courts. If the tables available 
afford a convenient comparison with the increase in habeas 
corpus petitions, over the past two decades, this also would 
be interesting. 
You may well be overcommitted already in the process 
of moving to the Administrative Office. Accordingly, I will 
quite understand if you are not in a position to undertake 
this inquiry. In any event, I emphasize that I am not 
suggesting original research as distinguished from using 
what is available and relevant to the above inquiries. 
*I cannot resist commenting that Fay, at least, swung open 
the "gates" to the federal courts. 
- 3 -
If the foregoing is not clear, I will be happy to discuss 
it with you. 
Sincerely, 
Russell R. Wheeler, Esquire 
lfp/ss 








Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 74-1055 Stone v. 
No. 74-1222 Wolff v. 
~···· 
DATE: April 2, 1976 
You may find it of interest to look at the SG's brief 
in MacCollom No. 74-1487, and particularly the discussion 
emphasizing the extraordinary nature of collateral review 
contrasted with review on direct appeal. • ·~ 
i.f 
:!j, ( 
I may have mentioned this to you before. I was impressed 
the SG's MacCollom brief which was written by Frank 
Easterbrook, one of ablest lawyers of any age 






TO: Greg Palm 
F.ROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 




.'I, t 'J. :,!; 
~ ·' 
'\)_i tl\ 
DATE: April 12,1976 
. ': No. 74-1055 Stone v. Powell 
r:''c, As a result of spending most of Saturday reviewing the 
·:,Iii 
latest draft, I have come to the conclusion that we are trying 
.~·:· ,, 
•. :t 
to "overwrite" this case. 
I think we have a strong, lawyer-like opinion through 
Parts I, II and III. ': ~' 
); ~·' 
Part I is fairly routine, although the statement of the 
facts and issues always is important. I do think we have 
stated the facts in too much detail, and suggest that you 
summarize them in more conclusory fashion. You can see how 
this was done in the California Court of Appeals and also in 
the federal courts. As we do not come back to the facts, in 
any significant way, I see no useful puurpose in detailing 
" ;_ facts that may be relevant to such issues as probable cause, 
and who did what and when. r 
:tf.; 
Parts '· II and III of the draft are excellent in every 
respect. I have done some editing, and have a couple of riders, 
but I believe we have these just about right. 
,, 
~. In Part II the draft reviews, constructively and 




· ' L 
Part III deals with the Fourth Amendment, and the 
exclusionary rule. The discussion of the purpose and justifica-
tions of the exclusionary rule is quite good. We show that , 
the rule · is not a personal constitutional right, and that its 
primary purpose is deterrence of future police misconduct. 
You effectively dispose of the "judicial integrity" argument. 
Perhaps we should say, in_ a note, that the rule also has some 
educational value that we do not minimize. ,~ 
There is· a key sentence at the bottom of page 22B reading 
as follows: 
.•.. ·r 
"' '' \,' "• 
"But despite the broad deterrent purpose of the 
rule, it has never been interpreted to proscribe 
the introduction of illegally seized evidence in 
all proceedings or against all persons." 
Calandra is a key decision, as Professor Monaghan has 
pointed out. , You use Calandra effectively on page 23, and 
thenmove on to say that its pragmatic approach notoonly is not 
new (Walder) but also points the way for a proper analysis 
of the issue whether the rule should apply to Fourth Amendment 
habeas corpus cases. • · 
This brings us to Part IV. The first page and a half 
(26, 27) summarizes briefly the negative consequences of the 
rule as applied at trial and on direct review. This is a 
proper introduction to the "balancing process" that Part III 
has shown to be the proper basis of analysis. We get into 
trouble on page 27 by moving into a consideration of general 
3. 
societal interests, namely, those that I relied upon rather .,. 
heavily in Bustamante. In that case, however, I was addressing 
the use of habeas corpus jurisdiction itself, rather than , .: , ' 
whether -the exclusionarp rule properly may be extended to 
a Fourth Amendment habeas claim. In practical consequences, 
the difference may not be too important. In terms of analysis, · 
however, . 
/it seems to me that there is a considerable difference. ·::: ~·; ,, 
""· ·~ 
Rather than devote a half a dozen or more pages of our 
opinion to the interest identified on page 27, I suggest that 
we rewrite the opinion from this point on with the focus on 
· the exclusionary rule itself. That is, applying the type of 
analysis indicated by Calandra and explicated in the balancing 
approach mentioned in Part · III- we should emphasize the reasons 
~ why the deterrent effect of the rule is minimal on collateral 
review of Fourth Amendment claims. 
This , approach would require a discarding of page 27 
(beginning with "in addition to these costs"), and of virtually 
all of pages 28, 29, 29a, 30, 31 and 33 (I don't find any page 
32). 
You return to consider specifically the efficaciousness 1' 
-if 'm ~;;"'' 
\ ·~· ~· ,',:t111: 
' of the exclusionary rule, commencing at the bottom of page 33 
and continuing the end on page 36. ;·, · '"~' 
My suggestion is that you redraft Part IV, condensing it 







of the exclusionary rule when applied to collateral review 
of a Fourth Amendment claim. Such a reduction, to perhaps 
three or four pages, would mean the elimination of the 
interesting and generally supportive material from the middle 
of page 27 through most of page 33. There are two possible 
ways in which we might utilize some of the points made in these 
pages (~·&•• use of resources of the legal system, merit of 
finality, minimization of friction). It may be possible, in 
a single paragraph, to summarize in highly conclusory fashion 
these important societal interests. Such a paragraph could 
be included in the text, at some appropriate place in Part IV, 
as policy considerations supportive of our basic position 
on the exclusionary rule. We must bear in mind, however, that 
these same policy considerations apply rather generally to 
all habeas corpus review. This is a rather compelling reason 
why we should not overemphasize them in this opinion. 
An alternative to · including such a paragraph in the text, 
would be to place it in a footnote. A general reference 
could be made to my opinion;l in Bustamonte. 
A point of some delicacy is how we conclude that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply on collateral review of a 
Fourth Amendment claim without the same reasoning being 
applicable, say, to Fifth Amendment claims. ·As you know, 
Judge Friendly would apply the same analysis to both. I 
5. 
do not want to foreclose this possibility, and yet I do have 
a rather strong feeling - for the reasons stated by Justice 
Black in Kaufman - that Fourth Amendment claims are different. 
As we have pointed ou~and may need to reiterate, there is far 
,, less likelihood of uncertainty as to the facts, or of an 
innocent person being denied the benefit of habea~ corpus 
relief, where the issue is simply whether the rule should be 
applied to exclude specific, incriminatory fruits of a search. 
· ~yhope that you and Chris will do some careful thinking about · 
this, and also some artful drafting. 
"! .. , 
* * * 
Still lurking in my mind is the desire to accommodate 
·~ 
Justice Stewart• s wish that we leave the way open for applica:-_ 
tion of the rule in what he might characterize as an outrageous 
violation by police resulting, at least arguably, in the 
conviction of an innocent defendant. ~ I was going to try a · · 
footnote on this point, but my time has run out this (Saturday) 
afternoon. ·'-;.) 1 would think we might say that, in; .. S: case such ,i~\ 
as Stewart would ~·describe, that considerations of fundamental ,', . 
li 
fairness implicit in due process would always justify habeas _.·~ 
·~'" 
..-:f 
review and the application of an exclusionary rule where 
justice requires. There is a good deal of language in some of 
the cases (alluded to at one point in your draft} to the effect 
that habeas itself is appropriate only to remedy serious 
errors."~-' Also, there is the theory that habeas relief has 
6. 
·~· ' 
~.· $; ;~_, 
,~r:i 
some of the flexibility of equity. If we include such a note, 
we must make clear that application of the rule, in light of 
the conclusion of the Court in this case, would rarely be 
appropriate, and only to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 
..,: "t· :J,' 
I~ 
Somewhere in the opinion, perhaps as a concluding 
paragraph, we should pay our respects generally to the values .;.: 
of the Fourth Amendment, the utility of habeas review to 
correct grievous error (see some of my good language in ·· 
,, Bustamante), and emphasize that the effect of our decision 
I?'J 
-...;t_~ 
should have affirmative effects - rather than negative ones -
on the fair and effective administration of the criminal 
justice system. It will be somewhat easier to write such 
concluding paragraph if we have left room for a ·:· "fundamental 
',~ 
fairness ,~.' exception. In this connection, take a look at 
the concurring and diss~nting opinion that Carl ·; and I have l:' «: t~~::. 





TO: Greg Palm DATE: April 15, 1976 
!;. F FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
iii-
Rice and Powell 
l ~i Ji' 
Justice Stewart called and suggested that we take a look 
at two cases: Sunal v. Large and Chestman v. California. 
Justice Stewart did not have the citations. He thinks 
both of the cases were decided in the late 1950's, that Douglas 
wrote for the Court in Sunal and wrote a ,dissent in Chestman. 
"t 
Justice 1Stewart' s recollection, ·twithout having verified 
it, is that in both cases Douglas emphasized that habeas corpus 
is not a substitute for appeal and that the writ should not be 
abused. 
Justice Stewart recognizes that neither of these cases 
is "on point", but he thinks there may be some opportunity -







TO: Greg Palm DATE: April 19, 1976 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Powell and Rice 
When you reach the point of "going to the press" for a 
Chambers Draft, I suggest that you make a xerox copy of the 
opinion and notes. We would be here :until August if, by some 
back luck, the printers lost or destroyed our only copy of 
thbs opinnon with its multitude of changes. 
,, 
' 
* * * * 
We should discuss, perhaps on Thursday, whether our 
opinion need recognize specifically that Kaufman is over-
ruled. In a technical sense, of course, it is not overruled 
as that involved collateral review of federal court action. 
But, as we have agreed, there is even less reason for such 
review. My preference is to state, with candor, that our 
holding rejects the ~~a~tn& of Kaufman. Perhaps we could 
say this in a note which also reemphasized that Kaufman, 
as Justice Black noted, did not consider whether the purpose 
of the exclusionary rule would be served by its holding. It 
merely assumed that the rule applied on collateral review, 
a conclusion supported neither by reason nor authority. 




MEMORANDUM TO FILE 
No. 74-1055 Stone v. Powell 
No. 74-1222 Wolff v. Rice 
We know, from the "clerk grapevine" that 
Justice Brennan plans to file an "explosive" dissent. 
We will probably have to make some response. 
Among other things, we might keep in mind the following: 
(i) somewhat greater emphasis that t here comes 
a point when the cost to society of applying 
a prophylactic rule, that does not create a 
personal constitutional right, simply is too 
great. 
(ii) other civilized systems do not release 
guilty defendants merely because the constable 
blundered 
(iii) the view of the dissent (if it materializes 
in the form expected) is that the Court's decision 
in these cases represents a major regressive 
reversal of prior precedents. One answer
1 
not 
mentioned in my present draft opinion, is that 
until ~ - only 14 years ago - the exclusionary 
rule was not applied to the states in Fourth 
Amendment cases, and not until the dictum in 
Kaufman did this r.ourt indicate that it applied 
2 • 
.&t.L: 
on collateral review of Fourth Amendment 
1\ 
cases. Thus, for the first century and 
3/4ths (175 years) of the life of our 
country, persons demonstrably guilty as 
charged were not "turned loose" on society 
merely because critical evidence had been 
seized unlawfully. 
(iv) We might add something along the lines 
of my Bustamonte opinion to the effect that 
habeas corpus, at least until Fay v. Noia, 
had been considered a remedy to afford relief 
against unjust incarceration. Normally this 
would not include defendants clearly guilty 
whose trials were flawed by a Fourth Amendment 
infringement. In this general connection, 
the following statement in Townsend v. Sain, 
372 U.S. 293 at 312 may possibly be relevant: 
"State prisoners are entitled to 
relief on federal habeas corpus only 
upon proving that their detention 
violates the fundamental liberties of 
the person, safeguarded against State 
action by the Federal Constitution." 
3. 
* * * * * 
Mr. Justice Stewart thinks we should be prepared 





MEMORANDUM TO FILE 
No. 74-1055 Stone v. 
No. 74-1222 Wolff v. Rice 
We know, from the "clerk grap·evine" that 
Justice Brennan plans to file an "explosive" dissent. 
We will probably have to make some response. 
Among other things, we might keep in mind the following: 
(i) somewhat greater emphasis that there comes 
a point when the cost to society of applying 
a prophylactic rule, that does not create a 
personal constitutional right, simply is too 
great. 
(ii) other civilized systems do not release 
guilty defendants merely because the constable 
blundered 
(iii) the view of the dissent (if it materializes 
in the form expected) is that the Court's decision 
in these cases represents a major regressive 
reversal of prior precedents. One~ answer not 
mentioned in my present draft opinion, is that 
until Mapp - only 14 years ago - the exclusionary 
rule was not applied to the states in Fourth 
Amendment cases, and not until the dictum in 





>f, . .-: ·r'~ 
on collateral review of Fourth Amendment 
cases. Thus, for the first century and 
3/4ths, (175 years) of the life of our 
country, persons demonstrably guilty as 
charged were not "turned loose" on society 
because critical evidence had been •1 
seized unlawfully. v l 
(iv) We might add something along the lines 
of my Bustamante opinion to the effect that 
habeas corpus, at least until Fay v. Noia, ·: "'. 
'., ..... - ...... ,, 
had been considered a remedy to afford relief 
against unjust incarceration. Normally this 
·tlti 
; would not include defendants clearly guilty 
whose trials were flawed by a Fourth Amendment 
In this general connection, 
the following statement in Townsend v. Sain, 
293 B;t 312 may possibly be relevant: 
"State prisoners are entitled to 
relief on federal habeas corpus only 
1' ~~· 
upon proving that their detention ' ' 
··' violates the fundamental liberties of 
J!' 
' the person, safegaarded against State ';· ·~ 
the Federal Constitution." 
, 
* 
Mr. Justice Stewart thinks we should be prepared 
~," 
~,,··~, to make a strong response to Mr. Justice Brennan's full 
I 
l 
' · scale assault. : 
L.F.P., Jr. 
' . 
lfp/ss f1/ll/76 Rider A, p 23 (Stone v. Powell) 
Add the following to note 30: 
We nevertheless afford broad habeas corpus relief, 
recognizing the need in a free society for an additional 
safeguard against compelling an innocent man to suffer 
an unconstitutional loss of liberty. The Court in Fay v. 
~. described habeas corpus as a remedy for "what 
society deems to be intolerable restraints", and recognized 
that those to whom the writ should be granted "are persons 
whom society has grievously wronged". 372 u.s., at 401, 
441. In the typical Fourth Amendment claim asserted on 
collateral attacK, however, a convicted defendant is 
usually asking society to redeterming an issue that has 
no bearing at all on the basic justice of his incarceration. 
5/11/76 
In sum, we conclude that where the State has 
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of 
35 
a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be 
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that 
such claim was erroneously rejected by the state courts. 
In this context 1 the contribution of the exclusionary 
rule, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment 
is minimal and the recognized costs of application of the 
36 
rule persist with special force. 
lfp/ss 5/11/76 Rider A, p 21 (Stone v. Powell) 
The answer is to be found by weighing the utility of the 
exclusionary rule against the costs of extending it to 




lfp/ss 5/ll/76 Rider A, p. 24 (Stone v. Powell) 
...,..... 
But there is no reason to believe that the overall 
educative effect of reexamining state convictions on 
Fourth Amendment grounds would be significant. 
CHAMBERS OF 
,ju:pumt Q}cmt ltf t4t ~lt ,jhdtg 
'llhtllftittghttt.lO. <!}. 21l.;t~~ 
JUSTICE WM.J. BRENNAN, JR. 
May 15, 1976 
RE: Nos. 74-1055 and 74-1222 Stone v. Powell & 
Wolff v. Rice 
Dear Lewis: 
In due course I shall circulate a dissent in the 
above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
) 
j)nprtmt Qf4tttrt 4tf tfrt 'JI!ttittb j)tatts 
~asfriughttt.!B. <!f. 2ll~'l-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWAR T 
May 17, 1976 
Re: Nos. 74-1055 and 74-1222, Stone v. Powell 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in 
this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
P. S. to Mr. Justice Powell only 
It is quite possible that I may have some further 
suggestions after we see the dissenting opinion. 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
ju.vrtmt <!Jom:t .o-f t!rt ~tb ,jt~s 
jlras!rittghm. ~. <!J. 2llgt~~ 
May 17, 1976 
) 
Re: No. 74-1055, Stone v. Powell; No. 74-1222, Wolff 
v. Rice 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me in your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
~U}tfttttt <!f01tri qf tlrt ~tb ,j~ztt.tg 
-ufring~ ~.<!f. 2U&i~$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
May 17, 1976 
Re: Nos. 74-1055 and 74-1222 - Stone v. Powell, et al. 
Dear Lewis: 
I think that I have some language which will satisfy 
you and me, though it might not satisfy Potter, on page 24 
in your opinion in this case. 
read: 
The last two lines of text on that page presently 
"We adhere to the view that these considera-
tions support the implementation of the 
exclusionary rule at trial ••• " 
I think the desired neutrality would be fully achieved 
if something like this could be substituted for those two 
lines: 
"We adhere to the view that these considera-
tions support the implementation of the 
rule under which illegally seized evidence 
may be excluded at trial ••• " 
If the language appeals to you, use it as you will. 
If it doesn't, forget it. 
Sincerely,~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
~tutt <Q:ltltrl llf tltt )lnitth ~httt­
Jl'ulti:ttgbm. ~. <Q:. 2llbi~~ ' 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
May 24, 1976 
Re: No. 74-1055 - Stone v. Powell 
No. 74-1222 - Wolff v. Rice 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
.Supr~mt <lJ:!lUrlllf tlr~~ttb' .sw~-
1Ja,g.lfittghnt. ~. a):. 2lJ.gi'l' 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 27, 1976 
Re: 74-1055 - Stone v. Powell 
74-1222 - Wolff v. Rice 
Dear Lewis: 
Confirming my oral statement to you, I do 
intend to join your opinion for the Court but 
am considering writing a short additional con-
curring opinion because of the exceptional 
importance of the case. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 74-1055 AND 74-1222 
W. T. Stone, Warden,! . . . 
Petitioner On Wnt of Certwran to the 
74-1055 ' United States Court of Appeals 
Lloyd Ch;ies Powell. for the Ninth Circuit. 
Charles L. Wolff, Jr.,) . . . 
Warden, Petitioner, On Wnt of Cert1oran to the 
?'4-1222 v United States Court of Appeale 
D 'd L. R' for the Eighth Circuit. av1 . 1ce. 
[May -, 1976] 
Mn. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal 
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were af-
firmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied 
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged 
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent 
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by 
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under-
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether 
a federal court should consider, in ruling on a petition for· 
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that 
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or sei-
zure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously 
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation 
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of consid-
erable importance to the administration of criminal 
justice. 
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I 
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural 
history of these cases. 
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder 
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At 
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three com-
panions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Ber-
nardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an alter-
cation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the 
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed 
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten hours later 
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department ar-
rested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy 
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest dis-
covered a .38 caliber revolver with six expended car-
tridges in the cylinder. 
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of 
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Ber-
nardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at 
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist· 
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun 
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected' 
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson 
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the re-
volver should have been excluded because the vagrancy 
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the· 
1 The ordinance provides : 
"Every person is a vagrant who : 
" [1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify 
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any police· 
officer to do so [3] if surrounding circumstances are such as · 
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such: 
iP,~ntiiicatJon." 
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conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of 
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that 
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of 
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error, 
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson offi-
cer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Su-
preme Court of California denied Powell's petition for 
habeas corpus relief. 
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a 
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in 
the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California, contending that the testimony con-
cerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been 
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued 
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson 
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and 
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe 
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded 
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held 
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional, 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not 
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits 
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the 
alternative, that court agreed with the California District 
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence con-
cerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The $fourt concluded. ~ 
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague/ that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and 
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principally 
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), where 
we invalidated a city ordinance in part defining vagrants as ... "per~ 
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve r,t~ 
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were 
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would servf;l 
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting 
unconstitutional statutes. Id., at 98.. After an inde-
pendent review of the evidence the court concluded that 
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error 
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's 
accomplices. Id., at 99. 
B 
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in 
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05 
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a tele-
phone call that a woman had been heard screaming at 
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that 
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it ex-
ploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investi-
gation of the murder centered on Duane Peak, a 
15-year-old member of the National Committee to Com-
bat Fascism ("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant 
was issued for Peak)s arrest. The investigation also 
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including 
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill 
Peak before he could incriminate them. in their search 
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m. 
that night and found iights and a teievision on, but there 
was no response to their repeated knocking. While some 
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was 
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any 
lawful purpose or object .... " Id., at 156--157, n. 1. Noting the 
similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see 
n, 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second 
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently 
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Peti• 
'tioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposi-
tion of the case we need not consider this issue. 
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obtained to search for explosives and illegal weapons 
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the 
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain 
view, dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials use• 
ful in the construction of explosive devices. Peak 
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice 
voluntarily surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing 
at that time were subjected to chemical analysis, disclos--
ing dynamite particles. 
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District 
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted plant-. 
ing the suitcase and making the telephone call, and 
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative 
evidence the State introduced itetns seized during the 
search, as well as the results of the chemical analysis of 
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to sup-
press this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search 
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search 
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480 
I 
(1972). ' 
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarcera-
tion was unlawful because the evidence underlying his 
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal 
search of his home. The District Court concluded that 
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affi-
davit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U. S. 410 ( 1969) , and {iguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190--194 (1974).8 · The court 
8 The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit 
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police 
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home 
because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent 
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also rejected the State's contention that even if the 
warrant was invalid the search was justified because of 
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the 
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Peak 
and search for bombs and explosives believed in posses-
sion of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest war-
rant did not justify the entry as the police lacked 
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and 
further concluded that the circumstances were not suffi-
ciently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless 
search. !d., at 194-202.4 The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons 
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 (1975). 
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respec-
tive state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, 
petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions 
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past 
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said should 
be used against the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In 
concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the 
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit 
alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testi-
mony adduced at the suppression hearing but not included in the 
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. W. 2d 480, 487-488. See 
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The 
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the 
affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded prob-
able cause was lacking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should 
be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidavit 
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an 
issue we need not reach. 
4 The District Court further held that the evidence of dynamite 
particles found on Rice's clothing should have been suppressed as 
the tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued 
but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207. 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne; 
[;umber Co ., Inc . v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920) . 
74-105" & 14-1222-0FINION 
STONE v. POWELL 1 
eencerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role 
cf the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases 
lnvolving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their 
:petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975).5 We 
new reverse. 
II 
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first 
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation 
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody 
by the United States. The original statutory authoriza-
tion did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It 
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall 
have power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . ... " 
Ibid. The courts defined the scope of the writ in accord-
ance with 'the common law and limited it to an inquiry as 
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g., 
5 In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that 
counsel in PoweU v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the 
questions: 
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that 
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest 
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of 
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitu-
tional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of 
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is 
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254~" 
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of 
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circum-
stances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U.S. C. 
§ 2254." 
6 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used 
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien-
dum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte BoUman, 8 U. S. (4 
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.) , 
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar.-
dhall, C. J.). ' · 
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act 
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. U~der the 1867 
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in "all 
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or 
law of the United States .... " . But the limitation of fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g., 
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895); 
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. 
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the con-
cept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain 
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded,7 this 
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8 
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In 
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that 
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur-
7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review 
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review 
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote 
because of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court. 
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The· 
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973); 
¥rankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32, 
19-80 & n. 107 (1928) . Pressure naturally developed for expansion 
cnf the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable· 
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100' 
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and ' 
Federal Habeas Corpus For State PrisonerS, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441,473 
& n. 75 (19763). 
8 The expansion occurred primarily with regard to (i) convic-
tions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e, g., Ex parte · 
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentions based upon an allegedly illegal' 
sentence, e. g. , Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 WalL) · 163 (1973), .. 
'Se:e ]iator, s~v.ra, n. 7, at. 40.5:-47.4 .. 
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state su-
preme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess-. 
fully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district 
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because 
Frank's federal claims had been considereq by a compe-
tent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized, 
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the 
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process" 
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether 
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the 
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. !d., 
at 333-336. 
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487, 
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 In 
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas 
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in 
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors and in rul-
ing certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the high-
est court of the State had rejected these claims on direct 
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and 
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951). 
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective 
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of 
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full 
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if 
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In 
9 There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the 
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision 
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923). Compare Hart, Fore-
ward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105 
(1959) ; Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State 
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator, 
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. 8. 391, 421 
& :n, 30; id., at 451-460 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct· r~ 
view had refused to consider ·the appeal because the 
papers were filed out of time. This Court held that 
since the state court judgment rested on a re~onable 
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a 
ground that would have barred direct review of his 
federal claims by this Court, the . District Court lacked 
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S., 
at 458, 486. 
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of 
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 
(1963).'0 Noia and two codefendants had been convicted 
of felony murd~r. The sole evidence against each de-
fendant was a signed confession. N oia's codefendants, 
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. Al-
though their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent 
state proceedings they were able to estab1ish that their 
confessions had been coerced and their convictions there-
fore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a sub-
sequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipu-
lated that Noia's confession also had been coerced, but 
the District Court followed Daniels in ho1ding that Noia's 
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183 
:~.o Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been 
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional 
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal ·counterpart, 28 
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.''' 
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, non-
constitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but 
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceeclings. !d., at 
178-179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 & n. 15 
(1974). Even those nonconstitutional claims that could riot have 
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only 
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which in~ 
nerently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' " id., at 346,, 
quoting Htll v United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962). 
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F. Supp. 222, 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals re-
versed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and 
that he be released from custody or a new trial be 
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, nar-
rowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal 
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal con-
stitutional claims.11 
During the period in which the substantive scope of 
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider 
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect 
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior 
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the 
federal courts of appeals had concluded that collateral 
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on 
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available 
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.'2 The 
11 In constming broadly the power of a federal district court to 
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the 
writ, noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command 
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require:' 
28 U. S. C. § 2243." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis 
v. Henderson, - U. S. - (1976), holding that a state prisoner 
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the 
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a post-
conviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual 
prejudice, we emphasized: 
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances con-
siderations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its 
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425--426;" 
12 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d 
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965); 
De Welles v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388 
U. S . . 919 (1967); Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 {CA-9 
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions 
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in 
kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in 
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn 
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge 
evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic de-
vice intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment vio-
lations by law enforcement officers." I d., at 224. See 
Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 
F . 2d 822 (1966). 
· Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search-
and-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings. 
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy ex-
tends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial," 
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. (J., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 
U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, that there was no basis for restricting "access by 
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims 
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similar 
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U.S., at 226. 
Although in recent years the view has been expressed 
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope· 
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review 
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the question of 
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair oppor-
tumty to raise and have adjudicated the question in state 
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250' 
1962); Arm-stead v. United States, 318 F . 2d 725 (CA5 1963), withr 
e. g., Untted States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v. 
United States, 317 F . 2d 494 (CAlO 1963). See also Thornton v. 
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966} 
(search-and-seizure claims not cogmz.able under § 2255 absent special: 
~b:cumstances). . 
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( 1973) (PowELL, J., concurring) / 8 the Court, without 
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to 
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See 
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).14 
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal 
habeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectua-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the grant~ 
ing of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been con~ 
victed in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in 
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were 
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require 
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of convic~ 
tion upon direct review.15 Until this case we have not 
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this assump~ 
tion. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, at 
249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of 
13 See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 ( 1970) . 
14 In Newsome the Court focused on the issue whether a state 
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where 
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal. 
The Court did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See 
420 U. S., at 287 n. 4. 
15 As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 217, 231, 239 (1969), the Kaufmrm majority made 
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a 
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that 
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. See Mancusi v. DePorte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); 
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas 
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as 
well as in Warden, the issue considered here was not presented to 
the Court in the petition for writ of certiorari. As emphasized by 
Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we con, 
sider issues not .raised in the petition. 394 U. S., at 239 & n. 7. 
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the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule, that the a.ssumption is unjustified.16 
III 
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unrea.sonablf:l searches and seizures." The 
Amendment wa.s primarily a reaction to the evils ~ci­
ated with the use of the general warrant in England ~nd 
· the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Te:Das, 
. 379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 
U. S. 360, 363-365 (l959), and was intended to protect 
the "sanctity of a man's hqme and the privacies of life," 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from 
searches under unchecked general authority.17 
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means 
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourtp Amend-
ment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v. United States, 
255 U. S. 298 ( 1921), there existed no barrier to the 
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Amendment. See Adams v. New York, 
16 As we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence 
·should have been excluded because it was obtainoo by an illegal 
search or seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full and 
fair consideration of that claim in the btate courts, may not invoke 
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we find it 
unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning the exclusionary 
rule raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in 
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se 
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or 
the circumstances of the police action. 
l7 See generally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme 
Court (1966); Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937) . 
I 
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192 U. S. 585 (1904).18 In Weeks the Court held that 
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of 
property secured through an illegal search or seizure con-
ducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held 
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a 
federa.l prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. 
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally 
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the 
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), 
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by 
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment 
is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as 
such enforceable against the States through the [Four-
teenth Amendment] Due Process Clause.'' !d., at 27-28. 
The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclu-
sionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as 
"an essential ingredient of that right.'' hi., at 29. The 
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions, 
see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea· 
v~ United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little 
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was 
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
u. s. 643 (1961). 
18 The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boyd' 
·'V~ United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that 
the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers 
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v·. 
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that 
the "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the 
defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered 
to the common-law rule tl\at a trial court must not inquire, . on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwise• 
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. .. 
D'ana;, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (.1841} . 
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Decisions prior to M app advanced two principal rea-
sons for application of the rule in federal trials. The 
Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special 
supervisory role over the lower federal courts, referred to 
the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that 
exclusion of illega1ly seized evidence prevents contami- ~ . ;(J,..,/ 
nation of the judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222.19 Bu~ ~ ::::'. f 
a more pragmatic ground was emphasized: (!~ 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. 
Its purpose is to deter-to co.mpel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail .. 
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
it." I d., at 217. 
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule 
to the States on several grounds,2{) but relied principally 
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlaw-
ful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658. 
Althoug~decisions 1 1 · I H :P1' often have ·al- ~ 
luded to the "imperative of · judicial integrity/' e. g., 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975), 
19 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 12-13 (1008); Weeks v. Uniteil 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J ., dissenting); id., at 484 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
:20 See 367 U . . S., at 656 (prevention of introduction of evidenoo 
where introduction is "tantimiount" to a coerced confession) ; id., at 
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (pres-
ervation of judicial integrity) . 
Only four Justices adopted the· view that the Fourth Amendment 
itself requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in 
state criminal trials. See 367 U. S., at 656, 666. Mr. Justice Black 
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, . 
was not sufficient, _see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949) 
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amend-
ment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban 
against compelled self-incrimination, a· constitutional basis emerges; 
!or: :teq_uiring exclusion. 361 U. S., at 661. See n. 18, supra .. 
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they demonstrate the limited role of that justifica-
tion in the determination whether to apply the rule in a 
particular context.21 Logically extended this justifica-
tion would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally 
seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defend-
ant, or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandon-
ment of the standing limitations on who may object to 
the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence, 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and 
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings 
need not abate when the defendant's person is unconsti-
tutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 
(1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952). Simi-
larly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does 
not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand 
jury proceedings. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 
338 (1974). Nor does it require that the trial court 
exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a 
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to 
result in convictions in some cases. Walder v. United 
States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases 
is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be con-
cerned with preserving the integrity of the judiciai 
process, this concern has limited force as a justifica-
tion for the exclusion of highly probative evidence.22 
The importance of this justification becomes minimal 
21 See Monaghan, Foreword : Constitutional Common Law, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975). 
22 As we recognized last Term, judicial integrity is "not offended 
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that 
their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions sub-
sequent to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type 
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the 
Constitution." United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538 (emphasis 
omitted) . 
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where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisonev 
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full 
p.nd fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at 
trial and on direct review. 
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule 
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates 
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions havE) 
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional 
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to th~:t 
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any 
"[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead, 
"the rule is a judicially created remedy· designed tQ 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect .... " United States v, 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539; 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U. S., at 63~637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 
406, 416 (1966). 
Mapp involved the enforcement of the exclusionary 
rule at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as 
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of 
the Fourth Amendment aiso requires the consideration 
of search-and-seizure claims upon coilaterai review of 
state convictions. But despite the broad deterrent pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been in• 
terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized 
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As in 
the case of any remedial device, "the application of the· 
rule has been restricted to those areas where its reme-
dial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."' 
United States v. Calandra, supra at 348.28 Thus, our 
28 As Professor Amsterdam has observed : 
1'Th~t rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispen~ 
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refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential 
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury 
by such extension against the potential contribution to 
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through de-
terrence of police misconduct : 
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be 
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury pro"' 
ceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence 
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it 
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the 
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly 
further that goal. Such an extension would deter 
only police investigation consciously directed toward 
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand 
jury investigation .... 
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that 
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly mini-
mal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct 
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of 
the grand jury." !d., at 351 (footnote omitted). 
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's 
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier 
sation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the 
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert[ing] general legal pressures 
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of . . . 
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a 
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be 
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many 
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from bltmdering, 
pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity· 
inflicts gratuitous harm on the public interest ... .'' Amsterdam, 
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev .. 
378, 388-389 (1964) (footnotes omitted) . 
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in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court 
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evi~ 
dence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had 
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, 
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusion· 
ary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to 
prevent perjury and to llSSUre the integrity of the trial 
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly 
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not 
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of 
competing policies. In thfl.t case, the public interest in 
determination of truth at trial :w was deemed to out.. 
weigh the incremental contribution that might have been 
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by 
application of the rule. 
The balancing process at work in these cases also 
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing 
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist 
only when the Government attempts to use illegally ob-
tained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal 
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See JoneS' 
v. United States, 362 U:S. 257, ·261 (1960). The stand-
ing requirement is premised on the view that the "addi-
tional benefits of extending the rule" to defendants other 
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed' 
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence· 
·uSee generally Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal 
View, 31st Annual Benjamm N. Cardozo Lecture, As$11. of th~ Bar 
of the C1ty of New York, Dec. 16, U174. 
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which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174-175,25 
IV 
We turn now to the specific question presented by these 
eases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amend-
ment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The question is whether state prisoners-
who have been afforded the opportunity for full and fair 
consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule 
with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial 
and on direct review-may invoke their claim again on 
federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found· 
through the balancing process identified above in Part 
III. 
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at 
trial and on direct review are well known: 26 the focus 
25 Cases addressing the question whether search-and-seizure hold-
ings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the· 
<;l"eterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with 
the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule con-
text, See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254 
& n. 21 (1969) ; Linkletter v. W;uker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-637 (1965). 
Cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 8l (1968) . The "attenuation-
of-the-taint" doctrine also~~· consistent with the balancing approach. 
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963); Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 
389-390. 
26 See, e. g., Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971) 
(BURGER, C. J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); 8 Wigmore On Evidence§ 2184a, at 
51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 388-391; 
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule. 
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and 
sources cited therem, Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis-
conduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 256 (1961) ;: 
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?:,. 
SD. Texas L: Rev. 'Z36 (1972) . 
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of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, 
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or inno-
cence that should be the central concern in a crimi-
nal proceeding.27 Moreover, the physical evidence sought 
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in 
his dissent in Kaufman: 
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many 
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence 
seized can in no way have been rendered untrust-
worthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often 
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any 
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty." 
394 U. S., at 237. 
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding 
process and often frees the guilty. ·The disparity in par-
ticular cases between the error committed by the police 
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by 
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of propor-
tionality that is essential to the concept of justice.28 Thus, 
27 See address by Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 
delivered at the N ahonal Conference on the Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction With thr Admuustration of .Justice, at 8-9, April 8, 
1976 ; cf Frankel, n. ~supra. 
28 Many of the proposals for mod1ficat10n of the scope of the 
exclusionary rule recognize at least 1mphmtly the role of propor-
tionality m the cnminal justice system and the potential value of 
-establislung a direct relationship between the nature of the vio-
lation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A 
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at 
181-183 ("substantial viOlations"); H. Fnendly, Benchmarks 260-262' 
1 (1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of 
· activity mtentionally or flagrantly 11legal.") Wigmore, suprcv, n 25, 
~t 52-53 See n. 16, supra. 
.. 
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although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police 
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for 
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately 
it may well have the opposite effect of generating dis-
respect for the law and administration of justice.29 
These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a, 
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collat-
eral review on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim 
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state 
courts.80 
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that 
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite 
the absence of supportive empirical evidence,S1 we have 
29 In a different context, Da11in Oaks has observed: 
"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccu-
pation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures 
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth 
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends .... 
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our 
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of 
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted 
from these goals." 
Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility, Convocation and 
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young 
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975. 
30 Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to 
assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of lib-
erty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our system 
of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of 
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal 
trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state· 
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional 
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded.'~ 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J., con-
curring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231 
(Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra, n. 13. 
81 The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has long been the subject 
of sharp debate. Until ·recently, scholarly empirical research 
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assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be 
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the 
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to dis-
regard it. More importantly, over the long term, this 
demonstration that our society attaches serious conse-
quences to violation of constitutional rights is thought 
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement 
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incor-
porate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value 
system.32 
We adhere to the view that these considerations sup-
port the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial 
and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court con-
victions. But the additional contribution, if any, of the 
consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state pris-
oners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs. 
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered 
may add marginally to an awareness of the values pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. But there is no 
reason to believe that the overall educative effect of over-
turning convictions based on evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment would be appreciably 
diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not be 
raised in federal habeas corpu~;~ review of state convic-
was unavailable, Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 218 (1960) . 
And, the evidence derived from recent empirical research is still 
inconclusive. Compare, e. g., Oaks, supra, n. 26; Spiotto, Search 
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its· 
Alternatives, 2 Journ. Legal Studies 243 (1973), with, e. g., Cannon, 
Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and 
a Plea Against a Precipitious Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974). 
See United States v. Janis,-- U.S.--,- n. 22 (1976; Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 
349, 475 n, 593 (1974); Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical 
Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiott<J. 
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 74.0 (1974)-
'32 See Oaks, supra, n. 26, at 756. 
I' 
u 
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tions.88 Nor is there reason to assume that any specific 
disincentive already created by the risk of exclusion of 
evidence at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct 
review would be enhanced if there were the further risk 
that a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on 
direct review might be overturned in collateral proceed-
ings years after the incarceration of the defendant. The 
view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment viola-
tions would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption 
that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal 
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure 
that went undetected at trial and on appeal. 84 Even if 
83 "As the exclusionary rule "is applied ~ime after time, it seems 
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of dimin-
ishing returns, and beyond that po"int its continued application is a 
public nuisance:" Amsterdam, supra, n. 22, at 389. 
84 The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support 
of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to 
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of 
the state courts as fair and competent (arums for the adjudication 
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts 
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through 
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this 
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal ra-
tionale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective 
institutional setting within which federal judges and state judges 
operate. Despite difference:; in institutiomil environment and the 
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state 
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now 
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights 
in the trial and appellate courts of the several State>. State courts, 
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard per-
sonal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 
14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816). Moreover, the argument 
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutionai 
law is especially unr}ersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure 
claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial 
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason 
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more 
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one rationally could assume that some additional incre-
mental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases, 
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering 
Fourth Amendment rights would be outweighed by the 
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational 
system of criminal justice. 
In sum, in view of the substantial societal costs .associ-
ated with the exclusionary rule, we conclude that where 
the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair 
litigation of Fourth Amendment claims,a~ a state pris-
oner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on 
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional 
search or seizure was introduced at his trial. In this 
context the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, 
to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal 
and the recognized oosts of application of the rule 
persist.86 
Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of AppealiS 
are 
Reversed,. 
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the appliC3--
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state1 courthouse." 
ator, supra, n. 7, at 50. 
af.Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for fed-
eral habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by this Court 
through an application for It writ of certiorari, and l!ince the time 
to apply for certiorari has now passed, any dimilljition in their 
ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ~round evidence obtained' 
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introducEJCl at their trials 
should be prospective. Cf. England v. Louisiana Sfate Board of 
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422'-423 (1964) . 'fe reject these 
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior· 
decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S., 391, respondents '\'ere, of course, 
free to ~le a timely petition for certiorari prior to ~king feder.M: 
habe us elief. 
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Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal 
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were af-
firmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied 
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged 
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent 
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by 
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under 
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether 
a federal court should consider, in ruling on a petition for 
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that 
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or sei-
zure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously 
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation 
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of consid-
erable importance to the administration of criminal 
justice. 
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I 
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural 
history of these cases. 
A 
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder 
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At 
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three com-
panions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Ber-
nardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an alter-
cation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the 
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed 
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten hours later 
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department ar-
rested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy 
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest dis-
covered a .38 caliber revolver with six expended car-
tridges in the cylinder. 
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of 
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Ber-
nardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at 
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist 
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun 
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected 
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson 
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the re-
volver should have been excluded because the vagrancy 
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the 
1 The ordina.nce provides: 
"Every person is a vagrant who : 
" [1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify 
himself and to arcount for his presenre when asked by any police 
officer to do so [3] if surrounding circumstances are such as 
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such 
identification." 
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conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of 
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that 
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of 
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error, 
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson offi-
cer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Su-
preme Court of California denied Powell's petition for 
habeas corpus relief. 
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a 
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in 
the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California, contending that the testimony con-
cerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been 
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued 
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson 
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and 
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe 
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded 
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held 
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional, 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not 
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits 
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the 
alternative, that court agreed with the California District 
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence con-
cerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The court concluded 
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague/ that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and 
2 In support. of the vagueness holding the court relied principally 
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), where 
we mvalidated a city ordinance in part defining vagrants as . .. "pc~ 
74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION 
STONE v. POWELL 
that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no 
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were 
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve 
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting 
unconstitutional statutes. !d., at 98.. After an inde-
pendent review of the evidence the court concluded that 
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error 
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's 
accomplices. !d., at 99. 
B 
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in 
April 1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05 
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a tele-
phone call that a woman had been heard screaming at 
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that 
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it ex-
ploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investi-
gation of the murder centered on Duane Peak, a 
15-year-old member of the National Committee to Com-
bat Fascism ("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant 
was issued for Peak's arrest. The investigation also 
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including 
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill 
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search 
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m. 
that night and found lights and a television on, but there 
was no respo11se to their repeated knocking. While some 
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was 
sons wandering or strollmg around from place to place without any 
lawful purpose or object .. , ." !d., at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the 
similarity betwern the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see 
n. 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second 
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently 
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Peti-
tioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposi-
tion of the case we need not consider this issue 
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obtained to search for explosives and illegal weapons 
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the 
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain 
view, dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials use-
ful in the construction of explosive devices. Peak 
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice 
voluntarily surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing 
at that time were subjected to chemical analysis, disclos-
ing dynamite particles. 
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District 
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted plant-
ing the suitcase and making the telephone call, and 
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative 
evidence the State introduced items seized during the 
search, as well as the results of the chemical analysis of 
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to sup-
press this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search 
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search 
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480 
(1972). 
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarcera-
tion was unlawful because the evidence underlying his 
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal 
search of his home. The District Court concluded that 
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affi-
davit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974).3 The court 
3 The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit 
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police 
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home 
because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent 
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF 
74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION 
6 STONE v. POWELL 
also rejected the State's contention that even if the 
warrant was invalid the search was justified because of 
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the 
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Peak 
and search for bombs and explosives believed in posses-
sion of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest war-
rant did not justify the entry as the police lacked 
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and 
further concluded that the circumstances were not suffi-
ciently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless 
search. !d., at 194-202.4 The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons 
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 ( 1975). 
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respec-
tive state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, 
petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions 
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past 
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said should 
be used aga.inst. the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In 
concluding that there exi::;ted probable cause for issuance of the 
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit 
alone sttfficient, it also referred to information contained in testi-
mony adduced at the suppre::;::;ion hearing but not included in the 
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. W. 2d 480, 487-488. See 
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The 
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the 
affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969); 
Aguilm· v. Texas. :378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded prob-
able cau~:>c was lacking. Petitionrr Wolff contends that police should 
be permittrd to supplement the information containrd in an affidavit 
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an 
issue we nred not reach. 
4 The Distnct Court further held that the evidence of dynamite 
particles found on Rice's clothing should have been suppressed as 
the tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued 
but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207. 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne 
Lv.mber Co., lnr: . v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920}. 
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concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role 
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases 
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their 
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975).5 We 
now reverse. 
II 
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first 
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation 
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody 
by the United States. The original statutory authoriza-
tion did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It 
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall 
have power to issue writs of .. . habeas corpus . ... " 
Ibid. The courts defined the scope of the writ in accord-
ance with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as 
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g., 
5 In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that 
counsel in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the 
questions : 
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that 
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest 
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of 
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitu-
tional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of 
a search mcident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is 
one cognizabl€1 under 28 U. S. C. § 2254." 
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of 
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circum-
stances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2254.'' 
6 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used 
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corp·us ad subjicien-
dum, known as the "Great Writ.'' Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 
Cra.nch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.). 
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar-
shall, C. J.). 
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act 
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867 
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in "all 
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or 
law of the United States .... " But the limitation of fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g., 
ln re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895); 
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. 
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the con-
cept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain 
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this 
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8 
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In 
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that 
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur-
7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review 
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review 
on certificate of diVlsion of opinion in the circuit court was remote 
because of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court. 
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The 
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973); 
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32, 
79-80 & n. 107 (1928). Pressure naturally developed for expansion 
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable 
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and 
Frderal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441,473 
& n. 75 {19763) . 
8 The expansion occurrrd pnmanly with regard to (i) convic-
tions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex parte 
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentions based upon an allegedly illegal 
sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1973) . 
See Bator, supra, n 7, at 465-474. 
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state su-
preme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess-
fully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district 
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because 
Frank's federal claims had been considered by a compe-
tent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized, 
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the 
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process" 
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether 
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the 
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. I d., 
at 333-336. 
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487, 
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 In 
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas 
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in 
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors and in rul-
ing certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the high-
est court of the State had rejected these claims on direct 
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and 
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951). 
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective 
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of 
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full 
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if 
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In 
9 There bas been disagreement among scholars as to whether the 
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision 
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 ( 1923) . Compare Hart, Fore-
ward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105 
(1959) ; Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State 
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator, 
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 421 
& n .. 30; id., at 451-46.0 (Harlan, J., dissr..nting). 
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct re-
view had refused to consider the appeal because the 
papers were filed out of time. This Court held that 
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable 
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a 
ground that would have barred direct review of his 
federal claims by this Court. the District Court lacked 
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S., 
at 458. 486. 
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of 
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 
(1963).1'0 Noia and two codefendants had been convicted 
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each de-
fendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants, 
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. Al-
though their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent 
state proceedings they were able to establish that their 
confessions had been coerced and their convictions there-
fore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a sub-
sequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipu-
lated that N oia's confession also had been coerced, but 
the District Court followed Daniels in holding that N oia's 
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183 
1.o Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been 
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutiohal 
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28 
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal." 
Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, non-
constitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but 
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. Id., at 
178-179 ; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 & n. 15 
(1974). Even those nonconstitutional claims that could not have 
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only 
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which in-
herently results in a complete m1scarriage of justice,' " id., at 346, 
quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962}. 
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F. Supp. 222, 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals re-
versed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and 
that he be released from custody or a new trial be 
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, nar-
rowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal 
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal con-
stitutional claims.11 
During the period in which the substantive scope of 
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider 
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect 
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior 
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the 
federal courts of appeals had concluded that collateral 
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on 
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available 
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.12 The 
11 In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to 
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the 
writ, noting that " [ d] iscretion is implicit in the statutory command 
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as la.w and justice require.' 
28 U. S. C. § 2243." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis 
v. Henderson, - U. S. - (1976), holding that a sta.te prisont:or 
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the 
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a post-
conviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual 
prejudice, we emphasized : 
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances con-
siderations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its 
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426.'' 
12 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2cl 
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965); 
De Welles v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388 
U. S. 919 (196.7); Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (CA9 
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions 
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in 
kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in 
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn 
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge 
evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic de-
vice intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment vio-
lations by law enforcement officers." !d., at 224. See 
Thornton v. United States, 125 U.S. App. D. C. 114, 368 
F. 2d 822 ( 1966). 
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search-
and-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings. 
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy ex-
tends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial," 
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 
U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 
( 1!)68), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, that there was no basis for restricting "access by 
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims 
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similar 
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U.S., at 226. 
Although in recent years the view has been expressed 
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope 
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review 
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the question of 
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair oppor-
tunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state 
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250 
1962) ; Arrnstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d 725 (CA5 1963), with, 
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v. 
United States, 317 F. 2d 494 (CAIO 1963). See also Thornton v. 
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966) 
(search-and-seizure claim~> not cognizable under § 2255 absent special 
eircumstan oos). 
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( 1973) (PowELL, J., concurring) / 3 the Court, without 
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to 
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See 
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).14 
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal 
habeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectua-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the grant-
ing of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been con-
victed in sta.te court on the basis of evidence obtained in 
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were 
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require 
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of convic-
tion upon direct review.l5 Until this case we have not 
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this assump-
tion. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, at 
249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of 
13 See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). 
14 In Newsome the Court focused on the issue whether a state 
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where 
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal. 
The Court did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See 
420 U. S., a.t 287 n. 4. 
15 As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. United 
States, 394 U. S. 217, 231,239 (1969), the Kaufman ma.jority made 
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a 
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that 
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. See Mancusi v. De.Forte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); 
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas 
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as 
well as in Warden, the issue considered here was not presented to 
the Court in the petition for writ, of certiorari. As emphasized by 
Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we con-
sider issues not mised in the petition. 394 U. S., at 239 & n. 7. 
jli . I 
II 
I 
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the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule, that the assumption is unjustified.16 
III 
The Fourth Amendment assures the 11right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The 
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associ-
ated with the use of the general warrant in England and 
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas, 
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 
U. S. 360, 363- 365 (1959), and was intended to protect 
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from 
searches under unchecked general authority.17 
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means 
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v. United States, 
255 U. S. 298 ( 1921), there existed no barrier to the 
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Amendment. See Adams v. New York, 
16 As we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence 
should have been excluded because it was obtained by an illegal 
search or seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full and 
fair consideration of that claim in the state courts , may not invoke 
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we find it 
unnecessa ry to consider the other issues concerning the exclusionary 
rule raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in 
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se 
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or 
the rircumstances of the police action. 
1 7 See generally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme 
Court (1966) ; La.:;son, The History and Development of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution ( 1937) . 
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192 U. S. 585 (1904) .18 In Weeks the Court held that 
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of 
property secured through an illegal search or seizure con-
ducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held 
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a 
federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. 
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally 
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the 
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), 
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by 
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment 
is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as 
such enforceable against the States through the [Four-
teenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." I d., at 27-28. 
The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclu-
sionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as 
"an essential ingredient of that right." Id., at 29. The 
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions, 
see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea 
v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little 
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was 
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
u. s. 643 (1961). 
18 The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that 
the compulsory production of a person's private books and parwrs 
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v. 
New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that 
the "law held tmconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the 
defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered 
to the common-law rule that a trial court must not inquire, on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwise 
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealt-h v. 
Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (I84ll) 
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Decisions prior to M app advanced two principal rea-
sons for application of the rule in federal trials. The 
Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special 
supervisory role over the lower federal courts, referred to 
the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that 
exclusion of illegally seized evidence prevents contami-
nation of the judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222.10 But 
even in that context a more pragmatic ground was 
emphasized: 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. 
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
it." I d., at 217. 
The Mapp majority .iustified the application of the rule 
to the States on several grounds/0 but relied principally 
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlaw-
ful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658. 
Although our decisions often have alluded to the 
"imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., United States 
10 See 'Terry v. Ohw, 392 U. S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J ., dissenting); id., at 484 
(Brandeis, J., disSt>ntmg). 
20 See 367 U. S., at 656 (preventwn of introduction of evidence 
where introduction is "tantamount" to a coerced conf~ion); id., at 
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (pres-
ervation of judicial mtrgnty) . 
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment 
itself requirel:l the exclusion of unconstitutionally l:leizE>d evidence in 
state criminal tnals. SE'<' 367 U.S., at 656, 666. Mr. Justice Black 
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, 
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949) 
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amend-
ment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban 
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges 
for requiring E>xcluswn 367 U S., at 661. See n. 18, supra. 
.• 
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v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 ( 1975), they demon-
strate the limited role of that justification in the de-
termination whether to apply the rule in a particular 
context. 21 Logically extended this justification would 
require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized 
evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, 
or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 
379 U. S. 443 (1965) . It also would require abandon-
ment of the standing limitations on who may object to 
the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence, 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and 
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings 
need not abate when the defendant's person is unconsti-
tutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 
(1975); Prisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952). Simi-
larly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does 
not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand 
jury proceedings. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 
338 (1974). Nor does it require that the trial court 
exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a 
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to 
result in convictious in some cases. Walder v. United 
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases 
is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be con-
cerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial 
process, this concern has limited force as a justifica-
tion for the exclusion of highly probative evidence.22 
21 See Monaghan, Foreword: ConstitutiOnal Common Law, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975). 
22 As we recognized la::;t Term, judicial integrity is "not offended 
if law enforcement officials rea~onably believPd in good faith that 
their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decision::; sub-
sequent to the search and sPizure have held that conduct of the type 
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the 
Constitution " United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538 (emphasis 
omitted}. 
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The importance of this justification becomes minimal 
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner 
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full 
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at 
trial and on direct review. 
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule 
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates 
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have 
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional 
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the 
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any 
"[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead, 
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect .... " United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539; 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 
406, 416 (1966) . 
Mapp involved the enforcement of the exclusionary 
rule at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as 
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of 
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration 
of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of 
state convictions. But despite the broad deterrent pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been in-
terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized 
evidence m all proceedings or against all persons. As in 
the case of any remedial device, "the application of the 
rule has been restricted to those areas where its reme-
dial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." 
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United States v. Calandra, supra at 348.23 Thus, our 
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential 
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury 
by such extension a.gainst the potential contribution to 
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through de-
terrence of police misconduct: 
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be 
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury pro-
ceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence 
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it 
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the 
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly 
further that goal. Such an extension would deter 
only police investigation consciously directed toward 
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand 
jury investigation .... 
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that 
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly mini-
mal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct 
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of 
the grand jury." Id., at 351 (footnote omitted). 
23 As· Professor Amsterdam has observed: 
"The rule is unsupportable a.':l reparation or compensatory dispen-· 
sation to the injured rriminal; its sole rational justification is the 
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert [ing] general legal pressures 
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of ... 
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a 
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be 
swa.Ifowed than IS needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many 
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering, 
pursuance of thi;; policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity 
inflicts gratuitous harm on the public interest ... .'' Amsterdam, 
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 1!2' U. Pa. L. Rev_ 
l7.8'; 38$-389\ (19'64) ((footnotes omi'tted) . 
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The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's 
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier 
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court 
permitted the Gove~;nment to use unlawfully seized evi-
dence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had 
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, 
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusion-
ary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to 
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial 
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly 
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not 
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of 
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in 
determination of truth at trial 24 was deemed to out-
weigh the incremental contribution that might have been 
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by 
application of the rule. 
The balancing process at work in these cases also 
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing 
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist 
only when the Government attempts to use illegally ob-
tained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal 
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See Jones 
v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 261 (1960). The stand-
ing requirement is premised on the view that the "addi-
tional benefits of extending the rule" to defendants other 
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed 
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
24 See generally Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal 
View, 31st Annual Benjamm N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar 
·Of the City of Nrw York, Dec. 16, 1974. 
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acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence 
which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174-175.25 
IV 
We turn now to the specific question presented by these 
cases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amend-
ment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The question is whether state prisoners-
who have been afforded the opportunity for fuJI and fair 
consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule 
with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial 
and on direct review-may invoke their claim again on 
federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found 
by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against 
the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at 
trial and on direct review are well known : 26 the focus 
25 Case:; addressing the question whether search-and-seizure hold-
ings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the 
deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with 
the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule con-
text, See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254 
& n. 21 (1969); Linlclette1· v. Walke?', 381 U.S. 618, 636-637 (1965). 
Cf. Pulle?' v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 81 (1968). The "attenuation-
o-f-the-taint" doctrine also 1s consistent with the balancing approach. 
See Browro v. Illmots, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United 
States, 37! U. S. 471, 491--492 (1963); Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 
389-39'0. 
20 See, e.g·., Irvine v. California, :347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971) 
(BlmGER', C. J., dissf'nting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 
N. E. 585 (1926) (Ca.rdozo, J.); 8 Wigmore On Evidence§ 2184a, at 
51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 388-391; 
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule 
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and' 
sources cited therein; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis-
conduct by the Police, 52 JJ. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 2:56 (100!); 
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of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, 
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or inno-
cence that should be the central concern in a crimi-
nal proceeding.27 Moreover, the physical evidence sought 
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendanto As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in 
his dissent in Kaufman : 
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many 
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence 
seized can in no way have been rendered untrust-
worthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often 
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any 
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guiltyo" 
394 Uo S., at 237. 
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding 
process and often frees the guiltyo The disparity in par-
ticular cases between the error committed by the police 
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by 
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of propor-
tionality that is essential to the concept of justiceo28 Thus, 
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 ( 1972). 
27 Set> address by Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 
delivered at the Nationnl Conference on the Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, at 8-9, April 8, 
1976 ; cf. Frank!'!, n . 24, suprao 
28 Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the 
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of propor-
tionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of 
establishing a direct relationship lx>tween the nature of the vio-
lation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A 
Model Code of Pre-a.rraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at 
181-183 (!'substantial violations"); H. Friendly, Benchmarks 260-262 
(1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of 
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although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police 
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for 
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately 
it may well have the opposite effect of generating dis-
respect for the law and administration of justice.20 
These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a 
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collat-
eral review on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim 
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state 
courts.30 
activity intentionally or flagrantly illegal."}; Wigmore, supra, n. 25, 
at 52-53. See n. 16, supra. 
2 " In a different context, Dallin H. Oaks has observed: 
"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccu-
vation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures 
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth 
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends .... 
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our 
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of 
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted 
from these goals" 
Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility, Convocation and 
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young 
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975. 
30 Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to 
assure that no innocrnt person suffers an unconstitutional loss of lib-
erty, results m seriou::; intrusions on values important to our system 
of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of 
limited judicial resource~, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal 
trials, (Iii) the mmimization of friction between our federal and state 
systems of JUShce, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional 
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded." 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J., con-
curring) . See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231 
(Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra, n. 13. 
We nevertlwles!:i afford broad habeas corpus relief, recognizing 
the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against 
compelling an mnocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of 
liberty. The Court m F'ay v. Noia, supra, described habeaH corpus 
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Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that 
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite 
the absence of supportive empirical evidence/' we have 
assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be 
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the 
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to dis-
regard it. More importantly, over the long term, this 
demonstration that our society attaches serious conse-
quences to violation of constitutional rights is thought 
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement 
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incor-
porate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value 
system."2 
We adhere to the view that these considerations sup-
"' port the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial 
'' 
a~ a remrdy for "whatever society drems to be intolc•rablc re-
straint~." and recognized that tho;;e to whom the writ should be 
granted ··arc pcr::;o!l~ whom ~ociety has grievously wronged." 372 
U. S., at ·!01, 4.JJ. But in the case of a typiral Fourth Amendment 
cia im, assertrd on rollateral attark, a convicted defendant is usually 
a::;king society to rC'determinc an issue that ha;; no bearing on the 
basic just ice of his incarceration. 
31 The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has long been the subject 
of sharp debate. Until recently, scholarly empirical research 
was unavailable, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960). 
And, the evidence derived from recent · empirical resea.rch is still 
Inconclusive. Compare, e. g., Oaks, sup1'a, n. 26; Spiotto, Search 
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its 
Alternatives, 2 Joum. Legal Studies 243 (1973), with, e. g., Cannon, 
Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and 
a Plea Against a Precipitious Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974). 
See United States v. Janis,-- U.S.--,-- n. 22 (1976; Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 
349, 475 n, 593 (1974); Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical 
Evaluations of the Rxclu::;ionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiott,o 
Research and United State;; v. Calandra, 69 Nw, L. Rev. 740 (1974), 
·~ 2 See Oaks, supra, n. 20, at 75tl. 
-
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and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court con-
victions. But the additional contribution, if any, of the 
consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state pris-
oners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs. 
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered 
may add marginally to an awareness of the values pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. There is no reason to 
believe, however, that the overall educative effect of 
the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished 
if search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in fed-
eral habeas corpus review of state convictions."a Nor 
is there reason to assume that any specific disincentive 
already created by the risk of exclusion of evidence 
at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct review 
would be enhanced if there were the further risk that 
a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on 
direct review might be overturned in collateral proceed-
ings years after the incarceration of the defendant. The 
view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment viola-
tions would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption 
that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal 
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure 
that went undetected at trial and on appeaJ.B-1 Even if 
~3 ''At; thr exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems 
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of dimin-
i~;hing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a 
public nui~ancc." .'\msterdam, supra, n. 22, at 389. 
3" The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support 
of thr view that fedrral habeas corpus review is necessary to 
cffectuatr the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of 
the stair rourts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication 
of frdera.l constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts 
cannot he trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through 
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this 
Court on rcrtiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal ra-
tionale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective 
institutional setting within whjch federal Judges and :;tate judges 
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one rationally could assume that some additional incre-
mental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases, 
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering 
Fourth Amendment rights would be outweighed by the 
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational 
system of criminal justice. 
In sum, we conclude that where the State has pro-
vided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a 
Fourth Amendment claim/'" a state prisoner may not 
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground 
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or 
seizure was introduced at his trial. In this context the 
contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effec-
tuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the 
substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist 
with special force. 86 
operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the 
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state 
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now 
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights 
in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, 
like federal courts, have a coru;titutional obligation to safeguard per-
sonal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816) . Moreover, the argument 
that federal j1.1dges are more expert in applying federal constitutional 
law is especially 1mpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure 
claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial 
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason 
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more 
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the ~~pplica­
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse." 
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50. 
S5 Cf. Townsend, .. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
86 Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for fed-
eral habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review ·by this Court 
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time 
to apply for certiorari has now passed, any dimunition in their 
ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ground evidence obtained 
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Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals 
t\l'e 
Rever.~d.. 
in an trnconstitutional sea:rch or sei'zure was i'ntrod'trced' at their· trials· 
should be prospective. Cf. England' v. Louisiana State Board' of' 
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-423 (19'64). We reject these 
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior 
decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, respondents were, of course,. 
free to file a timely petition for certiorari pri01: to seeking federal 
ba he.as corpus relief. 
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Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal 
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were af~ 
firmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied 
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged 
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent 
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by 
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under 
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether 
a federal court should consider, in ruling on a petition for 
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that 
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or sei-
zure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously 
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation 
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of consid-
erable importance to the administration of criminal 
justice. 
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I 
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural 
history of these cases. 
A 
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder 
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At 
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three com-
panions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Ber-
nardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an alter-
cation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the 
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed 
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten hours later 
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department ar-
rested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy 
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest dis-
covered a .38' caliber revolver with six expended car-
tridges in the cylinder. 
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of 
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Ber-
nardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at 
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist. 
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun 
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected 
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson 
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the re-
volver should have been excluded because the vagrancy 
ordinance was unconstitutional In October 1969, the 
1 The ordinance provides· 
"Every person IS a vagrant who : 
" [1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or busmess and [2] who refuses to identify 
himself and to account for h1s presence when asked by any police-
officer to do so [3] If surrounding Circumstances are such as~ 
to indicate to a reasonable man that thr public safety demands such 
identification " 
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conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of 
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that 
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of 
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error, 
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson offi~ 
cer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 ( 1967). The Su-
preme Court of California denied Powell's petition for 
habeas corpus relief. 
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a 
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in 
the United States District Court for the Northern Dig.. 
trict of California, contending that the testimony con-
cerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been 
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued 
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson 
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and 
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe 
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded 
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held 
tha.t even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional, 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not 
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits 
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the 
alternative, that court agreed with the California District 
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence con-
cerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The court concluded 
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague/ that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and 
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principally 
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), where-
w.e- i.J)._valid,ateQ. a cit¥ w-Qjnal)ce in vart. definin~ vagrants as . ."per-. 
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no 
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were 
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve 
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting 
unconstitutional statutes. Id., at 98.. After an inde-
pendent review of the ev:idence the court concluded that 
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error 
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's 
accomplices. Id., at 99, 
B 
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in 
April1971 after trial i,n a Nebraska state court. At 2:05 
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a tele-
phone call that a woman had been heard screaming at 
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that 
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it ex-
ploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investi-
gation of the murder centered on Duane Peak, a 
15-year-old member of the National Committee to Com-
bat Fascism ("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant 
was issued for Peak's arrest. 'The investigation also 
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including 
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill 
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search 
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m. 
that night and found lights and a television on, but there 
was no response to their repeated knocking. While some 
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was 
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any 
lawful purpose or object .. , ." Id., at 158-157, n. 1. Noting the 
similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see 
n, 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, It concluded that the second 
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently 
specific to cure Its overall vagueness. 507 F 2d, at 95-97. Peti-
tioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposi-
tion of the rase we need not, consider this issue. 
74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION 
STONE v. POWELL 5 
obtained to search for explosives and illegal weapons 
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the 
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain 
v1ew, dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials use~ 
ful in the construction of explosive devices. Peak 
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice 
voluntarily surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing 
at' that time were subjected to chemical analysis, disclos~ 
ing dynamite particles. 
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District 
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted plant-
mg the suitcase and making the telephone call, and 
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative 
evidence the State introduced items seized during the 
search, as well as the results of the chemical analysis of 
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to sup-
press this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search 
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search 
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480 
(1972). 
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarcera-
tion was unlawful because the evidence underlying his 
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal 
search of his home. The District Court concluded that 
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affi-
davit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393' 
U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974).8 The court 
8 The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit 
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police 
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home 
because (1) Rice was an offiCial of the NCCF, (2) a violent 
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF 
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also rejected the State's contention that even if the 
warrant was invalid the search was- justified because of 
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the 
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Peak 
and search fot ·bombs and e~plosives believed in posses-
sion of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest war-
rant did not justify the entry as the police- lacked 
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and 
further concluded that the circumstances were not suffi-
ciently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless 
search. Id., at 194-202/ The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons 
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 (1975). 
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respec-
tive state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, 
petitioned for review of these decisions; raising questionS" 
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past 
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said shoutcr 
be used against the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In 
concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the 
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit 
alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testi-
mony adduced at the suppression hearing but not included in · the 
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. w: 2d 480, 487-488. See 
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The 
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to · the face of the 
affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n.. 3 (1969); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded ptob-· 
able cause was lacking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should 
be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidavit 
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an· 
issue we need not reach. 
4 The District. Court further held 'that the evidence of dynamite 
particles found on Riee's clothing should have been suppressed as 
the tainted fn1it of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued 
'but for the · unlawful search of his· home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207 . 
. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963) ; Silverthorne: 
· {.umber Go ., Inc . v. United States~ 251 TJ., S . 385 (1920) . 
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concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role 
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases 
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their 
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975) .5 We 
now reverse. 
II 
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first 
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation 
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody 
by the United States. The original statutory authoriza-· 
tion did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It 
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall 
have power· to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . . .. " 
Ibid. The courts defined the scope of the writ in accord-
ance with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as 
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g., 
5 In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that 
counsel in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the 
questions : 
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that 
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest 
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of 
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitu-
tional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of 
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is 
one cogmzable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254." 
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of 
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circum-
stances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U.S. C. 
§ 2254 " 
6 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used 
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien-
dum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4, 
<)anch.) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C J .). 
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar-
shall, C. J.). 
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. . Act 
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867 
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in "all 
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty ,or 
law of the United States .. . . " But the limitation of fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g., 
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895); 
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. 
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the con-
cept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain 
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this 
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8 
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In 
Franlc, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that 
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur-
7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review 
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review 
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote 
because of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court. 
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The 
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973); 
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32, 
79-80 & n. 107 (1928) . Pressure naturally developed for expansion 
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable 
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law an<f 
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv, L. Rev.441, 473· 
& n. 75 (19763) . 
8 The expansion occurred primarily with regard to (i) convic-
tions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex parte-
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentions based -upon an allegedly illegal 
sentence, e. g. , Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S .. 1(18 Wall.) 163 (1973). 
SeA Bator, supra, n. 7, at 465-474 . 
?4-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION 
STONE v. POWELL 
der had been dominated by a mob. After the state su-
preme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess-
fully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district 
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because 
Frank's federal claims had been considered by a compe-
tent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized, 
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the 
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process" 
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether 
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the 
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. /d.,. 
at 333-336. 
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487, 
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 0 In 
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas 
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in 
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors and in rul-
ing certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the high-
est court of the State had rejected these claims on direct 
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and 
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951). 
Despite the appareAt adequacy of the state corrective 
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of 
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full 
reconsideration of these constitutional clai)lls, including, if 
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In 
9 There has been disagreement among scho!a.rs as to whether the-
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision 
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923). Compare Hart, Fore-
ward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105· 
(1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State, 
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator,. 
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 421'. 
cy;: 1}.. Q,O; if$,;,, at. 457-46.0 (Hadan, J., qjssc.nting) . 
•' 
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct re .. 
view had refused to consider the appeal because the 
'papers were filed out of time. This Court held that 
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable 
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a 
ground that would have barred direct review of his 
federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked 
authority to grant habe~s corpus relief. See 344 U. S., 
at 458,486. 
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of 
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus pro~ 
ceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 
(1963).10 Noia and two codefendants had been convicted 
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each de~ 
fendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants, 
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. AI~ 
though their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent 
state proceedings they were able to establish that their 
confessions had been coerced and their convictions there~ 
fore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a sub~ 
sequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipu~ 
lated that Noia's confession also had been coerced, but 
the District Court followed Daniels in holding that N oia's 
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183 
10 Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been 
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional 
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28 
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.'' 
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, non-
constitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but 
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. I d., at 
178-179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 & n. 15 
(1974) . Even those nonconstitutional claims that could not have 
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only 
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which in-
berently results m a complete miscarriage of JUstice,' " id., at 346, 
' quotmg-Hill v. United States, 368 U. S 424, 428 (1962) . 
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F. Supp. 222, 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals re· 
versed, ordering that N oia's conviction be set aside and 
that he be released from custody or a new trial be 
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, nar-
rowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal 
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal con-
stitutional claims.11 
During the period in which the substantive scope of 
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider 
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect 
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior 
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the 
federal courts of appeals had concluded that collateral 
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on 
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available 
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.12 The 
11 In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to 
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habea.s 
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffinned the equitable nature of the 
writ, noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command 
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' 
28 U. S. C. § 2243." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis 
v. Henderson, - U. S. - (1976), holding that a state prisoner 
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the 
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a post-
conviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual 
prejudice, we emphasized: 
"This Court .has long recognized that in some circumstances con-
siderations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its 
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426." 
12 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d 
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965) ; 
.De Welles v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388 
U, R 919 (1967); Williams v, United States, 307 F . 2d 366 (CA9 
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decision~ 
was that Fourth Amendment vit>lations are different in 
kind from denials .of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights i.n 
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn 
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge 
·evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic de-
vice intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment vio-
1atiOns by law enforcement officers." -ld., at 224. See 
Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 
F . 2d 822 (1966). 
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search-
and-seizure claims are cognizable in §· 2255 proceedings. 
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy ex-
tends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,'r 
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 
U. S. 364 (1968); Carafq,s v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 23{ 
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, that there was no basis for restricting "access · by 
federal prisoners with illegal search-arid-seizure claims 
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similaf" 
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U.S., at 226. 
Although in recent years the view has been expressed 
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope' 
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit .collateral review 
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the ·question of 
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair oppor-
tunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state 
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 250 
1962); Armstead v, United States, 318 F. 2d -725 (CA5 1963), with,. 
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v. 
United States, 317 F. 2d 494 (CAlO 1963) . See also Thornton v. 
United States, 125 U. S. App. D C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966' 
(search-and-seizure claix;os not cogniaable under § 2~55 ;tbsent special' 
, ;(li!CUJ:ThStances ), .. 
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( 1973) (PowELL, J., concurring) / 3 the Court, without 
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to 
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See 
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975) .14 
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal 
habeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectua-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the grant... 
ing of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been con~ 
victed in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in 
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were 
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 0961), to require 
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of convic-
tion upon direct review.u Until this case we have not 
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this assump-
tion. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, ~t 
249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of 
13 See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). 
14 In Newsome the Court focu::;ed on the iss11e whether a state 
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where 
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal. 
The Court did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See 
420 U. 8., at 287 n. 4. 
1.6 As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. Unitea 
States, 394 U.S. ~17, 231, 239 (1969), the Kaufman majority made 
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a 
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that 
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); 
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 381' 
U. S. 294 ( 1967). But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas 
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as 
well as m Warden, the Issue considered here was not presented to' 
the Court m the petition for writ of certiorari. As emphasized ·by 
'.Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we con .... 
. sidfx; lSSQCS not. ~a1s@. in tJhe };?6titiOJil, a94. U. S., at 239 & n. 7. 
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the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exc}u ... 
sionary rule, that the assumption is unjustified.16 
III 
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The 
Amendment was primarily a re~ction to the evils associ-
ated with the use of the general warrant in England and 
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas, 
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect 
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privfWies of life/~ 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from 
searches under unchecked general authorityY 
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means 
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. Uniter! 
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v. United States, 
255 U. S. 298 (1921), there existed no barrier to the 
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Amendment. See Adams v. New Y ark, 
16 As we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence 
should have been excluded because it was obtained by an illegal 
search or smzure, who has been afforded the opp<:>rtunity for full and 
fair consideration of that claim in the state courts, may not invoke 
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we find it 
unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning the excluswnary 
rule raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in " 
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied .on a per se 
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or 
the circumstances of the police action. 
11 See gem'rally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Suprem~ 
,f'ourt (1966), Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth 
AmendmPnt to the Umted States Constitutwn (1937) . · 
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192 U. S. 585 (1904)?8 In Weeks the Court held that 
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of 
property secured through an illegal search or seizure con-
ducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held 
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a 
federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. 
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally 
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the 
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), 
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by 
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment 
is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as 
such enforceable against the States through the [Four-
teenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." !d., at 27-28. 
The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclu-
sionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as 
"an essential ingredient of that right." !d., at 29. The 
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions, 
see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea 
· v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little 
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was 
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
u. s. 643 (1961) . 
18 The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boy a 
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that 
the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers 
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v. 
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphru>izing that 
the "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the 
defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered 
to the common-law rule that a trial court must not inquire, on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwise-
competent ev1dence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v~ 
])ana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (1841) . 
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Decisions prior to M app advanced two principal rea-
sons for application of the rule in federal trials. The 
Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special 
supervisory role over the lower federal courts, referred to 
the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that 
exclusion of illegally seized evidence prevents contami~ 
nation of the judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222.10 But 
even in that context a more pragmatic ground was 
emphasized: 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. 
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
1t." l d., at 217. 
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule 
to the States on several grounds, 20 but relied principally 
upon the belief that exclusion wouid deter future unlaw-
ful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658. 
Although our decisions often have alluded to the 
·."imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., United States 
19 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States, 
• 277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting}; id., at 484 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) . 
20 See 367 U. S., at 656 (prevention of introduction of evidence 
where mtroduction is "tantamount" to a coerced confession) ; id., at 
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (pres-
ervation of judicial integrity) . 
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment 
itself reqmres the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in 
state criminal tnals. See 367 U. S., at 656, 666. Mr. Justice Black 
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, 
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949) 
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amend-
ment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban 
.against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges 
{or requmng exclusiOn. 367 U S , at. 661 See n. 18, supra. 
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v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975), they demon-
strate the limited role of that justification in the de· 
termination whether to apply the rule in a particular 
context.21 Logically extended this justification would 
require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized 
evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, 
or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandon-
ment of the standing limitations on who may object to 
the mtroduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence, 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and 
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings 
need not abate when the defendant's person is unconsti-
tutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 
(1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952). Simi-
larly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does 
not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand 
jury proceedings. United States v. Cala,;,dra, 414 U. S. 
338 (1974). Nor does it require that the trial court 
exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a 
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to 
result in convictions in some cases. Walder v. United 
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases 
is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be con-
cerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial 
process, this concern has limited force as a justifica-
tion for the exclusion of highly probative evidence.u 
21 See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89' 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975) . 
22 As we recognized last Term, judicial integrity is "not offended' 
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that 
their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions sub-
sequent to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type 
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the 
Constitution " Uni_tea Sjqtes v .. feltjer:~ suP,ra, at '538 (emphasi$ 
<!_r_n_ittE!(\,'' 
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The importance of this justification becomes minimal 
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisonel' 
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full 
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at 
trial and on direct review. 
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule 
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates 
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have 
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional 
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the 
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any 
"[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead, · · 
"the rule is a judicially created remedy desigl}ed to-
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect , . .. " United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539; 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. I, 28--:29 (1968); Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 
406, 416 (1966) . 
M app involved the enforcement of the exclusionary 
rule at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as 
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of 
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration 
of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of 
state convictions. But despite the broad· deterrent pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been in ... 
terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized 
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. · As in 
the case of any remedial device, "the appl~qation of the· 
rule has been restricted to those areas where its reme-
dial obiectives are thought most efficaciously served J 'f' 
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United States v. Calandra, supra at 348.23 Thus, our 
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential 
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury 
by such extension against the potential contribution to 
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through de-
'terrence of police misconduct : 
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be 
·achieved by extending the rule to grand jury pro-
ceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence 
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it 
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the 
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly 
further that goal. Such an extension would deter 
only police investigation consciously directed toward 
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand 
jury investigation . . .. 
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that 
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly min-i-
mal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct 
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of 
the grand jury." !d., at 351 (footnote omitted). 
23 As Professor Amsterdam has observed : 
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispen-
sation to the injured criminal ; its sole rational justification is the 
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert[ing] general legal pressures 
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of . . . 
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a 
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be 
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted tha.t so many 
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering, 
pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity 
inflicts gratmtm.ts harm on the public mterest .... _, , Amsterdam, 
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
3.78, 3&&--389 (1964) (fQQtuotQs omitted) . 
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The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's 
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier 
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court 
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evi-
dence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had 
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, 
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusion-
ary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to 
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial 
process. 'The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly 
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not 
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of 
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in 
determination of truth at trial 24 was deemed to out-
weigh the incremental contribution that might have been 
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by 
application of the rule. 
The balancing process at work in these cases also 
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing 
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist 
Gnly when the Government attempts to use illegally ob-
tained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal 
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 491-492 (1963) . See Jones 
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The stand-
ing requirement is premised on the view that the "addi-
t ional benefits of extending the rule" to defendants other 
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed 
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
2 ' See generally Frankel, The Search For Truth- An Umpireal 
View, 31st Annual Benjamlfl N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar 
,of the City of New York, Dec. 16, 1974. 
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acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence 
which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174-175.2~ 
IV 
We turn now to the specific question presented by these 
cases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amend-
ment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The question is whether state pri89ners-
who have been afforded the opportunity for full and fair 
consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule 
with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial 
and on direct review-may invoke their claim aga,in on 
federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found 
by weighing the utility of the exclusionllfY rule against 
the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
The costs of applying the exclusfonary rule even at 
trial and on direct review are well known: 26 the focus 
2D Cases addressing the question whether sear!Jh-and-seizure hold-
ings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the 
deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with 
the balancing analysis appjied generally in the exclusionary rule con-
text. See :()esist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254 
& n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. 8. 618, 636-637 (1965). 
Cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 81 (1968) . The "attenuation-
of-the-taint" doctrine also is consistent with the balancing ~tpproach. 
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1!}75); Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963); Amsterdall\, supra, n. 23, at 
389-390. 
26 See, e. g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, +41 (1971) 
(BURGER, C. J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150· 
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); 8 Wigmore On ~vidence§ 2184a, at 
51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961) ; Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 388-391; 
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; O&ks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule 
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-754 0970), and' 
sources cited tberein ; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule arid Mis-. 
QQtJ.d\lcf by tll.e Poiice1 52 J. Crim. L, ·c. & P. s. 255, 256 (1961) ~ 
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of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, 
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or inno-
cence that should be the central concern in a crimi-
nal proceeding.27 Moreover, the physical evidence sought 
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in 
his dissent in Kaufman: 
~'A claim of illegal search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many 
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence 
seized can in no way have been rendered Untrust-
worthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often 
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any 
shadow of a doubt that the · defendant is guilty/' 
394 U. S., at 237. 
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfi.nding 
process and often frees the guilty. · ·The disparity in par.-
ticular cases between the error committed by the police 
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty· defendant by 
application of the rule is contrary ·to the idea of propor-
tionality that is essential to the concept ofjustice.28 · Thus, 
, Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders.?, 
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972). 
21 See address by Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois,. 
delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, at 8-9, April 8_, 
· 1976; cf. Frankel, n. 24, supra. 
28 Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the· 
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of propor--
. tionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of 
establishing a direct relationship between the nature of the vio-
lation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A 
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at 
181-183 ("substantial violations"); H. Friendly, Benchmarks 260-262: 
. ~1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit .of 
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although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police 
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for 
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately 
it may well have the opposite effect of generating dis-
respect for the law and administration of justice.29 
'These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a 
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on colla.t-
·eral review on tbe ground that a search-and-seizure claim 
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state 
courts.30 
activity intentionally or flagrantly illegaL") ; Wigmore, supra, n. 25, 
at 52-53. See n. 16, supra. 
29 In a different context, Dallin H. Oaks has observed : 
''I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccu-
pation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures 
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth 
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends .... 
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our 
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of 
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted 
from these goals." 
Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility, Convocation and 
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young 
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975. 
30 Resort to habeas corpus, especi~~>lly for purposes other than to 
assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of lib-
erty, results in serious intrusions on values i!nportant to our system 
of government. They include "(i) the most effective '!ltilization ·of 
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal 
trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state· 
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional 
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded:" 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. 8., at 259 (PowELL, J., con-
curring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231 
(Black, J ., dissenting) ; Friendly, supra, n. 13. 
We nevertheless afford broad h~:~-beas corpus relief, recognizing· 
the need in & free society for an additional safeguard against 
compelling an innocent man to suffer an upconstitutional loss of 
l~berty. The Com:t 'in fay v Noia, supra, described habeas corpus: 
/ 
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Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the-
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that 
the 'frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite· 
the absence of supportive empirical evidence,31 we have 
assumed that the immediate effect ' of exclusion will be· 
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the 
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to dis-
regard it. ' More importantly, over the long term, this 
demonstration that our society attaches serious conse-
quences to violation of constitutional rights is thought.· 
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement 
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incor-
porate Fourth Amendment ideals into t~eir value 
s :stellJ..!2 
We ada@~:@ \.8 Uli vie"' th~ hese considerationsA sup-
the imp~entation of the exclusionary rule at trial 
----
as a remedy for "whatever so~iety deems to be intolerable re-
straints," and recognized that those to whom the writ should be 
granted "are persons whom society has grievously wronged." 372 
JJ Q ot dOl ddl But in thP. case oi a. tvoical Fourth Amendment 
LFP/gg 6-18-76 Rider A, p. 24 (Stone v. Powell) 
We assume that the continued vitality of these 
assumptions justifies the application of the Exclusionary 
Rule at trial and its enforcement on direct appeal of state 
. . 32a b h d court conv1ct1ons, ut t ey o not support its 
application on collateral review. The additional contribution, 
if a ny, of the 
LFP/gg 6-18-76 Rider A, p. 25 (Stone v. Powell) 
32a. The Chief Justice, in his concurring 
opinioq,and Mr. Justice White in his dissent, address 
generally the application of the exclusionary rule. Ante 
at and But we find no occasion in this habeas 
corpus case to question the application of the rule at trial 
and on direct appeal, as we think it unnecessary to reach 
the broader issues addressed by the Chief Justice and by 
Mr. Justice White. See n. 16, supra. 
.. 
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a:ncT 1ts enforcement on direct appeal of state court cont 
victions. But the additional contribution if any of th~ 
con era 1on o sear -smzure ··claims of state pris-
oners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs·. 
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered 
may add marginally to an awareness of the values pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. There is no reason to 
believe, however, that the overall educative effect of 
the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished 
1f search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in fed-· 
eral habeas corpus review of state convictions.33 Nor 
1s there reason to assume that any specific disincentive 
already created by the risk of exclusion of evidence 
at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct review 
would be enhanced if there were the further risk that· 
a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on 
direct review might be overturned in collateral proceed-
ings years after the incarceration of the defendant. The 
view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment viola-
tions would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption 
that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal 
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure 
that went undetected at trial and on appeal.34 Even if 
____ "":.i., :' 3 "As lhe exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems-· 
that Its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of dimin-
tshing retmns, and beyond that point its continued application is a 
public nuisance." Amsterdam, supra, n. 22, at 389. 
3·1 The pohcy arguments that respondents marshal in support 
of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to 
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of 
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication-
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts:· 
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through 
fmr applicatiOn of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this 
Court on certiorari is an madequate safeguard. The principal ra-
tionale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective 
t .tJ.St.J1.tltion:~.l settJ-n~ witinn which federaL judges and state judges: 
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one mtionally could assume that ·some additional incre-
mental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases, 
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering 
Fourth Amendment rights would be outweighed by the 
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rationiW. 
system of criminal .i ustice. 
In sum, we conclude that where the State has pro .. 
vided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a 
Fourth Amendment claim,"" a state prisoner may not 
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground 
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search Ol" 
seizure was introduced at his trial. ln th~s context the 
contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effec-
tuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the 
substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist 
with special force.36 
operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the 
un.sympa.thetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state 
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now 
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights 
in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, 
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard per-
sonal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Les~ee,. 
14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816). Moreover, the argtjment 
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional 
law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizt)Ie 
claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial 
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "~~ intrinsic reason 
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more 
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the appli6v. 
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse." 
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50. 
85 Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963) . 
86 Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for fed-
eral habeas corpus rather than seeking d1rect review by this Court 
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time· 
to apply for certiorari has now passed, , any dimunition in tpeir 
ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ground evidence obtained 
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According]y, the j,udgments of the Courts of AppealS! 
aJre 
Reversed. 
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their trials 
should be prospective. Cf'. Engiand v. Louisiana State Board of 
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-423 (1964). We reject these 
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior 
decisions, see1Fay v. Noia, 372' U. S. 391, respondents were, of course,, 
free to file a timely petittQn fot c~tt;iorari prior to seeking federall 
lw.bey1s cor{>~ te~ .. 
I 
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Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal 
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were af· 
firmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied 
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged 
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent 
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by 
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under 
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether 
a federal court should consider, in ruling on a petition for 
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that 
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or sei-
zure was introduced at his trial, when he 
been afforded an opportumty for full fair litigation 
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of consid-
erable importance to the admmistration of criminal 
just1ce. 
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I 
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural 
history of these cases, 
A 
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder 
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At 
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three com-
panions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Ber-
nardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an alter-
cation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the 
theft of a bottle of wine. . In the scuffling that followed 
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten hours later 
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department ar-
rested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy 
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest dis-
covered a .38' caliber revolver with six expended car-
tridges in the cylinder. 
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of 
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Ber-
nardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at 
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist 
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun 
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected 
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson 
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the re-
volver sho~Id have been excluded because the vagrancy 
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the 
1 The ordinance provides : 
"Every person is a vagrant who : 
" [1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify-
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any police-
officer to do so [3] if surrounding circumstances are such ag, 
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands suclb 
· id.entificatiouo" 
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conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of 
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that 
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of 
the arrest ~tnd search because it concluded that the error, 
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson offi~ 
cer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Su-
preme Court of California denied Powell's petition for 
habeas corpus relief. 
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a 
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in 
the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California, contending that the testimony con-
cerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been 
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued 
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson 
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and 
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe 
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded 
that the arresting officer h!Ld probable cause and held 
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional, 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not 
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits 
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the 
alternative, that court agreed with the California District 
Court of Appeal that the admission of t~e evidence oon-
{!erning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The court concluded' 
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague/ that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and' 
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court rehed principally 
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), where-
we- ii).valid;tted. a city Qrdjna.\Jce in :t_>art. defining vagrants as ... "per-. 
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no 
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were 
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve 
the public interest by deterring legisla-tors from enacting 
unconstitutional statutes. Id., at 98.. After an inde-
pendent review of the evidence the court concluded that 
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error 
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's 
accomplices. Id., at 99, 
B 
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in 
April1971 after trial i.n a Nebraska state court. At 2:05 
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a tele-
phone call that a woman had been heard screaming at 
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that 
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it ex-
ploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investi-
gation of the murder centered on Duane Peak, a 
15-yea.r-old member of the National Committee to Com-
bat Fascism ("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant 
was issued for Peak's arrest. ·The investigation also 
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including 
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill 
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search 
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m. 
that night and found lights and a television on, but there 
was no response to their repeated knocking. While some 
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was 
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any 
lawful purpose or object .. . . " /d., at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the 
similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see 
n. 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, It concluded that the second 
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently 
specific to cure Its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Peti-
·tJoner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposi-
tton of the ease we need not ronsider this tssue. 
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obtained to search for explosiv·es and illegal weapons 
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the 
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain 
view, dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials use-
ful in the construction of explosive devices. Peak 
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice 
voluntarily surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing 
at' that time were subjected to chemical analysis, disclos-
ing dynamite particles. 
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District 
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted plant-
ing the suitcase and making the telephone call, and 
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative 
evidence the State introduced items seized during the 
search, as well as the results of the chemical analysis of 
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to sup-
press this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search 
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search 
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480 
(1972). 
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarcera-
tion was unlawful because the 'evidence', underlying his 
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal 
search of his home. The District Court concluded that 
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affi-
davit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974).3 The court 
3 The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit 
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police 
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's hornEt 
because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent 
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF 
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also rejected the State's contention that even if the 
warrant was invalid the search was· justified because of 
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the 
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Peak 
and search fot bombs and explosives believed in posses-
sion of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest war-
rant did not justify the entry as the police· lacked 
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and 
further concluded that the circumstances were not suffi~ 
ciently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless 
search. Id., at 194-202/ The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons 
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 (1975). 
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respec-
tive state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, 
petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questionS' 
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past 
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said shou1U 
be used against the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In 
concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the 
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit 
alone sufficient, it also referred to information conta.ined in testi-
mony adduced at the suppression hearing but not included in · the 
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. W: 2d 480, 487-488. See 
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The 
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the 
affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. lJJO, 413 n. 3 (1969); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded prob-
able cause. was lacking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should 
be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidavit 
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an 
issue we need not reach. 
4 The District, Court further held 'that the evidence of ·dynamite 
partwles found on Riee's clothing should have· been suppressed as 
the tainted fmit of a.n arrest warrant that would not have been issued 
'but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207. 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne: 
; J;.umber Go., Inc . v. United. Stat-es~ 251 li... S., 385 (.1920) . 
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concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role 
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases 
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their 
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975).5 We· 
now reverse. 
II 
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first 
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation 
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody 
by the United States. The original statutory authoriza-· 
tion did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It 
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall 
have power· to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . ... " 
Ibid. The courts d~fined the scope of the writ in accord-
ance with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as 
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g., 
5 In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that 
counsel in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the 
questions : 
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that 
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest 
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of 
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitu-
tional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of 
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is 
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254." 
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and sea.rch of 
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circum-
stances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U.S. C. 
§ 2254," 
6 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used' 
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien-
dum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4, 
'Qranch.) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.). . 
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar-
shall, C. J.). 
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. . Act 
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867 
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in "all 
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or 
law of the United States .. . . " But the limitation of fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g., 
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895); 
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. 
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the con-
cept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain 
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded,7 this 
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8 
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In 
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that 
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur-
7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review 
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review 
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote 
because of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court. 
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The 
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973); 
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32, 
79-80 & n. 107 ( 1928) . Pressure naturally developed for expansion 
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable 
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879) ; Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and' 
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv, L. Rev. 441, 473' 
& n. 75 (19763) . 
8 The expansion occurred primarily with regard to (i) convic-
tions based on assertcdly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex part~ 
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentiOns based ·upon an allegedly illegal 
sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S l{l8 Wall.) 163 (1973). 
See Bator, supra, n 7. :tt 465-474. 
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state su-
preme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess-
fully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district 
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because 
Frank's federal claims had been considered by a compe-
tent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized, 
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the 
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process" 
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether 
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the 
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. I d., 
at 333-336. 
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487, 
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 In 
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas 
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in 
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors and in rul-
ing certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the high-
est court of the State had rejected these claims on direct 
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and 
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951). 
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective 
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of 
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full 
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if 
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In 
9 There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the-
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision 
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923). Compare Hart, Fore-
ward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105' 
{1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State' 
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator,. 
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 421'. 
cy;: lf_. ~0; it$,,, at. 457-46.0 (Hat:lan, J., dissenting) . 
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct re-o 
view had refused to consider the appeal because the 
papers were filed out of time. This Court held that 
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable 
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a 
ground that would have barred direct review of his 
federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked 
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S., 
at 458,486. 
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of 
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 
(1963).1() Noia and two codefendants had been convicted 
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each de-
fendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants, 
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. Al-
though their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent 
state proceedings they were able to establish that their 
confessions had been coerced and their convictions there-
fore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a sub-
sequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipu-
lated that Noia's confession also had been coerced, but 
the District Court followed Daniels in holding that N oia's 
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183 
J.o Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been 
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional 
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28 
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal." 
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, non-
constitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but 
were not, may not be asserted in coll~~oteral proceedings. I d., at 
178-179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 & n. 15 
(1974) . Even those nonconstitutional claims that could not have 
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only 
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which in-
berently results in a Complete miscarriage of JUStice,' " id., at 346, 
' quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962). 
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F. Supp. 222, 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals re· 
versed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and 
that he be released from custody or a new trial be 
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, nar-
rowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal 
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal con• 
stitutional claims.11 
During the period in which the substantive scope of 
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider 
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect 
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior 
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394 
U. S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the 
federal courts of appeals had concluded that collateral 
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on 
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available 
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.12 The 
11 In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to 
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habea.s 
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffifllled the equitable nature of the 
writ, noting that " [ d] iscretion is implicit in the statutory command 
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' 
28 U. S. C. § 2243." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis 
v. Henderson, - U. S. - (1976), holding that a state prisoner 
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the 
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a cha.!lenge in a post-
conviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual 
prejudice, we emphasized: 
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances con-
Siderations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its 
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426." 
~2 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United States v. Jenkins , 281 F. 2d 
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965) ; 
.De Welles v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388 
U, S. 919 (1967); Will{Qms v [jnited States, 307 F . 2d 366 (CA9 
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions 
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in 
kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights i.n 
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn 
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge 
·evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic de-
vice intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment vio-
lations by law enforcement officers." !d., at 224. See 
Thornton v. United Stqtes, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 
F. 2d 822 (1966). 
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search-
and-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings. 
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy ex-
tends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,'~ 
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 
U. S. 364 ( 1968) ; Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 23-! 
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construe-· 
tion, that there was no basis for restricting "access· by 
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims 
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similal"' 
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U.S., at 226. 
Although in recent years the view has been expressed' 
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope' 
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review 
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the 'QUestion of 
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair oppor-
tunity to raise an'd have adjudicated the question in state 
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250 
1962); Armstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d .725 (CA5 1963), with,. 
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v. 
United States, 317 F. 2d 494 (CAlO 1963) . See also Thornton v. 
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966~ 
{search-and-seizure claims not cogni.able under § ~255 ;tbsent speciaf 
• l((i]::cuJ.Jl.lltances ). .. . 
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( 1973) (POWELL, J., concurring) / 8 the Court, without 
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to 
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See 
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283 (1975) .u 
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal 
habeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectua-. 
tion of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the grant.. 
ing of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been con~ 
victed in sta.te court on the basis of evidence obtained in 
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were 
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 0961), to require 
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of convic-
tion upon direct review.n Until this case we have not 
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this assump-
tion. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, at 
249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of 
uSee, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). 
H In Newsome the Court focused on the iss11e whether a state 
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where 
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal. 
The Court did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See 
420 U. S., at 287 n. 4. 
n As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. Unitea 
States, 394 U.S. ~17, 231, 239 (1969), the Kaufman majority made 
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a 
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that 
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); 
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294 (1967) . But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas 
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as 
well as m Warden, the Issue considered here was not presented to' 
tlie Court m the petition for writ of certioran. As emphasized by 
Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we con~. 
si<Wr; lSSQCS not. :r.aiserl .. in tlhe J;?etitioJil. 3..94 U. S., at 239 & n. 7, 
·. 
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the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclu--
sionary rule, that the assumption is unjustified.'16 
III 
The Fourth Amendment assures the 11right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The 
Amendment was primarily a re~tetion to the evils associ-
ated with the use of the general warrant in England and 
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas, 
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect 
the 11sanctity of a man's home and the privfWies of life/' 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from 
searches under unchecked general authority.17 
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means 
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. Uniteil 
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v. United States, 
255 U. S. 298 ( 1921), there existed no barrier to the 
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Amendment. See Adams v. New York, 
16 As we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence 
should have been excluded because it was obtained by an illegal 
search or seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full and 
fair consideration of that claim in the &'tate courts, may not invoke 
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we find it 
unnecessa,ry to consider the other issues concerning the exclusionary 
rule raiSed by the parties. These include, principally, whether in . 
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se 
basis Without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or 
the circumstances of the police actio!\ 
17 See g('nerally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Suprem~ 
Court (1966), Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth . 
Amendment to the Umted States ConstitutiOn (1937) 
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192 U. S. 585 (1904).~8 In Weeks the Court held that 
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of 
property secured through an illegal search or seizure con-
ducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held 
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a 
federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. 
v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 ( 1920) (fruits of illegally 
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the 
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), 
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by 
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment 
is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as 
such enforceable against the States through the [Four-
teenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." I d., at 27-28. 
The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclu-
sionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as 
"an essential ingredient of that right." I d., at 29. The 
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions, 
see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea 
v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little 
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was 
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
u. s. 643 (1961) . 
18 The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boy a 
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that 
the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers 
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v. 
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that 
the 1'law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the 
defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered 
to the common-law rule that a trial court must not inquire, on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwise-
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v~ 
])ana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (1841} . 
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Decisions prior to M app advanced two principal rea-
sons for application of the rule in federal trials. The 
Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special 
supervisory role over the lower federal courts, referred to 
the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that 
exclusion of illegally seized evidence prevents contam1~ 
nation of the judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222.19 But 
even in that context a more pragmatic ground was 
emphasized: 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. 
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
1t." I d., at 217. 
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule 
to the States on several grounds/0 but relied principally 
upon the belief that exclusion wouid deter future unlaw-
ful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658. 
Although our decisions often have alluded to the 
·."imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., United States 
19 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States, 
• 277 U. 8. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J ., dissenting); id., at 484 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) . 
20 See 367 U. S., at 656 {prevention of mtroduction of evidence 
where introductiOn is "tantamount" to a coerced confession); id., at 
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (pres-
ervatiOn of judicial integnty) . 
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment 
itself reqmres the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in 
state criminal tnals. See 367 U. S., at 656, 666 Mr. Justice Black 
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, 
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949) 
(concurring opmion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amend-
ment is considered in conjunctiOn w1th the Fifth Amendment ban 
.against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges 
for rE'qumng exclusiOn 367 u s , aJ 661 sf'(' n, 18, supra. 
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v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975), they demon-
strate the limited role of that justification in the de-
termination whether to apply the rule in a particular 
context.21 Logically extended this justification would 
require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized 
evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, 
or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandon-
ment of the standing limitations on who may object to 
the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence, 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and 
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings 
need not abate when the defendant's person is unconsti-
tutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pv,gh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 
(1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952). Simi-
larly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does 
not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand 
jury proceedings. United States v. Cala,;,dra, 414 U. S. 
338 (1974). Nor does it require that the trial court 
exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a 
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to 
result in convictions in some cases. Walder v. United 
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases 
is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be con-
cerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial 
process, this concern has limited force as a justifica-
tion for the exclusion of highly probative evidence.u 
21 See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89' 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975) . 
22 As we recognized last Term, judicial integrity is "not offended· 
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that 
their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions sub-
sequent to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type 
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the 
Constitution .. " Uni_te_a Sjqtes v .. feltjer:~ B"UP.rct,, at , 538 (emphasi$ 
~rp._itt~, , 
. N-i655 & 74-12M-O:PINtON 
18 STONE v. POWELL 
The importance of this justification becomes minim~ 
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by- a prisoner 
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full 
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim a-t 
t.rial and on direct review, 
The primary justification for the exclusionary ru~e 
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates 
Fourth Amendment-rights. Post-Mapp decisions hav,e · 
established that the rule is not a personal constitutio~al 
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the 
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any 
11 [r]epa.ration comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead, 
"the rule is a judicially created remedy desigl').ed ~ 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect, . ; ," ., United States .vr 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539; 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28....:29 (1968); Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 
406, 416 (1966). 
Mapp involved the enforcement of the exclusionary 
rule at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as 
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of 
the Fourth Amendment also reqHires the consideratiQ.n 
of search-and-seizure claims upon colla.teral review . of 
state convictions. But despite the broad· deterrent pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been in..-
terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized 
evidence in' all proceedings -or against ·all persons. · As in 
· the case of any remedial device, "the appliqation of the· 
rule has been restricted to those areas where its reme-
, 'dial obiectives are · thought most efficaciou~ly served."" 
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United States v. Calandra, supra at 348.23 Thus, our 
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential 
injury to the historic role and function 9f the grand jury 
·by such extension against the potential contribution to 
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through de-
'terrence of police misconduct : 
11Any incremental deterre.nt effect which might be 
·achieved by extending the rule to grand jury pro-
ceedings is uncertain fit best. Whatever deterrence 
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it 
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the 
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly 
further that goal. Such an extension would deter 
only police investigation consciously directed toward 
the discovery of evidence solel:y for use in a grand 
jury investigation . . .. 
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that 
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly mini-
mal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct 
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of 
the grand jury." !d., at 351 (footnote omitted). 
23 As Professor Amsterdam has observed: 
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispen-
sation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the 
experience of its indispensibility jn 'exert[ing] general legal pressures 
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of 0 0 0 
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a 
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, ~edicament; no more should be 
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many 
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering, 
:pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity 
inflicts gratu.itm.ls harm on the public interest . .. . 0, Amsterdam, 
Search, Seizure, arid Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PaoLo Rev. 
378,_ ~389 (19,64) (fqqtuotes omitte~) . 
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The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's 
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier 
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court 
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evi-
dence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had 
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, 
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusion~ 
ary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to 
prevent perjury and to assu~e the integrity of the trial 
process. 'The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly 
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not 
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of 
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in 
determination of truth at trial 24 was deemed to ou~ 
weigh the incremental contribution that might have been 
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by 
application of the rule. 
The balancing process at work in these cases also 
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing 
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist 
only when the Government attempts to use illegally ob-
tained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal 
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See Jones 
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The stand-
ing requirement is premised on the view that the "addi-
tional benefits of extending the rule" to defendants other 
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed 
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
24 See generally Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal 
View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar 
,of the City of New York, Dec. 16, 1974 .. 
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acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence 
which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174-175.2<'1 
IV 
We turn now to the specific question presented by these 
cases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amend-
ment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The question is whether state pri89ners-
who have been afforded the opportunity for full and fair 
consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule 
with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial 
and on direct review-may invoke their claim again on 
federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found 
by weighing the utility of the exclusion~ry rule against 
the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at 
trial and on direct review are well known: 26 the focus 
23 Cases addressing the question whether searph-and-seizure hold-
ings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the· 
deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with 
the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule con-
text. See :()esist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254 
& n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 636-637 (1965). 
Cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 8p, 81 (1968). The "attenuation-
of-the-taint" doctrine also is consistent with the balancing approach. 
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1~75) ; Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963) ; Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 
389-390. 
26 See, e. g., Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 136 0954); Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971) 
(BuRGER, C. J., dissenting) ; People v. Defore , 242 N. Y. 13, 150· 
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ; 8 Wigmore On ~vidence§ 2184-a, at 
51- 52 (McNaughton ed. 1961) ; Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 388-391; 
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Ot\ks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule 
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-754 0970), and. 
sources cited tberein ; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis-. 
QQnd\lct· by the Po1i~~ 52 J. Crim. L , ·c . & P. S. ' 255, 256 (1961) ;. 
e' 
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of the tri~l, and the attention of the participants therein, 
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or inno-
cence that should be the central concern in a crimi-
nal proceeding.27 Moreover, the physical evidence sought 
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emph~ized in 
his dissent in Kaufman: 
~tA claim of illegal search and seizure under· the 
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many 
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence 
seized c~n in no way have been rendered untrust-
worthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often 
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any 
shadow of -. a doubt that the -defendant is guilty;" 
394 U. S., at 237. 
Application, of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding 
process and often frees the guilty. · 'The disparity in par.-
ticular cases between the error committed by the police 
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty· defendant by 
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of propor-
tionality that is essential to the concept ofjustice.28 • Thust 
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders_?, 
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972). 
27 See address by Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois,. 
delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, at 8-9, April 8, 
1976; cf. Frankel, n. 24, supra. 
28 Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the· 
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of propor· 
· tionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of 
· establishing a direct relationship between the nature of the vio-
lation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A 
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at 
tSl-183 ("substantial violations"); H. Friendly, Benchmarks 260-262: 
. ~1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit .pf 
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although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police 
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for 
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately 
it may well have the opposite effect of generating dis- ~..-:-;;; 
respect for the law and administration of j;iice.29 ,-
'These long-recognized costs of the rule persist en a 
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collat-
·eral review on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim 
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state 
courts.30 
act1vity intentionally or flagrantly illegaL") , Wigmore, supra, n. 25, 
at 52-53. See n. 16, supra. 
29 In a different context, Dallin H. Oaks has observed : 
"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccu-
p,ation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures 
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth 
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends .... 
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our 
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of 
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted 
from these goals." 
Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility, Convocation and 
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young 
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975. 
80 Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to 
assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of lib-
erty, results in serious intrusions on values i!nportant to our system 
of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization ·of 
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criniina1 
trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state· 
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional 
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded:"· 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J., con-
curring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231 
(Black, J ., dissenting); Friendly, supra, n. 13. 
We nevertheless afford broad habeas corpus relief, recognizing 
the need in a free soc1ety for an additional safeguard against 
compelling an inrrocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of 
liberty. The Cowt in fay v Noia, supra, described habeas corpus: 
j 
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Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that 
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite 
the absence of supportive empirical evidence,S1 we have 
assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be· 
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the 
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to dis-
regard it. More importantly, over the long term, · this 
demonstration that our society attaches serious conse-
quences to violation of constitutional rights is thought· 
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement 
LFP/gg 6-18-76 Rider A, p. 24 (Stone v. Powell) 
We assume that the continued vitality of these 
assumptions justifies the application of the~clusionary 
}tule at trial and its enforcement on direct appeal of state 
court convictions, 32a but they do not support its 
application on collateral review. The additional contribution, 
if a ny, of the 
a. .J. J..t:ic:\1 .n.e,ttHl.0\.1 tll ~ !CV1p1li1UUI:) VVU.\...l.U;:)J.Vu, VI.# .1.."-.J • .-• ....,,.,...., , • ..,._._ \-""' • .... 1 • 
See United States v. Janis,- U.S.-,- n . .22 (1976; Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 
349, 475 n, 593 (1974); Comment, On the Limitations of Empiricaf 
Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule : A Critique of the Spiotto• 
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 740 (1974) ~ 
82 8.ee Oaks, supra,.n. 26, at 756. · 
I 
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'
ancf its enforcement on direct appeal of state court con-
victions. But the additional contribution, if any of the 
consid-eration of searc -and-seizure c aims of state pns-
oners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs. 
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered 
may add marginally to an awareness of t~e values pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. There IS no reason to 
believe however that the overall educative effect of 
the ex~lusionary 'rule would be appreciably diminished 
If search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in fed-
6-18-76 
• to , , _____ .:---....;......_ .. '"0 3a NA.l' 
Rider A, p. 25 (Stone v. Powell) 
32a. The Chief Justice, in his concurring 
opinio~and Mr. Justice White in his dissent, address 
generally the application of the exclusionary rule. Ante 
at and But we find no occasion in this habeas 
corpus case to question the application of the rule at trial 
and on direct appeal, as we think it unnecessary to reach 
the broader issues addressed by the Chief Justice and by 
Mr. Justice White. See n. 16, supra. 
t.;ourt on cen10ran Il:l au wautlJUI:l<o ""''"'"u'"'"· --.-- • . . 
tionale for this view emphasizes the broad differences m the resP_Cct1ve, 
l,I)Stltutiomtl sett1~ withm wh1ch federal_ judges and state JUdges: 
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one r-ationally could assume that -some additional incre~ 
mental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases, 
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering 
Fourth Amendment rights would be outweighed by the 
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a ration8J. 
Rystem of criminal justice. 
In sum, we conclude that where the State has pro-
vided an opportunity for full and fair htigation of a 
Fourth Ame11dment claim,'j" a state prisoner may not 
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground 
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or 
seizure was introduced at his triaL In th~s context the 
contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effec-
tuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the 
substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist 
with special force.36 
operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the 
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state 
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now 
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights 
in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, 
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard per-
sonal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's LesBee,. 
14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816). Moreover, the argt!Illent 
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutionaJ 
law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and~seizqre 
claims, since they are dealt with on a daily . basis by trial 
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "~o intrinsic reason 
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more 
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the appli~ 
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse." 
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50. 
85 Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293 (1963) . 
86 Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for fed-
eral habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review· by this Court 
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time· 
to apply for certiorari has now passed, any dimunition in their 
·ability to obtain habeas corpus relief 011 the g,round evidence obtained 
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Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals 
are 
Reversed.. 
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their trials 
should be prospective. Cf'. England v. Louisiana State Board of 
Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 422-423 (1964). We reject these 
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior 
demsions, see1Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, respondents were, of course, 
free to file a timely peti_ttQn {ot cettiorari prior to seeking federal! 
:Mb~s COt'\)V.S 1;el'¥i .. 
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Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal 
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were af-
firmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied 
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged 
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent 
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by 
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under 
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether 
a federal court should consider, in ruling on a petition for 
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that 
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or sei-
zure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously 
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation 
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of consid-
erable importance to the administration of criminal 
justice. 
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I 
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural 
history of these cases. 
A 
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder 
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At 
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three com-
panions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Ber-
nardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an alter-
cation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the 
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed 
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten hours later 
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department ar-
rested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy 
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest dis-
covered a .38 caliber revolver with six expended car-
tridges in the cylinder. 
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of 
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Ber-
nardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at 
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist 
testified that the revolver found on Powell \vas the gun 
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected 
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson 
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the re-
volver should have been excluded because the vagrancy 
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the 
1 The ordinance provides: 
"Every person is a vagrant who: 
"[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify 
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any police 
officer to do so [3] if surrounding circumstances are such as 
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public sa.fety demands such 
identification." 
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conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of 
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that 
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of 
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error, 
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson offi-
cer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Su-
preme Court of California denied Powell's petition for 
habeas corpus relief. 
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a 
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in 
the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California, contending that the testimony con-
cerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been 
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued 
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson 
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and 
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe 
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded 
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held . 
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional, 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not 
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits 
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the 
alternative, that court agreed with the California District 
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence con-
cerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
In December 1974, the Court of Appea1s for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The court concluded 
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague,2 that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and 
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principally 
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), where-
we invalidated a city ordinance in l?art dcfinin~ vagrants as ... "pet-
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no 
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were 
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve 
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting 
unconstitutional statutes. I d., at 98.. After an inde-
pendent review of the evidence the court concluded that 
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error 
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's 
accomplices. /d., at 99. 
B 
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in 
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05 
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a tele-
phone call that a woman had been heard screaming at 
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that ' 
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it ex-
ploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investi- , 
gation of the murder centered on Duane Peak, a : 
15-year-old member of the National Committee to Com-
bat Fascism ("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant 
was issued for Peak's arrest. The investigation also 
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including 
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill · 
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search 
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m. 
that night and found lights and a television on, but there 
was no response to their repeated knocking. While some 
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was 
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any 
lawful purpo~e or object .... " /d. , at 156-157, n . 1. Noting the 
similarity between the first element of the Hender8on ordinance, see 
n.l, supra, and the J acksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second 
and third elements of the HcndPrson ordinance were not sufficiently 
specific to cure its owmll vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Peti-
tioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposi-
tion of the case we need not consider this issue. 
74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION 
STONE v. POWELL 
obtained to search for explosives and illegal weapons : 
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the 
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain 
view, dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials use-
ful in the construction of explosive devices. Peak 
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice 
voluntarily surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing · 
at that time were subjected to chemical analysis, disclos-
ing dynamite particles. 
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District 
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted plant-
ing the suitcase and making the telephone call, and 
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative 
evidence the State introduced items seized during the 
search, as well as the results of the chemical analysis of 
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to sup-
press this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search 
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search 
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480 
(1972). 
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarcera-
tion was unlawful because the evidence underlying his 
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal 
search of his home. The District Court concluded that 
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affi-
davit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974).3 The court 
3 The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit 
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police 
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home 
bec.ause (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent 
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF 
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also rejected the State's contention that even if the· 
warrant was invalid the search was justified because of 
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the 
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Peak 
and search for bombs and explosives believed in posses-
sion of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest war-
rant did not justify the entry as the police lacked 
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and 
further concluded that the circumstances were not suffi-
ciently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless 
search. !d., at 194-202.4 The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons 
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 (1975). 
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respec-
tive state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, 
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past 
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said should. 
be used again~t the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In 
concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the 
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Ccurt found the affidaYit 
alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testi-
mony adduced at the suppresoion hearing but not included in the 
affidaYit. 188 Ncb. 728, 738--739, 199 N. W. 2d 480, 487-1-88. See 
also 183 Ncb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The 
District Court limited it s probable cau5c inquiry to the face of the 
affidavit, sec Spinelli v. Unit rd States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 109 n. 1 ( 1964), and concluded prob-
able cause was la rking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should 
be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidaYit 
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, a 
contention th:1t we ha,·e se,·eral times rejected, sec, e. g., TT'hit ely v. 
Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n. 8 (1971); Aguilar v. Texa ~, supra, at 
109 n . 1, and need not re:1c h again here. 
• The District Court further held that the evidence of dynamite 
particles found on Rice's clothing should ha\'e been suppre;::sed as 
the tainted fruit of an arr('st warrant thnt \\·ould not hnYe been i s~ued 
but for the unlawful sea rch of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207. 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne 
Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) . 
.. 
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petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions 
concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role 
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases 
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their 
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975).5 We 
now reverse. 
II 
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first 
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation 
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody 
by the United States. The original statutory authoriza-
tion did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It 
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall 
have power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . ... " 
Ibid. 'rhe courts defined the scope of the writ in accord- . 
ance with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as ! 
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g., 
5 In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that 
counsel in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the 
questions: 
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that 
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest 
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of 
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitu-
tional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of 
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is 
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254." 
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of 
·respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circum-
stances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U.S. C. 
§ 2254." 
· 6 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used 
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien-· 
dum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.). 
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar-
shall, C. J.). 
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act 
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867 
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in "all 
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or 
law of the United States .... " But the limitation of fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g., 
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895); 
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. 
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the con-
cept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain 
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this 
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8 
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In 
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that 
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur- · 
7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review 
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review 
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote 
because of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court. 
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The 
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973); 
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32, 
79- 80 & n. 107 ( 1928) . Pressure naturally developed for expansion 
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable 
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 
U. S. 371, 376- 377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and · 
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441,473 
& n. 75 (19763). 
8 The expansion occurred primarily with regard to (i) convic-
tions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex parte 
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentions based upon an allegedly illegal 
sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1973). 
See Bator, supra, n. 7, at 465-474. 
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state su-
preme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess-
fully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district 
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because 
Frank's federal claims had been considered by a compe-
tent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized, 
powever, that if a habeas corpus court found that the 
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process" 
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether 
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the 
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. I d., 
at 333-336. 
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. 8., at 482-487,: 
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 In 
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas 
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in : 
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors and in rul-
ing certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the high-
est court of the State had rejected these claims on direct 
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and 
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951). 
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective 
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of 
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full 
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if 
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In 
8 There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the 
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision 
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) . Compare Hart, Fore-
ward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105 
(1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State 
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator, 
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 42! 
& n. 30; id., at 457-460 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct re-
view had refused to consider the appeal because the 
papers were filed out of time. This Court held that 
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable 
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a 
ground that would have barred direct review of his 
federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked 
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S., 
at 458, 486. 
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of 
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings was removed in Fay v. N oia, 372 U. S. 391 
{1963).10 Noia and two codefendants had been convicted 
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each de-
fendant was a signed confession. N oia's codefendants, 
but not N oia himself, appealed their convictions.. Al-
though their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent 
state proceedings they were able to establish that their 
confessions had been coerced and their convictions there-
fore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a sub-
sequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipu-
lated that N oia's confession also had been coerced, but 
the District Court followed Daniels in holding that Noia's 
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183 
·10 Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been 
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional 
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28 
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal." 
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, non-
constitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but 
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. !d., at 
178-179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 & n. 15 
(1974). Even those nonconstitutional claims that could not have 
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only 
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which in-
herently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' " id., at 346, 
quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). 
I 
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F. Supp. 222, 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals re-
versed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and 
that he be released from custody or a new trial be 
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, nar-
rowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal 
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal con-
stitutional claims.11 
During the period in which the substantive scope of 
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider 
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect 
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior 
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the 
federal courts of appeals had concluded that collateral 
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on 
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available 
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.12 The 
11 In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to 
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the 
writ, noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command 
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' 
28 U. S. C. § 2243." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis 
v. Henderson, - U. S. - (1976), holding that a state prisoner 
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the 
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a post-
conviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual 
prejudice, we emphasized: 
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances con-
siderations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its 
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426." 
:u Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d 
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965); 
De Welles v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), ccrt denied, 388 
U. S. 919 (1967); Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (CA9, 
I 
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions 
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in 
kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in 
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn 
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge 
, evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic de-
vice intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment vio-
lations by law enforcement officers." !d., at 224. See 
Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 
F. 2d 822 (1966). 
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search-
and-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings. 
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy ex-
tends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial,", 
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 
U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, that there was no basis for restricting "access by' 
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims 
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similar 
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U. S., at 226. 
Although in recent years the view has been expressed 
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope 
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review 
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the question of 
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair oppor-
tunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state 
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250 
1962); Armstead v. United States, 318 F . 2d 725 (CA5 1963), \Yith, 
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v. 
United States, 317 F . 2d 494 (CAlO 1963). See also Thornton v. 
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966) 
(search-and-seizure claims not cognizable under § 2255 absent special 
circumstances). 
/ 
74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION 
STONE v. POWELL 13 
(1973) (PowELL, J., concurring) / 3 the Court, without 
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to 
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See 
Lefk 20 U. S. 283 (1975); Cardwell 
(1974 i' 
13 See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). 
14 In Newsome the Court focused on the issue whether a state 
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where 
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal, 
and did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See 420 
U. S., at 287 n . 4. Similarly, in Cardwell m1d Cady the question 
considered here was not presented in the petition for certiorari, and 
in neither case was relief granted on the basis of a search-and-
seizure claim. In Cardwell the plurality expressly noted that it was 
not addre38ing the issue of the substantive scole of the writ. See 
417 U.S., at 596 and n. 12. 
1.5 As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. Unit ed 
States, 394 U. S. 217, 231, 239 (1969) , the Kaufman majority made 
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a 
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that 
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. See Mancusi v. D e.Forte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); 
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas 
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that ease, as 
well as in TV arden, the issue of the substantiYe scope of the writ 
was not presented to the Court in the petition for writ of certioran. 
MoreoYer, of the other "numerous occasions" cited by Mn. JusTICE 
BRENNAN 's dissent , post, at -, in which the Court has accepted 
juri~diction over colbteral attacks by state prisoners raising Fourth 
Amendment claims, in only one case--Whitley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 
560-\Yas relief granted on that basis. And in Whitley, as in Man-
cusi, the issue of the substantive scope of the writ was not pre ented 
in the petition for certiorari. As empha;;ized by ::--Ir. Justi ce Black, 
only in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not raised 
in the petition. 394 U.S., at 239 and n . 7. 
I 
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The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal 
habeas corpus rests on the view that the effectua-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the grant-
ing of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been con-
victed in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in 
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were 
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require 
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of convic-
tion upon direct review.15 Until this case we have not 
l 
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this view'£) 
See, e. g., ardwell v. Lewis su ra at 596 and n. 12f..-
Sclinec ' ot 1 v. ustamonte, supra, at 249 n. 38· Upon 
examination, we cone u e, in light o t 1e nature and 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, 
that this view is unjustified.1 6 We hold, therefore, that 
where the State has provided an opportunity for full and 
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Con-
stitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted 
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence 
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was in-
troduced at his trial.17 
IG The issue in Kaufman was the scope of § 2255. Our decision 
today rejects the dictum in Kaufman concerning the appli ~[\b ility 
of the exclusionary rule in federal h[lbeas corpu3 reYiew of state 
court decisions pursuant to § 2254. To the extent the applic[ltion 
of the exclusionary rule in Kaufman did not rely upon the suprr-
vi5ory role of this Court OYer the lower federal courts, cf. Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), seep.-, infra, the rationale 
for it s application in that context is also rejected. 
17 'Ve find it unnece>sary to consider the other issues concerning 
the exclusion:uy rule, or the statutory scope of the habeas corpus 
r statute, raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in view of the purpose of the rule, it should be a.pplied on a per se 
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or 
the circumstances of the police a.ction. 
/ 
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III 
The Fourth Amendment assures the 11right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The 
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associ-
ated with the use of the general warrant in England and 
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas, 
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect 
the 11sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from 
searches under unchecked general authority.' 8 
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means 
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amend-' 
ment. Prior to the Court's decisions in W ecks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383 ( 1914), and Gouled v. United States, 
255 U. S. 298 (1921), there existed no barrier to the 
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Amendment. See A dams v. New York, 
192 U. S. 585 ( 1904) .19 In Weeks the Court held that 
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of 
. uSee generally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme 
Court (1966); Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937). 
19 The rootS of the lVerks decision Jay in an early decision, Boyd 
.v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 ( 1886), where the Court held that 
. the compulsory production of a person's pri,·ate books and papers 
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v. 
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that 
the "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the 
' defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered 
to the common-Jaw rule that a trial court must not inquire, on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwise 
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v, 
Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (1841). 
.• , 
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property secured through an illegal search or seizure con-
ducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held 
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a 
federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. 
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally 
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the 
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), 
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by 
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment 
is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as 
such enforceable against the States through the [Four-
teenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." !d., at 27- 28. 
The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclu-
sionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as . 
"an essentinl ingredient of that right." !d., at 29. The 
full force of Wolf was . ~roded in subsequent decisions, 
see Elkins v. United ·states, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); R ea 
v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little 
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was 
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
u. s. 643 (1961). 
Decisions prior to M app advanced two principal rea-
sons for application of the rule in federal trials. The 
Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special 
supervisory role over the lo"·er federal courts, referred to 
the "imperatiYe of judicial integrity," suggesting that 
exclusion of illegally seized evidence prevents contami-
nation of the judicial process. 364 U. S. , at 222. ~ 0 But 
even in that context a more pragmatic ground was 
emphasized: 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. 
20 Set> Terru v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 12-13 (1968) ; Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U. S. 438, 4i0 (1928) (Holmes, J., dis~enting); id., at 484 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
it." !d., at 217. 
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule 
to the States on several grounds,21 but relied principally 
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlaw-
ful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658. 
Although our decisions often have .alluded to the 
"imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., United States 
v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 ( 1975), they demon-
strate the limited role of that justification in the de-
termination whether to apply the rule in a particular 
con text. 22 Logically extended this justification would 
require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized 
evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, 
or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandon-
ment of the standing limitations on who may object to 
. the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence, 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and 
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings 
21 See 367 U. S., at 656 (prcYention of introduction of eYidence 
where introduction is "tantamount" to a coerced confession); id., at 
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (pres-
ervation of judicial integrity). 
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment 
. itself requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized eYidence in 
state criminal trials. Sec 367 U. S., at 656, 666. l\Ir. Justice Black 
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, 
was not suflicicnt, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949) 
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amend-
ment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban 
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges 
for requiring exclusion. 367 U.S., at 661. Sec n. 19 , supra. 
22 See 1\Ionagh:m, Fore\\·ard: Con~titutional Common Law, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975). 
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need not abate when the defendant's person is unconsti-
tutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 
( 1975) ; Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 ( 1952). Simi-
larly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does 
not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand 
jury proceedings. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 
338 (1974). Nor does it require that the trial court 
exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a 
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to 
result in convictions in some cases. Walder v. United 
States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases 
is clear. vVhile courts, of course, must ever be con-
cerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial 
process, this concern has limited force as a justifica-
tion for the exclusion of highly probative evidence.23 
The importance of this justification becomes minimal 
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner ' 
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full 
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at 
trial and on direct review. 
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule 
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates 
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have 
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional 
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the 
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any 
"[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. TValker, 
381 U. S. ~18, 637 (1965). Instead, 
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to 
23 As we recognized bst Term, judicial integrity is "not offrnded 
if law enforcement officials reason::~b ly believed in good faith that 
their condurt was in accordance with the bw even if decisions sub-
sequent to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type 
engnged in by the law enforcement offi('i::lls is not permitted by the 
Constitution." United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538 (emphasis 
omitted). 
I 
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safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect .... " United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539; 
T erry v. Ohio, 302 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 
406, 416 (1966). 
M app involved the enforcement of the exclusionary 
rule at state trials and on direct review. The decision in 
\ 
Kaufman, as noted above, is premised on the view that 
implementation of the Fourth Amendment also requires 
the consideration of search-and-seizure claims upon col-
lateral review of state convictions. But despite the broad 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rult, it has never 
been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally 
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. 
As in the case of any remedial device, "the application of 
the rule has been restricted to those areas where its reme-
dial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." 
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348.2'1 Thus, our 
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings \vas based on a balancing of the potential 
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury 
24 As Profe5sor Amsterdam h:~ s obsen·cd: 
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispen-
sation to the injured crimiual; its sole rational justification is the 
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert [ing] general legal pressures 
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of ... 
law-enforcing officers.' As it sen·es this function, the rule is a 
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be 
swallo\\·ed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many 
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering, 
pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity 
inflicts gratuitous harm on the public interest .... " Amsterdam, 
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
378, 388-389 ( 1964) (footnotes omitted). 
I 
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by such extension against the potential contribution to 
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through de-
terrence of police misconduct: 
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be 
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury pro-
ceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence 
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it 
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the 
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly 
further that goal. Such an extension would deter 
only police investigation consciously directed toward 
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand 
jury investigation .... 
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that 
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly mini-
mal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct 
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of 
the grand jury." !d., at 351 (footnote omitted). 
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's 
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier 
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court 
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evi-
dence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had 
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, 
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusion-
ary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to 
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial 
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly 
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not 
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of 
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in 
determination of truth at trial 25 '.Yas deemed to out-
25 See gencmlly Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal 
I 
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weigh the incremental contribution that might have been 
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by 
application of the rule. 
The balancing process at work in these cases also 
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing 
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist 
only when the Government attempts to use illegally ob-
tained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal 
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165; Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See Jones 
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The stand-
ing requirement is premised on the view that the "addi-
tional benefits of extending the rule" to defendants other 
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed 
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence 
which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174-175.26 
IV 
We turn now to the specific question presented by these 
cases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amend-
View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar 
' of the City of New York, Dec. 16, 1974. 
26 Cases aclclre~sing the question whether search-and-seizure hold-
ings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the 
· deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with 
the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule con-
text. See D esist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254 
& n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-637 (1965). 
Cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 81 (1968). The "attenuation-
. of-the-taint" doctrine also is consistent with the balancing approach. 
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 591-!92 (1963); Amsterdam, supra, n. 24, at 
389-390. 
I 
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ment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The question is whether state prisoners-
who have been afforded the opportunity for full and fair 
consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule 
with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial 
and on direct review-may invoke their claim again on 
federal habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found 
by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against 
the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at 
trial and on direct review are well known: 27 the focus 
of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, 
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or inno-
cence that should be the central concern in a crimi-
nal proceeding. 28 Moreover, the physical evidence sought 
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in 
his dissent in Kaufman: 
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many 
27 See, e. g., Ervine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens 
v. Six Unkno1un Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971) 
(BURGEH, C. J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); 8 Wigmore On EYidcnce § 2184a, at 
51-52 (:\lc~au~hton ed . 1961); Amsterdam, supra, n. 24, at 383-391; 
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule 
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and 
sources cited therein; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis-
conduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P . S. 255, 256 (1961) ; 
Wright, l\1ust the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972) . 
28 Sec address by Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 
dcliYered at the National ConfC'rencc on the Causes of Popular 
Dissati~faction With the Administration of Justice, at 8-9, April 8, 
1976; cf. Frankrl, n. 25, supra. 
I 
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other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence 
seized can in no way have been rendered untrust-
worthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often 
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any 
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty." 
394 U. S., at 237. 
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding 
process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in par-
ticular cases between the error committed by the police 
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by 
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of propor-
tionality that is essential to the concept of justice.29 Thus, 
although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police 
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for 
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately 
it may well have the opposite effect of generating dis-
respect for the law and administration of justice.30 
29 I\Iany of the propo>als for modification of the scope of the 
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of propor-
tionality in the criminal justice system and the potential nlue of 
establishing a direct relat ionship betwren the nature of the vio-
lation and the decision whether to im·oke the rule. See A. L. I., A 
I\Iodcl Code of Pre-:maignment Proc-edure, :i\Iay 20, 1975, § 290.2, at 
181-183 (" ~ub--tantial Yiolations"); H. Friendly, Benchmarks 260-262 
(1967) (eYen at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of 
activity intentionally or flagrantly illegal."); l'i'igmore, supra, n. 26, 
at 52-53. See n. 17, supra. 
30 In a different context, Dallin H. Oaks has observed: 
"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccu-
pation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures 
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth 
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends .... 
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our 
people, and the law and the lrgal profession will not be worthy of 
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted 
from these goals." 
Ethics, :.!orality nnd Profesional Rc.;ponsibil ity, 3 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 
591, 596 (1975). 
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These long-recognized costs of the rule persist '"hen a 
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on coll&t-
crall eYicw on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim 
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state 
courts."' 
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that 
the frequency of future violations \vill decrease. Despite 
the ab!::ence of supportive empirical eviclence,32 we have 
31 Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purpc3es other than to 
assure that no inuocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of lib-
erty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our system 
of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of 
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal 
trials, (iii) the min imization of fri ction bct\\·een our fede>rn l and state 
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional 
balance upon which the doctrine of fed ernlism is founded." , 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J., con-
ClJrring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231 
(Black, J ., dis~enting); Friendly, supra, n. 13. 
We ne\'erthel e~s nfford broad h:1beas corpus relief , recognizing · 
the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against 
compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconst itutional loss of 
liberty. The Court in Fay v. Noia, supra, described hnbeas corpus 
as a remedy for "whate\'er ~ociety deems to be intolerable re-
straints," and recognized thnt those to whom the writ should be 
granted "are persons whom society has grie\'ouoly wronged." 372 
U.S., at 401, 441. But in the case of a typical Fourth Amendment 
claim, asserted on colla tern! attack, a convicted defendant is usually 
asking society to redetermine an issue that has no bearing on the 
basic justice of his incarceration. 
32 The efficacy of the exclmionary rule has long been the subject 
of sharp debate. Until recently, scholarly empirical research 
was unavailable, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960). 
And, the evidence derived from recent empirical research is still 
inconclusiw. Compare, e. g., Oaks, supra, n. 27: Spiotto, Search 
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its 
Alternatives, 2 Journ. L€gal Studies 243 (1973), with, e. g., Cannon, 
Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and 
I 
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assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be 
to disc9urage law enforcement officials from violating the 
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to dis-
regard it. More importantly, over the long term, this 
demonstration that our society attaches serious conse-
quences to violation of constitutional rights is thought 
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement 
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incor-
porate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value 
system.33 
We adhere to the view that these considerations sup-
port the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial 
and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court con-
victions. But the additional contribution, if any, of the 
consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state pris-
oners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs. 
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered 
may add marginally to an awareness of the values pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. There is no reason to 
believe, however, that the overall educative effect of 
the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished 
if search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in fed-
eral habeas corpus review of state conYictions. ~·' Nor 
is there reason to assume that any specific disincentive 
already created by the risk of exclusion of evidence 
a Plea Agninst a Preripitious Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974) . 
See United States v. Janis,-- U.S.--,-- n. 22 (197G; Am-
sterdam, Per.spert iYes on the Fourth Amendment, 58 l\Iinn. L. Rev. 
349, 475 n. 593 (1974); Comment, On the Limitations of EmpiricnJ 
Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Crit ique of the Spiotto 
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 740 (1974). 
• 3a See Oak~, supra, n. '27, at 756. 
34 "As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time. it serrns 
that its deterrent eflicacy at some stage reaches a point of dimin-
ishing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a 
public nui~ance." Amsterd:un, supra, n. 23, at 389. 
I ~ 
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at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct review 
would be enhanced if there were the further risk that 
a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on 
direct review might be overturned in collateral proceed-
\ ings often occurring years after the incarceration of the 
defendant. The view that the deterrence of Fourth 
Amendment violations IYould be furthered rests on the 
dubious assumption that law enforcement authorities 
would fear that federal habeas review might reveal fio11·s 
in a search or seizure that went undetected at trial and 
on appcaJ.35 Even if one rationally could assume that 
some additional incremental deterrent effect would be 
present in isolated cases, the resulting advance of the 
s:; The policy arguments that respondents marshal in sumJOrt 
of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to 
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of 
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication 
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts 
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through 
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this 
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal ra-
tionale for this view emphnsizes the broad diiTerences in the respective 
institutional setting within which federal judges and state judges 
operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the 
unsympathetic attitude to federal con8titutional claims of some state 
judges in years past , we are unwilling to asstm1e that there now 
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights 
in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, 
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard per-
sonal liberties and to uphold federal law. Mart in v. Hunter's Lessee, 
14 U. S. ( 1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 ( 1816). MoreoYer, the argument 
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional 
law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure 
claims, since they arc dealt with on a daily basis by trial 
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason 
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more 
competent, or con,;cient iou ~, or k :t rn ccl \\'it h rr~pert to t hP [ con:;id-
er::~tioll of Fomih Amendment <ft\ln~] than his neighbor in the ~tate 
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legitimate goal of furthering Fourth Amendment rights 
would be outweightd by the acknowledged costs to other 
values vital to a rational system of criminal justice. 
In sum, we conclude that where the State has pro-
vided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a 
Fourth Amendment claim,36 a state prisoner may not 
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground 
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or 
• seizure was Introduced at his trial.37 In this context the 
36 Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). 
37 The dissent characterizes the Court's opinion as laying the 
ground\York for a "drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, 
if not for all grounds, then at lrast [for many] .... " Post, at 
-. It refers variously to our opinion as a "novel reinterpretation , 
of the habeas statute," post, at -; as a "harbinger of future e\'is-
cerations of the habras statutes," post, at-; as "rewrit[ing] Con-
gress' jurisdictional :;tatutes . . . and [barring] access to federal 
courts by state priooners with constitutional clims distasteful to a o.i 
majority" of the Court, post, at -; and as a "denigration of con-
stitutional guarantees [that] must appall citizens taught to expect 
judicial respect" of constitutional rights. Post, at -. 
}Vith all respect, the hyjlerbole of the dissenting opinion is mis-
diQectcd. Our deci~ion today is not concerned with the scope 
of the habras corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional 
cl::tims generally. We do reaffirm that the exclusionary rule is a 
.iudiriall~· created rc'medy rnther ~I an a per_<ona l constitutional 
right,]~me empha~izP the minim 1tility of the rule \Yhrn sought 
to be npplird to Fourth Amendm 1t claim~ in a habeas corp1s 
procreding. As l\Ir. Jn::;tirc Black recognized in this context, "or-
dinarily the e\·idence ~ci;~rd can in no \\'ay ha"e been untru~t­
worthy ... and indeed often ... alone establishes be~·ond Yirtually 
any shado\1· of a doubt that the defendant i~ guilty• " iJ:f· 1: ~t;( 
In sum, \\'e hold only that a federal court need not apply the C'(clu-
sionary rule on habras re\·ie\\' of a Fourth Amrnclment claim absrnt 
a showing that the ~tate prisoner was denied an opportunity for a 
full and fair litigation of that claim :1t trial and on direct re\'iew. 
Our cl eci,-ion clors not mran th:lt the federal comt lacks jmi~diction 
over such a claim, but only that the application of the rule is lim-
ited to ca~rs in which there has been both such a sho\\'ing and a 
Fourth Amendment violation. 
u.s. ZJ7. 
contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effec-
tuation of the Fouith Amendment is minimal and the 
substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist 
with special force. 38 
Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals 
are 
Reversed. 
Set. t'l· l' 1---.......;=~--
~. 381Re~pondcnts contend th[lt since they filed 11ctitions for fed-
eral habeas corpus r[lther than seeking direct review by this Court 
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time 
to apply for certiorari has now passed, any dimunition in their 
ability to obtain habeas corpus relid on the ground evidence obtained 
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their trials 
should be prospective. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Board of 
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-423 (1964). We reject these 
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior 
decisions, sec Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, respondents were, of course, 
free to file a timely petition for certiorari prior to seeking federal 
habeas corpus relief. 
/ 
3rd DRAFT 
SUPJlEME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 74-1055 AND 74-1222 
W. T. Stone, Warden,) . . .. 
74-1055 v. ' United St~tes C~urt.of Appeals 
p~.titioner On Wnt of Certwran to the 
Lloy~ Charles Powell. for the Nmth Crrcmt .. 
Charles L. Wolff, Jr.,) . . . 
Warden Petitioner On Wnt of Certwran to the 
74-1222 'v ' United States Court of Appeals 
D 
'd T. ·a· for the Eighth Circuit. 
aVl ~· 1ce. 
[June -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the 
·court. 
Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal 
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were af-
firmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied 
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged 
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent 
~ubsequently sought relief in a federal district court by 
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under 
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether 
a feder~J court should consider, in ruling on a petition for 
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that 
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or sei-
zure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously 
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation 
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of consid-
erable importance to the administration of criminal 
justice. 
.-
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I 
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural 
history of these cases. 
A 
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder 
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At 
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three com-
panions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Ber-
nardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an alter-
cation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the 
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed 
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten hours later 
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department ar-
rested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy 
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest dis-
covered a ,38 caliber revolver with six expended car-
tridges in the cylinder. .. 
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of 
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Ber-
nardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at 
the liquor stor~ testified against him. A criminologist 
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun 
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected 
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson 
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the re-
volver should have been excluded because the vagrancy 
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the· 
1 The ordinance provides: 
"Every person is a vagrant who: 
"[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify 
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any police 
officer to do so (3] if surrounding circumstances are such as 
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such 
:identification." 
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conviction was affirmed by a California District Court of 
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that 
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of 
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error, 
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson offi-
cer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Su-
preme Court of California 'denied Powell's petition for 
habeas corpus relief. 
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a 
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S.C. § 2254 in 
the United States District Court for the Northern Dis--
trict of California, contending that the testimony con-
cerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been 
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued 
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson 
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and 
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe 
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded 
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held 
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional, 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not 
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits 
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the 
alternative, that court agreed with the California District 
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence con-
cerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The court concluded 
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague,2 that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and 
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principally 
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 4Q5 U. S. 156 (1972), where' 
we invalidated a city ordinance in part defining vagrants as ... "pe~ 
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no 
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were 
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve 
. the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting 
unconstitutional statutes. Id., at 98.. After an inde-
pendent review of the evidence the court concluded that 
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error 
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's 
~complices. Id., at 99. 
B 
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in 
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05 
·a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a tele-
phone call that a woman haa been heard screaming at 
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that 
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it ex-
ploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investi-
gation of the murder centered on Duane Peak, a 
15-yea.r-old member ·of the National Committee to Com-
bat Fascism (11NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant 
was issued· for- Peak's alTest. The investigation also 
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including 
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill 
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search 
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m. 
that night and found lights and a television on, but there 
was no response to their repeated knocking. While some 
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was 
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any 
lawful purpose or object . . , ."· Jd·.; at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the 
similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see 
n. 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second 
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently 
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Peti-
tioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposi-
tion of the case we need not consider this issue. 
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obtained to search for explosives and illegal weapons 
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the 
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain 
view, dynamite, blasting caps, and other materials use-
ful in the construction of explosive devices. Peak 
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice 
voluntarily surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing 
at that time were subjected to chemical analysis, disclos-
ing dynamite particles. 
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District 
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted plant-
ing the suitcase and making the telephone call, aJ;ld 
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative 
evidence the State introduced items seized during the 
search, as well 88 the results of the chemical analysis of 
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to sup-
press this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of 
Nebr88ka affirmed the conviction, holding that the search 
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search 
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480 
(1972). 
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of 
habe88 corpus in the United States District Court for 
Nebr88ka. Rice's sole contention w88 that his incarcera-
tion w88 unlawful because the evidence underlying his 
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal 
search of his home. The District Court concluded that 
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affi-
davit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974).8 The court 
8 The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit 
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police 
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's homa 
because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent 
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF 
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also rejected the State's contention that even if the-
warrant was invalid the search was justified because of 
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the 
exigent circumstances of the situation-d~tnger to Peak 
and search for bombs and explosives believed in posses-
sion of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest war-
rant did not justify the entry as the police lacked 
probable cause to believe . Peak was in the house, and 
further concluded that the circumstances were not suffi-
ciently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless 
search. /d., at 194-202.' The Court of Appeals for·the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons 
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 (1975). 
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respec-
tive state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, 
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past 
that Rice possessed weapons a.nd explosives, which he said should 
be used against the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In 
concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the 
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit 
alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testi-
mony adduced at the suppression hearing but not included in the 
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. W. 2d 480, 487-488. See 
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion) . The 
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the 
affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded prob-
able cause was lacking. Petitioner Wolff oontends that police should 
be permitted to supplement the information contained in an affidavit 
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, a 
contention that we have several times rejected, see, e. g., Whitely v. 
Warden, 401 U. S. 560, 565 n. 8 (1971); Aguilar v. Texas, supra, at 
109 n. 1, and need not reach again here. 
~ The District Court further held that the evidence of dynamite 
particles found ·on Rice's· clothing should have been suppressed as 
the tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued 
but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207. 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne 
Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920). 
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petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions 
concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role 
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases 
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their 
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975).6 We 
now reverse. 
11 
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first 
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation 
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody 
by the United States. The original statutory authoriza-
tion did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It 
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall 
have power to issue writs of . . . habeas corpus. . . ." 
Ibid. The courts defined the scope of the writ in accord-
ance with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as 
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g., 
6 In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that 
counsel in PoweU v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the 
questions: 
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that 
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest 
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of 
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitu-
tional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of 
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is 
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254." 
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of 
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circum-
stances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U.S. C. 
§ 2254." 
11 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used 
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien-
dum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.). 
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar· 
"'hall, C. J.). 
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act 
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867 
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in "all 
cases where a..ny person may be restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or 
law of the United States .... " But the limitation of fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g., 
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895); 
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. 
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the con-
cept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain 
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this 
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8 
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S~ 309, in 1915. In 
Frank, the prisoner had claimed-in the state courts ~hat 
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur-
7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review 
in federal criminal ·cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review 
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote 
b-ecause of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court. 
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, &' Wechsler, Hart & WechSler's The 
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973); 
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32, 
79-80 & n. 107 ( 1928). Pressure naturally developed for expansion 
of the scope of ·habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable 
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and 
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv, L. Rev. 441, 473 
& n. 75 (19763). 
8 The expansion occurred primarily with regard to (i) convic-
tions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex part~ 
Siebold, supra, or (ii) ' detentions based upon an allegedly illegal 
sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1973). ' 
See .Bator, .supra, . n. 7, at 46_5-474. 
74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION 
STONE v. POWELL 9 
der had been dominated by a mob. After the state su• 
preme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess· 
fully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district 
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because 
Frank's federal claims had been considered by a compe· 
tent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized, 
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the 
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process" 
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether 
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the 
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. I d., 
at 333-336. 
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487, 
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 In 
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas 
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in 
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors and in rul-
ing certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the high-
est court of the State had rejected these claims on direct 
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and 
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951). 
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective 
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of 
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full 
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if 
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In 
8 There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the 
result in Brown v. Allen wa.s foreshadowed by the Court's decision 
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). Compare Hart, Fore-
ward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105 
(1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State 
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator, 
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 42I 
& n. 30; id .• a.t 457-460 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct re~ 
view had refused to consider the appeal because the 
papers were filed out of time. This Court held that 
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable 
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a 
ground that would have barred direct review of his 
federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked 
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S., 
at 458,486. 
This final. barrier to broad colla~eral re-examination of 
state criminal convictions. in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings was removed in, Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 
(1963)."~0 Noia and two codefendants had been convicted 
. ' ' 
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each de-
fendal'lt was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants, 
but not Noia him~elf, appealed their convictions., Al-
though their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent 
state proceedings they were able to establish that their 
confessions had been coerced and their convictions there-
fore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a sub-
sequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipu-
lated that N oia's confession also had been coerced, but 
the District Court followed Daniels in holding that N oia's 
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183 
10 Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been 
·no change in tne established rule with respect to nonconstitutional 
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28 
U. S. C. § 22~5, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal." 
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947) . For this reason, non-
constitutional claims that could nave been raised on appeal, but 
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. Id., at 
178--179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 & n. 15 
(1974). Even tnose nonconstitutional claims that could not have 
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only 
if the alleged error constituted "'a fundamental defect which inp 
herently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' " id., at 346 .• 
'(j_Uoting Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962) . 
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F. Supp. 222; 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals re'" 
versed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and 
that he be released from custody or a new trial be 
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, nar-
rowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal 
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal con-
stitutional claims.11 . 
During the period in which the substantive scope of 
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider· 
whether exceptions to full revfew might exist with respect 
to particuiar categories of constitutional claims. Prior 
to the Court's decis1on in Kau/man v. United States, 394 
tJ. S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of th~ 
federal courts of appea1s had concluded that collateral 
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on 
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C. 
§' 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available' 
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.12 The 
11 In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to 
<l'Onsider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the 
writ, noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command 
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as law and. justice require.;' 
28 U. S. C. § 2243.'' 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis 
v. Henderson, ..-- U. S. - (1976), holding that a state prisoner 
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the 
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a post-
conviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actuai 
prejudice, we emphasized: 
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances con-
siderations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its 
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426.'' 
l 2 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d 
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F . 2d 55 (CA6 1965) ; 
De WeUes v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388' 
l]L S. 919 (1967); Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (CA91 
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions 
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in 
kind from denials of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in 
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn 
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge 
evidence as· inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic de-
vice intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment vio-
lations by law enforcement officers." . Id., at 224. See 
Thornton v. United States, 125 U.S. App. D. C. 114, 368 
F. 2d 822 (1i)66). 
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search-
and-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings. 
The Court noted that "th~ ·federal habeas remedy ex-
tends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial," 
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. (}., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 . 
U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, that there was no basis for restricting "access by 
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims 
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similar 
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U. S., at 226. 
Although in recent years the view has been expressed 
that the Court should · re-examine the substantive scope 
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review 
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the question of 
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair oppor-
tunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state 
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 250 
1962); Armstead v. United States, 318 F . 2d 725 (CA5 1963), with, 
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v. 
United States, 31'T·F. 2d 494 (CAlO 1963) . See also Thornton v. 
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966) 
(~earch-and-seizure claims not cognizable under § 2255 absent special 
circumstances) . 
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( 1973) (PowELL, J., concurring) ,18 the Court, without 
discussion or consideration of the issue, ha.s continued to 
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See 
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283 (1975); Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973); Cardwell v. Lewis, 
417 U. S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion) ,14 
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal 
habeas corpus rests on the view that the effectua-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, a.s applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the grant-
ing of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner ha.s been con-
victed in sta.te court on the basis of evidence obtained in 
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were 
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require 
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of convic-
tion upon direct review.13 Until this case we have not 
18 See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev.'142 (1970) . 
H In Newsome the Court focused on the issue whether a state 
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where 
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal, 
and did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See 420 
U. S., at 287 n. 4. Similarly, in Ca1'dwell and Cady the question 
considered her~) was not presented in the petition for certiorari, and 
in neither case was relief granted on the basis of a search-and-
seizure claim. In Cardwell the plurality expressly noted that it was 
not addressing the issue of the substantive scole of the writ. See 
417 U.S., at 596 and n. 12. 
u As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. Unitecl 
States, 394 U. S. 217, 231, 239 (1969), the Kaufman majority made 
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a 
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that 
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); 
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U, S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeaa 
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had occasion fully to consider the validity of this view. 
See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, at 249 n. 38; 
Cardwell v. Lewis, supra, 'at 596 and n. 12. Upon 
examination, we conclude, in light of the nature and 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, 
that this view is unjustified.16 We hold, therefore, that 
where the State has provided an opportunity for full and 
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Con~ 
stitution does not require that a state prisoner be granted 
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence 
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was in~ 
troduced at his trial.17 
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as 
well as in Warden, the issue of the ..substantive scope of the writ 
was not presented to the Co~rt in the petition for writ of certiorari. 
Moreover, of the other "numerous occasions" cited by MR. JusTICE 
BRENNAN's dissent, post, at -, in which the Court has accepted 
jurisdiction over collateral attacks by state prisoners raising Fourth 
Amendment cbims, in only one case-Whitley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 
560-was relief granted on that basis. And in Whitley, as in Man-
cusi, the issue of the substantive scope of the writ was not presented 
in the petition for certiorari. As emphasized by Mr. Justice Black, 
only in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not raised 
in the petition. 394 U.S., at 239 and n. 7. 
10 The issue in Kaufman was the scope of § 2255. Our decision 
today rejects the dictum in Kaufman concerning the applicability 
of the exclusiol!ary rule in federal habeas corpus review of state 
court decisions pursuant to § 2254. To the extent the application 
of the exclusionary rule in Kaufman did not rely upon the super-
visory role of this Court over the lower federal courts, cf. Elkins v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), seep.-, infra, the rationale 
for its application in that context is also rejected. 
17 We find it unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning 
the exclusionary rule, or the statutory scope of the habeas corpus 
statute, raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in 
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per· se 
basis without regard to the nature of · the constitutional claim or 
the circumstances of the police action, 
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III 
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The 
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associ-
ated with the use of the general warrant in England and 
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas, 
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect 
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from 
searches under unchecked general authority.18 
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means 
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v. United States, 
255 U. S. 298 (1921), there existed no barrier to the 
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Amendment. See Adams v. New Y ark, 
192 U. S. 585 (1904).19 In Weeks the Court held that 
the defendant coqld petition before trial for the return of 
"ls See generally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme 
Court ( 1966) ; lason, The History and Development of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937). 
19 The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that 
the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers 
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendme~ts. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams w. 
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that 
the "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the 
defendant io furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered 
to the common-law rule that a trial court must not inquire, on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwise 
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. 
Dana~. 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (1841). 
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property secured through an illegal search or seizure con~ 
ducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held 
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a 
federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. 
v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally 
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the 
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), 
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by 
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment 
is "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as 
', such enforceable against the States through the [Four-
teenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." !d., at 27-28. 
The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclu-
siona,ry rule would not be imposed upon the States as 
"an essential ingredient of that right." !d., at 29. The 
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions, 
see Elkins v. United States, .364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea 
v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little 
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was 
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
u. s. 643 (1961). 
Decisions prior to M app advanced two principal rea-
sons for application of the rule in federal trials. ·The 
Court in Elkins, for example, in the context of its special 
supervisory role over the lower federal courts, referred to 
the "imperative of judicial integrity," suggesting that 
exclusion of illegally seized evidence prevents contami-
nation of the judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222.20 But 
even in that context a more pragmatic ground was 
emphasized: 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. 
20 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968) ; Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U. S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J ., dissenting); id., at 484;, 
{6randeis, J., dissenting). 
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Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail· 
able w~y-by removing the incentive to disregard 
it." ld., at 217. 
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule 
to the States on several grounds/ 1 but relied principally 
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlaw-
ful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658. 
Although our decisions often have alluded to the 
"imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., United States 
v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975), they demon-
strate the limited role of that justification in the de-
termination whether to apply the rule in a particular 
context.22 Logically extended this justification would 
require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized 
evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, 
or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandon-
ment of the standing limitations on who may object to 
the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence, 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and 
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings 
21 See 367 U. S., at 656 (prevention of introduction of evidence 
where introduction is "tantamount" to a coerced confession); id., at 
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (pres-
ervation of judicial integrity). 
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment 
itself requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in 
state criminal trials. See 367 U. S., at 656, 666. Mr. Justice Black 
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, 
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949) 
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amend-
ment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban 
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges 
for requiring exclusion. 367 U.S., at 661. Seen. 19, supra. 
22 See Monaghan, Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975), 
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need not abate when the defendant's person is unconsti-
tutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 
(1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519 (1952). Simi-
larly, the interest in promoting judicial integrity does 
,not prevent the use of illegally seized evidence in grand 
jury proceedihgs. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 
338 ( 1974). Nor does it require that the trial court 
exclude such evidence from use for impeachment of a 
defendant, even though its introduction is certain to 
result in convictions in some cases. Walder v. United 
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). The teaching of these cases 
is clear. While courts, of course, must ever be con-
cerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial 
process, this concern has limited force as a justifica-
tion for the exclusion of highly probative evidence.23 
The importance of this justification becomes minimal 
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner 
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full 
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at 
trial and on direct review. 
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule 
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates 
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-M app decisions have 
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional 
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the 
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any 
'' [r] eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead, 
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to, 
28 As we recognized last Term, judicial integrity is "not offended 
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that 
their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions sub-
sequent to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type 
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted by the 
Constitution."· United States v. Peltier, supra,. at 538 (emphasis: 
omitted). 
- . 
74-.1055 & 74-1222-0J:>INION 
STONE v. POWELL 19 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect .... " United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539; 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U.S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 
406, 416 (1966). 
Mapp involved the enforcement of the exclusionary 
rule at state trials and on direct review. The decision iri 
Kaufman, as noted above, is premised on th~ view that 
implementation of the Fourth Amendment also requires 
the consideration of search-and-seizure claims upon col-
lateral review of state convictions. But despite the broad 
deterrent purpo~e of the exclusionary rult, it has never 
been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally 
seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. 
As in the case of any remediai device, "the application of 
the rule has been restricted to those areas where its reme-' 
dial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." 
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348.24 Thus, our· 
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential 
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury 
u As Professor Amsterdam has observed: 
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispen-
sation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the 
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert[ing] general legal pressures 
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of . , . 
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a 
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be 
swallowed· than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many 
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering, 
pursuance of thiS policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity 
inflicts gratwtous harm on the public interest . . . ."· Amsterdam; 
Search, Sei;mre, and. Section 2255.: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev, 
378, 388-389 (1964) (footnotes omitted). 
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by such extension against the potential contribution to 
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through de· 
terrence of police misconduct: 
' 
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be 
achieved by extending the· rule to grand jury pro-
ceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence 
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it 
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the 
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly 
further that goal. Such an extension would deter 
only police investigation consciously directed toward 
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand 
jury investigation .... 
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that 
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly mini-
mal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct 
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of 
the grand jury." /d., at 351 (footnote omitted) . 
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's 
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier 
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court 
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evi-
dence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had 
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, 
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusion-
&y rule in that context were outweighed by the need to 
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial' 
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly 
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not. 
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of 
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in 
determination of truth at trial 25 was deemed to out-
25 See gen~rally Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal 
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weigh the incremental contribution that might have been 
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by 
application of the rule. 
The balancing process at work in these cases also 
finds e~pression in the standing requirement. Standing 
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist 
only when the Government attempts to use illegaUy ob-
tained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal 
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165; Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See Jones 
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The stand-
ing requirement is premised on the view that the "addi-
tional benefits of extending the rule" to defendants other 
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed 
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence 
which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174-175,26 
IV 
We turn now to the specific question presented by these 
eases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amend-
View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar 
of the City of New York, Dec. 16, 1974. 
2° Cases aqdressing the question whether search-and-seizure hold-
ings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the 
deterrent purpose sei'Ved by the exclusionary rule, consistently with 
the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule con-
text, See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254 
& n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-637 (1965). 
Cf. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 81 (1968). The "attenuation-
of-the-taint"' doctrine also is consistent with the balancing approach. 
See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v. Unitea 
States, 371 U. S.. 411, 591-492 (1963); Amsterdam, supra, n. 24, at. 
~.9-390. 
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ment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteen'tht 
Amendment. The question is whether state prisoners--
who llave been afforded the opportunity for full and ·fair 
consideration of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule 
with respect ~o seized evidence by the state courts at trial 
and on direct review...:_may ·invoke their claim again on 
federal habeas.corpus review. The answer is to be found 
by weighing the utility of the exclusionary rule against 
the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth 
Amendment claims. 
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at 
trial and on direct review are well known : 27 the focus 
of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, 
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or inno-
cence that should be the central concern in a crimi-
nal proceeding.28 Moreover, the physical evidence sought 
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in 
his dissent in Kaufman: 
11A claim of illegal search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many 
27 See, e. g., Ervine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 441 (1971) 
(BuRGER, C. J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.); 8 Wigmore On Evidence§ 2184a, at 
51-52 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Amsterdam, supra, n. 24, at 388-391; 
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule 
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev."665, 736-754 (1970), and 
sources cited therein; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis-
conduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 256 (1961); 
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 
50 Texas L. ReV'. '736 (1972). 
28 See address by Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 
delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular 
Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, at 8-9, April 8,.. 
m7&;; cf. Frankel, n. 25, supra. ' 
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other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence 
seized can in no way have been rendered untrust-
worthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often 
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any 
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty." 
394 U.S., at 237. 
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding 
process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in par-
ticular cases between the error committed by the police 
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by 
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of propor-
tionality that is essential to the concept of justice.29 Thus, 
although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police 
activity in part through 'the nurturing of respect for 
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately 
it may well have the opposite effect of generating dis-
respect for the law and administration of justice.30 
29 Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the 
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of propor-
tionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of 
establishing a direct relationship between the nature of the vio-
lation and the decision whether to ·invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A 
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at 
181-183 ("substantial violations"); H. Friendly, Benchmarks 260-262 
(1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of 
activity intentionally or flagrantly illegal."); Wigmore, supra, n. 26, 
at 52-53. Seen. 17, supra. 
80 In a different context, Dallin H. Oaks has observed: 
"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccu-
pation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures 
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth 
and justice, and procedurt>..s are but means to these ends .... 
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our 
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of 
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted 
from these · goals . " 
Ethics, Morality and Profesional Responsibility, 3 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 
591. 596 (1975). 
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These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a 
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collat-
eral review on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim 
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state 
courts.31 
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that 
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite 
the absence of supportive empirical evidence/2 we have 
31 Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to 
assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of lib-
erty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our system 
of government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of 
limited judicial resou11ces, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal 
trials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state 
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional 
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded." 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J., con-
curring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 231 
(Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra, n. 13. 
We nevertheless afford broad habeas corpus relief, recognizing 
the need in a free society for an additional safeguard against 
compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of 
liberty. The Court in Fay v. Noia, supra, described habeas corpus: 
as a remedy for "whatever society deems to be intolerable re-
straints," and recognized that those to whom the writ should be-
granted "are persons whom society has grievously wronged." 372 
U. S., at 401, 441. But in the case of a typical Fourth Amendment 
claim, asserted on collateral attack, a convicted defendant is usually 
asking society to redetermine an issue that has no bearing on the 
basic justice of his incarceration. 
82 The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has long been the subject 
of sharp debate. Until recently, scholarly empirical research 
was unavailable, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960). 
And, the evidence derived from recent empirical research is still' 
inconclusive. Compare, e. g., Oaks, supra, n. 27; Spiotto, Search 
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its· 
Alternatives, 2 Journ. Legal Studies 243 (1973), with, e. g., Cannon, 
Is thll Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and 
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·assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be 
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the 
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to dis-
regard it. More importantly, over the long term, this 
demonstration that our society attaches serious conse-
quenoes to violation of constitutional rights is thought 
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement 
policies, a..nd the officers who implement them, to incor-
porate Fourth .A..mendment ideals into their value 
systern,.88 
We adhere to · the view that · these considerations sup-
port the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial 
and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court con-
victions. But the additional contribution, if any, of the 
consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state pris-
oners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs. 
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered 
may add marginally to an awareness of the values pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. There is no reason to 
believe, however, that the overall educative effect of 
the exclusionary ru1e woU1d be appreciably diminished 
if search-a.nd-sei~ure claims could not be raised in fed-
eral habeas corpus review of state convictions.34 Nor 
is there reason to assume that any specific disincen~ive 
already created by the risk of exclusion of evidepce 
a Plea Against a Precipitious Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974). 
See United States v. Janis,-- U.S.--,-- n. 22 (1976; ,Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 
349, 475 n, 593 (1974); Comment, On the Limitations of Empirica:J 
Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule : A Critique of the Spiotto 
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 740 n974). 
88 See Oaks, supra, n. 27, at 756. 
84 "As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems 
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of dimin-
ishing returns, · and beyond that ·point its continued application is a 
public nuisance." Amsterd.<tm, St[.pra, n. 23, at 389. 
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at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct re.view 
would be enhanced if there were the further risk that 
a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on 
direct review might be overturned in collateral proceed-
ings often occurring years after the incarceration of the 
defendant. The view that the deterrence of Fourth 
Amendment violations would be furthered rests on the 
dubious assumption that law enforcement authorities 
would fear that federal habeas review might reveal flows 
in a search or ~izure that went undetected at trial and 
on appeaP5 Even if one rationally could assume that 
some additional incremental deterrent effect would be 
present in isolated cases, the resulting advance of the 
3 ~ The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support 
of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to 
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of 
the state courts as fair .and competent forums for the adjudication 
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts 
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through 
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this 
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal ra-
tionale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective 
institutional setting within which federal judges and state judges 
operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the 
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state 
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now 
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights 
in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts, 
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard per-
sonal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 
14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816). Moreover, the argument 
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional 
law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure 
claims, since they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial 
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason 
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more 
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the [ consid-
eration of Fourth Amendment claims] than his neighbor in the state-
courthouse." Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50. 
-
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legitimate goal of furthering Fourth Amendment rights 
would be outweightd by the acknowledged costs to other 
values vital to a rational system of criminal justice. 
In sum, we conclude that where the State has pro-
vided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a 
Fourth Amendment claim/ 6 a state prisoner may not 
be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground 
that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or 
seizure was introduced at his trial.37 In this context the 
86 Cf. Townsend v. Sairi, 372 U. S. 293 (1963). 
37 The dissent characterizes the Court's opinion as laying the 
groundwork for a "drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, 
if not for all grounds, then at least [for many] .... " Post, at 
-. It refers variously to our opinion as a "novel reinterpretation 
of the habeas st~t~te," post, at -· -; as a "harbinger of future evis-
cerations of the habeas statutes," post, at -; as "rewrit[ing] Con-
gress' jurisdictional statutes . . . and [barring] access to federal 
courts by state prisoners with constitutional claims distasteful to a 
majority" of the Court, post, at -; and as a "denigration of con-
stitutional guarantees [that] must appall citizens taught to expect 
judicial respect" of constitutional rights. Post, at -. 
With all respect, the hyperbole of the dissenting opinion is mis-
9-irected. Our decision today is not concerned with the scope of the 
habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims 
generally. We do reaffirm that the exclusionary rule is a judicially 
created remedy rather than a personal constitutional right, see p. 18, 
supra, and we emphasize the minimal utility of the rule when sought 
to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims in a habeas corpus 
proceeding. As Mr. Justice Black recognized in this context, "or-
dinarily the evidence seized can in no way have been untrust-
worthy . . . and indeed often . . . alone establishes beyond virtually 
any shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty." 394 U. S., at 
237. In sum, we hold only that a federal court need not apply tpe ex-
clusionary rule on habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim absent 
a showing that the state prisoner was denied an opportunity for a 
full and fair litigation of that claim at trial and on direct review. 
Our decision does not mean that the federal court lacks jurisdiction 
over such a claim, but only that the application of the rule is lim~ 
ited to cases in which there has been both such a showing and a 
Fourth Amendment violation. 
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contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effec ... 
tuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal and the· 
substantial societal costs of application of the rule persist, 
with special force. 38 
Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals 
are 
Reversed .. 
58 See n. 31, supra. Respondents contend that since they filed peti-
-tions for federal habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by 
this Court through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since 
the time to apply for certiorari has now passed, any dimunition in 
their ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ground evidence ob-
tained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their 
trials should be prospective. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Board of 
Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 422-423 (1964) . We reject these 
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior 
decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, respondents were, of course~ 
free to file a timely petition for certiorari prior to seeking federal 
habeas corpus relief. 
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Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal 
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were af-
firmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied 
upon evidence obtained in searches and seizures alleged 
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent 
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by 
filing a petition for federal habeas corpus under 28 
U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether a 
state prisoner may be granted habeas corpus relief on 
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional 
search and seizure was introduced at his trial, when he 
has previously been afforded an opportunity for full 
and fair litigation of his claims in the state courts. The 
issue is of considerable importance to the administration 
of criminal justice. 
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I 
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural 
history of these cases. 
A 
Respondent, Lloyd Powell, was convicted of murder 
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. He 
and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store 
in San Bernadino, Cal., at about midnight on February 
17, 1968, where Powell became involved in an altercation 
with Gerald Parsons, the store manager. In the scuffling 
·that followed Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten 
hours later, on Sunday morning, an officer of the Hender-
son, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for viola-
. tion of the Henderson vagrancy ordinance/ and in the 
search incident to the arrest discovered a .38 caliber 
revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder. 
Powell was extradicted to California and tried for 
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Ber-
nardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at 
' the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist 
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun 
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected 
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson 
·police officer as to the search and discovery of the re-
volver should have been excluded because the vagrancy 
ordinance was unconstitutional. In July 1969, the con-
viction wa.s affirmed by a California District Court of 
1 The ordina.nce provides: 
"Every person is a vagrant who: 
"[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify 
himself a.nd to account for his presence when asked by any peace 
officer to do so, [3] if the surrounding circumstances are such as 
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such 
identification." 
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Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that 
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of 
the arrest and search because it concluded that even if it 
was error to admit the testimony of the Henderson officer, 
this was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Su-
preme Court of California denied Powell's petition for 
habeas corpus relief. 
In August 1971 Powell filed a petition for a writ of 
federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California, contending that the testimony concerning 
the .38 caliber revolver should have been excluded as 
fruit of an illegal search. He argued that his arrest had 
been unlawful because the Henderson vagrancy ordi-
nance was unconstitutionally vague, and that the arrest-
ing officer lacked probable cause to believe that he was 
violating it. The District Court did not reach the ques" 
tion of the constitutionality of the ordinance, although it 
did conclude that the arresting officer had probable cause. 
The Court agreed with the California District Court 
that the admission of the evidence concernirtg Poweli's 
arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Court alternatively held that even if the vagrancy 
ordinance was unconstitutional, the deterrent purpose 
of the exclusionary rule does not require that it be ap-
plied to bar admission of the fruits of a search incident 
to an otherwise valid arrest. 
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The Court concluded 
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague/ that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and 
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principly 
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972) , where 
we invalidated a city ordinance defining vagrants as "persons wander-
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no 
deterrent purpose ·with regard to police officers who were 
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve 
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting 
unconstitutional statutes. !d., at 98. After an inde-
pendent review of the evidence the court concluded that 
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error 
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's 
accomplices. Id., at 99. 
B 
Respondent, David Rice, was convicted of murder in 
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05 
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a tele-
phone call that a woman was heard screaming at 2865 
Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that address 
examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it exploded, 
killing him instantly. By August 22 the investigation of 
the murder centered on Duane Peak, a 15-year-old mem-
ber of the National Committee to Combat Fascism 
("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant was issued for 
Peak's arrest. The investigation also focused on other 
known members of the NCCF, including respondent Rice, 
some of whom were believed planning to kill Peak 
before he could incriminate them. Upon arriving at 
Rice's home at 10:30 p. m., the police found lights and 
television on but there was no response to their repeated 
knocking. While officers were left to watch the premises, 
a warrant was obtained to search for explosives and 
ing or strolling around from plarc to place without any lawful 
purpose or object .... " !d., at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the similarity 
between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see n. 1, 
supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded tha.t the second 
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently 
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Peti-
tioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposi-
tion of the case we need not consider this issue. 
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illegal weapons believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak 
was not in the house but upon entry the police discov-
ered, in plain view, dynamite, blasting caps, wire, a 
battery, and a pair of long nosed pliers. Peak subse-
quently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice voluntarily 
surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing at that time 
were subjected to chemical analysis, disclosing dynamite 
particles. 
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District 
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted plant-
ing the suitcase and making the telephone call, and 
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative 
evidence the State introduced items sci2led in the search, 
as well as the results of the chemical analysis of his 
clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to suppress 
this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search 
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a va.lid search 
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480 
(1972). 
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarcera-
tion was unlawful because the evidence underlying his 
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal 
search of his home. The District Court concluded that 
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affi-
davit was fatally defective under Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U. S. 108 (1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1973).3 
3 The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit 
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police 
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home 
because (1) Rice was an active member of the NCCF, (2) a violent 
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF 
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past 
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The court also rejected the State's contention that even 
if the warrant was invalid the search was justified be-
cause of the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because 
of the exigent circumstances of the situation. The court 
reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry 
as the police lacked probable cause to believe Peak was 
in the house, and further concluded that the circum-
stances were not sufficiently exigent to justify an im-
mediate warrantless search. !d., at 194-202.4 The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affrrmed, sub-
stantially for the reasons stated by the District Court. 
513 F. 2d 1280 (1975). 
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the State 
prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, peti-
tioned for review of these decisions, raising questions con-
. oerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role 
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases 
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their 
that Rice possessed weapoiLS and explosives, which he said should 
be used against the police. See Appendix to Petitioner's Cert. 
:34 n. Z. In concluding there existed probable cause for issuance of 
the warrant, the state trial court on the motion to suppress and 
the State Supreme Court on appeal relied in pa.rt on information 
contained in testimony adduced at the suppression hearing that was 
not included in the affidavit. The District Court limited its prob-
able cause inquiry to the face of the affida.vit, see Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U. S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969) ; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 
108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded probable cause was lacking. 
Petitioner Wolff contends that police should be permitted to supple-
ment the information contained in an affidavit for a search warrant 
at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an issue we need not reach. 
4 The District Court further held that the evidence of dynamite 
particles found on Rice's clothing should have been suppressed as 
tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued 
but for the unlawful search of hi home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207. 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920). 
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petitions for certiorari. 411 U. S. 1055 (1975). 5 We 
now reverse. 
II 
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciedum 6 was included in the first 
grant of federal court jurisdiction made by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation 
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody 
by the United States. The original statutory authoriza-
tion did not define its substantive reach. It merely 
stated that the courts of the United States "shall have 
power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . ... " Ibid. 
The courts defined the scope of the writ in accordance 
with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as to 
the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g., 
Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar-
shall, C. J.). 
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act 
5 In granting certiorari in these cases we requested that counsel 
in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the 
questions: 
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that 
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest 
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of 
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitu-
tional, respondent's clajm that the gun ruscovered as a result of 
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is 
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254. 
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of 
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circum-
stances of this case is a question properly cognizable under U. S. C. 
§ 2254." 
6 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used 
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjicie-
dum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.). 
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of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867 
Act relief by federal courts was authorized in "all cases 
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty 
in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law 
of the United States .... " The principle that federal 
habeas corpus jurisdiction was limited to consideration of 
the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, however, re-
mained the touchstone in this area. See, e. g., In re 
Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 
(1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895); Berge-
mann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. Nich-
ols, 203 U. S. 192 ( 1906). And, although the concept 
of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain as 
the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this 
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8 
until Frank v. Mangnum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In 
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that 
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur-
-der had been dominated by a mob. After the state su-
preme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess-
1 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review 
"in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review 
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was rare 
because of the practice of single district judges holding circuit court. 
See Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 
31-32, 7!}-80 ( 1927). Pressure naturally developed for expansion 
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable 
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 
U. S. 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal 
Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 473 and 
n. 75. See generally Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973). 
8 The expansion occurred primarily where there were (i) convic--
tions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex parte 
Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1879), and (ii) detentions based upon an 
allegedly illegal sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 
Wall.) 163 (1873). See Bator, supra, n. 7, at 465-474. 
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fully sought habeas corpus relief in the Federal District 
Court. On direct review, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
denial of relief because Frank's federal claims had been 
considered fully by a competent and unbiased state tri-
bunal. The Court recognized, however, that if a habeas 
corpus court finds that the State has failed to provide 
adequate "corrective process" for the full and fair litiga-
tion of federal claims, whether or not "jurisdictional," the 
court may inquire into the merits to determine whether 
the detention is lawful. I d., at 333-336. 
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443 ( 1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487, 
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 
In these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas 
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in 
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling 
certain confessions admissible. In Brown, on direct ap-
peal from the conviction these claims had been rejected 
on the merits by the highest court of the State, State v. 
Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99 (1951), and this 
Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951). 
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective 
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of 
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full 
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if 
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In 
Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct re-
9 There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the 
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision 
in Moore v. Dempsy, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) . Compare Fay v. Noia, 
372 U. S. 3911, 421 and n. 30; Hart, Foreward: The Time Chart of 
the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105 (1959) ; Reitz, Federal Habeas 
Corpus: Impact of Abortive States proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 
1315, 1328-1329 (1961) with Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S., at 457-460 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Bator, supra, n. 7, at 488-491. 
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view had refused to consider the appeal because the 
papers were filed out-of-time. This Court held that 
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable 
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a 
ground that would have barred direct review of his 
federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked 
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S., 
at 458, 486. 
This final barrier to full collateral re-examination of 
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings was removed in F'ay v. N oia, 372 U. S. 391 
(1963). Noia and two codefendants had been convicted 
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each de-
fendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants, 
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. Al-
though their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent 
state proceedings they were able to establish that their 
confessions had been coerced and their convictions there-
fore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a sub-
sequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, although it was 
stipulated that his confession also had been coerced, the 
District Court followed Daniels in holding that N oia's 
failure to appeal barred habeas review. The Court of 
Appeals reversed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set 
aside and he be released from custody or a new trial 
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, nar-
rowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal 
court in its discretion may refuse to consider the merits 
of federal constitutional claims 10 to cases involving de-
•o Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been 
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional 
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28 
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal." 
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, non-
constitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but 
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. Id., at 
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liberate bypass of state procedural rules or failure to ex-
haust available state remedies.11 
Throughout the period in which the substantive scope 
of the writ was expanded the Court did not consider 
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect 
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior 
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the 
federal courts of appeal had concluded that collateral 
review of search-and-seizur.e claims was inappropriate on 
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C. 
§' 2255.12 The primary rationale advanced in support of 
178-179. Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 345-346 and n. 15 
( 197 4). Even those claims that could not have been asserted on 
direct appeal ~an be raised in collateral review only if the alleged 
error constituted "a fundamental defect which 'inherently results in 
a complete miscarriage of justice.'" !d., at 346. See Hill v. United 
States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962). 
11 In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to 
consider constitutional claims presented in a writ of habeas corpus, 
the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the writ, 
noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command that 
the judge 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' 28 
U. S. C. § 2242." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis v. 
Henderson, - U. S. - (1976), holding that absent a claim of 
actual prejudice a state prisoner who fails to make a timely chal-
lenge to the composition of the grand jury that indicted him cannot 
bring that challenge in a post-conviction federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, we emphasized that: 
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances con-
siderations of corruty and concerns for the orderly administration of 
criminal justice require a federal court to forego exercise of its 
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426." 
12 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 389 U. S. 820 (1967); United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d 
193 (CA3 1960); Armstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d 725 (CAS 
1963) ; Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965); De Welles 
v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert. denied, 388 U. S. 919 
(1967); Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (CA9 1962), with, 
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those decisions was that Fourth Amendment violations 
are different in kind from denials of other constitutional 
rights in that claims of illegal search and seizure do not 
"impugne the integrity of the fact-finding process or 
challenge the evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, 
the exclusion of illegally seized evidence is simply a 
prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth 
Amendment violations by law enforcement officers." 
Id., at 224. See Thornton v. United States, - U. S. 
App. D. C. - , 368 F. 2d 822 (1966). 
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search-
and-seizure claims are cognizable in § 225·5 proceedings. 
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy ex-
tends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial," 
id., at 225~226, see, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392-U. S. 
364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968), 
anci concluded that there was no basis for restricting 
"access by federal prisoners with illegal search-and-
seizure claims to federal collateral remedies, while placing 
no similar restriction on access by state prisoners." 
Although in recent years the view has been expressed 
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope 
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review 
of Fourth Amendment claims "solely to the question 
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair oppor-
tunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state 
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250 
(1973) (PowELL, J., concurring),1 3 the Court without 
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v. 
United States, 317 F. 2d 494 (CAlO 1963). See also Thornton v. 
United States, - U. A. App. D. C. -, 368 F . 2d 822 (1966) 
(search-and-seizure claims not cognizable under § 2255 absent special 
circumstances) . 
u See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). 
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discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to 
a-ccept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See 
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283 (1975). 
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal 
liabeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectua-
ti_on of the Fourth Amendment requires the granting of 
habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been convicted 
in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in an 
illegal search or seizure as the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require exclusion of such evidence, under 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), at trial and reversal 
of such a conviction upon direct review?4 Until this 
case we have not had occasion fully to consider the 
rationale underlying this assumption. See, e. g., Schneck-
loth v. Bustamante, supra, at 249 n. 38. Upon examina-
tion, we conclude, in view of the nature and purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, that the 
assumption is unjustified.15 
14 As Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. United 
States, 394 U. S. 217, 239 (1969), the Kaufman majority made no 
effort to justify its result in light of the long-re.cogn.izcd deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a 
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that 
search-and-seizure clajms are cognizable in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. See Mancusi v. De.Forte, 39·2 U. S. 364 (1968); 
'Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi was habeas relief ordered 
<on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as well 
as in Warden, the issue was not presented to the Court in the 
petition for writ of certiorari. As emphasized by Justice Black, 
only in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not raised 
·in the petition. 394 U.S., at 237 and n. 7. 
J.s Ail we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence 
·should have been excluded because it was obtained in an illegal 
·search and seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full 
<consideration of that claim in the state courts, may not invoke the 
·exclusionary rule on federal habeas corpus review, we find it un-
necessary to consider the other issues concerning the exclusionary 
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III 
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The 
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associ-
ated with the use of the general warrant in England and 
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas, 
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect 
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from 
searches under unchecked general authority.16 
The exclusionary rule was adopted to effectuate the 
rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. Prior to the 
Court's decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 
(1914), evidence obtained in violation of the Amend-
ment generally could be introduced in both state and 
federal criminal trials. See Adams v. New York, 192 
U. S. 585 (1904).1.7 In Weeks the Court held that evi-
rule raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in 
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se 
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or 
the circumstances of the police action. See Michigan v. Tucker, 
417 U. S, 433, 446 (1974) ("the deterrent. purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in 
willful, or at least very negligent, conduct which has deprived the 
defendant of some right") ; Brown v. !Uinois, 422 U. S. 590, 606 
(1975) (PowELL, J., concurring in part); Cf. United States v, 
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). 
Hl See generally Lasson, The History and Development of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937); Lan-
dynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966). 
17 The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boyd 
'v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (18 6), where the Court, forging a 
link between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, held that the com-
pulsory production of a person's private books and papers for 
introduction against him at trial was unconstitutional. Boyd was 
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dence secured through an illegal search and seizure could 
not be introduced in a federal prosecution. The prohibi-
tion soon was extended to the fruits of the illega.Uy 
seized evidence. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920). Thirty-five years after 
Weeks the Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 
(1949), that the right of privacy against arbitrary intru-
sion by the police that is protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and 
As such enforceable against the States through the [Four-
teenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." /d., at 27. 
'The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclu-
sionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as 
"an essential ingredient of that right." /d., at 27. The 
full force of Wolf was steadily eroded in subsequent 
decisions, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 
(1960); Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and 
a little more than a decade later the exclusiona.ry rule 
was held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643. 
Decisions prior to M app advanced two reasons for 
application of the rule in federal trials. In Elkins, for 
example, the Court referred to the "imperative of judi-
cial integrity," suggesting that exclusion of illegally 
seized evidence prevents contamination of the judicial 
process. 364 U. S., at 222.18 But a more pragmatic 
ground was emphasized: 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. 
severely limited in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where 
the Court, emphasizing that the "law held unconstitutional [in 
Boydj virtually compelled the defendant to furnish testimony 
against himself," id., at 598, adhered to the common-law rule that 
a trial court must not inquire into the method by which otherwise 
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. 
Dana, 2 Met. (Mass. ) 329 (1841). 
18 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United 
16 
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Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail~ 
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
it." 364 U. S., at 217. 
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule 
to the States on several grounds,' 9 but relied principa.Ily 
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlaw~ 
ful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658. 
Although decisions subsequent to M app often have al~ 
luded to the "imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975), 
they also demonstrate the limited role of that justifica~ 
tion in the determination whether to apply the rule in a 
particular context. 20 Logically extended this justifica-
tion would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally 
seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defend-
~nt, or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandon~ 
ment of the standing limitations on who may object to 
'States, 23S U. S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U. S. 438, 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting), 484 (Brandeis, J., 
'dissenting). 
19 See 367 U. S., at 356 (prevention of introduction of evidence 
where introduction is "tantamount" to a coerced confession); id., at 
'658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (pres-
ervation of judicial integrity). 
Only four JuRtices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment 
alone requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in 
state criminal trials. See 367 U.S., at CA3, 666. Mr. Justice Black 
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, 
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949) 
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amend-
ment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban 
· against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges 
for requiring exclusion. 367 U. S., at 661. Seen. 1, supra. 
20 See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 n. 33 (1975). 
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unconstitutionally seized evidence, see Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and the abatement 
of judicial proceedings when the defendant's person is 
unconstitutionally seized, a proposition we rejected in 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975). Last Term, 
we recognized that judicial integrity is "not offended 
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good 
faith that their conduct was in accordance with the law 
even if decisions subsequent to the search and seizure 
have held that conduct of the type engaged in by the 
law enforce;ment officials is not permitted by the Consti-
tution." United States v. Peltier, supr~, at 53S ( empha-
sis omitted) 1 Similarly, the interest in promoting j u-
dicial integrity does not prevent the use of illegally seized 
evidence in grand jury proceedings. United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974). Nor does it require 
that the trial court exclude such evidence from use for 
impeachment of the defendant, even though its intro-
duction is certain to result in convictions in some cases. 
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Cf. Har-
ris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The teaching 
of these cases is clear. While courts, of course, must 
ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the 
)udicial process, this concern has limited force as a justi-
Jication for the exclusion of highly probative evidence 
without regard to the circumstances that may have made 
its seizure violative of the letter of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The force of this justification becomes minimal 
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner 
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for a 
full consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at trial 
and on direct review. 
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule is 
the deterrance of unlawful police conduct that violates 
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-M app decisions have 
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established that the rule is not a personal constitutional 
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the 
privacy of the search victim, for any "[r] eparation comes 
too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 637 
(1965). Instead, 
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to 
sa.feguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect .... " United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539 
(1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Link-
letter v. Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 
382 U. S. 406, 416 (1966). Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
u.s. 433,446 (1974). 
Mapp involved the application of the exclusionary rule 
at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as 
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of 
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration 
of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of 
·state convictions. But despite the broad deterrent pur-· 
pose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been in-
' terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized 
' evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As in 
' the case of any remedial device, "the application of the 
· rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial 
objectives are thought most efficaciously served." 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S., at 348.21 Thus, 
21 As Professor Amsterdam has observed: 
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensation dispen-
sation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the 
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert[ing] general legal pressures 
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of ... 
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a 
needed, but grudingly taken, medicament; no more should be swal-
lowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many 
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our refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings was based on a weighing of the potential 
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury 
of such extension against the potential contribution to 
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through de-
terrance of police misconduct: 
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be 
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury pro-
ceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence 
of police misconduct may result from criminal trials, 
it is unrealistic to assume that application of the 
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly 
further that goal. Such an extension would deter 
only police investigation consciously directed toward 
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand 
jury investigation .... 
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that 
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly mini-
mal advance in the deterrance of police misconduct 
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of 
the grand jury." /d., at 351. 
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's 
necessity in a particular context was evident earlier in 
Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62, where the Court 
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evi-
dence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had 
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, 
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusion-
ary rule were outweighed in that context by the need 
to prevent perjury and assure the integrity of the trial 
criminals must go free as will deter constables from blundering, 
pursuance of this policy beyond the confines of necessity inflicts a 
gratuitous harm on the public interest .... " Amsterdam, Search, 
Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 388-
389 ( 1964) (footnotes omitted). 
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process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly 
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not 
absolute. Rather, their utility must be evaluated in 
light of competing policies. In that case, the public 
interest in determination of truth at trial 22 was deemed 
to outweigh the incremental contribution that might 
·have been made to the protection of Fourth Amendment 
values by application of the rule. 
·The balancing process at work in these cases 23 also 
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing 
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been restricted to 
situations in which the Government attemp~s to .use such 
cevidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal search. 
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 2.29 (1973); Alderman 
v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 
U. S. 257 (1960). The standing r_equire:g:~ent .is premised 
on the view that the "additional benefits of extending 
the ruie" to defendants other than the victim of the 
search are outweighed by the "further encroachment 
upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of 
22 See generally Frankel, The Search Jfor Truth-An Unpireal 
View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozd Lecture, Assn. Of the Bar 
of the city of New York, Dec. 16, 1974. 
23 The focus on the deterrent purpose s,e'rved . by the exclusionary 
rule in those cases addressing the question whether that purpose 
would be served through retroactive application of the rule despite· 
the costs associated with such application is in harinony ~ith the 
balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule context. 
See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 254 n. 21 
(1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-,-637 (1965); Fulle~ 
v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80, 81 (1968). Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U. S., at 446. The "attenuation-of-the-taint". doctrine also is con-
sistant with the balancing approach. See Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Amsterdam, supra,- n. 21-, at 3S9-390'.-
~f. Brown v. Illinois, supra. 
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crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the 
basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Al· 
derman v. United States, 394 U.S., at 174-175. 
IV 
We return now to the questioh presented by these 
cases. Respondents allege viblations of Fourth Amend-
ment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The question is whether these state pris-
oners-whose reliance upon the exclusionary rule with 
respect to the seized evidence has been fairly considered 
and rejected by the state courts at trial and on direct 
review-may be granted federal habeas corpus relief by 
invoking again the exclusionary rule on such collateral 
review. The answer is to be found through the balanc-
ing process identified above in Part III. 
Even where the exclusionary rule is applied at trial 
and on direct review, the costs are well known: '24 the 
focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants 
therein, is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or 
innocence that should be the central concern in a crimi-
nal proceeding. Moreover, the physical evidence sought 
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence 
24 See, e. g., Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 411 (BURGER, 
C. J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 
(1926) (Cardozo, J.); 8 Wigmore On Evidence § 2184, at 51-52 
(McNaughton ed. 1961); Amsterdam, supra, n. 21, at 388-391; 
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule 
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and 
sources cited therein; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis-
conduct by Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 256 (1961); 
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972). 
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of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in 
his dissent in Kaufman: 
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many 
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence 
seized can in no way have been rendered untrust-
worthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often 
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any 
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty:)' 
394 U. S., at 237. 
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding 
process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in par-
ticular cases between the error committed by the police 
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by 
applica'tion of the rule is contrary to the idea of propor-
tionality 'that is essential the concept of justice.25 Thus, 
although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police 
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for 
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately 
the rule may well have the opposite eff-ect of generating 
disrespect for the law and administration of justice.26 
25 Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the 
exclusionary rule at least implicitly recognize the role of propor-
tionality in the criminal ju;stice system and the potential value of 
establishing a national relationship between the nature of the vio~ 
lation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A 
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2 
("substantial violations"); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 2184, pp. 51-
52 (J. McNaughton ed., 1961); H. Friendly, Benchmarks 26-261 
(1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of 
activity intentionally or flagrantly illegal."). See n. 15, supra. 
26 In a different context, Dallino Oaks has observed: 
"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccu-
pation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures 
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth 
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends .... 
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our 
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These long recognized costs of the rule persist with 
peculiar force when the rule is extended to collateral 
review of Fourth Amendment claims already considered 
by two or more tiers of state courts.27 
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that 
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite 
the absence of supportive empiric evidence,28 we have 
Jleople, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of 
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted 
from these goals." 
Ethics, Morality and Professionals Responsibility, Convocation and 
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young 
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975. 
27 Resort to habeas corpus for purposes other than to assure that 
no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty results 
in serious intrusions on values important to our system of govern-
ment. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of limited 
judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, 
fiii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state 
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional 
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded." 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J., con-
curring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 237 
(Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra, n. 14. 
28 The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has been the subject of 
sharp debate since its inception. Until recently, scholarly empirical 
research was unavailable. Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 
218 (1960). And, although certain empirical research has cast doubt 
on the efficacy of the rule, the evidence is still inconclusive. Cf., 
e. g., Oaks, supra, n. 20; Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical 
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 Journ. Leg. 
St. 243 (1973) with, e. g., Cannon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Fail-
ing Health?, Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitious 
Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974). United States v. Janis, 
- U. S., at - n. -. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the 
Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 475 n. 593 (1974); 
Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Ex-
clusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United 
States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 740 (1974). 
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assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be 
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the 
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to dis-
regard it. More importantly, over the long term, this 
demonstration that our society attaches serious conse-
quences to violation of constitutional rights is thought 
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement 
policies, nad the officers who implement them, to incor-
porate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value 
system.29 
We adhere to these assumptions as supportive of the 
exclusionary rule at trial and on direct appeal. 
But at the collateral review stage of the judicial process 
not only is there no empiric evidence supporting the rule 
but the incremental contribution, if any, of the consid-
eration of search-and-seizure claims to the effectuation 
of the Fourth Amendment is small in relation to the 
costs. To be sure, each case in which such a claim is 
considered contributes to the community's awareness and 
understanding of the values protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. But the marginal contribution at some 
stage reaches a point of sharply diminishing returns. We 
do not believe the long-term moral and educative effect 
of overturning convictions based on evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment would be signifi-
cantly diminished if search-and-seizure claims were re-
stricted to trial and direct appeal.B0 Moreover, it cannot 
rationally be assumed that any disincentive created by 
the risk of exclusion at trial or on direct review would 
be further increased in any meaningful way if a police-
29 See Oaks, supra, n. 29, at 756. 
30 "As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems 
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of dimin-
ishing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a 
public nuisance." Amsterdam, supra, n. 21, at 389. 
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man, tempted to seize evidence unlawfully to obtain a 
conviction, also were told that the conviction might be 
overturned in collateral proceedings years after incar-
ceration of the defendant. The view that the police-
man's incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment is 
significantly decreased by the possibility of federal ha-
beas corpus review rests on the doubtful assumption that 
such review may reveal flaws in a search or seizure that 
will go undetected at trial or on appeaJ.31 Even if one 
could assume some additional incremental deterrent 
effect in isolated cases, the resulting speculative advance 
of this legitimate goal would be outweighed by the 
costs to other values that are vital to a rational system 
of criminal justice. 
81 State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obliga-
tion to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law. 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U. S. (1 Wheat) 304, 341-344 
(1816). The policy arguments that respondents marshall in sup-
port of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to 
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of 
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication 
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts 
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through 
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this 
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal ra-
tionale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the insti-
tutional setting which federal judges operate. Despite differences in 
institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude of some 
state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume a general 
lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial 
and appellate courts of the several States. Indeed, the argument 
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional 
law is especially limited in the Fourth Amendment context, since 
search-and-seizure claims are dealt with on a daily basis by trial 
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason 
why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more 
competant, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the applica-
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse." 
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50. 
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In sum, in view of the substantial costs as· 
sociated with collateral review of state court judg· 
ments and particularly with the exclusionary rule itself, 
we conclude that where the state has provided an ade· 
.quate process for full and fair litigation of Fourth 
Amendment claims, a state prisoner may not be granted 
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence 
obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was 
introduced at his trial. At that stage the contribution of 
such review, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth 
Amendment is minimal and the recognized costs of appli· 
cation of the exclusionary rule persist in full force.a2 
Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals 
:Me 
Reversed. 
82 Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for fed-
. eral habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by this Court 
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time 
to apply for certiorari has now passed, any change in the substan-
tive scope of collateral review should be prospective. Cf. England 
' V. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-
423 (1964). We reject these contentions. Although not required 
· to do so under the Court's prior decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 
391, respondents were, of course, free to file a timely petition for 
certiorari prior to seeking federal habeas corpus relief. More im-
portantly, an untimely filing in a state or federal criminal case is 
not a jurisdictional defect, and, under appropriate circumstnnces, 
plenary review in this Court is appropriate. E. g., Taglianetti v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 316, n. 1 (1969); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 
U. S. 80 (1968); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 (1969). 
Respondents' remedy, therefore, lies in the filing of an out-of-time 
petition for certiorari. At that time we can assess whether the 
claimed prejudice arising from our decision in this case justifies the 
·maiver of the time rule, and whether we should exercise our discre-
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I 
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural 
history of these cases. 
A 
Respondent {Lloyd Powelllwas convicted of murder + / ~ 
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. e 
and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store 
in San BernaJ:!ino, Cal.:Jit about midnight on February 
I (17, 1968,]Where Powell became involved in an altercation -- - nr-T:: -r ~e~ "~ c. with Gerald Parsons, the store manage~ In the scuffling '>ove.:r ~ 0~ vJ \ vo.t.. 
that followed Powell shotjnd killed Parson's wife. Ten 'oo -----
hours later ,.O:Q ~HBday meiiliB~' an officer of the Render- ~ 
son, Nev., Police Department arrested Powell for viola-
tion of the Henderson vagrancy ordinance/ and in the 
search incident to the arrest discovered a .38 caliber 
revolver with six expended cartridges in the cylinder. 
_Powell was extradicted to California and MieeKfot 
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Ber-
nardino County. Parsons and Powell's -accomplices at 
the liquor store testified against him. A criminoiogist 
testified that the revolver found on PoweU was the gun 
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected 
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson 
police officer as to the search andldiscovery of the re-
volver should have been excluded because the vagrancy 
I ordinance was unconstitutional. In ~ 1969, the con-viction was affirmed by a California District Court of 
1 The ordinance provides: 
"Every person is a vagrant who: 
"[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify 
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any *"" 
officer to do soT[3] if~ surrounding circumstances are such as 
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such 
identification." 
·: 
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Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that 
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of 
( ihe arrest and search because it concluded that · · 
wtte-erPer to admit the testimony of the Henderson officer f-
. ~ was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Su-
preme Court of California denied Powell's petition for 
habeas corpus relief. 
In August 1971 Powell filed -i:, petition for a writ of 
1 federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in the 
· United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California, contending that the testimony concerning 
the .38 caliber revolver should have been excluded as) 
I 
fruit of an illegal search. He argued that his arrest had' 
been unlawful because the Henderson vagrancy ordi-
nance was unconstitutionally vague, and that the arrest-
' ing officer lacked probable cause to believe that he was 
violating it. The District Court did Bet Pea,el:t tao EJ:l:lOB 
tion of tho ~itu~nalit;y of tfie ordinance, ::dthoaghit 
:;::--::::::::-...L__:di4::' conclud~that the arresting officer had probable caus 
¢ourt agreed with the California District Court.-t---
that the admission of the evidence concerning Powell's 
arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Tfie CeHrj/a,ltQn.Ultiw~l~r held that even if the vagrancy 
ordinance was unconstitutional, the deterrent purpose 
of the exclusionary rule does not require that it be ap-
plied to bar admission of the fruits of a search incident 
to _an otherwise valid arrest . / - --.. - --
·rn December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The Court concluded 
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague,2 that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and 
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied princi~y ~ \ 
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), where / 
we invalidated a city ordinance/defining vagrants as ~ersons wande6) \V'l '?o.r-\- • • • 
------
, .. 
1 • , •• 
. t' •· .... 
. . 
( 
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no 
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were 
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve 
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting 
unconstitutional statutes. !d., at 98. After an inde-
pendent review of the evidence the court concluded that 
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error 
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's 
accomplices. !d., at 99. 
B 
Respondentfnavid Ricefoas convicted of murder in ~ /-;J 
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05 
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a tele-
p~one call that a wom_an ~ heard screaming at 286t W '»t~'~' / 7 
Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that address 
examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it exploded, 
killing him instantly. By August 22 the investigation of 
the murder centered on Duane Peak, a 15-year-old mem-
ber of the National Committee to Combat Fascism 
("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant was issued for 
_Peak's arrest. The . investigation also focuse~ other 
known members of the NCCF, including reepe.t Rice, 
.some of whom were believed)planning to kill Peak 
before he could incriminate them. 
Rice's home at 10:30 p. m., *e pehQe found lights and 
/..television onLbut there was no response to their repeated 
1 knocking. Whilekfficers were left to watch the premises, 
a warrant was obtained to search for explosives and 
ing or strolling around from place to place without any lawful 
purpose or object .... " !d., at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the similarity 
between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see n. 1, 
supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second 
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not. sufficiently 
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Peti-
tioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposi-
tion of the case we need not consider this issue . 
... ~ . 
,' 
·: 
;:., -~'><\< ~·;:"""" ~ 
~... ?-ec...~) ~e. 
~c:.\\t..e ~ -\o 
~~t./1('~\i\eJ 
' ,. 
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illegal weapons believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak 
was not in the house but upon ~ the police discov-
ered, in plain view, dynamite, blasting caps, wire, a 
battery, and a pair of long nosed pliers. Peak subse-
quently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice voluntarily 
surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing at that time 
were subjected to chemical analysis, disclosing dynamite 
particles. 
Rice was tried. for first-degree murder in the District 
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted plant,-
ing the suitcase and making the telephone call, and 
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative 
(_
evidence the State introduced. ite!lls seized ¢'the search, 
as well as the results of the chemical analysis of ~ 
clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to suppress 
this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search 
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a va.lid search 
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480 
(1972). 
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarcera-
tion was unlawful because the evidence underlying his 
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal 
search of his home. The District Court concluded that 
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affi-
~ davit was fa.taU:y- defective under Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U. S. 108 (1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (197~). 3 -4 
3 The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit 
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police 
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home 
because (1) Rice was an aetivek-t>Hililer of the NCCF, (2) a violent 
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF 
was involved, and (3) police had received information in the past 
. .... 
Q \-\-'>-lo "")"- ~e. 
~clo-t~~ ... S'-'pv-ew.e 
Co"'"'~ ~11\V\J ~ 
~ c-..."; -t o. \ a-ne 
5'-'.+f.it.i e.V\"'.i \-\- 0\\~ 
nfe.N'tJ +-o 
' 
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The court also rejected the State's contention that even 
if the warrant .was invalid the search was justified be-
cause of the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because 
I 
of the exigent circumstances of the situatio e court 
reasoned that the arrest warrant did not justify the entry 
as the police lacked probable cause to believe Peak was 
in the house, and further concluded that the circum-
stances were not sufficiently exigent to justify an im-
--~~e.r +o ?ec-~ 
"'-Yl-J. s~ ~r 
~ ~ "'f/(\as,\Jt,l. 
}.e.\\~~ ... ,c.:.~~i-
mediate warrantless search. Id., at 194-202.4 The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, sub-
stantially for the reasons stated by the District Court. 
513 F. 2d 1280 (1975). 
6lf- NC..C:.f. 
( 
l'etitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of theJ/tate 
prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, peti-
tioned for review of these decisions, raising questions con-
cerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role~-----­
of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of caseS* 
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We grante.d their 
~ ., 
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said should 
~ .--be used against the police. See · · · ' . 
-64 B. ~. In concluding{there existed probable cause for issuance of 
the warran , · · 
'Ml;H~;e-t~~~~~.._.~:i.pj,~u~· ~·w...p.u~~ information 'ov::lf 
contained in testimony adduced at tl:~~l?ression hearing ~hat> ;~ ..--\-$.-S-~-e.-:-'o-,--=;;;-:2.8')-
not included in the affidavit./..The District Court limit€d its prob-
able cause inquiry to the face of the affida.vit, see Spinelli v. United 13R-1 3.l ~ \C\Cj 
States, 393 U. S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. \\1. W, ~ 4 \\0) 
108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded probable cause was lacking. 
Petitioner Wolff contends that police should be permitted to supple- 481-"\8& ~ ~ 
ment the information contained in an affidavit for a searrh warrant o..\'?1 \~ ~. 
at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an issue we need not reach. ..br IS".t\) \'\ w.w, cd ~ 
4 The District Court further held that the evidence of dynamite 
particles found on Rice's clothing should have been suppressed as 4"\S (c:.rJV\~or\ ~ 
/tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued ()~\"''""' ). _ 
but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207. _ _ ., 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne 
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petitions for certiorari. 
now reverse. 
4/i U. S. 1055 (1975).5 We 
II 
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciifjum o was included in the first 
grant of federal court jurisdictio!}(made by the Judiciary ...f'J' 
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation 
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody 
b'y the United States. The original statutory authoriza-
tion did · not define * substantive reaclj. It merely ~ J ~ -\W v-~"'"' 
stated that the courts of the United States "shall have 
power to issue writs of . . . habeas corpus. . . ." Ibid. 
The courts defined the scope of the writ in accordance 
with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as to 
the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g., 
Ex parte Watkins/'28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar,.;, ____ _ 
shall, C. J.). 
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act 
J 5 In.( granting certiorari in these cases we requested that counsel) 
in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the 
questions: 
11Whether, in light of the fact that tho District Court found that 
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest 
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of 
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitu-
tional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of 
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is ~ 
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254i 
"Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of 
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circum-
stances of this case is a question properly cognizable under/u. S. C. 28 
§ 2254." ;... 
" 6 It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used 
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjicie-1, -n 
dum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U. S. (4 
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C. J.). 
' , ... . .. 
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of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867 
Act Felief ey federal courts ~authorizedfin "all cases 
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty 
in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law 
of the United States ... . "/:..the ptinciple that federal 
habeas corpus jurisdiction was limited to consideration of 
the jurisdiction of the sentencing court,-hewe¥9#, Pe 
m~illi!Q llbe lle~eH:ellene in thil!! IUeftl. See, e. g., 1n re 
Wood, 'i40 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, "140 U.S. 545 
(1891); Andrews v. Swartz, i56 U.S. 272 (1895); Berge-
mann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. Nich-
ols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the concept 
of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain as 
·the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this 
'----
expansion was limite~to only a few classes of cases 8 
until Frank v. Man~m, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In 
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that 
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur-
der had been dominated by a mob. After the state su-
preme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess-
7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practiral effect, no appellate review 
~~ J(wc. \\ N'' ~ ~ tlr 
(' eN"~-~0 
' in federal criminal cases. The po sibility of Supreme Court review 
--on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was .... 
because of the practice of single district judg~ holding circuit court. ~ 
See rankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 
L 31-32, 79-80~ (192\) . Pressure naturally developed for expansion 
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable 
decisions involving fundamental rights. .;See Ex pa1·te Siebold, 100 
·U. S.@76-377 (1879); 'Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal,_----.~~_;_::.:------
h-~~_j[:;~abije;a~C~o~rip~s~F~or~S~ta~re~Pir~is~on~ecl:Je;.{f~~~~~~;~~~~-~~~ 'Ba\M> ~\~l(.i'(l> S~"~\"o> I  ~,~Hart & Wechsler 
We.c.'-' \ Fed~ralJ:lystem 153.9-1540 ' (2d ed. 19 
~ $ e¥" 8 The expansion occurred pnmarily··-~--- (i) convic-
)~)o't"' 
tions based on asscrtedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g~ Ex parte 
Siebold, lee U. S. S'i'l (lfj9), 1tnd (ii) detentions based upon an 
allegedly illegal senrence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, "'85 U. S. (18 
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fully sought habeas corpus relief in the .Federal :y{istrict 
(/ourt. On eliFeet Feview, t"'¥:. Ottprenrn Court affirmed the 
denial of relief because Frank's federal claims had been 
considered fully by a competent and unbiased state tri-
bunal'. The Court recognized, however, that if a habeas 
corpus court. that the State + failed to provide 
adequate "corrective process" for the full and fair litiga-
tion of federal Claims, whether·or not "j"urisdictional," the 
court ~ inquire into the merits to determine whether 
~detention if. lawful. !d., 'at 333-:336. 
In the landmark decisionTin Brown v. A'llen, 344 U.S. 
443 ( 1953), ~ Df1;mB~B v. All9\tl;, ~44 U. 8., at-482-489', 
the scope of the writ was expanded stiTI further. 9 
In these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas 
corpus relief claiming that the tria1 courts had erred in 
failing to quash their indictments due to a1leged dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors and in ruling 
certain confessions admissible. In Brown,~~~· ~l!:;.iloo~--\ 
peal from the conviction-these elf.Mms.lwl ~; }ejeet.ed: 
en the met its by the-highest -eom+of the 8tf:l::te, State v. 
Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, (195'5, and this 
Court had 'denied certiorari, ./341 U. S. M3 (1951). 
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective 
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of 
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full 
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, incfuding, if 
appropriate, a hearing in the Eederal District Court. In 
~t'lltivf, however, the s~ate supreme court on direct re-
~"''e.,\s. "· f\\\-~, -y.~ 
v '>·) ~ "\Bl."> 
9 There has been disagreement EUl}{}ng scholar~ as to whether the 
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's ~ision 
t'--e c:. tl'I'V'~-N.t.H\ c e.. •e.. 
~~_) __ 
r~n?:;~o~ ;o~Ett:~!. ~s ,
81r!~t,(~:;~~'a.r~~~:r~~:7! c~~i:~ 
the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105 (1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas 
J 
Corpus: Impact ofJAbortive State'l-proceecling, 74 ~rv· L. Rev. 
I 1315, 1328--1329 ~1~ with Fag :. Nota, SF! W. ~t U? t~i 
' jaocl'"o 1 o i;m.Z::.11 BatoT, mpia, n. 7, at 48&-4::.3 
r 
0\.\S'o ~ ..;. ~) '37 l 
:!,C\1 ) 4 2.1 ~ V\ • ~Q ) l&l,, 
4S7- 41o0 ( ~o.-r\c,.,~) j,) J ;'-S2V\-\;.,j ) -
•' 
l/or'llf\""U"": ~\'t!OI~ 
~e 1"\, \ \ bc.c.~ 
~ .W\\owi"'' 
~o..1e 
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view had refused to consider the appeal because the 
papers were filed outfo":r9Gime. This Court held that 
since the state court juclgmcnt rested on a reasonable 
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a 
ground that would have barred direct review of his 
federal claims by this Court. the District Court lacked 
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S., 
at 458, 486. 
This final barriC'r to~ coiiatera] re-examination of 
state criminal convictions in federal habeas rorpus pro-
ceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 
(1963).j Noia and two codefendants had been convicted 
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each de-
fendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants, 
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions. Al-
though their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent 
state proceedings they were able to establish that their 
confessions had been coerced and their convictions there-
fore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a sub-
) 
sequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, al~Lot1gl1 it was 
stipulated that.J:38: confession also had been coercedL the 
District Court followed Daniels in holdi1~1g~t::.:h~a=t ...:N:..:.;;:. ~01!.:::. a::..:'s;_ ,--~-::-:---, 
failure to appeal barred habea~review. The Court of See. \9'3 ~ s~~~ · 
Appeals reversed. ordering that Noia's conviction be set '2'2.'l.) zz.s (\, 40 ). 
aside and)he be released from custody or a new trial,< 
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, nar-
rowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal 
court 4f.l its eiseretiorl"'may refuse to consider the merits 
of federal constitutional claimsj h eMee in o el: iB@!!: ele 
10 Despite the expan~ion of the scope of the writ, there has been 
no change in the established rule with rPSpect to nonronstitutional 
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its fedrral countE>rpart, 28 
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowrd to do service for an appeal." 
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, non-
constitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but 
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libCI2!k bypMs of st2!k pwcedmttlldles 01 faihtn 18 8JI 
Ballet so ailable sbate tttncdics?' 
1f'H.rsH~9Y:i the period in which the substantive scope 
of the writ was expanded~ the Court did not consider 
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect 
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior 
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the 
federal courts of appea}(had concluded that collateral 
review of search-and~seizur.e claims was inappropriate on 
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. ·C. · 
§ 225F The primary rationale advanced in support of 
} r178-179~ Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 345-346 ~ n. 15 ~ 
(1974). Even thoseLclaims that could not have been asserted on 1'\<NICO'f'~+'l.,.,..~\ovw..\ 
L
direct appeal can be raised ~ collateral review only if the alleged £M 
error constituted/a fundamental defect which "'inherently results in 
a complete miscarriage of justice.'" !d., at 346. See Hill v. United 
States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962). 
11 In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to 
consider constitutional claims presented in a Jwrit of habeas corpus, 
he Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the writ, 
noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command that 
the judgeJ.:dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' 28 
U. S. C. § 224~." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis v . 
Henderson, - U. S. - (1976), holding that s:h~ent a: elairn of 
ttetual p1ejudice--a state prisoner who fail.( to make a timely chal-
lenge to the composition of the grand jury that indicted him cannot 
bring * challenge i~J:.zROSt-conviction federal habeas corpus pro-
f 0.:~'>"-"'T "'" -c..-;-b--:-,""'-......,__J_.:::.ceedin~ we emphasize~: 
~(..~\ ~~wlice "This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances con-
siderations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 
criminal justice require a federal court to J forego exercise of its 
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426.'' 
' . 
12 Compare, e. g., "United States v. Re, 372 F . 2d 641 (CA2), cert. 
enied, ~ U. S. - (1967) · United tales v. Jenkins .281 JL2d 
193 0 · 'Armstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d 725 (CA5 
1963)1 ~sner v. Upited States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965); De Welles 
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those decisions was that Fourth Amendment violations 
are different in kind from denials of/other constitutional mos.~ 
rights in that claims of illegal search and seizure do not 
"impugn! the integrity of the fact-finding process or 
challenge~ evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, 
the exclusion of illegally seized evidence is simply a 
prophylactic device intended generally to deter Fourth 
Amendment violations by law enforcement officers." 
I d., at 224. See Thornton v. United States, -f U. S. \2.5 
App. D. C. +. 368 F. 2d 822 (1966). 
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search-
~nd-seizure claims are cognizable in § 225·5 proceedings. 
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy ex-
tends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained e~nce was admitted against them at trial," 
at 22~ ~e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 
364 (1968); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968), 
·--...-~~a:-::n~ coi1cludea }hat there was no basis for restricting 
' 0.$ 0. MO. '¥r ~ of 
::,~~~~ <:.<MS~~CM) ~'access by federal prisoners with illegal search-and-. d ~)/ ..l se1zure claims to fe eral collateral remedies, while placing ") ~ 3C14 \.) ,S ') ~ 
no similar restriction on access by state prisoners 
I though in recent years the view has been expressed '2.2 6 · 
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope 
,----:---:---->----~o~f~federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review 
~ea--("c>.-- c...~ -~e:, t"'-.s~) of F"'Z':1t !mtetHi~ claims "solely to the questiol}( "of 
}Vhether the petitioner was provided with a fair oppor-
tunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state 
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250 
(1973) (PowELL, J., concurring),u the Court,(_with~J 
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v. 
United States, 317 F . 2d 494 (CAlO 1963). See also Thornton v. 
·united States, -J;- U . .f... App. D. C. *' 368 F . 2d 822 (1966) 
(search-and-seizure claims not cognizable under § 2255 absent special 
circumstances) . 
-ns See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). 
74-1055 & 74-1222.--0PINION 
STONE v. POWELL 13 
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to 
-accept Jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See 
/'Lefkowitz v-. Newsome, 420 U. S. 283 (1975). L 
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal 
'habeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectua-
tion of the Fourth Amendmen~uires the granting of 
. habeas corpus relief when a pnsoner has been convicted 
in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in an 
, ille al search or seizure ae i!fie Fotu th tttrd Fo ar b.c:;:;h 
I..).) A,.Jj ~e,\t.ll \t'\ l. f"'"."j ""'~ Amendments r quire ...... rucclusion of such evidence/ nndir 
L-~~-------l'Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (19Q!]~t trial and reversal 
o conviCtiOn upon direct review.~ Until this 
· .. 
case we have not had occasion fully to consider the 
ratitmtde }itfrderly iHg this assumption. See, e. g., Schneck-
loth v. Bustamante, supra, at 249 n. 38. Upon examina-
~ tion, we conclude, in view of the nature and purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, that the 
assumption is unjustified.~ 
;,- If Asl Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. United 
States, 394 U. S. 217,L239 (1969), the Kaufman majority made no 
effort to ju~tify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent J 
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a 
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that 
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus 
, proceedings. See Mancusi v. De.Forte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); 
/Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayae.5. 387 
. S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi ~habeas relief orliere€1 
· on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as well 
as in Warden, the issue~was not presented to the Court in the 
petition for writ of certiorari. As emphasized by~ Justice Black, 
only in the most exceptional cases will we consider issues not raised 
in the petition. 394 U.S., at 23'/. afft n. 7. 't /. 
------...::::"':u=~fA's we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence 
1 c. hould have been excluded because it was obtained ..tf an illegal 'ty . 
o< earch +seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full,.( .,....,J ~,.,. 
onsideration of that claim in the state cour~·F not invoke the c.~~.\\V\!)~ 
,,.. xclusionary rule r federal habeas corpus . ' we find it un- ~~ 
ecessary to cons1der the other issues concermng the exclusionary 
.· 
i.s.s~e v.JY\e..~V.ev--
+-eAe.v'eo. \ 'v..o..\:>~s. 
n.rt ~c:..\os.t 
Co~~'t ~\J. V1-t~+ 
See. 4~0 
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III 
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The 
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associ-
ated with the use of the general warrant in England and 
./ 
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas, 
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); 'Frank v. Maryland, 359 
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect 
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life/' 
'~Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from 'if 
searches under unchecked general authority:;.;..·J,A'~--,-r-o--.(--:-----:--:--:-"7.--.... 
-\-V.ex~ ~i..:.\-e6 The exclusionary rule was , Q. ~ .... ~It-\~\~ 
'f'oO 'o••:<'("\~ -\o ~ rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. Prior to the c:.\'ec:o.t"~ -e.c-~ 
'"\-r6a~c.+:""' i~ r---::::: .... ~~-~'~ecisio~in Weeks v. United 'States, 232 U. S. 383 °~ e.~c..-+ ... c..-\"\V\t:_) 
cc-i""'~-..\ W'\&.\$ •'f ~ d (1914), e~idence obtained in violation of the Amen -
O.\'\~ G., .. \e6 v. 
u111· ~ s.+ ... te.~) -~ 
25S v.s. t.~& 
(\~2.1 } ) 
;/ITJ 
mentJgeBePaJJy Eleulel be inbtodaeed in 88ta state !Mt~ 
feeleflti-· criminal trials. See Adams v. New York, 192 
U.S. 585 (1904).Y In Weeks the Court held that-ef-
rule raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in 
.view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se 
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or 
the circumstances of the police action. See Michigan v. Titcker) 
417 U. S, 433, «i, (1974) ('/he deterrent purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in 
willful, or at least very negligent, conduct which has deprived the 
defendant of some right"); Bmwn v. /Uinois, 422 U. S. 590, 606 
(1975) (PowELL, J., concurring in part); /jf. United States v. 
(_ _ __......, 
Peltier, 422 U.~31 (19.75).. -
~See generally ~Lasson, The History and Development o~~!-r---1...· 
ourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937) 
& nskL__ §ear and Seizure andthe Su reme Court Q966)• 
)If The roots of ee .;s ecision lay in an early decision, Boyd 
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court/TePgiHg !t 
li'Ak blltnrilu~. (he Fs1uth ~tnd Fifth Ame!'lel:msBts; held that the com-
pulsory production of a person's private books aJJ.d papers i.or 
introduction against him at trial '~~'ail \IR8SBBtitlfMi Boyd 
vio\~~~ ~ 
~ ..... -~"'"' O.V\c.\ ~;-;{'\'\. 
~-tMc:~W. 
Co~>.\c). ~~-h....-. 
be.;~(4:, ~ ... , ~ 




Jf'\ Goo...\tJ -\~~ C..o~AoV'\' \.,~ ~ro~A ~ ~ ~~ 
~~~~ c..to A v-.J\ \o ~('4.e ..1 "' ~ ~ 
~~ ~ . .Sec. w(l'-nl~ ..,, 1-t..:y.le.M:.> 1.81 \).\. z..c;~";)loq·J~ -
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secured through an illegal scarch~re~~'(") 
:Ret 8@ i:RtrQduced in a, federa.l prosecutiQU. · · eCH'Id.M. ~ 
ii!:eM" seeR: WI*! e!ttenEI:ee te the ft. · ~e,v.J ~-\\~ 
sei:;;;id. i"id!ince [Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. Unitedl~
Sl7if'es, 251 . S. 385 (1920). Thirty-five years after  
Weeks the Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 
..J. .L... 'Pe ~~ ~ (1949), that the right efpPi\!tCJ agljlni5b arbitrary intru- '\"' 
sion by the police that is protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment is "implicit inlthe concept of ordered liberty~and 
as such enforceable against the States through the [Four-
eenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." !d., a.t 27 ~ -l8 
The Court concluded, however, that the W eek.s exclu-
sionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as 
n
'an essential ingr·edient of that right." Id., at 2'f.. The 
full force of Wolf was stettelily eroded in subsequent 
decisions, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 
(1960); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), and 
a little more than a decade later the exclusionary rule 
was held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643~ 
Decisions prior to Mapp advanced two/.reasons for 
application of the rule in federal trials. In Elkins, for 
example, the Court referred to the "imperative of judi-
cial integrity," suggesting that exclusion of illegally 
seized evidence prevents contamination of the judicial 
process. 364 U. S., at 222.)1 But a more pragmatic 
_ ground was emphasized: 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. 
severely limited in Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where 
the Court, emphasizing that the "law held unconstitutional [in 
I BoydJ virtually compelled the defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered to the common-law rule that 
{ a trial court must not inquire/into the method by which otherwise 
competent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. 
Dana, 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (1841). 
j See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United 
--
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Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
I it," e64~8:-,at217. 
'J;'he Mapp majority justified the application of the rule 
to the $tates on several grounds,.JI but relied principally 
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlaw-
ful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658. 
Aithough decisions subsequent to M app often have al-
luded to the "imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., 
United §_tates v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975), 
they~ demonstrate the limited role of that justifica-
tion in the determination whether to apply the rule in a 
particular context.~ Logically extended this justifica- ~ 
tion wouid require that courts exclude unconstitutionally 
seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defend-
ant, or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandon- -\"vv.,.~ \A~~~ 
ment of the standing limitations on who may obj'ect to J. ~ 
2. States, 23A U. S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United _ ~ ~. 
- f S~ates, .277 U. S. 438, 470j_(Holmes, J., dissenting)j484 (Brandeis, J., ~ 
Ld1ssentmg). 
)I See 367 U. S., at ~ (prevention of introduction of evidence 
where introduction is "tantamount" to a c'Oerced confession); id., at 
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (pres-
ervation of judicial integrity). 
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment 
alone requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence 'in 
state criminal trials. See 367 U.S., at~ 666. Mr. Justice Black t;.!) 
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, 
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949) ___..-
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amend-
m,ent is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban 
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges 
for requiring exclusion. 367 U.S., at 661. See n.i.,, supra. 
~See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
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unconstitutionally seized evidence, .:-Alderman ~ 
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), and .tft.t~~~~:--tr:'f;;~~~~e~ ~ ~ 
even if decisions subsequent to the search and seizure 
have held that conduct of the type engaged in by the 
law enforcement officials is not permitted by the Consti-
tution." United States v. Peltier su ra at 538 em ha-
sis omitted . Similarly, the interest in promoting ju-
dicial integrity does not prevent the use of illegally seized 
evidence in grand jury proceedings. "United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974). Nor does it require 
that the trial court exclude such evidence from use for 
~ impeachment of ~ defendant, even though its intro-
duction is certain to result in convictions in some cases. 
"Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Cf. Har-
ris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The teaching 
of these cases is clear. While courts, of course, must 
ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the 
judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justi-
fication for the exclusion of highly probative evidence 
without regard to the circumstances that may have made 
its seizure violative of ilhe leilt af the Fourth Amend-
.-men . The force of this justification becomes minimal 
! where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner 
L who previously has been afforded the opportunity for a full consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at trial and on direct review. 
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule}J.s 
e. the deterrince of -luilhawfuJ.. police conduct that violates 




_l.,.d.\c..\ol ~ ~( . .'U ' yto ~~ 
'1\UJ. ~ ..}o~ 
(sic::) 
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established that the rule is not a personal constitutional 
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the 
' privacy of the~ victi:nt, for any "[r]eparation comes 
too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 637 
( 1965). Instead, 
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect .... " United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 53-fo-539 
[
~;"Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Link-
letter v. Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; ./Tehan v. Shott, 
382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). -/Cf. Michigan v. Tucke~, 417 
U.S. 433,446 (1974). 
~involved the 6filplic'fiee of the exclusionary rul' 
at:srit;; trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as J 
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of 
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration 
of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of 
state convictions. But despite the broad deterrent pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been in-
terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized 
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As in 
the case of any remedial device, "the application of the 
{ 
l"ule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial 
objectives are thought most efficaciously served." 
nited States v. Calandra, 41~ U. ~., at 348." Thus, 
,!. As Professor Amsterdam has observed: 
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensa~ dispen-
sation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the 
experience of its indispensibility in 'cxcrt[ing] general legal pressures 
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of ... 
law-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a 
needed, but grudinglyltaken, medicament; no more should be swal- J 
lowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many 
. '• 
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our refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings was based on a wei~.B~ of the potential bo..\~c:.\'f\~ 
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury 
h~ ~ such extension against the potential contribution to 
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through de-
e terr,ince of police misconduct: 
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be 
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury pro-
ceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence 
of police misconduct may result from · riminal trials, 
it is unrealistic to assume tl).at,4pplication of the 
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly 
further that goal. Such an extension would deter 
only police investigation consciously directed toward 
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand 
jury investigation .... 
___-''We therefore decline to embrace a view that 
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly mini-
mal advance in the deter~nce of police misconduct 
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of 
the grand jury." !d., at 351./ 
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's 
HeeesA.it"! in a particular context was evident earlier in 'I 
Walder v. United States, ~47 U ~where the Cour~ 
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evi-
dence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had 
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, 
in effect, that the interests safeguar:ded b the exclusion-
ary ruletwere outweighed in that context by the need 
to prevent perjury and~ssure the integn y of the trial 
criminals must go free as will deter ~onstables from blundering, 
pursuance of this policyJbeyond the confines of necessity inflicts ~ 
gratuitous harm on the public interest .... " 'Amsterdam, Search, 
Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378,388-
389 ( 1964) (footnotes omitted) . 
~e.. e...)(.c..\"'s ~ «1\'\ ~ 
\ \\e..so.\\'1 se\ reJ 
e..·.li~~e. ~ 
e. 
74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION 
' 
20 STONE v. POWELL 
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly 
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not 
absolute. Rather, ~ir ttl)fity must be evaluated in 
light of competing policies. In that case, the public 
interest in determination of truth at trial' was deemed 
to outweigh the incremental contribution that might 
have been made to the protection of Fourth Amendment 
values by application of the rule. 
./ The balancing process at work in these cases ralso 
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing 
to invoke the exclusionary rule ha.s been i'ef'~*d=~-::;f fo\MI\~ 
sitnatieftB in vehieh the Government attempts to use ~~":>~ c:.MV., 
evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal search. w~ 
"Brown V. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman \\\~o,\\) o-.-\-e.:\f\&c\ 
v. United States, 394 U. S. !,65; "wong Sun v. United / 
States, 371 U. S. 47 (1963) ~Jones v. United States, 362 -0 ~ 
U.S. 257/.(1960). The standing requirement is premised 
on the view that the "additional benefits of extending 
the rule" to defendants other than the victim of the 
search} are outweighed by the "further encroachment 
upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of'_ ...... _ _ _ 
~_.,( See generally Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Ulpireal 
View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of tt'e Bar 
C"fr f the city of New York, Dec. 16, 1974 . 
.al~he feet1~ on _t!Hl d'i'ter~ent fRU!38f:l8 ~e¥¥eEl B) the exemeieB&Py 
Case C\6-~v-e.> \'t\.~ ~ ctl..,e~~on 
V~e;\-lf.ex s~- w.,J,- se.A~ ~\N-, 
s."'-o ~ \oc CA.f~\; .l 't ~o..c -'"~ GA~o 
~ C.\11.1.. C\1'\ ~ ~ ~ 
z 
\>VW"'{>~~Q ... .J ~ ~ .<!Jlf ~'~ 
~Q.) c ~~\ s-\eH\~\~ 
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rime and having them acquitted or convicted on the 
basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth," Al-
erman v. United States,~ at 174-175.A 
IV s~..-.) 
We ~m now to thei question presented by these 
•cases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amend-
ment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The question is whether~ state pris-
-oners-wh~pon the exclusiona rule wit 
respect to ~ seized evidence "'ftf!bS-1~~1111111!1!!11 
<;; .... , "" 0.. ~ ._:, '(\ 
Ool' ~ --.--
"'"~tl>.) U'C9~ '(W\~' 
&aEl PejeeteEl by the state courts at trial and on direct 
·review-i:ay B~ g~eti- feeleP&l lia,bea,e 88Ffll:l8-PeHef BY 
· iaveking again the ex:c]lli.i.Qaa,py rttle-tm ueh eollater!M 
II@; ie~. The answer is to be found through the balanc-
c~ -
. ing process identified above in Part III. 
E-vl ll vvrfl:ere the exclusionary rule is !:b}9+d at trial ~ 
and on direct review~~ ciG are well known: ~ the ~ 
focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants 
therein, is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt orj 
innocence that should be the central concern in a crimi-
nal proceedingi Moreover, the physical evidence sough 
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence 
~See, e. g., 'Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954 ·Biven 
v. Six Unknown .Pe~. Naleo&ie.,.Agents, 403 U. S. 388,411 (BuRGER, (\<ill) 
C. J., dissenting); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 
(1926) (Cardozo, J.); "'8 Wigmore On Evidence § 218~ at 51-52 o.. 
(McNaughton ed. 1961); Amsterdam, supra, n. 4Y, at 388-391; 2 
"Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Daks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule 
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi . L. Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and 
sources cited therein; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis-
conduct bY/Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 256 (1961); 
'Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 
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of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in 
his dissent in Kaufman: 
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many 
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence 
seized can in no way have been rendered untrust-
worthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often 
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any 
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty." 
394 U. S., at 237. 
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding 
process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in par-
, ticular cases between the error committed by the police 
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant b~ 
' application of the rule is contrary to the idea of propor-
, tionality that is essentiallthe concept of justice.~ Thus, ~ 
although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police---
. activity in part through the nurturing of respect for 
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately 
\~ ilie P"f.9 may well have the opposite effect of generating 
disrespect for the 1aw and administration of justice.JM' ~ 
~Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the 
' exclusionary rule at east Imp ICI y recognize the role of propor- 'W 
tionality in the criminal justice system an e potential value of 
I 6\-18'3 
establishing a /;p+jgpaL relationship between the nature of the vio-
lation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A 
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2 
("substantial violations") ; 84. Wig~Bero{i;"itlsnee, § 2184, pp. 6iL 
8~ (J. MeNaugM6R o8., 1Q81), H. Friendly, Benchmarks ~--------­
(1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fr:~it of~ . Wi~IMoft) ~ 
·activity intentionally or flagra~Jy illegal."){""See n. 1 , supra. J ~~ 2.4) 4 
1 ~In a different context, DallinTOaks has observed: ~ S2. -S3. 
'"I am criticizing, not our concern with procedurt:S, but our preoccu-
pation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures tO 
are not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth 
and justice, and procedures are but means to these ends .... 
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our 
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These long~recognized costs of the rule persist~ 
c;, c_,-~,.,.,,~\ ~\)~<..-\;"""' 
i ~ ~e.~~ 4-o \:)Q 
a.~~......e J CfY\ 
veet~lia.F fePee when · collateral 
review of FoHFia 1A..,meaamoHt eltliims !MFe9.ey eeB~;;,d;.;.e::.;;Fe.;;El~---
by two or more tiers of state courts . .il'f ~ 
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that 
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despit.!t..,._--
the absence of supportive empiricj evidence,~ we have 
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of 
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted 
from these goals." 
Ethics, Morality and Professionalt Responsibility, Convocation and ~ 
Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young 
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975. 
Of\ ~ ~f"o-J 
~ e.. ~~-.th·c.~i 
~~'i'"'ve c..~""' 
W"'-~ e ('('~UI.U \j 
;tf Resort to habeas corpus for purposes other than to assure that 
no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty results 
in serious intrusions on values important to our system of govern-
ment. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of limited 
judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, 
(iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state 
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional 
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded." 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S., at 259 (PowELL, J ., con-
curring). See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 23( 
(Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra, n. ~ . \'l \c.M, 
~The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has[been the subjec~- · . j 
sharp debate siacjte iR~iea. Until recently, scholarly empirical ~e. e~~ ~~"~,...) 
research was unavailable . .,.-Elkins."'· United States. 3£=l U. S. 206 ~~ ve~ ~~'"" 
218 (1960). And, slthOI.l8Aot!IIFtBjf®pi;ic~l re~aa~bJaao ~~t !i:ee:bl! ~~::,'~,.,e. 
r;;:;r---r........:tffi:~~~~~-81- tHe Pttle, tJHe e •l!i:eft88 Iii sehll mco&u:lmave. ~ --
e. g., Oaks, supra, n. ~i ,~Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical C. 
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 Journ. Le~ 0..,...~ .. .,.. 
----s't 243 (1973).. with, e. g./Cannon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Fail-
ing Health?, ~orne New Data and a Plea Against a Prccipitious _., Se~ 
Conclusion .t62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974 . /United States v. Janis, r---------
- U. S. · Amsterdam, Perspectives on the - \_)- ~. 2.2 (lct~Il. 
Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 475 n. 593 (1974); ( ":} 
~'Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Ex-
clusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United ' (O<M, 
States v. Calandrii;\69 Nw. L. Rev. 740 (1974). 
t-t'· 
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assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be 
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the 
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to dis-
regard it. More importantly, over the long term, this 
demonstration that our society attaches serious conse-
quences to violation of constitutional rights is thought 
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement 
policies, fil&:l the officers who implement them, to incor-
porate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value 
system.' 
We adhere te te ese &BBl:l:'Fft}3tieR~ alil ~HIJFH~rtiue ef tlu~ 
.Qxcluliliten~a:uy rttle &i tried e:nel SH: Elire9t 8;}3}3eaJ.. 
]~wt at t};}e 9ellateral fQHlQW Biage Sf the j1:1:ei9ial l'JF9QQiillil 
·not on lJ, ii tliePe ne ctnfJii ie c v iderrce SUJJpot ~il'lg tke FW19 
'but the inCI emen tal c011 tr ibtttieR, if ft:H) , sf t};}e 99BBiEl 
·QratioFJ: ef sea:reh ~tnel: seii!tl:t'e eiaiw~ te tl'!e effectuation 
cie set selieve ifie hmg ter'Fft 'Fftsrad &na eeitteaii v e dfeet-
gf t;urertvrnins QQRz:ieiiens 6tteed ott eo ider.tee e8i&ine8: ill 
ldQllltiQR g£ tlle }\;;JWFtlxl Atntttdtntti~ n Ot!lli ee ei~t'iift 
"·Qfiin +lJ' dimini shed jf search anS: ecizare claitns wete re-
~- etPie1;e8: ~o ~rial anel elit ce~ ftllJJ'ettl }ttt Pwior eo vet , it can11o+i 3l!/ 
oflltiQRll ll J' be 8 SS1l m ed th at a p3r 8isinGtitLive creahcel by 
J bftt tielr: sf QXQ}ugjqp at t rjQ l QF 811 8iPee~ ICViCVV VCOtt}ft 
:.Qe fl:l:P~fteP illCfifilliliQ iJOI fiiPY aiQQBingfwl Wlij' jf a police= 
~See Oaks, supra, n . .r;j, at 756. 2A 
P'"As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems 
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of dimin-
ishing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a 
public nuisance." Amsterdam, supra, n. 2l at 389. ;. 
. ® Y.adhere to the view that these .considerations support 
the implementation oflll the exclusionary rule at trial and 
its enforcement on direct appeal of state court convictions. 
But the additi~contribution, if any, of the consideration 
of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral 
review is small in relation to the costs. To be sure, 
' 
each case in which such a claim is considered~ 
t ee e zwm~i~ awareness of the values protected by the 
J\ 
Fourth Amendment. But there is no reason til to believe that 
the overall educative effectt~a of overturning convictions 
based on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
would be apprecia~ly diminished if search-and-seizure claims 
could not be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state 
3i. ~~~~¢;; \."'~!·~') 
convictions. lR- a8ditian, ue earuc ~ assume that 
disincentive already created by the risk of exclusion of 
evidence at trial or ... the reversal of convictions on 
direct review would be ei:~ui:f · 
A.. 
if there were the further risk that a conviction obtained 
in state court and affirmed on direct review might be overturned 
in collateral proceedings years after the incarceration of 
alt-~~ 
the defendant. The view that the ~~· ~- ~~~- rt~~~~~ 
~,~ 
• Fourth Amendment~ ~"E:.~~ 
 ~ 
1nc~ea~e d rests on theAI"l:fanhtfnl assumption thatJ tit pQJ.iaemaC 
#~ 
would fear that federal habeas reviewA~ ~e l~ksl¥ ee 
~ 
reveal flaws in a search or seizure that~~W go undetected 
a.··-Q 
at trial ~ on appeal. Even if 
~~ 
one .. could assume 
'\ 
that some additional incremental deterrent effect would 
be present in isolated cases, the resulting advance of 
the legitimate goal of furthering Fourth Amendment rights 
would be ou~eighed by the ~--~~~~--
a.dc.c.~A.,....J... 
costs Eo other values vital to a rational system 
" of criminal justice. 
·. 
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~ftn, ternt'ieel te seitJe eo idence unlawfully te obtain a. 
Gollvieiion, ftlso vvere told that the conviction might he· 
.Q'I'OFtuFned in eolia teral proceedings y eaa ~ afteF iaea&-, 
..eeraiioa of the defendant. The view that tao police-
.maa's ir:teentive to violate the Fourth Amendmen:t is 
.sig11ifieaatly d8eFoaseel: by the possibility of f8d8rt;~) hac 
b8as eorptt~ review rests on the doubtful assmnptiofi taat 
st1:eh r e ,·iew ffl:ay re o eal B:a ovs i11: a seMes gr iii~ivu:e th Q t 
will go uadeieeteel: a:t tr ia;l 01 on a:pl'e8:I:..C EYeR if gao 
f!ould asswJ:Ro soffl:e 8:dditional inet emeaial el:eterren~ 
effect. in isolated. eases, tse reiiiulticg ilpeenlQtive advance. 
of t:bis legitiJ:Raie goal would be ottineighed by t:be 
~sis to othet v a;} ues that are vital to a r atiot1:8il sysieRr 
Q£ crjmjp al j 1 IiticQ , 
}II{ tate courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obliga-
tion to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law. 
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U. S. (1 Wheat) 304, 341-344 
(1816). e po 1cy argumen s iat responaents marshall m -sup-
port of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to 
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of 
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication 
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts 
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through 
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this 
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal ra- ~s~~vt. 
1ionale for this view emphrusizes the broad differences in thelinsti-
tutional settingj.which federal judgesloperate. Despite differences in 
institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitud~of some 
state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume a general 
lack of appropriate sensitivity t.o constitutipnal ri.J;t;;::;ts~in::_:~e_:::.r_:,:la~l--.,..-~~!..:~~-=~ 
nd a c.ru,1t£; of the several Stat~ the argument 
t at federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional 
law IS especially ~ in the FsuPts !.mBJH;lmon~ context/,SinceJ 
~ t\tHI BBiBIUB t~IAiJBI!< are dealt with on a daily basis ty trial 
~CAl\ level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason 
~ why the fact that a man is a federal judge should make him more 
competJ{'nt, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the applica-e 
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse." 
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50. 
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In sum, in view of the substantial~ costs as-
sociated with eoHa:to al t e c ie'" ef ebate com t j ael~ 
· meRiB ttM:tt }'3ttPiiewlaJAl) n i~h the exclusionary rule,~ 
we conclude that where the ~tate has provided an ade-
, quate process for full and fair litigation of Fourth 
Amendment claims, a state prisoner may not be granted 
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence 
' obtained in an unconstitutional search ~ seizure was 
mtroduced at his tria~ ts&i sia~e the contribution of 
Y-1fl:l1fft~~·ew, if any, to the effectuation of the Fourth 
Amendment is minimal and the recognized costs of appli-
. ation of the enelw~.lt'eqr rule persist in f""ll"1eree . .M" 
Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals 
are 
Reversed. 
~ Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for fed-
eral habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by this Court 
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time 
t---,.---to apply for certiorari has now passed, any ~~e-i!'HM-~;;;;-"""1r.~·,-"'·,-t-\ol\ \" 
ti•e eeel"e ef colla:tual t01ien should be prospective. Cf. ngland ~.C..w· e-.'0.\~~ ~ 
v. Louisiana State Board of M edical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 422- o'o-\o:,-n '(\-..\oe.-.~ 
423 (1964). We reject these contentions. Although not required ~~~'I\\ ~\\e~ 
.to do so under the Court's prior decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. .,, ~ ":>~~~ 
391, respondents were, of course, free to file a timely petition for -t,...) ia\MC.t .,~\ ). 
certiorari prior to seeking federal habeas corpus relief. More im- \"' o.tf'\ VMC.~J.A\v. T 
portantly, an untimely filing in a state or federal criminal case is ~W\~ ~t~ o-t 
not a jurisdictional defect, and, under appropriate circumstances, ~Q.l.lMo wo..s. ..L. 
plenary review in this Court is appropriate. E. g., Taglianetti v. \. . \ ~ 
\-...~r»At•, 
United States, 394 U. S. 316, n. 1 (1969); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 ll . o( ~~\l. 
:U. S. 80 (1968); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 (196f>r' 
Respondents' remedy, therefore, lies in the filing of an out-of-time 
petition for certiorari. At that time we can assess whether the 
claimed prejudice arising from our decision in this case justifies the 
waiver of the time rule, and whether we should exercise our discre-
-----tion to review the merits of the issues raised in the petitions. 
. , . . . 
j ~"· ~ 
~e-:.) 'lS! 0. ~. 
-4 \S > 4\3 V'\ I 7 
(,,s~) . 
~d CHAMBERS DRAFt 
SUPREME COURT Ofl, TilE U:NITED STATES 
Nos. 74-1055 AND 74- 1222 
W. T. Stone, Warden, ! . . . · 
P~titioner, On W .. nt. of Cert10r~n t o t h-e 
74-1055 v. U~1ted St~tes C~urt_of Appea.ls 
Ll d Ch 1 P 11 
. for the Nmth Ciromt. 
oy ar es owe . , 
Cll.arles L. Wolff, Jr.,l , . . . ' 
W!lrden, Petitio.ner, On ~nt of Cert10ran to the 
74-1222 v. Umted S~ates C~urt.of Appeals 
D 'd L R' for the E~ghth'Circmt. av1 . 1ce. 
[May -, 1976] 
1\{R. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
'Court. 
Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal 
offenses in st~te courts, and their convictions were !lf-
:firmed on appeal. The prosecution in each· case relied 
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged 
by respondents to have peen 11.nl~wful. Each respondent 
s11.bsequently sought relief in ~ federal district court by 
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under 
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether 
a federf\1 court should consider, in ruling on a petition for 
habeas corpus relief filed by ~ st~te prisoner, ~ claim that 
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or sei-
zure' was introd"!lced at his trial, when he hltS previously 
been afforded an opportunity for full and ffl,ir , litigation 
of his claim in the state courts. The isst~.e 1s of consid-
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I 
We summarize first the relevant facts and procequral 
history of these cases. 
A 
Respondent Lloyd. P'owell was convicted of murder 
in June 1968 after trial in a Californi~ state court. At 
about mid.p.ight on February 17, 1968, he aQd three com~ 
panions entered tpe Bon.anza Liquor Store in San Ber-
nardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an alter-
cation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the 
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed 
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. · Ten hours later 
an officer of the I{enderson, Nev., Police Department ar-
rested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy 
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest dis-
covered a .38 . caliber revolver with six expended car-
tridges in the cylinder. 
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of 
second-degree murder in the Superior Court· of San Ber-
nardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at 
the liqum; store testified against him. A criminologist 
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun 
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected 
Powell's contention that testimony by the Henderson 
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the re-
volver should have been excluded because the vagrancy 
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the 
1 The ordinance provides: 
"Every person is a vagrant who: 
"[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify 
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any police 
officer to do so [3] if surrounding circumstances are such as 
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such 
. Identification/' 
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eonviction was affirmed by a California District Court of 
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that 
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of 
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error, 
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson offi~ 
cer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (l967). The Su· 
preme Court of California denied Powell's petition for 
habeas corpus relief. 
In August 1971 Powell filed ~n amended petition for a 
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in 
the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California, contending that the testimony con-
cerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been 
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued 
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson 
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and 
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe 
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded 
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held 
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional, 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not 
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits 
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the 
alternative, that court agreed with the California District 
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence con-· 
cerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The Court concluded 
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague,2 that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and 
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principally 
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), where 
W(>" invalidated a CJty ordinance m part defining vagrants as ... "per-· 
. ' 
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that although exclusion of the evideQce would ~rve Qo 
d~terrent purpose with regard to poli~ officers w~o were 
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve 
the public interest by deterring legislators from eha.cting 
unconstitutiona.l statutes. l d., !tt . 98. After an inde-
pendent review of the .evidence the court concluded that 
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error 
since it Sl\pported the testimony of PjU'sons and Powell's 
accomplices. · ld., at 99. 
B 
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murder in 
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05 
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omah.a police received a tele-
phone call that a woman had been heard screaming at 
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that 
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it ex-
ploded, killing him instantly. By August ~2 the investi-
gation of the ~urder centered on Duane Peak, a 
15-year-old member of the National Committee to Com-
bat Fascism ("NCCF"), and that afternoon a warrant 
was issued for Peak's arrest. The investigation also 
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including 
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill 
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search 
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m. 
that night and found lights and a television on, but there 
was no response to their repeated knocking. . While some 
officers remained to watch the premises, a warra.nt was 
sons wandering or strolling around from pla.ce to place without any 
lawful purpose or object .... " !d., at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the 
similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see 
n, 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second 
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently 
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F . 2d, at 95-97. Peti-
tioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposi-
:tion of the case we need not consider this issue . 
.. 
: 
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obtp,ined to search for explosives and illegal wep,pons to 
be in Rice's poasession. Peak w~s not in tht'l house but 
upon entering the police discovered, in plain view, dyna-
mite, blasting caps, wire, a battery, and a pair of long 
nosed pliers. Peak subsequently was arrested, and on 
August 27, Rice volu~tarily surrendered. The clothes 
Rice was wearing at that time were subjected to che:rnical 
analysis, disclosing dynfl,mite pp,rticles. 
Rice was tried for :ijrst-degree murder in .the District 
Court of Douglas County. At triaJ Peak admitted plp,nt-
ing the suitcase and making the telephone c~tll, a.nd 
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corrobora-tive 
evidence the State introducep items seized during the 
search, as well ~ the results of the chemicp,l analysis of 
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to sup-
press this evidence. On' appeal the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska a.flinned the conviction, holding that the search 
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a va-lid search 
wa-rrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2q 480 
(1972). . 
In September 1972 Rice filed ~ petition for It writ of 
habeas corpus in the U:p.ited States District Court for 
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incf~-rcera­
tion WitS unlawful because the evidence underlying his 
conviction had peen discovered a.s the result of an illega-l 
sea-rch of his home. The District Court concluded that 
the search warr~nt wa.s inva-lid, ItS the supporting affi-
da-vit was defective under Spi'fl,elli v. United States, 393 
U. S. 410 (196~), and Aguilar v. Texqs, 378 U. S. 108 
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974).3 The court 
8 The sole evidence presented to the ma.gistrate was the affidavit 
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police 
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home 
because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent 
killing of an officer had occurred and it appear~ that the NCCF 
w~ involved, and (3) police had received information in the past 
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also rejected the St&te's contention that even if the 
warrant was invalid the search was· justified because of 
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the 
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Pe&k 
and search for bombs and explosives believed in posses-
sion of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest war-
rant did not justify the entry as the police lacked 
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and 
further concluded that the circumstances were not suffi.. 
ciently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless 
search. !d., at 194-202.4 ·The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the fleasons 
stated by the District Court. 5!3 F. 2d 1280 (1975). 
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respec-
tive state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, 
petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions 
concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role 
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said should 
be used agajnst the police See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In 
concludmg that there existed probable cause for issuance of the 
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit 
alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testi-
mony adduced at the suppression hearing but not included in the 
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. W. 2d 480, 487-488. See 
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The 
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the 
affidav1t, see Spm.elli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded prob-
able cause was lacking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should 
be perm.1tted to supplement the mformation contained in an affidavit 
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an 
ibi>ue we need not reach. 
4 The Distnct Court further held that the evidence of dynamite 
particles found on Rice's clothing should have been suppressed as 
the tainted fnut of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued 
but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207. 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne 
Lumber Co., Inc . v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920) . 
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of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases 
involving Fourth A:rnendment claims. We granted their 
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975).5 We 
now reverse. 
II 
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of 
habeas corp'l.fs ad subjiciendum 6 W!lS included in the first 
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judici&ry 
Act of 1789, p. 20 § 14, 1 St~tt. 81, with the limitation 
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody 
by the United States. The originlll statutory authoriza-
tion did not define the supstantive reach of the writ. It 
merely stated that the courts of the United States 1'shall 
have power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . ... " 
Ibid. The courts defined the scope of the writ in accord-
ance with the common law and lilllited it to an inquiry as 
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g., 
D In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that 
counsel in PoweU v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the 
questions: 
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that 
the Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest 
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of 
arrest had not been · authoritatively determined to be unconstitu-
t ional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of 
a search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution iS" 
one cogruzable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254n 
"'Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of 
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circum-
stances of thiS case 1s a question properly cogniza.ble under 28 U.S. C. 
§ 2254." 
6 It is now well estabhshed that the phrase "habeas corpus" used 
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien-
dum, known as the 0 Great Writ." Ex parte BoUr,nan, 8 U. S. (4-
ICmnch) .75, 95 (1807) {Nla.rshal.l, C. J .). 
:.;., . 
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Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar-
shall, C. J.). 
In 1867 the writ was extende.d to state prisoners. Act 
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867 
Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in '1all 
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or 
law of the United States .... '' But the limitation of fed,. 
, eral habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the' 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g., 
In re Wood, 140 U. 8. ,278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895); 
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. 
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the con-
cept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain 
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this 
expansion was limited ·to only ~. few classes of cases 8 
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In 
Frank, the prisoner had claimed in the state courts that 
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur-
1 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review 
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review 
on certificate of division of opinion in th11 circuit court was remote 
beC!\.USe of the practice of single district judge's holding circuti court. 
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The 
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 19,73) . 
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32, 
79-80 & n. 107 (1928) . Pressure naturally developed for expansion 
of the scope of habeas corpus to reach Gtherwise unreviewable 
decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and 
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 473 
& n. 75 (19763). 
8 The expansion occurred primarily with regard to (i) convic-
tions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex parte 
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentions based upon an allegedly illegal 
sentence, e. (} ., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1973). 
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state su-
preme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess-
fully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district 
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because 
Frank's federal claims h&d been considered by a compe-
tent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized, 
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the 
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process" 
for the full and fair litigati9n of federal claims, whether 
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the 
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. I d., 
at 333- 336. 
In the landmark decision in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 
443 ( 1953), the scope of the writ was expanded still fur-
ther.9 In these cases st&te prisoners app1ied for federal 
habeas corpus relief claiming that the trial cou,rts had 
erred in failing to qul;\sh their indictments due to alleged 
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors and in rul-
ing certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the high-
est court of the State had rejected these claims on direct 
·appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N. C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and 
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951). 
Despite the apparent ·adequacy of the state corrective 
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of 
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full 
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if 
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In 
Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482, the companion case to 
8 There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the 
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision 
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923). Compare Ha.rt, Fore-
ward : The T1me Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105 
(1959); Re1tz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State-
proceedmg, 74 Harv. L. R.ev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator, 
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 39-1, 4~1 
& n, 30i id , at 457-46.0 (Harlan1 .J., dissenting) . 
~: . 
. ' '• 
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Brown, however, the state supreme court on direct re-
view had refused to consider the appeal because the 
papers were filed out of time. This Court held' that 
since the state court jqdgment rested on a reasop&ble 
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a 
ground that would have barred direct review of his 
federal claims by this Court, tlle District Court lacked 
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S., 
at 458,486. 
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of 
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings was removeq in Ji'ay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 
(1963).'1° Noia and two codefendants had been convicted 
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each de-
fendant was a signed confessi~n. N oia's codefendants, 
but not N oia himself, appealed their convictions. Al-
though their appeals were unsuccessful, in subseq11ent 
state proceedings they were able to establish that ·their 
confessions h&d been coerced and their convictions there-
fore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a sub-
sequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipu-
lated that Noia's confession also had been coerced, but 
the District Court followed Daniels in holdililg that Noia's 
f&ilure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183 
10 Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been 
no change in the established rule with respect to noncpnstitutional 
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28 
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be &llowed to do service for an appeaL" 
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, non-
constitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but 
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. !d., at 
178-179; Davis v. United States1 417 U. S. 333, 34&-346 & n. 15 
(1974). Even those nonconstitutional chums that could not have 
been asserted on d1rect appeal can be raised on collateral review only 
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which in-
'herently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" /d., 11-t 346. 
'See HiU v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962). 
•, 
I 
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F. Supp. 222, 225 (1960). The Court of Appeals re-
versed, ordering that N oia's conviction be set · asid~ and 
that he be released from custody or a new .trial be 
granted. This Court affirmed the gr~tnt of the writ, nar-
rowly restricting the circumstances in which a fed~ral 
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal con-
stitutional clairns.n 
During the period in which the sttbstantive scope of 
the writ was expanded, the Court did not cpnsider 
whether ex~ptions to full review might exist with n~spect 
to particular categories of constitutional cl~· Prior 
to the Cottrt's decision in K(lufman v. United States, 394 
U. S. 217 (1969), however, ~substantial majority of the 
federal co\}rts of appeals had concluded that coll~tteral 
review of search-and-seizure cla~ms was inappropriate on 
motions filed by federal prisoners . under 28 U. S. G. 
§ 2255, the modern post:..conviction procedure available' 
to federal prisop.ers in lieu of habe~tS corpus}2 The 
:u In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to 
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, the Court · in Fay also' reaffirmed the equitab\e na.ture of the 
writ, noting that " [ d] iscretion is implicit in the statutory command 
that the judge , . . 'dispose of the matter as l&.w and jus~ice require.'' 
28 U. S. C. § 22'43.'1 372 U. S., at 438. More re~ntly,' in Francis 
v. Henderson, - U. S. - · (1976), holding that a state prisoner 
who failed to make a timely challenge to t~e composition of the· 
grand jury that indicted hffn cannot bring such a challenge in a post~ 
conviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual 
prejudice, we emphasized: 
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances con-
siderations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 
criminal justice require a federal court to the fareg.o exercise of its 
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. s: 391, 425-426." 
12 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert. 
denied , 388 U. S. 912 (1967); United Sta~es v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d 
193 (CA3 1960); Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965); 
De Welles v. United States, an F. ~ 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388' 
U.S. 919 (1967) ; Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (CM 
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions 
· was that Fourth Amendment violations are different iQ. 
kind from denials of most other constitutional rights in 
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn 
the integrity of the failt..:finding process or challenge 
evidence as inherently unreliable; rathrr, the exclusie:>n 
of illegally seized evidence is si:q1ply a prophylactic de~. 
vice intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment vio-
lations by law enforcement officers." !d., at 224. See 
Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 
F. 2d 822 ( 1966). 
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search-
·and-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings, 
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy ex-
tends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial," 
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 
U. S. 364 (1968); Carafas v. Lafallee, 391 U. S. 234· 
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, that there was no basis for restricting "access by 
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims 
to federal collateral remedies, while- placing no similar 
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U. S., at 226. 
Although in recent years the view has been expressed 
that the Court shotJld re-examine the substantive scope· 
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review 
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the question of 
whether the petitioner was provided wi.th a fair oppor-
tunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state 
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 250' 
1962); Armstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d 725 (CAS 1963), with,. 
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v. 
United States, 317 F. 2d 494 (CAlO 1963). See also Thornton v. 
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966)' 
(search-and-seizure claims nQt cog_nizablfl under ~ 2255 absent specia.Jl 
.• r,il:ctU.nstances) • 
. ' 
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(1973) (POWELL, J., concurring),18 the Court, without 
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to 
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See 
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).14 
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal 
habeas corpus rests on the assumption th~t the effectua-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the grant-
ing of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been con-
victed in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in 
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were 
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require 
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of convic-
tion upon direct review. 1 ~ Until this case we have not 
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this assump-
tion. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, S'ttpra, at 
249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of 
13 See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innoce11ce Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). 
14 In Newsome the Court focused on the issue whether a state· 
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where 
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal. 
The Court did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See 
420 U. S., at 287 n. 4. 
16 As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. Unitea 
States, 394 U.S. 217, 231, 239 (1969), the Kaufman majority made· 
no effort to justify Its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on ar 
series of prtor cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that; 
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus-
proceedings. See Mancusi v. De.F'orte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); 
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294 (1967) . But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas 
relief on the basi~ of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as· 
well as in Warden, the issue considered here was not presented to· 
the Court in the petition for writ of certiora.ri. As emphasized by 
Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we con-
~ider. issl.l.f>,s no.t. oused. in tb.e petition. a94 u . s.,, at 239 & n. 7. 
74-1055 & '74-1222-6:PfN'f6:N 
STONE v. POWELL 
the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule, that the assumption is unjustified.'(! 
III 
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, hoQ~s, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and 8eizures." · 'The 
Amendment was primax:ily a reaction to the evils associw 
ated with the use of the general warrant in England and 
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, · Stanford v. Texas, 
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Marylqnd, 359 
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect 
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), {rom 
searches under unchecked general authority.17 
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means 
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amend .. 
ment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. United 
l 6 As we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence 
should have been excluded because it was obtained by an illegal 
search or seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full and 
fair consideration of that claim in the state courts, may not invoke 
the exclusiOnary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we find it 
unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning the exclusionary 
rule raised by the parttes. These include, principally, whether in 
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se 
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or 
the circumstances of the police action. See ¥ichigan v. Tucker, 
417 U S 433, 447 (1974) "[T]he deterrent purpose of the exclu-
stonary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in 
willful, or at least very negligent, conduct which has deprived the 
defendant of some right"); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590, 606 
(1975) (PowELL, J ., concurring in part); cf. United States v. 
Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975). 
17 See generally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme 
Court (1966); Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourti} 
Amendment to the Umted States Constitution (1937). 
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States, 232 U. S. 383 (l914), and Gouled v. United States, 
255 U. S. 298 (1921)~ ther~ existed no barrier to the 
introduction in crimin11l trials of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Amendment. See Adqms v. New York, 
192 U. S. 585 (1904) .18 In Weeks the Court held tha,t 
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of 
property secllred through an illegal search or seizure con-
ducted by feder11l authorities. In Gouled the Cou~t held 
br~adly that such evidence could not be introduced in a 
feder&-1 prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 
294, 304-305. See ~tlso Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920) (fruits of ill~gally 
seized eviqence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the 
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), 
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by 
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment 
is "implicit in 'the cpncept of ordered liberty' and as 
such enforce~hle against the States through the [Four-
teenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." Id., at 27-28'. 
The CotJrt concltJded, howeyer, that the Weeks exclu-
sionary rule would not b~ imposed tJpon the States as 
"an essenti11l ingredient of that right." /d., at 29. The' 
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions, 
see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea: 
18 The roots of the Weeks decision l~:~y in an early decision, Boyd' 
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), where the Court held that 
the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers 
for intrqduction against him at trial violated the .Fourth and Fifth, 
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams v. 
New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that-
the "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the 
defendant to furnish testimpny against himself," id., at 598, adhered 
to the conunon-law rule tha,t a trial court must not inquire o!ll. 
Fourt,h Amendment grounds into the method by wpich otherwise-
competent evidence was ~tcquired. See, e. g., C:ommon.wealt·h v.~ 
Dana, 2 Met. (Mass,) 329 (1841). 
''· 
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v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little 
more than a decade later the e~clusionary rule was 
held applicable to the States in Mapp v: Ohio, 367 
u. s. 643 (1961). 
Decisions prior to Mapp advanced two principal rea-
sons for application of the rule in federal trials. In 
Elki:ns, for example, the Court referred to the "impera-
tive of judicial integrity," suggesting that exclusion of 
illegally seized evidence precents contamin.ation of the 
judicial process. 364 U. S.; at 222.1 9 But a more prag-
matic ground was emphasized: 
11The rule is calculated to prevent, not to rep·air. 
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
it/' ld., at 217, 
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule 
to the States on several grounds/~ but relied principally 
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlaw-
ful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658 .. 
19 See Terry v. Ohio, 39·2 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968) ;· Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U. 8, 383, 391-392, 394 (19H); Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J,, dissenting); id., at 4.84 
(Brandeis, J ., dis:;enting) . 
20 See 367 U. S, at 656 (prevention of introduction of evidence 
where introduction is "tantamount" to a coerced confession); id., at 
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment viol~tions); id., at 659 (pres-
ervation of judi mal mtegrity). . 
Only four JqstJC!_JS adopted the v~ew that the Fourth Amendment 
alone requires the exclusion ·of unconstitutionally seized evidence in 
state criminal trials. See 367 U. S., at 656, 666. Mr. Justice Black 
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,. 
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. s:- ·25, 39 (1949) 
(concurring opinion) , but concl{Ided that, when the Fourth Amend~· 
ment is comndered in conjunction with the Fifth · Amendment ban 
;against compelled self-incrimination, ·a constitutional ·basis emerges; 
for :requiring exrluswn 367 U. 8 .1 at 661. See n. 18, supra ... 
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Although decisions subsequent to M app often have al-
Juded to the "imperative of judicial integrity," e. g., 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975)r 
they demonstrate the limited role of that justifica-
tion in the determination whether to apply the rule in a. 
particular context.21 Logically extended this justifica-
tion would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally 
seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defend-· 
ant, or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi,. 
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandon-· 
ment of the standing limitations on who may object to· 
the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence, 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and 
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings 
need not abate when the defendant's person is unconsti-
tutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119' 
(1975). Similarly, the interest in promoting judicial 
integrity does not prevent the use of illegally seized· 
evidence in grand jury proceedings. United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974). Nor does it require 
that the trial court exclude such evidence from use for 
impeachment of a defendant, even though its intro-
duction is certain to result in convictions in some cases. 
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Cf. Har-· 
ris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The teaching· 
of these cases is clear. While courts, of course, must: 
ever be concerned with preserving the integrity of the· 
judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justi-" 
ficatwn for the exclusion of highly probative evidence 
without regard to the circumstances that may have . 
made its seizure violative of the Fourth Amendment. 
As we recognized last Term, judicial integrity is 
"not offended if law enforcement officials reasonably 
21 See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89) 
lf"l;r..v, 4. R,fv. 1, 5-6 & n., 3.1 (1975). 
•. 
'· 
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believed in good faith that their conduct was in accord .. 
ance with the law even if decisions subsequent to the 
search and seizure have held that conduct of the type. 
eugaged in by the la-w enforcement officials is not per-
mitted by the Constitution." United States v. Peltier, 
S'upra, at 538 (emphasis omitted). The force of this 
justification becomes minimal where federal habeas 
corpus relief is sought 'by a prisoner who previously 
has been afforded the opportunity for a full consideration 
of hi::; search-and-seizure claim at trial ' and on direct 
rev1ew. 
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule 
then 1s the deterrence of police conduct that violates 
Fou~th Amendment rights. Post-Mapp decisions have 
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional 
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the 
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any 
"[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead, 
"the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect .... " United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Accord , United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539; 
'Perry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; 'Pehan v. S.hott, 382 U.S. 
406, 416 (1966) . Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 
446 (1974) 
Mapp mvolved the enforcement of the exclusionary 
rule at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as 
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of 
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration 
of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of 
state convictions. But despite the broad deterrent pur-' 
pose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been in .. 
. . 
I 
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terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized 
evidence in ~tll proceedings or fl,gainst all persons. As in 
the case of ~tny remedial device, ~'the application of the 
rule has been restricted to those areas whefe its reme-
dial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." 
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348.22 Thus, 
our refus!l-1 to extenq the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings was based on a bal!l-ncing of the potential 
injury to the historic role and function of the gr~Wd jury 
by such extension a.gainst the potential contribution to 
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendmei).t through de-
terrence of police misconduct: 
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be 
achieved by extending the r'ule to grand jury pro-
ceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence 
of police misconduct may result from the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it 
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the 
rule to grand jury proceedings would signific!l-ntly 
further that goal. Such an extension would deter 
only police investigation consciously directed toward 
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand 
jury investigation . .. , 
2 2 As Professor Amsterdam has observed: 
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispen~ 
sation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the 
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert[ing] general legal pressures 
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of . . . 
law-enforcmg officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a 
needed, but grudingly lstc] taken, medicament; no more should be 
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many 
crimmals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering, 
pursuanct> of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity 
inflicts gratuitollll hann on the public interest . . . . " Amsterdam, 
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa, L. Itev. 
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"We therefore decline to ·embrace a view that 
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly mini-
mal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct 
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of 
the grand jury." 1d., at 351 (footnote omitted). 
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's 
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier 
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court 
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized eviw 
dence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had 
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, 
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusionw 
ary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to 
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial 
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly 
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not 
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of 
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in 
determination of truth at trial 23 was deemed to out-
weigh the incremental contribution that might have been 
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by 
applioation of the rule. 
The balancing process at work in these cases also, 
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing 
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist 
only when the Government attempts to use illegally ob-
tained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal 
search. Brown v. Vnited States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165; Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See Jonetr 
v. United States, 36~ U.S. 257, 261 (1960). The stand-
ing requirement is Itermsed on the view that the "addi-
28 See generally Fran~el, The Search For Truth-An Umpirmi 
View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Bar 




74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION 
STONE v. POWELL 21 
tional benefits of extending the rule" to defendA-nts other 
than the victim of the search or seizure are oqtweighed 
by the "further enrofl,chment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and ha-ving them 
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence 
which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174-175/4 
IV 
We turn now to the specific question presented by these 
ca,ses. Respondents allege viot~tions of Fourth Amend-
ment rights guaranteed them through the Fourtee~th 
Amendment. The question is whether st&,te prisOners-
who have been afforded the opportunity for fair consider-
ation of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule with 
respect to seized evid~noe by the state courts at tria-l and 
on direct review-m{l.y invoke their claim again on fed-
eral habeas corpus review. The answer il!l to be found 
through the balancing process' identified above in Part 
III. 
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at 
trial and on direct review are well known: 2~ the focus 
114 Cases addressing the question whether search-1\.nd-seizure hold,. 
ings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the 
d!lterrent purpose serveq by the exclusioq.ary rule, consistently with 
the balancing a,nalysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule con-
text. See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254 
& n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-637 (1965). 
Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S., at 446. Fuller v. AlaskOJ, 393 
U. S. 80, 81 (1968). The ('attenuation-of-the-taint" doctrine also is 
consistent with the balancing approach. See Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963); Amsterdam, supra, n. 22, at 
389-390. Cf. Brown v. Illinois, supra. 
2~ See, e. g., Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971) 
(BURGER, C. J ., dissenting); People v. Defore, 2.42 N. Y. 13, 150 
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, .J.); 8 Wismore On Evidtmce § 2184a, at 
.51-52 (McNaughton edo 1961); A,msterdam, $Upra, n. 22, at 388-391~ 
. • . .. . . 
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of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, 
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or inno~ 
cence that should be the central concern in a crimi-
nal proceeding.26 Moreover, the physical evidence sought 
to be excluded is typ:ioally reliable and often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in 
his dissent in Kaufman: 
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many 
other con&titutional rights; ordinarily the evidence 
seized can in no way have been rendered untrust-
worthy by the mea.ns of its seizure and indeed often 
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtua-lly any 
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty." 
394 U. S., at 237. 
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding 
process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in par-
ticular cases between the error committed by the police 
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by 
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of propor-
tionality that is essential to the concept of justice.27 Thus, 
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule 
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 73&-754 (1970), and 
sources cited therein; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis-
conduct by the Police, 52 J . Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 256 (1961); 
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972). 
:!ti Cf. Frankel, n. 22, s·upra. 
27 Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the 
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of propor-
tionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of 
' establishing a direct relationship between the nature of the vio-
lation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A 
Model Code of Pre-arratgnment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at 
181-183 ("substa.nt,ml violations");; H. Fnendly, Benchmarks 260-26~ 
. \ ·. 
·:-..:.· .. . 
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although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police 
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for 
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately 
it may well have the opposite effect of generating dis-
respect for the law and administration of justice.28 
These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a 
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collat-
eral review on the groqnd that a search-and-seizure claim 
was erroneously by t~o or more tiers of st~tte courts.29< 
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that 
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despi~ 
P967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of 
activity intentionally or flagrantly ille~al."); Wigmore, supra, n. 24, 
at 52-53. See n 16, supra 
:.!S In a different context, Dallm Oaks has observed: 
"·I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccu-
pation, in which we may lose sight of the f4ct that our procedures 
are not the ultimate goals of our leg~tl system. Our goals are truth 
and justice, and procedures are but mea~s to these ends .... 
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our 
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of 
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted 
.from these goals." 
EthiC!:!, Morality and Profe:;sional Responsibility, Convocation and 
DedicatiOn of the J Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young 
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, l975. 
29 Resort to ha~ corpus for purposes other than to assure that 
no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty results 
in serious intrul:lions on values important to our system of govern-
ment. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of limited 
judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, 
(iii} the minimization of frwtion between our federal and state 
systems of justice, and (iv) the mamtenance of the constitutional' 
balance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded;"' 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U S., at 259 (PowELL, J ., con-
curring) See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 23l 
(Blark, J ., d.tt<sflnting) ; Ft:'lt'ndl.y, S'lllpra, n. 13. 
.'··· 
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the absence of supportive empirical evidence,30 we have 
assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will he 
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the 
Fourth Amendment hy· removing the incentive to dis-. 
regard it. More import&ntly, over the long term, this 
demonstration that our society attaches serious conse-
quences to violation of constitutional rights is thought 
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement 
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incor-
porate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value 
system . .~, 
We adhere to the view that these considera.tions sup-
port the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial 
and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court con-
victions.. But the additional contribution, if any, of the 
consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state pris-
oners on collateral review is small in rela.tion to the costs. 
To be sure, each case in which such cla.im is considered 
may add marginally to an awareness of the values pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. But there is no 
reason to believe tha.t the overall educative effect of over-
turning convictions based on evidence obtained in viola-
30 The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has long been the subject 
of :sharp debate. Until recently, schola.rly empirical research 
was Ullavailable, Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 218 (1960). 
And, the evidence denved from recent empirical research i~ i:itill 
inconclu::;ive. Compare, e. g., Oaks, supra, n. 25; Spiotto, 8farch 
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the E11clusiqnary Rule and Its 
Alternatives, 2 Journ. Legal Studies 243 (1973), with, e. g., Cannon, 
Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and 
a Plea Against a Precipitious Conclmnon, 62 Ky L. Rev. 681 (1974). 
See United States v. Janis,- ·- U. S. ·-,- n. ~Z (1976) . Am-
sterdam, Perspective::; on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 
349, 475 n, 593 (1974) ; Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical 
Evaluation::; of the Excluswnary Rnle : A Critique of the Spiott() 
Research and Umted States v. Calandra 69 Nw. L. Rev . 740 (1974). 
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tion of the Fourth Amendment would be appreciably 
dimmished if search-and-seizure claims could not be 
raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convic-
tions.32 Nor is there reason to assume that any specific 
disincentive already created by the risk of exclusion of 
evidence at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct 
review would be enhanced if there were the further risk 
that a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on 
direct review might be overturned in collateral proceed-
ings ye~rs after the incarceration of the defendant. The 
view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment viola-
tions would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption 
that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal 
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure 
that went undetected at trial and on appeaV:1 Even if 
3~ "'As the exclusiona,ry rule is applied time after time, it seems 
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of dimin-
ishing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a 
public nuisance." Amsterdam, supra, n. 22, at 389. 
Ja The policy arguments that respondents marshall in support 
of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to 
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of 
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication 
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts· 
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through 
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this 
Court on certiorari is an inadeqt1ate safeguard. The principal ra-
tionale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective 
institutional setting within which federal judges and state judges> 
opera.te. Despite differenc&; in institutional environment and the 
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state 
judges m years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now 
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights 
in the tna.l and appellate courts of the several States. State courts. 
like federal courts, have a constitutiOnal obligation to safeguard per-
sonaJ liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 
14 U. S (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816). Moreover, the argument 
tba.t fed.eralludges are more expert in applying federal constitutionan 
" 
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one rationally could assume that some additional incre-
mental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases, 
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering 
Fourth Amendment rights would be outweighed by the 
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational 
system of criminal justice. 
In sum, in view of the substantial societal costs associ-
ated with the exclusionary rule, we conclude that where 
the State has provided an adequate process for full and 
fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims, a state pris-
oner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on 
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitution·al 
search or seizure was introduced at his trial. In this 
context the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, 
to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal 
and the recognized costs of application of the rule 
persist.84 
law is especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure 
claims, since they are dealth with on a daily basis by trial 
level judges in both systems. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason 
why the fact that a man Is a federal judge should make him more 
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the applica .. 
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse." 
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50. 
34 Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for fed .. 
era! habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by this Court 
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time 
to apply for certiorari has now pa::;::;ed, any dimunit10n m their 
ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ground evidence obtained 
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their trials 
should be prospective. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Board of 
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-423 (1964) . We reject these 
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior 
decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, respondents were, of course, 
free to file a timely petition for certiorari prior to seeking federal 
habeas corpus relief. More importantly, an untimely filing in a 
state or federal criminal case is not a jmisdictional defect, and, under 
appropriate circumstances, plenary review in this Court is appro. 
.. 
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Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals: 
alle 
Rever,sed~ 
priate. E. g., Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U. S. 316, n. l 
(1969 ); Fuller v. Ala.ska, 393 U. S. 80 (1968); Arnold v. North 
Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 (1964); Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 
415, 418 n. 7 (1959) . Respondents' remedy, therefore, lies in the 
"filing of an out-of-time petition for certiorari . At that time we can 
assess whether the claimed prejudice arising from our decision in this 
case justifies the waiver of the time rule, and whether we should 
exercise our discretion to :teview the merits of the issues raised in 
the petitions. 
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Respondents in these cases were convicted of criminal 
offenses in state courts, and their convictions were af-
firmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case relied 
upon evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged 
by respondents to have been unlawful. Each respondent 
subsequently sought relief in a federal district court by 
filing a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus under 
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The question presented is whether 
a federal court should consider, in ruling on a petition for 
habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim that 
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or sei-
zure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously 
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation 
of his claim in the state courts. The issue is of consid-
erable importance to the administration of criminal 
justice. 
.. 
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I 
We summ~trize first the relevant facts and procedural 
history of these cases. 
A 
Respondent Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder 
in June 1968 after trial in a California state court. At 
about midnight on February 17, 1968, he and three com-
panions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store in San Ber-
nardino, Cal., where Powell became involved in an alter-
cation with Gerald Parsons, the store manager, over the 
theft of a bottle of wine. In the scuffling that followed 
Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. 'Ten hours later 
an officer of the Henderson, Nev., Police Department ar-
rested Powell for violation of the Henderson vagrancy 
ordinance/ and in the search incident to the arrest dis-
covered a .38 caliber revolver with six expended car-
tridges in the cylinder. 
Powell was extradicted to California and convicted of 
second-degree murder in the Superior Court of San Ber~ 
nardino County. Parsons and Powell's accomplices at 
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist 
testified that the revolver found on Powell was the gun 
that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court rejected 
Powell's contention that testimony ·by the Henderson 
police officer as to the search and the discovery of the re-
volver should have been excluded because the vagrancy 
ordinance was unconstitutional. In October 1969, the· 
1 The ordinance provides : 
'"Every person is a vagrant who : 
· " [ 1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place 
without apparent reason or business and [2] who refuses to identify 
himself and to account for his presence when asked by any police 
officer to do so [3] if surrounding circumstances are such as· 
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands sucb 
identification."' 
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{JOnviction was affirmed by a California District Court of 
Appeal. Although the issue was duly presented, that 
court found it unnecessary to pass upon the legality of 
the arrest and search because it concluded that the error, 
if any, in admitting the testimony of the Henderson offi-
cer was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967). The Su-
preme Court of California denied Powell's petition for 
I 
habeas corpus relief. 
In August 1971 Powell filed an amended petition for a 
writ of federal habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in 
the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California, contending that the testimony con-
cerning the .38 caliber revolver should have been 
excluded as the fruit of an illegal search. He argued 
that his arrest had been unlawful because the Henderson 
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and 
that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe 
that he was violating it. The District Court concluded 
that the arresting officer had probable cause and held 
that even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional, 
the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule does not 
require that it be applied to bar admission of the fruits 
of a search incident to an otherwise valid arrest. In the 
1\ltf')rnative, that court agreed with the California District 
Court of Appeal that the admission of the evidence con-
cerning Powell's arrest, if error, was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The Court concluded 
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague, 2 that Powell's fl,rrest was therefore illegal, and 
2 In support of the vagueness holding the court relied principally 
on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 4()5 U. S. 156 (1972), where 
we: invalidated a city ordinance in part defining v~rants as . . . "pel"-
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that although exclusion of the evidence would serve no 
deterrent purpose with regard to police officers who were 
enforcing statutes in good faith, exclusion would serve 
the public interest by deterring legislators from enacting 
unconstitutional statutes. Id., at 98. After an inde-
pendent review of the evidence the court concluded that 
the admission of the evidence was not harmless error 
since it supported the testimony of Parsons and Powell's 
accomplices. !d., at 99. · 
B 
Respondent David Rice was convicted of murde11 in 
April1971 after trial in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05 
a. m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a tele-
phone call that a woman had been heard screaming at 
2867 Ohio Street. As one of the officers sent to that 
address examined a suitcase lying in the doorway, it ex-
ploded, killing him instantly. By August 22 the investi-· 
gation of the murder center~d on Duane Peak, a 
15-yea.r-old member of the National Committee to Com-
bat Fascism ("NCCF"), and _that afternoon a warrant 
was issued for Peak's arrest. The investigation also· 
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including 
Rice, some of whom were believed to be planning to kill 
Peak before he could incriminate them. In their search 
for Peak, the police went to Rice's home at 10:30 p. m. 
that night and found lights and a television on, but there 
was no response to their repeated knocking. · While some 
officers remained to watch the premises, a warrant was 
sons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any 
lawful purpose or object .. .. " /d., at 156-157, n. 1. Noting the 
similarity between the first element of the Henderson ordinance, see 
n. 1, supra, and the Jacksonville ordinance, it concluded that the second 
and third elements of the Henderson ordinance were not sufficiently 
specific to cure its overall vagueness. 507 F. 2d, at 95-97. Peti-· 
tioner Stone challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposi-
tion. of the case we need. not consider this issue .. 
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obtained to search for explosives and ·illegal weapons 
believed to be in Rice's possession. Peak was not in the 
house but upon entering the police discovered, in plain 
view, dynamite, blasting caps, wire, a battery, and a pair 
of long nosed pliers. Peak subsequently was arrested, and 
on August 27, Rice voluntarily surrendered. The cloth~ 
Rice was wea,.ring at that time were subjected to chemical 
analysis, disclosing dynamite particles. 
Rice was tried for first-degree murder in the District 
Court of Douglas County. At trial Peak admitted plant-
ing the suitcase and making the telephone call, and 
implicated Rice in the bombing plot. As corroborative 
evidence the State introduced items seized during the 
search, a.s well as the results of the chemical analysis of 
Rice's clothing. The Court denied Rice's motion to sup-
press this evidence. On appeal the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska affirmed the conviction, holding that the search 
of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid search 
warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N. W. 2d 480 
(1972). 
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarcera-
tion was unlawful because the evidence underlying his 
conviction had been discovered as the result of an illegal 
search of his home. The District Court concluded that 
the search warrant was invalid, as the supporting affi-
davit was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U. S. 410 ( 1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. lOS 
(1964). 388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 (1974).3 The court 
8 The sole evidence presented to the magistrate was the affidavit 
in support of the warrant application. It indicated that the police 
believed explosives and illegal weapons were present in Rice's home 
because (1) Rice was an official of the NCCF, (2) a violent 
killing of an officer had occurred and it appeared that the NCCF 
·was involved, and (3) police had received infonhation in the .past 
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also rejected the State's contention that even if the 
warrant was invalid the search was justified because of 
the valid arrest warrant for Peak and because of the 
exigent circumstances of the situation-danger to Peak 
and search for bombs and explosives believed in posses-
sion of NCCF. The court reasoned that the arrest war-
rant did not justify the entry as the police lacked 
probable cause to believe Peak was in the house, and 
further concluded that the circumstances were not suffi-
ciently exigent to justify an immediate warrantless 
search. !d., at 194-202! ·· The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit affirmed, substantially for the reasons 
stated by the District Court. 513 F. 2d 1280 (1975). 
Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the respec-
tive state prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, 
petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions 
concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role 
that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, which he said should 
be used against the police. See 388 F. Supp. 185, 189 n. 1. In 
concluding that there existed probable cause for issuance of the 
warrant, although the Nebraska Supreme Court found the affidavit 
alone sufficient, it also referred to information contained in testi-
mony adduced at the suppression hea.ring but not included in the 
affidavit. 188 Neb. 728, 738-739, 199 N. W. 2d 480, 487-488. See· 
also 183 Neb., at 754, 199 N. W., at 495 (concurring opinion). The 
District Court limited its probable cause inquiry to the face of the 
affidavit, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n. 3 (1969); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 109 n. 1 (1964), and concluded prob-
able cause was lacking. Petitioner Wolff contends that police should 
be permitted to supplement the information contained in an a:ffi.davit 
for a search warrant at the hearing on a motion to suppress, an 
issue we need not reach. 
• The District Court further held that the evidence of dynamite · 
particles found on Rice's clothing should have been suppressed as 
. the tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have been issued 
but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 F. Supp. 202-207. 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Silverthorne; 
i.a?Jrnber Co., Inc . v. United States, 251 U. S .. 385 (1920), 
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of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases 
involving Fourth Amendment claims. We granted their 
petitions for certiorari. 422 U. S. 1055 (1975).5 We 
now reverse. 
II 
The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of 
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum 6 was included in the first 
grant of federal court jurisdiction, made by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation 
that the writ extend only to prisoners held in custody 
by the United States. The original statutory authoriza-
tion did not define the substantive reach of the writ. It 
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall 
have power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus . ... ',. 
Ibid. The courts defined the scope of the writ in accord-
ance with the common law and limited it to an inquiry as 
to the jurisdiction of the sentencing tribunal. See, e. g., 
5 In the order granting certiorari in these cases we requested that 
counsel in Powell v. Stone and Wolff v. Rice respectively address the 
questions: 
"'Whether, in light of the fact that the District Court found that 
the· Henderson, Nev., police officer had probable cause to arrest 
respondent for violation of an ordinance which at the time of' 
arrest had not been authoritatively determined to be unconstitu-
tional, respondent's claim that the gun discovered as a result of 
a. search incident to that arrest violated his rights under the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution is 
one cognizable under 28 U. S. C. § 2254." 
""Whether the constitutional validity of the entry and search of 
respondent's premises by Omaha police officers under the circum-
stances of this case is a question properly cognizable under 28 U. S. C. 
§2254." 
il It is now well established that the phrase "habeas corpus" used 
alone refers to the common-law writ of habeas corpus ad subjicien-
dum, known as the "Great Writ." Ex parte BoUman, 8 U. S. (4: 
!Cmnch) 75, 95 (1807) (M.arshall, C. J .). 
74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION 
8 STONE v. POWELL 
Ex parte Watkins, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Mar-
shall, C. J.). , . 
In 1867 the writ was extended to state prisoners. Act 
of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867 
Act federal courts were authorized to gi~e relief in "all 
cases where any person may be restrained of his or her 
liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or 
law of the United States .... " But the limitation of fed-
eral habeas corpus jurisdiction to consideration of the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court persisted. See, e. g., 
In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 
545 (1891); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1895); 
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. 
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). And, although the con-
cept of "jurisdiction" was subjected to considerable strain 
as the substantive scope of the writ was expanded/ this 
expansion was limited to only a few classes of cases 8 
until Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, in 1915. In 
Frank, the prisoner hacl claimed in the state courts that 
the proceedings which resulted in his conviction for mur-
7 Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no appellate review 
in federal criminal cases. The possibility of Supreme Court review 
on certificate of division of opinion in the circuit court was remote 
because of the practice of single district judge's holding circuit court. 
See Bator, Miskin, Shapiro, & Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The 
Federal Courts and the Federal System 1539-1540 (2d ed. 1973); 
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 31-32, 
79-80 & n. 107 (1928). Pressure naturally developed for expansion 
· of the scope of habeas corpus to reach otherwise unreviewable 
' decisions involving fundamental rights. See Ex parte Siebold, 100· 
U. S. 371, 376-377 (1879); Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and 
Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv, L. Rev. 441,473 
& n. 75 (19763). 
8 The expansiOn occurred primarily with regard to (i) convic-
tions based on assertedly unconstitutional statutes, e. g., Ex parte 
Siebold, supra, or (ii) detentions based upon an allegedly illegal ' 
sentence, e. g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1973) ~. 
s~ Bator, 8U7_Jra, n. 7, a.t 46/t-414. 
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der had been dominated by a mob. After the state su-
preme court rejected his contentions, Frank unsuccess-
fully sought habeas corpus relief in the federal district 
court. This Court affirmed the denial of relief because 
Frank's federal claims had been considered by a compe-
tent and unbiased state tribunal. The Court recognized, 
however, that if a habeas corpus court found that the 
State had failed to provide adequate "corrective process" 
for the full and fair litigation of federal claims, whether 
or not "jurisdictional," the court could inquire into the 
merits to determine whether a detention was lawful. I d., 
at 333-336. 
In the landmark decisions in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443 (1953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U. S., at 482-487, 
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. 9 In 
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas 
corpus relief claiming that the trial courts had erred in 
failing to quash their indictments due to alleged dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors and in rul-
ing certain confessions admissible. In Brown, the high-
est court of the State had rejected these claims on direct 
appeal, State v. Brown, 233 N.C. 202, 63 S. E. 2d 99, and 
this Court had denied certiorari, 341 U. S. 943 (1951). 
Despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective 
process, the Court reviewed the denial of the writ of 
habeas corpus and held that Brown was entitled to a full 
reconsideration of these constitutional claims, including, if 
appropriate, a hearing in the Federal District Court. In 
0 There has been disagreement among scholars as to whether the 
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's decision 
in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). Compare Hart, Fore-
ward: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 105 
(1959) ; Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus; Impact of an Abortive State 
Proceeding, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1315, 1328-1329 (1961), with Bator, 
supra, n. 7, at 488-491. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 421 
& n. 30; id., at 457-460 (Harlan, J., dissenting) . 
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Daniels, however, the state supreme court on direct re--
view had refused to consider the appeal because the 
papers were filed out of time. ' This Court held that 
since the state court judgment rested on a reasonable 
application of the State's legitimate procedural rules, a 
ground that would have barred direct review of his 
federal claims by this Court, the District Court lacked 
authority to grant habeas corpus relief. See 344 U. S., 
at 458, 486. 
This final barrier to broad collateral re-examination of 
state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 
(1963).'-0 Noia and two codefendants had been convicted 
of felony murder. The sole evidence against each de-
fendant was a signed confession. Noia's codefendants, 
but not Noia himself, appealed their convictions., Al-
though their appeals were unsuccessful, in subsequent 
state proceedings they were able to establish that their 
confessions had been coerced and their convictions there-
fore procured in violation of the Constitution. In a sub-
sequent federal habeas corpus proceeding, it was stipu-
lated that N oia's confession also had been coerced, but 
the District Court followed Daniels in holding that Noia's 
failure to appeal barred habeas corpus review. See 183 
10 Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ, there has been 
no change in the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional 
claims. The writ of habeas corpus and its federal CQunterpart, 28 
U. S. C. § 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeal." 
Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947). For this reason, non-
constitutional claims that could have been raised on appeal, but 
were not, may not be asserted in collateral proceedings. ld., at 
178-179; Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 340--348 & n. 15 
(1974). Even those nonconstitutional claims that could not have 
been asserted on direct appeal can be raised on collateral review only 
if the alleged error constituted " 'a fundamental defect which in-. 
herently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' " id., at 346,, 
rquoting Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962) . 
• 
. I 
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F. Supp. 222, 225 ( 1960). The Court of Appeals re-
versed, ordering that Noia's conviction be set aside and 
that he be released from custody or a new trial be 
granted. This Court affirmed the grant of the writ, nar-
rowly restricting the circumstances in which a federal 
court may refuse to consider the merits of federal con-
stitutional claims.11 
During the period in which the substantive scope of 
the writ was expanded, the Court did not consider 
whether exceptions to full review might exist with respect 
to particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior 
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the 
federal courts of appeals had concluded that collateral 
review of search-and-seizure claims was inappropriate on 
motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2255, the modern post-conviction procedure available 
to federal prisoners in lieu of habeas corpus.12 The 
11 In construing broadly the power of a federal district court to 
consider constitutional claims presented in a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed the equitable nature of the 
writ, noting that "[d]iscretion is implicit in the statutory command 
that the judge ... 'dispose of the matter as law and justice require.' 
28 U. S. C. § 2243." 372 U. S., at 438. More recently, in Francis 
v. Henderson, - U. S. - (1976), holding that a state prisoner 
who failed to make a timely challenge to the composition of the 
grand jury that indicted him cannot bring such a challenge in a post-
conviction federal habeas corpus proceeding absent a claim of actual 
prejudice, we emphasized : 
"This Court has long recognized that in some circumstances con-
siderations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of 
criminal justice require a federal court to the forego exercise of its 
habeas corpus power. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 425-426." 
12 Compare, e. g., United States v. Re, 372 F. 2d 641 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 388 U. S. 912 (1967) ; United States v. Jenkins, 281 F. 2d 
193 (CA3 1960) ;' Eisner v. United States, 351 F. 2d 55 (CA6 1965) ; 
De WeUes v. United States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA7), cert denied, 388 
U. S. 919 (1967) ; Williams v. United States, 307 F. 2d 366 (CA9 
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primary rationale advanced in support of those decisions 
was that Fourth Amendment violations are different in 
kind from denials of most other constitutional rights in 
that claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn 
the integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge 
evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic de-
vice intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment vio-
lations by law enforcement officers." I d., at 224. See 
Thornton v. United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 
F. 2d 822 ( 1966). 
Kaufman rejected this rationale and held that search-
and-seizure claims are cognizable in § 2255 proceedings. 
The Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy ex-
tends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial," 
394 U. S., at 225, citing, e. g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 
U. S. 364 (1968); Carajas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234 
(1968), and concluded, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, that there was no basis for restricting "access by 
federal prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims 
to federal collateral remedies, while placing no similar 
restriction on access by state prisoners," 394 U.S., at 226. 
Although in recent years the view has been expressed 
that the Court should re-examine the substantive scope 
of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral review 
of search-and-seizure claims "solely to the question of 
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair oppor-
tunity to raise and have adjudicated the question in state 
courts," Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 250 
1962); Armstead v. United States, 318 F. 2d 725 (CA5 1963), withr 
e. g., United States v. Sutton, 321 F. 2d 221 (CA4 1963); Gaitan v. 
United States, 317 F . 2d 494 (CAlO 1963) . See also Thornton v. 
United States, 125 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 368 F. 2d 822 (1966) 
(search-and-seizure claims no.t. cogp..izable under § 2255 absent speciar 
< mellm>tances) .. 
.-
74-1055 & 74-1222--0PINION 
STONE v. POWELL 13 
( 1973) (PowELL, J., concurring) ,18 the Court, without 
discussion or consideration of the issue, has continued to 
accept jurisdiction in cases raising such claims. See 
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).14 
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal 
habeas corpus rests on the assumption that the effectua-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the grant-
ing of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been con-
victed in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in 
an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were 
held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require 
exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of convic-
tion upon direct review.15 Until this case we have not 
had occasion fully to consider the validity of this assump-
tion. See, e. g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, supra, at 
249 n. 38. Upon examination, we conclude, in view of 
13 See, e. g., Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack 
on Criminal Judgments, 38 Chi. L. Rev. 142 (1970). 
14 In Newsome the Court focused on the issue whether a state 
defendant's plea of guilty waives federal habeas corpus review where· 
state law does not foreclose review of the plea on direct appeal. 
The Court did not consider the substantive scope of the writ. See 
420 U. S., at 287 n. 4. 
'16 As Mr. Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. Unitea 
States, 394 U. S. 217, 231, 239 (1969) , the Kaufm<m majority made 
no effort to justify its result in light of the long-recognized deterrent 
purpose of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the Court relied on a 
series of prior cases as implicitly establishing the proposition that 
search-and-seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus-
proceedings. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); 
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U. S. 294 (1967) . But only in Mancusi did this Court order habeas 
relief on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in that case, as 
well as in Warden, the issue considered here was not presented t~ 
the Court in the petition for writ of certiorari . As emphasized by 
Mr. Justice Black, only in the most exceptional cases will we con-
m®r issues not raised in the petition. 394 u. s .• a.t 239 & n. 7. 
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the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule, that the assumption is unjustified/6 
III 
The Fourth Amendment assures the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, . ho.uses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." - The 
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associ-
ated with the use of the general warrant in England a.nd 
the writs of assistance in the Colonies, S!aniord v. Texas, 
379 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 
U. S. 360, 363-365 (1959), and was intended to protect 
the "s~tnctity of a man's home and the privacies of life," 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), from 
searches under unchecked general authority.17 
The exclusionary rule was a judicially created means 
of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Prior to the Court's decisions in Weeks v. United 
·16 As we conclude that a state prisoner asserting that evidence 
should have been excluded because it was obtained by an illegal 
search or seizure, who has been afforded the opportunity for full-and 
fair consideration of that claim in the state courts, may not invoke 
the exclusionary rule in federal habeas corpus proceedings, we·find it 
unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning the exclusionary 
rule raised by the parties. These include, principally, whether in 
view of the purpose of the rule, it should be applied on a per se 
basis without regard to the nature of the constitutional claim or 
the circumstances of the police action. See Michigan v. Tucker, 
417 U. S. 433, 447 (1974) "[T]he deterrent purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in 
willful, or at least very negligent, conduct which has deprived the 
defendant of some right") ; Brown v. !Uinois, 422 U. S. 590, 606 
(1975) (PowELL, J., concurring in part); cf. United States v. 
Peltier, 422 U. S. 531 (1975) .. 
17 See generally Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme 
·Court (1966); Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937) . 
74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION 
STONE v. POWELL 15 
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and Gouled v. United States, 
255 U. S. 298 (1921) , there existed no barrier to the 
introduction in criminal trials of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Amendment. See Adams v. New Y ark, 
192 U. S. 585 (1904).18 In Weeks the Court held that 
the defendant could petition before trial for the return of 
property secured through an illegal search or seizure con-
ducted by federal authorities. In Gouled the Court held 
broadly that such evidence could not be introduced in a 
federal prosecution. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 
294, 304-305 (1967). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co .. 
v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (fruits of illegally 
seized evidence). Thirty-five years after Weeks the· 
Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), 
that the right to be free from arbitrary intrusion by 
the police that is protected by the Fourth Amendment 
is. "implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as 
such enforceable against the States through the [Four-
teenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." !d., at 27-28. 
'The Court concluded, however, that the Weeks exclu-
sionary rule would not be imposed upon the States as 
"an essential ingredient of that right." !d., at 29. ·The· 
full force of Wolf was eroded in subsequent decisions, 
see Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206 (1960); Rea 
18 The roots of the Weeks decision lay in an early decision, Boya 
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 ( 1886) , where the Court held that 
the compulsory production of a person's private books and papers 
for introduction against him at trial violated the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. Boyd, however, had been severely limited in Adams :v. 
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, emphasizing that 
the "law held unconstitutional [in Boyd] virtually compelled the 
defendant to furnish testimony against himself," id., at 598, adhered 
to the common-law rule that a trial court must not inquire, on 
Fourth Amendment grounds, into the method by which otherwis~ 
cor~petent evidence was acquired. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. 
Dana~ 2 Met. (Mass.) 329 (1841). 
74-1055 & 74-1222-0PINION 
16 STONE v. POWELL 
v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956), and a little 
more than a decade later the exclusionary rule was 
held applicable to the States in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
u. s. 643 (1961). 
Decision prior to M app advanced two principal rea-
sons for application of the rule in federal trials. In 
Elkins, for example, the Court referred to the "impera-
tive of judicial integrity," suggesting that exclusion of 
illegally seized evidence prevents contamination of the 
judicial process. 364 U. S., at 222?9 But a more prag-
matic ground was emphasized: 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. 
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail~ 
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
it." I d., at 217. 
The Mapp majority justified the application of the rule 
to the States on several grounds,20 but relied principally 
upon the belief that exclusion would deter future unlaw-
ful police conduct. 367 U. S., at 658., 
19 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); Olmstead v. United States, 
277 U. S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J.., dissenting); id., at 484 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) . 
'20 See 367 U. S., at 656 (prevention of introduction of evidence· 
where introduction is "tantamount" to a coerced confession); id., at 
658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations); id., at 659 (pres-· 
ervation of judicial integrity). 
Only four Justices adopted the view that the Fourth Amendment 
itself requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in 
state criminal trials. See 367 U. S., at 656, 666. Mr. Justice Black 
adhered to his view that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,. 
was not sufficient, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 39 (1949) 
(concurring opinion), but concluded that, when the Fourth Amend-
ment is considered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban 
against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges; 
f_q:r: :r:eq_uiring exclusion. 367 U. S., at 661. See n .. 18, supra. 
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Although decisions subsequent to M app often have al-
luded to the "imper!ltive of judicial integrity," e. g., 
United States v. Peltier, 422 U. S. 531, 536-539 (1975), 
they demonstrate the limited role of that justifica-
tion in the determination whether to apply the rule in a 
particular context.21 Logically extended this justinca-
tion would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally 
seized evidence despite lack of objection by the defend-
ant, or even over his assent. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 
379 U. S. 443 (1965). It also would require abandon-
ment of the standing limitations on who may object to· 
the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence, 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 (1969), and 
retreat from the proposition that judicial proceedings 
need not abate when the defendant's person is unconsti-
tutionally seized, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 
{1975). Similarly,, the interest in promoting judicial 
integrity does not prevent the use of illegally seized 
evidence in grand jury proceedings. United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), Nor does it require 
that the trial court exclude such evidence from use for 
impeachment of a defendant, even though its intro-
duction is certain to result in convictions in some cases. 
Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954). Cf. Har-
ris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The teaching 
of these cases is clel'l-r. While courts, of course, must 
ever be concerned w!th preserving the integrity of the 
judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justi-
fication for the exclusion of highly proba.tive evidence.22 
21 See Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 & n. 33 (1975). _ 
• 22 As we recognized last Term, judicial integrity is "not offended 
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good faith that 
their conduct was in accordance with the law even if decisions sub-
.sequent to the search and seizure have held that conduct of the type 
·engaged in by the law enforcement officials is. not permitted by the 
I 
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The importance of this justification becomes minimal 
where federal habeas corpus relief is sought by a prisoner 
who previously has been afforded the opportunity for full 
and fair consideration of his search-and-seizure claim at 
trial and on direct review. 
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule 
then is the deterrence of police conduct that violates 
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-M app decisions have 
established that the rule is not a personal constitutional 
right. It is not calculated to redress the injury to the 
privacy of the victim of the search or seizure, for any 
"[r]eparation comes too late." Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U. S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead, 
"the rule is a judichtlly created remedy designed to• 
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect .... " United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
Accord, United States v. Peltier, supra, at 538-539; 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968); Linkletter v. 
Walker, 381 U. S., at 636-637; Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 
406, 416 (1966). Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 
446 (1974). 
M app involved the enforcement of the exclusionary 
rule at state trials and on direct review. In Kaufman, as 
noted above, the Court assumed that implementation of 
the Fourth Amendment also requires the consideration 
of search-and-seizure claims upon collateral review of 
state convictions. But despite the broad deterrent pur-'· 
pose of the exclusionary rule, it has nevet been in-
terpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized· 
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As in 
the case of any remedial device, "the application of the · 
Constitution." United Sta,tes v.. Peltier, supra, at 53.8 (emphasis.: 
{)mitted). 
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rule has been restricted to those areas where its reme-
dial objectives are thought most efficaciously served."' 
United States v. Calandra, supra at 348.23 Thus, our 
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings was based on a balancing of the potential 
injury to the historic role and function of the grand jury 
by such extension against the potential contribution to 
the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through de-
terrence of police misconduct: 
"Any incremental deterrent effect which might be 
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury pro-
ceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence 
0f police misconduct may result from the exclusion 
of illegally seized evidence from criminal trials, it 
is unrealistic to assume that the application of the 
rule to grand jury proceedings would significantly 
further that goal. Such an extension would deter 
only police investigation consciously directed toward 
the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand 
fury investigation . .. . 
"We therefore decline to embrace a view that 
would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly mini-
mal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct 
28 As Professor Amsterdam has observed : 
"The rule is unsupportable as reparation or compensatory dispen-
sation to the injured criminal; its sole rational justification is the 
experience of its indispensibility in 'exert[ing] general legal pressures 
to secure obedience to the Fourth Amendment on the part of . . . 
Taw-enforcing officers.' As it serves this function, the rule is a 
needed, but grudingly [sic] taken, medicament; no more should be 
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted tha.t so many· 
criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering, 
pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity· 
inflicts gratuitous harm on the public interest ... .'' Amsterdam,. 
Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev .. 
318; 3'88-389' (!9'64) (.footllOtes omitted.) . 
20 
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at the expense of substantially impeding the role of 
the grand jury." Id., at 351 (footnote omitted). 
The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's 
usefulness in a particular context was evident earlier 
in Walder v. United States, supra, where the Court 
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evi-
dence to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had 
testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, 
in effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusion-
ary rule in that context were outweighed by the need to 
prevent perjury and to assure the integrity of the trial 
process. The judgment in Walder revealed most clearly 
that the policies behind the exclusionary rule are not 
absolute. Rather, they must be evaluated in light of 
competing policies. In that case, the public interest in 
determination of truth at trial 24 was deemed to out-
weigh the incremental contribution that might have been 
made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values by 
application of the rule. 
The balancing process at work in these cases also 
finds expression in the standing requirement. Standing 
to invoke the exclusionary rule has been found to exist 
only when the Government attempts to use illegally ob-
tained evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal 
search. Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (1973); 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165; Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491-492 (1963). See Jones 
v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 261 (1960). The stand-
ing requirement is premised on the view that the "addi-
tional benefits of extending the rule" to defenaants other 
than the victim of the search or seizure are outweighed 
by the "further enroachment upon the public interest in 
'24 See generally Frankel, The Search For Truth-An Umpireal 
View, 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, Assn. of the Ba_r: 
'Ql the. City of New York, Dec. 16, 1914. 
I 
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prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence 
which exposes the truth ." Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174-175.25 
IV 
We turn now to the specific question presented by these 
cases. Respondents allege violations of Fourth Amend-
ment rights guaranteed them through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The question is whether state prisoners--
who have been afforded the opportunity for fair consider-
ation of their reliance upon the exclusionary rule with 
respect to seized evidence by the state courts at trial and 
on direct review-may invoke their claim again on fed-
eral habeas corpus review. The answer is to be found 
through the balancing process identified above in Part 
III. 
The costs of applying the exclusionary rule even at 
trial and on direct review are well known: ·26 the focus 
25 Cases addressing the question whether search-and-seizure hold-
ings should be applied retroactively also have focused on the 
deterrent purpose served by the exclusionary rule, consistently with 
the balancing analysis applied generally in the exclusionary rule con-
text. See Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 249-251, 253-254 
& n. 21 (1969) ; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 636-637 (1965) . 
Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. 8., at 446 ; Fuller v. Alaska, 393 
U. S. 80, 81 (1008). The "attenuation-of-the-taint" doctrine also is 
consistent with the balancing approach. See Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U. S. 471, 491-492 (1963) ; Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 
389--390. Cf. Brown v. Illirwis, supra. 
2 6 See, e. g. , Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 136 (1954); Bivens 
v. Six Unkrwwn Named Federal Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 441 (1971) 
(BURGER, C. J. , dissenting) ; People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 
N. E. 585 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ; 8 Wigmore On Evidence§ 2184a, at 
51- 52 (McNaughton ed. 1961) ; Amsterdam, supra, n. 23, at 388-391 ; 
Friendly, supra, n. 13, at 161; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule 
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 7.36-754 (1970), and 
.sources cited therein ; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Mis· 
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of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, 
is diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or inno-
cence that should be the central concern in a crimi-
nal proceeding.27 Moreover, the physical evidence ,sought 
to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most 
probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in 
his dissent in Kaufman: 
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many 
other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence 
seized can in no way have been rendered untrust-
worthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often 
this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any 
shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty." 
394 U. S., at 237. 
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding 
process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in par-
ticular cases between the error committed by the police 
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by 
application of the rule is contrary to the idea of propor-
tionality that is essential to the concept of justice.28 Thus,. 
conduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 255, 256 (1961); 
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 
50 Texas L. Rev. 736 ·(1972). 
27 Cf. Frankel, n. 22, supra. 
28 Many of the proposals for modification of the scope of the· 
exclusionary rule recognize at least implicitly the role of propor-
tionality in the criminal justice system and the potential value of 
establishing a direct relationship between the nature of the vio-
lation and the decision whether to invoke the rule. See A. L. I., A 
Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, May 20, 1975, § 290.2, at 
181-183 ("substantial violations"); H. Frienc!Jy, Benchmarks 260-262· 
(1967) (even at trial, exclusion should be limited to "the fruit of 
activity intentionally or flagrantly illegal."); Wigmore, supra, n. 25, 
.a~~ 5~-53 . s~ n. 16, supra. 
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although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police 
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for 
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately 
it may well have the opposite effect of generating dis-
respect for the law and administration of justice.29 
These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a 
criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collat-
eral review on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim 
was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state 
eourts.30 
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that 
the frequency of future violations will decrease. Despite 
the absence of supportive empirical evidence,31 we have 
29 In a different context, Dallin Oaks has observed : 
IJ,I am criticizing, not our concern with procedures, but our preoccu-
pation, in which we may lose sight of the fact that our procedures 
are· not the ultimate goals of our legal system. Our goals are truth 
and justice, and procedurt>.s are but means to these ends .. .. 
"Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood by our 
people, and the law and the legal profession will not be worthy of 
public respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be diverted 
from these goals." 
Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility, Convocation and' 
Dedication of the J . Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham Young· 
University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975. 
80 Resort to habeas corpus, especially for purposes other than to· 
assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of lib-
erty, results in serious intrusions on values important to our system 
0f government. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of 
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal 
t rials, (iii) the minimization of friction between our federal and state· 
systems of justice, and (iv) the maintenance of the constitutional 
oalance upon which the doctrine of federalism is founded."" 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. 8., at 259 (PowELL, J ., con-
curring) . See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. 8., at 231 
(Black, J ., dissenting) ; Friendly, supra, n. 13. 
81 The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has long been the subject: 
•co.f sharp debate. Until Jtecently, scholarly empirical research 
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assumed that the immediate effect of exclusion will be 
to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the 
Fourth Amendment by removing the inoontive to dis-
regard it. More importantly, over the long term, this 
demonstration that our society attaches serious conse-
quenoos to violation of constitutional rights is thought 
to encourage those who formulate law enforcement 
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incor-
porate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value 
system.32 
We adhere to the view that these considerations sup-
port the implementation of the exclusionary rule at trial 
and its enforcement on direct appeal of state court con-
victions. But the additional contribution, if any, of the 
consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state pris-
oners on collateral review is small in relation to the costs. 
To be sure, each case in which such claim is considered 
may add marginally to an awareness of the values pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment. But there is no 
reason to believe that the overall educative effect of over-
turning convictions based on evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment would be appreciably 
diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not be· 
raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convic-
was unavailable, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960). 
And, the evidence derived from recent empirical research is still 
inconclusive. Compare, e. g., Oaks, supra, n. 26; Spiotto, Search 
and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its 
Alternatives, 2 Journ. Legal Studies 243 (1973), with, e. g., Cannon, 
Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?, Some New Data and' 
a Plea Against a Precipitious Conclusion, 62 Ky. L. Rev. 681 (1974) . 
See United States v. Janis , -- U. S. --,-- n. 22 (1976; Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 
349, 475 n, 59·3 (1974) ; Comment, On the Limitations of Empirical' 
Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule : A Critique of the Spiotto 
Research and Umted States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 740 (1974)-
32 See Oaks, supm, n. 26, at 756. 
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tions. 33 Nor is there reason to assume that any specific 
disincentive already created by the risk of exclusion of 
evidence at trial or the reversal of convictions on direct 
review would be enhanced if there were the further risk 
that a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on 
direct review migh~ be overturned in collateral proceed-
ings years after the incarceration of the defendant. The 
view that the deterrence of Fourth Amendment viola-
tions would be furthered rests on the dubious assumption 
that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal 
habeas review might reveal flaws in a search or seizure 
that went undetected at trial and on appeaP4 Even if 
83 "As the exclusionary rule is applied time after time, it seems 
that its deterrent efficacy at some stage reaches a point of dimin-
ishing returns, and beyond that point its continued application is a 
public nuisance." Amsterdam, supra, n. 22, at 389. 
34 The policy arguments that respondents marshal in support 
of the view that federal habeas corpus review is necessary to 
effectuate the Fourth Amendment stem from a basic mistrust of 
the state courts as fair and competent forums for the adjudication 
of federal constitutional rights. The argument is that state courts 
cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth Amendment values through 
fair application of the rule, and the oversight jurisdiction of this 
Court on certiorari is an inadequate safeguard. The principal ra-
tionale for this view emphasizes the broad differences in the respective 
institutional setting within which federal judges and state judges 
operate. Despite differences in institutional environment and the 
unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state 
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now 
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights 
in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State courts. 
like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard per-
sonal liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 
14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-344 (1816) . Moreover, the argument 
that federal judges are more expert in applying federal constitutional 
law IS especially unpersuasive in the context of search-and-seizure 
claims, smce they are dealt with on a daily basis by trial 
level Judges in both system8. In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason 
why the fact th.at a man is a federal judge should make him more 
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one rationally could assume that some additional incre-
mental deterrent effect would be present in isolated cases, 
the resulting advance of the legitimate goal of furthering 
Fourth Amendment rights would be outweighed by the 
acknowledged costs to other values vital to a rational 
system of criminal justice. 
In sum, in view of the substantial societal costs associ-
ated with the exclusionary rule, we conclude that where 
the State has provided an adequate process for full and 
fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims, a state pris-
oner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on 
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional 
search or seizure was introduced at his trial. In this 
context the contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, 
to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal 
and the recognized costs of application of the rule 
persist,M 
competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the appli~· 
tion of federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse." 
Bator, supra, n. 7, at 50. 
85 Respondents contend that since they filed petitions for fed-
eral habeas corpus rather than seeking direct review by this Court 
through an application for a writ of certiorari, and since the time 
to apply for certiorari has now passed, any dimunition in their 
ability to obtain habeas corpus relief on the ground evidence obtained 
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at their trials 
should be prospective. Cf. England v. Louisiana State Board of 
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422'-423 (1964). We reject these 
contentions. Although not required to do so under the Court's prior 
decisions, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, respondents were, of course, 
free to file a timely petition for certiorari prior to seeking federal 
habeas corpus relief. More importantly, an untimely filing in a 
state or federal criminal case is not a jurisdictional defect, and, under 
some circumstances, plenary review in this Court is appro-
priate. E. g., Taglianetti v. United States, 394 U. S. 316, n. I 
(1969) ; Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80 (1968); Arnold v. North 
Carolina, 376 U. S. 773 (1964); Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S~ 
4:1.5, 418 n. 7 (1959 ). Respondents' remedy, therefore, lies in th~ 
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Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals 
are 
Reversed. 
filing of an out-of-time petition· for certiorari. At that time we can 
assess whether the claimed prejudice arising from our decision in this 
case justifies the waiver of the time rule, and whether we should. 





criminal offenses in state courts, and their convictions 
were affirmed on appeal. The prosecution in each case 
a 
respondent subsequently sought relief in/federal district 
court by filing a petition for federal habeas corpus 
under 28 u.s.c. § 2254. The question presented is 
a state prisoner 
may be granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that 
·evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure 
when he has - --
previously been ~i ------------------------------
afforded an \ was introduced at his trial~ The issue is of considerable 
I 
oppportuni ty for ' / 
full and fair 
j 
litigation · l importance to the administration of criminal justice • 
.
. · of his claims 
in the state I. 
courts. 
We summarize first the relevant facts and procedural 




Respondent, Lloyd Powell, was convicted of murder 
in June 1968 after trial in ~'california}ftate ;6urt. 
He and three companions entered the Bonanza Liquor Store 
in San Bernadino, California, at about midnight on February 
17, 1968, where Powell became involved in an altercation 
with Gerald Parsons, the store manager. In the scuffling 
that followed Powell shot and killed Parson's wife. Ten 
hours later, on Sunday morning, an officer of the Henderson, 
Nevada, Police Department 
.. 




the Henderson vagrancy ordinance, and~~ search_. 
~.~~t-~<J J'Le-~ ~4~~ 
h~~ ~eover~ng a .38 caliber revolver with six expended 
cartridges in the cylinder. 
Powell was extradicted to California anp tried 
for second degree murder in the Superior Court of San 
Bernardino County. 
7~ ek~ ,.,. I IO el! C. ... ¥1 "}i:J:_@t_Jit'1) 
1\ ParsQ.Os a~ Powell's . acc0mplic~i(;.t 
the liquor store testified against him. A criminologist 
.; 
I 
testified that the lver found on Powell was .. .. .. 
the gun that killed Parsons' wife. The trial court 
. rejected Powell's contention that -testimony by the Henderson 
aA-1" Yo~ ~~A-~ 
police officerAeeneern4ag-ehe-cireumstances of th~ discovery 
of the revolver should have been excluded because the 
I 
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional. 
1 
In July, 1969, 
~ conviction was affirmed by a California District Court \ 
Although the- issue -was 
1 of Appeal. 
the arrest and search because it concluded that even if ;\- vJ "~ 
.a..· ... ~ a ,. • • ., • • A , • ~ I\ I 
th~- t~stim,q~y -~f ~he ,A this was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt m~der Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 
{1967}a ~ 





The Supreme Court of California denied Powell's petition 
for habeas corpus relief. 
· In August 1971 Powell filed a petition for a writ 
of federal habeas corpus under 28 u.s.c. § 2254 in the United 
.. 
States District Court for the Northern District of California, 
contending that the testimony concerning the .38 caliber 
revolver should have been excluded as fruit of an illegal 
had been unlawful Henderson 
1<4 vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, an 
l~~ arresting officer lacked probable causethat he was violating 
it. The District Court did not reach the question of the 
~onstitutionality of the ordinance, although it 
did conclude that the arresting officer had probable cause 
•• 
4. 
The Court agreed with the 
California District Court that the admission of the evidence 




alternatively held that even if the vagrancy ordinance 
· L~ 'Pu.nf~cf/4; 
was unconstitutional, thelexclusionary rule 
applied to bar admission of the fruits of a search incident 
to an otherwise valid arrest. 
· In December 1974, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed. 507 F. 2d 93. The Court concluded 
t 
that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, 
that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal, and that although 
exclusion of the evidence 
would serve no deterrent purpose with regard to 
police officers who were enforcing statutes in good faith, 
exclusion would serve the public interest by deterring 
legislators from enacting unconstitutional statutes. Id. at 98. 
. .,...........,.,......._.,.. __ ~·- .,.,. .. ... ' ;:; 
,' '• 
5. 
After an independent review of the evidence the court 
concluded that the admission of the evidence 
was not harmless error since it supported 
the testimony .of Parsons and Powell's accomplices 
• ~· at 99. 
Respondent, David Rice, was convicted of murder in 
April 1971 after triaL in a Nebraska state court. At 2:05 
a.m. on August 17, 1970, Omaha police received a telephone 
call that a woman was heard screaming at 2865 Ohio Street. 
As ·one of the officers sent to that address examined 
a suitcase lying in :the doorway, it exploded, killing him 
instantl~ . 
By August 22 the investigation of the murder 
centered on Duane Peak, a fifteen-year-old member of the 
National Committee to Combat Fascism ("NCCF").J 
arrest. 
~hat afternoon a warrant was issuedfor Peak's 








._ _______ _ 
focused on other known members of the NCCF, including 
respondent Rice, 
some of whom were believed planning 
to kill Peak before he could incriminate them. Upon 
arriving at Rice's home at 10:30 p.m., the police found 
response to their repeated knocking. While officers were 
left to watch the premises, a warrant was obtained to search 
.. 
for explosives and illegal weapons believed to be in Rice's 
, 
possession. Peak was not in the house but upon entry the 
police discovered, in plain view, dynamite, blasting caps, 
wire, a battery, and a pair of long nosed pliers. Peak 
subsequently was arrested, and on August 27, Rice voluntarily 
surrendered. The clothes Rice was wearing at that time were 





. • , 
1. 
Rice was tried for first degree murder in the 
District Court of Douglas County. court denied 
At trial Peak admitted planting the 
suitcase and making the telephone call, and implicated Rice 
in the bombing plot. As corroborative evidence the State 
introduced items seized in the search, as well as the results 
of the ~hemica~ analysis ~f his clothing. On appeal ' the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed conviction, holding 
that the search of Rice's home had been pursuant to a valid 
·search warrant. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W. 2d 480 
(1972). 
In September 1972 Rice filed a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court 
for Nebraska. Rice's sole contention was that his incarceration 
i . 
8. 
was unlawful because . the evidence underlying his conviction 
had been discovered as the result of an illegal search of 
his home. The District Court concluded that the search 
warrant was invalid, as the supporting affidavit was 
fatally defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393 u.s. 
410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 u.s. 108 (1964). 
388 F. Supp. 185, 190-194 
~ 
(19~3). The court also rejected 
the State's content"ion that even if the warrant was invalid 
. ' 
the search was justified because of the valid arrest 
warrant for Peak and because of the exigent circumstances 
of the situation. The court reasoned that the arrest warrant 
did not justify the entry as the police lacked probable 
cause to believe Peak was in the house, and further concluded 
that the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to 
justify an immediate warrantless search. Id. at 194-202. 
4 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, 
substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court. 






·-- .... -:. fit. 
· Petitioners Stone and Wolff, the wardens of the 
State prisons where Powell and Rice are incarcerated, 
petitioned for review of these decisions, raising questions 
concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the~'(~ 
· ~c.tb.4,~ 
exclusionary rule~b9-Gasee ~~ · 
c.\&\~.t • 
~ 6-f t:::l-•<..e··.4 ... ·.~ 
uii.C.On&tiWt'.iona~ar-eh-aad-s~. e grant their 
petitions for certiorari. 
. I 
422 u.s. 1055 (1975). 




· The authority of federal courts to issue the writ of 
~ 
habeas corpus ad subjiciedum was included in the first 
·grant of federal court juris'diction made by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, c. 20 § 14, 1 Stat. 81, with the limitation 
that the writ-extend only to@llllllfprisoners he.ld in 
custody by the United States. The original statutory 
authorization did not define its substantive reach. It 
merely stated that the courts of the United States "shall 
have power to issue writs of •.. habeas corpus .... " 
Ibid. The courts ~-- defined the scope of the writ in 
accordance with . the common law and limited it-~w«aek to 
l- j 
an inquiry as to the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
tribunal. .See_L e.g. , Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 
193 (1830)(Marshall1 C.J.). In 1867 the writ wa$ extended 
~soners. Act of February 
5, 1867, c. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385. Under the 1867 Act 
relief by federal courts was authorized in "all cases 
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty 





fpliaak•• t 1 federal district court. 
n~ ~••a .. •l~, ...... ~p~zws~, In~' however, 
on direct review the state supreme had refused to consider 
-H.e 
~ appeal because the papers were filed out-of-time. This 
Court held that since the state court judgment rested on a 
legitimate 
reasonable application of the state's f · : procedural rules, 
have barred - ·~ b ~ this CDur'!J 
a ground that would : I direct review of his federal claim~ . 
j 
the district court lacked authority to grant habeas corpus 
relief. See 344 u.s. at 458, 486. 
This final barrier to full collateral reexamination 
of state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings was removed in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
Noia and two co-defendants had been convicted of felony 
murder. The sole evidence against each defendant was a 
. r,;o!s J 
signed confession. ~ .. co-defendants, but not ;Noi) Ai~{f, 
appealed their convictions. Although their appeals were 
. . . ~-\ · 
unsuccessfu~ in subsequent-proceedings they were 
able to establish that their confessions had been coerced 





; ..! . ... • \ . 
14. 
~ '~ on motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
p~marq . 
The s iixl rationale advanced in support of those decisions 
was ~R@ view that Fourth Amendment violations are different 
$ 
in kind from deni~f other constitutional rights in that 
.,t.. 
claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn the 
. " 
.. 
integrity o~ the fact-finding process or challenge the 
evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion of 
illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device 
intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations 
by law enforcement officers." at 224. See Thornton 
v. United States, 368 F.2d 822 ufman rejected 
and lae/J . 
this rationale1J ldtng that search-and-seizure claims are 
.. cognizable in § 2255 proceedings_;; · Ift Pe;j eet?i..ft~ this 
. C-r.--
reeserri:ag the Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy 
extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial," 
'/ 
concluded that there was no basis ~· at 225-226~ 
. _,_ 
for restricting "access by federal prisoners with illegal 
search-and-seizure claims to federal collateral remedies, 
while placing no similar restriction on access by state 
prisoners." Although in recent years the view has been 
of the United States •..• " ·The principle that federal 
habeas corpus jurisdiction was limited to consideration of 
the jurisdiction of the sentencing court, however, ren~ined 
[ the touchstone in this area. ~ee. e.g .• In re Wood, 140 
U.S. 278 (1891); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); Andrews 
v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 
U.S. 655 (1895); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906). 
was subjected 
the substantive 
expansion was limited to only a 
'9 
·few classes of cases until \'ett•lllllll•il' _.. _ _.._,•) Frank v. Mangnum, 
-----· -·· 
237 U.S. 309, in 1915. · In Frank, the prisoner had claimed 
in the state courts that the proceedings which resulted in 
~s conviction for murder had been dominated by a mob. 
41-~ 
~the ftate jupreme .fourt rejected his contentions~--· 
Frank .-.a unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus 
' ·- -·--~ ... 
relief in the federal district court. g' i 'It 
------~ , 
l On ; '!. 1 fhe Svprem e. Courf _.) F'I'CLhk ~ federal ela.ims 
:Z affirmed the de~ial of reji..ef because ~p ·ned 
,
1
;, o.J 6een_ {&1 ~:J;.~n;i;;T:?J. ... _..~. 
.iii il I ~ii ~ L 3 by a competant ------ ------ -·-- . --- - .-
and ~ ~7L.~.~ unbias bu~~ArecognizedAtnat if a habeas corpus 
been coerced, 
habeas review. The court of appeals reversed, ordering 
~, .... $.) 
that'i a conviction be set aside and he be released from 
~ 
custody or a new trial granted. ~ Court affirmed the 
grant of the writ, narrowly restricting ~he circumstances 
-~v 
in· which a federal court ~ in its discretion refuse 
~ 
. 0 
~<l.u-h i ffd 1 .. 1. 1"' to r:eeu:BfR1-ae t e mer ts o e era const~tut~ona c a~ms 
to cases involving deliberate ,bypass of state procedural 
fJ-
r~les or failure to exhaust available state remedies. 
-------- ~~N••:::i:·i.•:IF ... •.•t:l.z~e ...................... ~ .......... .
w •n_. ............................ ,£ .. 5~ .... 31rhroughout 
the period in which the substantive scope of the writ was 
~
expa~ded( the Court did not address ehe iss~Awhether ~ 
~~~--~~ 
exceptions to full review might A-be-e~d 'l!ii.tb. r.eg-aro to 
' particular categories of constitutional claims. Prior 
. 
to the Court's decision in Kaufman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 217 (1969), however, a substantial majority of the 
federal courts of appeal had concluded that collateral 




court finds that the :tate has failed to Asupply adequate 
".correct1ve proces~' for the full and fair litigation of 
federal claiinS, w\lether or not "jurisdiCtionatf\J ioa a 
• •••• ••imlnal pzoceeettug, the court may~ 
the detention is lawful. !d. at )l)·3~. 
In the landmark decisions in ~rgwn v. Allen, 344 
t'~f.V 
U. 953), and Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S., at 482-487, 
,. , 
the scope of the writ was expanded still further. In 
these cases state prisoners applied for federal habeas 
corpus relief claiming that the trial cour~had erred in 
their 
failing to quash l · indictments due to alleged discrimina-
tion in the selection of grand juro~~~ ruling certain 
confessions admissible. \ ,In l3t'ownj ~·~i .·d::li'eot appeal ft'dm the 
. ...._ ___ - - . - · . . r-·- ,. 
convic1Iio;' 1~dtese claiins had been rej.iCted on . the. merits 
.by 
~he ahig~t court of . the State' State v. Brown, 
I • 
233 N.C. 202, 63 S.E . 2d 99 (\,Sf), and~ Court -
. J( ,qsJ) 1 
~had denied certiorari, 341 U.S. 94f- Despite 
of these constitutional 
corrective process, the 
hahea~ corpus c~  
to a full reconsideration 
L?a-r:q~~~ 




' "()\MC.\.1\j ... 1?e~.,~) 
l ~.,~ 1) . ~. !.~ 
( \"\bi)~ c..~'(~~ 
v. t... ... \1 ,.\\ tE> . ) 
~',u.s~ ~2~~ 
I U'l~t )) \ ·, 
\ ""' .... , -....,..._,. _____""" -
~ .. . . . 
~ .. 
,J.J ·~ on motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
p~mar~ . 
The ilnl rationale advanced in support of those decisions 
was ~8@ Yiew that Fourth Amendment violations are different 
. $ 
in kind from deni~f other constitutional rights in that 
A-
claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn the 
. . ~ 
. . 
integrity o~ the fact-finding process or challenge the 
evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion of 
illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylac~ic device 
intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations 
by law enforcement officers." at 224. See Thornton 
v. United States, 368 F.2d 822 ufman rejected 
and laeld . 
this rationale11 ldtng that search-and-seizure claims are 
'· cognizable in § 2255 proceedings_;.> · Irt E"ej ee&i:ft~ ei'tis 
·C-r:-
rea&eft'i.Rg the Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy 
extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial," 
'/ 
concluded that there was no basis ~· at 225-226~ 
(_ 
for restricting "access by federal prisoners with illegal 
search-and-seizure claims to federal collateral remedies, 
while placing no similar restriction on access by state 





&pp_;£O~et:e.,. , in n f p lisztlksas t ' a federal district court. 
n~ · =••• .. •t-.: ...... t~p~aM&~• In~, however, 
on direct review the state supreme court had refused to consider 
~e. 
~ appeal because the papers were filed out-of-time. This 
Court held that since the state court judgment rested on a 
· legitimate 
reasonable application of the state's f · : procedural rules, 
have barred • b ~ thi$ Coor~ 
a ground that would : I direct review of his federal claims, 
the district court lacked authority to grant habeas corpus 
relief. See 344 u.s. at 458, 486. 
This final barrier to full collateral reexamination 
of state criminal convictions in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings was removed in Fay V ·. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
Noia and two co-defendants had been convicted of felony 
murder. The sole evidence against each defendant was a 
. rt>io!s J 
signed confession. ,.. co-defendants, but not Noi) lu"wt-«{f.J 
appealed their convictions. Although their appeals were 
. . . ~-\ ' 
unsuccessful, in subsequent-proceedings they were 
able to establish that their confessions had been coerced 
and 
the Constitution. 
although it was stipulated that his confession&'also~ 
.. 
.,_,....,... ____ 1._ 
' . . 
14. 
~ ~~ 
on motions filed by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 • 
• 
P~~rq . 
The s ikl rationale advanced in support of those decisions 
was ~A@ Yiew that Fourth Amendment violations are different 
$ 
in kind from deni~f other constitutional rights in that 
..t,.. 
claims of illegal search and seizure do not "impugn the 
1\ 
integrity o~ the fact-finding process or challenge the 
evidence as inherently unreliable; rather, the exclusion of 
illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylactic device 
intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations 
by law enforcement officers." at 224. See Thornton 
v. United States, 368 F.2d 822 ufman rejected 
and /ae/J . 
this rationale11 ldtng that search-and-seizure claims are 
.. cognizable in§ 2255 proceedings;.; · Ift Pejeet-:ia~ t!ftis 
·C-r.-
~ the Court noted that "the federal habeas remedy 
extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial," 
v 
concluded that there was no basis ~· at 225-226~ 
for restricting "access by federal prisoners with illegal 
search-and-seizure claims to federal collateral remedies, 
, · 
while placing no similar restriction on access by state 






expressed that the Court should reexamine the substantive 
scope of federal habeas jurisdiction and limit collateral 
review of Fourth Amendment claims "solely to the question 
whether the petitioner was provided with a fair opportunity 
to raise and have adjudicated the question in state courts," 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, .\3 
j . 
412 U .. S. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, 
4!--~~ 
J., concurring)," the Court without discuss~on o the issue, 
has continued to accept jurisdiction in cases raising such 
claims. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). 
~----·] The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal 
,. ~ 
habeas CO~pus rests On the assumption that i2PI£ , 
.. 
I • effectuateo' 
.l. •• -.. 
'" ~ ,. .. , ... ,._ :"'!( , .. .. ...-- . • . .... 
+ ... .: "'- \•t.' , I re3azv.\('es, *"'e, :,-rc..""+;!!!!tJ 
. r\ ,. ,., ... ~ , (_ \ ,\ o..:S the Fou;th Amendmens£ ' ... - I I • ~ IW ' cl.. 
. . ,, a ¢ 3 < ,- ~ habeas corpusl when ~lPrisoner 
,·., 
, / ' ~·\'e." I ' 
has been convicted in state court on the b~sis of tl 
~ eviden~~ ob~~ined i~llegal searc eizur as 
i\e. fo"".-,~ CA~ lro\A~1-een~ AW\~·~ 
-~equire• ~~ion of s~ch evidence t trial and ~ 
suc~onvictione upon dir~ct review~IIIIIIIIIIIIIBI 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 u.s. 643 
have 
this case we/ 
this assumption , 
See, ~' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 
----~~~~' supra, at 249 n.38. 
Upon examination, we. conclude, in view of the nature and 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
~ssumption is unjustified.~~ 
exclusionary rule 
. . ' that 
III.' -~ 14'41.A-;(..;.t..,_ 
Amendment ~o*d s a.ltl. ~i:Q.a.eR£ ~be ''agh£ 
~ecure in their persons, houses, papers, an~ effects, 
The Fourth 
against unreasonable · searches and seizures." The Amendment 
was primarily a reaction to the evils associated with the 
use of the general war~ant in England and the writs of 
assistance in the Colonies, Stanford v. Texas ., 379 U.S. 476, 
481-485 (a•4S); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-365 
a 
( I'St ) , a~d was intended to protect the "sanctity of/man's 
home and the privacies of life," Boyd v . . United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 630 (1886), from searches under unchecked general 
li 
authority. 
The exclusionary rule was adopted ~~ erdec to effectuate 
·the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. Prior to the 
Court's decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914), evidence obtained in violation of the ¥ew~6h Amendment 
.· .. 
.,., 
generally could be introduced criminal trials both state ,,. 
and federa . See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). 
In Weeks the Court held that evidence secu~ed through an 
illegal search and seizure could not be introduced in a 
federal prosecution . . The prohibition~extended to 
the fruits of the illegally seized evidence. Silverthorne 
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Thirty-
five years after Heeks the Court held in Wolf v. Colorado, 
338 U.S. 25 (1949~ that the right of privacy against 
arbitrary intrusion by the police ' that is protected by 
the Fourth Amendment is "implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty and as such enforceable against the States through 
the [Fourteenth Amendment] Due Process Clause." Id., at 
27. the Court v? .ft.. uloolCs e.o<'l.u ;.,.,..') .-.. lo 
concluded tat ~would not e ~mposed upon the States as 
"an essential ingredient of that right." Id. at 27. The 
full force of Wolf steadily eroded in 
subsequent decisions, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 




.es:z}.y a little more than a decade later the exclusionary rule . 
~-~-U.ok 
was ··-----~&-QR the States 
Decisions prior to ~ 
.. 
in~ v. Ohio, 367 U.S. ~. 
advanced two reasons 
,;. federal 
for application of the rul . In ---=~ 
to the "imperative of judicial integrity" ~oF 
. ) 1\ 
contamination of the judicial process.~ 
18 ~~'. 
364 U.S. at 222. ~ut e~hai~ad a more pragmatic ground: 
.· . A 
The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. 
Its purpose is to deter- to compel~respect for 
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively 
available way- by removing the incentive to 
disregard it. 364 U.S., at 217. 
~~ustified the application of the rule to 
~ ~ 
the States on several grounds, but)\principallyAthe belief 





(!) __ J 
- -~-
.. _ _ , ~lthough -:.... ~e~isioiiSAfubsE.quent to 
\., oH-eN\ . LJ . . 
~ X have alluded to the "imperative of judicial 
~J 1.. "'U o.s. S:!.l,u .{ilSJ? 
.- integrity," ~d Stat~s v. Peltier, WQ j( 536-539 
~~""". desbi<>As11also demonstrate the limited role of that 
~- · ~ . 
~rifte in the determination whether to apply the ...... ? .. -. .. ~; 
A. . . 1J ~ 
rule in. a particular context. Logically extended ~&r~e 
~~k.w- . . . 
' would require that courts exclude unconstitutionally seized "' . . 
evidence despite lack of objection by the defendant, or even 
over his assent. Compare Henry v. Mississippi , .379 U.S. 443 
(1965). It/fould(aisj\ require abando~ent of the standing limi-
tations on who may object to unconstitutionally seized evidence, 
see Alderman v. United States, 394 u.s. 165 (1969), and the 
...... __ _ 
•• 
abatement of judicial proceedings when the defendant's ~ 
•> . 
is unconstitutionally seized, a proposition we rejected in 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 u.s. 103, 119 (1975). Last Term, we 
~~ 
recognized that judicial ?U;;-i&y is "not offended 
4\ 
if law enforcement officials reasonably believed in good 
faith that their conduct was 
---..........-.---~ 
in accordance with the law even if decisions subsequent . to 
the search and seizure have held that _ conduct of the type 
engaged in by the law enforcement officials is not permitted 
by the Constitution." 
"f .. .-1 : . - -
~-5_38 (emphasis omitted). Similarly, the."Prinei:pl:e 
--~~~ p ·s #S > • eat. -ff-hr* .. ;t=!.,., 
~;judicial integrity does not prevent the use of illegally 
. seized evidence in grand jury proceedings. United States v. 
Calandra, 414 U.So 338 
to result in convictions in some cases. require 
that the trial court exclude such evidence from use for 
impeachment of the defendant}, Walder v. ~ited States, 347 
u.s. 62. (1954.). Cf. Harris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) , 
__.-;;;> 
\ "-----......... -·----
The teaching of these cases in clear. While courts, of 
course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integrity 
of the judicial process, this concern has limited force 
as a justification for the exclusion of 
highly probative evidence without regard to the 
.. circumstances that may have made its seizure violative 
of the letter of the Fourth Amendment. The force of this 
justification becomes minimal where federal habeas corpus 
relief is sought by a prisoner who previously has been 
~~vu 
afforded the opportunity for a full aad fai~~itigation 
" "" ~ of his search - and - seizure claim at trial and on direct 
'- ~ 
review. .. 








-xeei~t!FB claims at trial aAd ga dil.r8Silt reujew, 
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule 
is the deterrance of unlawful police conduct that violates 
Fourth Amendment rights. Post-~ decisions have established 
that the rule is not a personal constitutional right. It 
is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the 
search victim, for any "'[r]eparation comes too late." 
~ Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965). Instead, 
' 
... ____ _ 
----- ----
-~ ..... __ -





$~)ad~ • . 
Accord United States v. Peltier, 7 
5); Terry 
Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,' 446 (1974). 
-~ . ~ 
?' ------- -
- -~ J'i-'--_...__ 
J ~involved the application of the;'xclusionary 
'--~ )_·.~~~~) • 
a~iaifand on direct review. ~n Kaufman 
1
\the Court 
assumed that implementation of the Fourth Amendment also ~ 
~e. c.ot\S\cle-rc.:h"~.-oL~~-~-se\~(~ ~~ 
requires 77-- · i ;trli - -,. - , .. i ~ I upon collateral 
L...A./ ~ U'>t.Vt d> ·ems J 
eview? the broad deterrent 
purpose of interpreted to 
proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in 
• 
all proceedings or against all persons. As in the case of 
any remedial device, "the application of the rule has been 
;. · 




restricted to those areas where its remedi.al objectives 
'Ow# 
are thought most efficaciously served." -u · 
Calandra, 4l~ _u.s~1 
... __... . ... ~ .. ~ r-· • • 
cd' 1>49. -~ . United States v. 
refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to grand jury 
proceedings was based on a weighing of the potential 
injury to the historic role and functionJ of the grand 
jucy of such extension against the potential contribution 
to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment through 
deterrance of police misconduct: 
·------------- --- ----- _. __ ........._.....__ 
Any incremental deterrent effect which 
might be achieved by extending the rule to grand 
jury proceedings is uncertain at best. Whatever 
deterrence of police misconduct may result from 
the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from 
·criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that 
application of the rule to grand jury proceedings 
would significantly further that goal. Such an 
extension would deter only police investigation 
consciously directed toward the discovery of 
evidenc7-~olely for use in a grand jury investi-
gation_. ••• 
_ _ _ __.) We ~herefore decline to embrace a view 
tha~ wouio achLe~e a speculative and undoubtedly 
minLmal advance Ln the deterrence of police 
misconduct at the expense of substantially impeding 
the role of the grand jury • .IJ. o:t :3.5'1. 
--------
~ · The same pragmatic analysis of the exclusionary rule's 
-t.a.~ 
necessity in a particular context ..._ was evidentAin Walder 
v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 
) 
where the Court 
permitted the Government to use unlawfully seized evidence 
to impeach the credibility of a defendant who had €ir~~ 









testified broadly in his own defense. The Court held, in 
effect, that the interests safeguarded by the exclusionary 
rule were outweighed in that context by the need to prevent 
perjury and assure the integrity of the trial process. The 
I 
·~udgment in Walder revealed most clearly that the - ~olici~s __ _C 
· ~ehind the exclusionary rule are. n~; abs~ . . . 
-@ < Rather, thf'utility t be evaluated 
in light of competing policies. In that case, the 
1..,. 
public interest in determination of truth at trial was 
deemed to outweigh the incremental contribution that might 
have been made to the protection of Fourth Amendment values 
by application of the rule. 
The balancing process at work in these cases also finds 
• the standing requirement. 
Standing to invoke the exclusionary rule has been restricted 
to situations in which the Government attempts to use such 
evidence to incriminate the victim of the illegal search. 
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. 
- \'-5" 
United States, 394 U.S •. 1111 .. 111; Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471 (1963); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 
• 
(1960). The standing requirement is premised on the view 
that the~additional benefits of extending the rule~to 
defendants other than the victim of the search . Qre outweighed 
by theNfurther encroachment~he public interest in 
· f;rosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted 







We return now to the question presented by these 
cases .... ~espondents allege _. ............... violations 
of Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed • them through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The question is whether these state 
prisoners---whose reliance upon the exclusionary rule with 
respect to the seized evidence has been fairly considered 
A"" -w"ic.\ W Ot\ ~~ 
and rejected by the 'state courts may be granted federal 
... habeas corpus relief by invoking again the exclusionary rule 
~. 
on~uch • collateral review. The answer -- --·~~· - .. . is 
... to be found through the balancing process identified 
above in Part III. 
Even where the exclusionary rule is applied at trial 
1A 
and on direct review, the costs are well known: the focus 
of the trial, 
from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that 
should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. 
,.... ... u-~~ 
reliable and often the most probative information bearing 
on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. As Mr. Justice 




"A claim of illegal search and seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment is crucially different 
from many other constitutional rights; ordinarily 
the evidence seized can in no way have been 
rendered untrustworthy by the means of its 
seizure and indeed often this evidence alone 
establishes beyond virtually any shadow of a 
doubt that the defendant is guilty." 394 U.S., 
at 237. 
Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding 
process~and often frees the guilty. The disparity in 
particular cases between the error committed by the police 
officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by 
application ~f the rule is contrary to the idea of 
proportionality that 
ess~~~ z.S 
the concept of justice. - --,.. . 
Thus, although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police 
activity in part through the nurturing of respect for 
Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately · 
the rule may well have the opposite effect of generating 
zc.. 
disrespect for the law and administration of justice. 
These long recognized costs of the rule persist with 
peculiar force when the rule is extended to collateral 
review of Fourth Amendment claims already considered by 
1.7 
two or more tiers of state courts. 
Evidence obtained by p~lice officers in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope 





Despite the absence of supportive empiric evidence, we 
have assumed 
enforcement officials from violating the Fourth Amendment 
L mo~e. ·.vW\~W\+1~, J 
by removing the incentive to disregard it.z~er the long 
term, this demonstration that our society attaches serious 
consequences to violation of constitutional rights is 
thought to encourage those who formulate law enforcement 
policies, and the officers who implement them, to incorporate 
2.CJ 
Fourth Amendment ideals into their value 
~ ) We adhere to these assumptions as supportive of the 
&-.... ·---





exclusionary rule at trial and on direct appea~. But 
at the collateral review stage of the judicial pr.ocessy-
not only is there 
but the 
no 
h Amendment is small in relation to 
\;..bo O.SS"'~e~J 
rationallyJCthat any 
the acost.· c; 
~ 
n2.~n.t:iye . creat~d . by .. the risk of exclusiop at trial or 
.. ' -· . . -· ,.. .- r ~ • • l '· .... ........ . I •. • ~ ~ • -. ' .~~ 
on direct review would be further increased in any 
. ·' - (" ! _J. : . :1 I ,;.. • 
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------~~ To be sure, each case in which 
is considered contributes to the 
- - . 
awareness and understanding of the values protected 
by the Fourth Amendment. But the marginal contribution ~ 
\-;._ -
$•~ejtstage reaches a point of sharply diminishing returns. 
Vle. J,o ~ ~\\~ ~e 
~ o~ o"«~V\\"'-' ~"\d-1 on~ 
,0~~-.~'E'a '"' vi()\~\;~ ~ ~ 
w~ \oe ~\~~+\c.~~ ~~~\..J ·« se~-~-~~~ 
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unlawfully .to obtain a conviction, also were told that 
\ ... .. ., ... ~~; .• ·~ ( '. :. . 
·'-the conviction might be overturned in collateral proceedings 
.. years 
.9¥ T'-"e ·J\ .~~_J 
the defendant. ~ \J " 
in a search 
or seizure at trial or 
Even if one could assume some additional incremental 
deterrent effect in isolated cases, the resulting speculative 
advance of this legitimate goal would be outweighed by the 
c~~~~her values that are vital to a rational system 
of criminal justice . .... 
In sum, in view of the substantial costs associated 
with collateral review of state court judgments and 
particularly with the exclusionary rule itself, we conclude 
that where the state has provided an adequate process for 
~• ··· "' · -:·' ·~··~~ ·• ·· ·····-"'•u • .. ..... ~ . . ~•· .... . A • · ~~\'4l>,il ~~ •  -.:: ':'\"UC~.,i!~\:. ·.-' '~,,.";':; , .,..~ .'!;(~·~ ·,.,· ~'r?·.-J .. J;'""".· ·. ~" ~-~ . ,J.~~r..,.-..r.~.·J.. · ~ ·~" · · l ~ ."Y.~ .. ..... ·.:.~  .. . -CJ ...:., ; .. :-. '"- . ~IOr .. .. ...-..... t..h.~~·.~;~l,:..·~-.t~Cf.i~\1 ' •i I~ • 
and fair litigation of Fourth· Affienament claims, a full 
state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus 
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an 
unconstitutional search and seizure was . introduced at his 
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trial. At that stage the contribution of such review, if 
·any, to the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment is minimal 
and the recognized costs of application of the exclusionary 
32 
X'\lle per!l ... , ... t in full force. 
· ~ Accordingly, the. judg~entsof the Cour~of Appeals 
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f If The ordinance provides: 
"Every person is a vagrant who: 
[1] Loiters or wanders upon the streets or 
from place to place without apparent reason 
or business and [2] who refuses to identify 
himself and to account for his presence when 
asked by any peace officer to do so [3] if 
the surrounding circumstances are s~ch as to 
indicate to a reasonable man that the public 
safety demands such identification," 
. ~ llf In support of the vagueness holding the court 
rel~ed princi~ly on Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 
~~.~ 
405 U.S. 156 (1972), where we~~k=dewn es aneonstituti~nally 
~ .. 
lUi~ a city ordinance defining vagrants as "persons 
wandering or strolling around from place to place without 
any lawful purpose or object. " Id. at 156-157 n. 1. -




Henderson ordinance and~~e.-a~p"e•a .. .-.. .a~~~--· 7 6 s• •']the ' 
·it concluded that 
CN=C J (.,. 
the second and third elements of the Henderson ordinance 4i6 
-'\ 
~ •,j;,. 
not aQ4 sufficient specific~ to cure ~ overall vagueness • 
.. - ~ ·. " 
ef ~ ~~8$~~~. 507 F.2d at 95-97. Petitioner Stone 
challenges these conclusions, but in view of our disposition 
of the case we need not consider this issue. 
3· Jhe affidavit in support of the warrant 
Whiea wes !he sole evidence . pre~ented to the magistr~ 
,.+ 
Aindicated that the police. believed explosives and 
illegal weap~ns were present in Rice's home because (1) 
Rice was an active .member of the NCCF, (2) a violent killing 
. ..__ 
of •«~po~~~~·~e~officer had occurred and it appeared that the 
.NCCF was involved, and (3) ~d received information 
in the past that Rice possessed weapons and explosives, 
which he said should be used against the police. See 
App. to Pet. Cert. 34 n. 2. In concl?ding the,-.e 
• 
existed probable cause for issuance of the warrant, the 
state trial court on the motion to suppress and the state 
supreme Court on appeal relied in part on information contained 
. :;: -






in testimony adduced at the suppression hearing that was 
not included in the affidavit. The district court limited - --
its probable cause inquiry to the faee of the affidavit, 
~ Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n:'3(\~~~j 
\. (aq~) J ._ 
Aguilar v. Texas,378 U.S. 108, 109, n:::lJtand concluded 
probable cause was lacking. Petitioner Wolff contends that 
. 
police should be permitted to supplement the information 
contained in .an affidavit for a search warrant at the 
hearing on a motion to suppress, an issue we need not reach • . 
4. The district court further held that the evidence -- ... -
of dynam~te particles found RiQ.Q -was WQaring 
&~ader should have been suppressed as 
tainted fruit of an arrest warrant that would not have 
been issued but for the unlawful search of his home. 338 
F . . supp. 202-207. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 
u.s. 385 (1920). 
Jr. In granting certiorari in these cases we requested 
that counsel in Powell v. Stoner Ne, 74 lQO~ and Wolff v. 
addre~espectively) the questions: --v. ~r=Uo. 74-f 





•~et~~r the constitutional validity of the entry and ~care~ 
of respondent's premises by. Ohmaha police offic~rs un lr ~le 
circumstances of this c~se is a question proper Y cogn za e 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. . . 
"Whether, in light of the fact that the District 
Court found that the Henderson, Nev.) ·- police 
officer had probable cause to arrest respondent 
for violation of an ordinance which at the time 
of arrest had not been authoritatively determined 
to be unconstitutional, respondent's claim that 
the gun discovered as a result of a search 
incident to that arrest violated his rights 
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution is one cognizable 
under 28 U.S. C. § 2254.'" 
AwA - ~,-
b. It is now well-estab 
corpus" ~sed alone 
·-ref~ to the common law writ of habeas corpus ad 
"Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 
(1807)(Marshall, fi'here still CJtis t, heue u er, Rletny 
I 
Stati&i; J6w 'Ll 5 i 5 8 ll (1981) · (ha'Beas eel! pas uti preoegaendaM:f. 
1. Prior to 1889 there was, in practical effect, no 
\ 
appellate review in federal criminal cases. The possibility 
of Supreme Court review on certificate of division 
opinion in the circuit court was ~aderee 




... ;;. ~ . 
a-5 
Frankfurter & Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 
31-32, 79-80 (1927). lnord±mree Fressure 
1
Mt,. ~aturall1'~' 
of the scope of habeas corpus ~ 
e5aec to reach otherwise unreviewqble decisions involving 
fundamental rights·. See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 376-377 
. 
(1879); Bator, Finality · in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas 
Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 473 & 
n. 75. See generally Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts 
and the Federal System 
ie The expansion occurred primarily ~ 
~ tf.,«eA(.... ~A (}. J 
~ convictions based on assertedlY, unconstitutional 
A . '-( I 31, ).;.~ 
statutes, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 37l~, and ~~) 
de~entions based upon an~~egal~ 
sentence, e.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 
nt71e ..,, 
(1873). See Bator, supra, flOte ~at 465-474. 
Cf· There has 
a~._,~ 
to whether the 
result in Brown v. Allen was foreshadowed by the Court's 
decision in Moore v. Dempsy, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). Compare 
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 421 & n. 301il~r~, Foreward: The 
Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 1q5 (1959); 
Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of Abortive States 




L~ V. ~') I 
L 372 U.S., at 457-460 
N-6 
(Harlan, J., .dissenting) j Bator, 
7 
supra, note )r, at 488-491. 
\~. •. In construing broadly the power of a federal 
~istrict court to consider constitutional claims presented 
~ a writ of habeas corpus, the Court in Fay also reaffirmed 
-·· . 
~'E ·.: :··· :-.~-:lu':l: L· the equitable nature of the writ, noting that "[d) iscretion 
~ .. . . . . .. .. 
• :' • ~; . rr ~. ~ - "' ... i' r , .. · .... .. · ...... ,... · ... .. .. :.·~ -·· •. .. ............ w • • • 
~ is implicit in the statutory command that the Judge 'dispose 
1 . ~ ~ c - .. .... ~ .. ~-
~ .,.. ·-•::.J '.: .. , •. ' . Q __ 
.: ~-?f».~ ~;<( [:· r-oJ· :·~h~ -mat:ter as law and justice require.' 28 U.S. C. _ 
• • • 0 Cl • • • ... • · ... ... • 
:J·~.L:~\· 8 t r3-J:... . .... -~ -.. ......... · ... __ ._1"""1 .,_ ~ -:--- .. ""' - · • .. ... .. ...... ,..... • .~ T .... ~ .. :· f""' ·= -- _. -. ___ . 
I 2242." 372 U.S. at 438. ·More :t:ecently, in -Francis v . 
. ,... .. . ,. ..... .• J ... • -~ 
:::.~:::~ ·:~ Henderson, _ q~s. ·- (1976), .. holding that absent 
• JII'.~ r ~ !) _ 1 ;; _'·~~1~~ of • actual ~~ej~dice ·~ . stat~; ~;is~ne; ~hO . f~l~ 
.... '.. )~ r..; .cn: : ...:. ... ~- . . .: . ., ·. :.·:~ ::_~: ·: St •. :. ~~ .. '·· : , ··~ .. : t: . : ·ro~ 
-i;.r/1: £;1: <. to : make a timely challenge to the composition of the 
'r;~-. "· .. _·::'~'" .... ~1 :L.(· ,-.:- ., ··- · 
grand jury that indicted 
.. ....... - ~· 
. . ":. . •· ... . 
bring that challenge in corpus , p;oceeding, 
we emphasized that: 
"This Court has long recognized that in some 
circumstances considerations of comity and 
concerns for the orderly administration of 
criminal justice require a federal court to 
forego exercise of its habeas corpus power. 
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 425-426." 
lZL As dasctcc Slack nsecci 221 elzssent, 
I ! 
... . ( 2: "" 
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jilt Despite the expansion of the scope of the writ,.there has been 
}no change in the.J 
· · established rule with respect to nonconstitutional claims.~~ 
The · writ of habeas corpus and its federal counterpart, 28 u.s.c. 
- ~ 
§ 2255, "will not be allowed to do service for an appeaJ.:' Sunal 
v. Large, 332 . u.s •. 174, 178 (l'i17 ) • 
For this reason, nonconstitutional claims that 
_,{_2-J J 
· · · 368 u.s.· 424, 428 ('~'1). . ) . . ., 
. ·' • .,._ • {I ) _ " I •- , I J 
~ 
J. ' 
. i'. . 
.... ... r '-! • I' 
. ' ·'· 
.. 
.. . 
\J.-, Compare, ~' United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641 
, uc .t,..; • ..a, ~a .. u.s. eao(a,~? 
(CA 2) ; United States v. Jenkins, 281 F.2d 193 ~ (CA 3 1960); 
Armstead v. United States, 318 F.2d 725 (CA 5 1963); Eisner v. 
k 
·United States, 351 F.2d 55 (CA 6 1965); De Welles v. Un1ted 
eM· cle.~ocl, 18t0 v.~. ~,._ (~1 
States, 372 F. 2d 67 (CA 7) _ - ; Williams v. United States, 
307 Fo2d 366 (CA 9 1962~ with, ~' United States v. Sutton, 
321 F.2d 221 (CA 4 1963); Gaitan v. United States, 317 F.2d 
494 (CA 10 1963). See also Thorton v. United States , 
· CAlX. . · . 
368 F.2d 822 ~96~)(search-and-s~izure claims not cognizable 
under § 2255 absent special circumstances). 
:r..~ ~VlO'-~~ :t:vt"etev~ ? Co 1\G\-ieN-J 
Cr-\'vw\1\~ . ~~ ) ~t Ct.-t,·l 
\.q~ ·c\C11o), . . 
~. ~Jt. As Justice Black commented in dissent, Kaufman v. United 
States, 394 u.s. 217, 239 (1969), the Kaufman 
• 
majority made no effort to justify its result in light of 
the long-recognized deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule. Ins tea') the Court relied . on a series of prior cases 
as implicitly establishing the proposition that search-and-
seizure claims are cognizable in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); 
Carafas v. · LaValee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 
387 U.S. 294 (1967). But only in Mancusi was habeas relief 
ordered on the basis of a search-and-seizure claim, and in 
'.j l...;~.:::::!.:~~_:_""l'-:--=~-:-...... -<.~~E~;.:::==::.::.:r~_;:;..~~;...,;_..-.;;;..._;.....,.<J~ 
.... t"' in ., 








15. As we conclude that a , state prisoner asserting 
\. . ."rt vJCa.!. o\o\tV."eJ iv:J 
that evidence should have been excluded because~ an 
~~eeN\ o-.~~,\e.J ·~) 
illegal search and seizure, who,._ ' ' s s )f fti p],r 
o~\lO'Mw-M· ~'(" ~\\ C-W\~\c\~""' J; ~c.X~'I\" \~ ·t\Na 
state courts, may not invoke 
the exclusionary rule on federal habeas corpus review, we 
find it unnecessary to consider the other issues concerning 
the exclusionary rule raised by the parti€s. These include, 
principally, whether in view of the p~rpose of the rule, 
it should be applied on a ~r ~ 'basis without regard to 
the nature of the constitutional claim or the circumstances 
of the police action. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 
446 (1974) ("the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged 
' • 
in willful, or at least very negligent, conduct which has 
deprived the defendant of some right"); Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590, 6~6 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part); 




See generally Lasson, The History and Development 
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
(1937); Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court 
(1966). 
~- The roots of the Weeks decision 
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), where the Court, 
forCing a· link between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, held 
~ 
that the compulsory production of a person's private books 
and papers for introduction against him at trial was 
. ~_;,;J_J. 
unconstitutional. Boyd was~repHdiaeed in Adams v. 
"" \. ~,~--~\~V\~ J 
New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904), where the Court, ~ C b tliat 
· 7:. C/n ~J ,-.. 
the "law held unconstitutional~fvirtual y compelled the defen-
dant to furnisp tgstimony 
· --,~at 598 
-A ' 
~ 
against himselfj' il. 
adhered to the common-law rule 
that a trial court must not 11111111111111111111111111111 
~inquire into the method by which otherwise 
/""'\ 
competent evidence was acquired. See., ~ Corr.mon wealth v. ~' 
.., ' '-' 





\f. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1968); 
Weeks v. United States, 233 U.S. 383, 391-392, 394 (1914); 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 ~.S. 438, 470 (Holmes, J., 
dissenting), 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
'" '!SC. - See 367 U.S., at •• - ·-~ --: -- ~---.JI 
~ 
:=··---_ -- -- ·_-:_----~-==-- -~ -. _., 'liiJ (prevention of introduction 
of evidence where introduction "tantamount" to a coerced 
1\ 
confession); ~ at 658 (deterrence of Fourth Amendment 
, violations); id., at 659 (preservation of judicial integrity) . 
. ---
. '\fo4A't' .,",.+i~ 
Only t, Jtl•t!i adopted the view that the Fourth 
alone 
:--;--;----:--~A~m!!:e~n~d~mentkequires the exclusion of unconstitutionally 
1n s lalfl criminal fria Is --~;wit.· ~4~~~~-fP..,.~'fP"P? 
..... 
367 U.s. at C'A}, '"G, • 
Mr. Justice Black adhered to his 
view that the 
~J 
Fourth Amendment, standing alone, was not ,_• J 
" 
see Wolf v. Colorado, 
338 U.S. 25, ), . (1949)(concurring opinion), 
-l:JL ~ ~lllAtd11t €Ad . 
L u-x.dv. cf.t d.. J 
but~that;, when 
cons~ ered in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment ban against 
~ 
compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerg~ ,c,, 
~67 U.S. at .J 















As Professor Amsterdam has ~ ......... observed: 
"The rule is ~nsupportable as reparation or compensation 
dispensation to the injured criminal; its sole rational 
ification is the experience of its indispensibility 
exert-f:l.ng] general legal pressures to secure obedience 
to the Fourth Amendment on the part of ••• law-enforcing 
officers) As it serves this function, the rule is a needed, 
but grudgingly taken-, medicament; no more should be 
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted 
that so many criminals must go free as will deter 
constables from blundering, pursuance of this policy beyond 
the confines of necessity inflicts a gratuitous harm on 
the public interest •• o." ~~fbi. 
• . 388-389ll1111~ C~ncste.s 
(\%-4) 
Se"'rc..-l) S.~.c. v... -rt) ~ S<!C'h-o:-V'\ t~sr.. A Ccr"-'"'~; 
llt.. u. \' c,. . L. ~· 31g 
- ~ 




, Ass 'n of theL.. ' 
Bar of the City 
of New York \ 
. , Dec • 16 , 19 7 4. 
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! .. , 
on the 
l. in -lAos e casts Adti~.J·;,:t ..;,..e I"~ s Hon 
the exclusionary rule~ wnether ·. 
..6-/ ~ .r<.A.A..-.-
)that purpose would be served through retroactive 
J despite 
/ anO~the costs associated with such applicatio~ is ..._in 
I . 
harmony with the balancing analysis applied generally in 
I 
! the exclusionary rule context. See Desist v. United States, 
I 394 U.S. 244, ;49-251, 254_n. 21 (1969); Linkletter v. 
! . 
: Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-637 (1965); Fuller v. Alaska, 
, I 
l 
1 393 U.S. 80, 81 (1968). Cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.s.)j I . 
. • 446. 
- •? ., 
1 Wong Sun v. 
SS I 4 .... 
· .. 
If ~· " 
The attenuation-of-the-taint doctrine~ 
consistant with the balancing at~roacho See 




..... ~ ...... . ' ~ ~·. 
• :.. . 
---""'---...... , ............. _ 
; 
/ 2~. See,~-~·; Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 
136 (1954); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 
. 
403 U.S. 388, 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); People v . 
. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926)(Cardozo, J.); 
ks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 
37 U. Chi. L~ Rev. 665, 736-754 (1970), and sources cited 
Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by . . 
Police, 52 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 255, 256 (1961); Wright, 
Must the CrLminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 
Texas L. Rev. 736 (1972>; . 
. 
,.··· 
. ~ - - -~· ·~ ,--., 
/ 
liP-"~. Many of the proposals for modification of 
.., - -
scope recognize the 
potential value !r establishing a ro'a of proportionality in 
~··J< .. eiZ--tf"'n.c-L .,~~~~~ 
the criminal justice system and · 'the 1-i-nM..ge between the 
'\ 
nature of the violation and the decision whether to invoke the 
rule. See A.L.I., A Model Code of Pre-arraignment Procedure, 
May 20, 1975, § 290.2 ("substantial violations"); 8 J. Wigmore, 
·Evidence, § 2184, pp. 51-52 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961); H. 
Friendly," Benchmarks 26--261 (1967)(even at trial, exclusion 
should be limited to "the fruit of activity intentionally 
,s 













\\; ' J •. 
• 
In a different context, Pref~~:o~s ~~s ~~4MArH411rin 
·I \ r"'VYV"'fY'~ ~ 
observed: 
"I am criticizing ,,not our concern with 
procedures, but our preoccupation, in Which we may 
lose sight of the fact that our procedures are not th 
ultimate goals of our legal system. Our gmals are 
truth and justice, and procedures are but means to 
these ends ••••• 
Truth and justice are ultimate values, so understood 
by our people, and the law and the legal profession 
will not be worthy of public respect and loyalty if 
we allow our attention to be diverted from these 
goals." 
Ethics, Morality and Professional Responsibility, Convocation 
and Dedication of the J. Reuben Clark College of Law Brigham 
Young University, Provo, Utah, September 5, 1975. 
Z). 
Resort to habeas corpus tor purposes other than to assure 
that no innocent .person suffers an unconstitutional loss 
of liberty ..._ resultsin serious intrusions on values 
important · to our system of govern-
ment. They include "(i) the most effective utilization of 
limited jpdicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality 
in criminal trials, (iii) the minimization of friction 
between our federal and state systems of justice and (iv) 
the maintenance of the constitutional balance up~n which 
the doctrine of federalism is founded." Schneckloth v 
Bustamante, 412 U.S., at 25~ (Powell, J., concurring). · · ,e.~o-.1 •• 
~~~~co.~ ~~ \.} ... ~;. ~~ n4- u..s. )·ca 2.;-$7 
(~\~~) J.) ~~SseN\~~)j ~~ceM.J \)J .s"'i~ ~ ,q. 
,\ • 
!~;-~------
~ ... --·-.., . 
... '· 
. .,., 
~~s!j!bf"U!o.i_o!! 0 'U: I&~ 
t .. The efficacy of the exclusionary rule has 
been the subject of sharp debate since its inception. Until 
recentl~ scholarly empirical research was unavailable. 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.~. 206, 218 (1960). And, 
-.\~+- c~"to.A~empi:t1\Ytl research has cast doubt on the 
still 
~~IMJ~ is /in-
conclusive. Compare,~·~·, Oaks, supra, note 20: Spiotto, 
Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary 
Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 Journ. Leg. St. 243 (1973) with, 
~·.&·, Cannon, _Is the Exclusionary_R~le_ i~ F~ilit)_g_ _He_aJ.th?_,_J)ome 
Ne~ata and a Pleel: _ _Against a ~re.~_!_Eiti~~~ Co_n_~_l_l!_sion, 62 Ky. L. 





"As the exclusionary rule is applied 
. time after time, it seems that i\s deterrent 
efficacy at some stage reaches a point of 
diminishing returns, and beyond that point 
its continued application is a public nuisance.' 
~terd~, supra, not.e ~' at 389. 







courts,~ federal courts, 
have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal 
liberties and to uphold federal law. Martin v. Hunter's 
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 341-344 (1816). 
/ ,. 
The policy arguments that re.spondents marshall 
· in support of the view that~ .. ~ .............. lal8 
federal habeas corpus review is necessary to effectuate 
the Fourth Amendment .. : ' •• :~ •• "¥ t . -- stem from 
a basic mistrust of the state courts as fair and competent 
forums for the adjudication of federal constitutional rights. 
argument is that 
. The~tate courts cannot be trusted to effectuate Fourth 
fair 
Amendment value3 through~pplication of the rule, and the 
-...L.·-- t \ 01\C~.J.f't J 
oversight jurisdiction of this Courtlis an inadequate safeguard. 
The principal rationale for this view emphasizes the broad 
differences in the federal 
federal constitutional law is especially 
\ 
limited in the Fourth Amendment context, 
claims are dealt with on . a daily basis by 
• 
/ I 





, .t ,I. i t ' •• ~ I . . I ') 
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·~espite differences in institutional environment 
and the unsympathetic attitude of some state judges in 
' <$~f'~rJ.._R_ 
years past, we are unwilling to assume a lack of appropriate 
A 
sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and 
appellate courts of the several states. Indeed, the 
argument that federal judges are 
\ 
\ 
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In sum, there is "no intrinsic reason why the fact that a 
' 
man is a federal judge should make him more competant, or 
conscientious, or learned with respect to the application of 
... 
federal law than his neighbor in the state courthouse." Bator, 
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~ 'I· Respondents contend that since they filed 
petitions for federal habeas corpus rather than seeking direct 
·review by this Court through an application for a writ of 
certiorari, and since the tLme to apply for certiorari has 
now passed, any change in the substantive scope of collateral 
review should be prospective. Cf. England v. Louisiana State 
Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422-423 (1964). We 
reject these contentions. Although not required to do so under 
the Court's prior decisions, see Fay v. Noia,. 372 U.S. 391, 
respondents were, of course, free to file a tLmely petition for 
certiorari prior to seeking federal habeas corpus .relief. 
More importantly, an untimely filing in a state or federal 
criminal case is not a jurisdictional defect, and, under 
~ tl.t.4 ·~ _) 
appropriate circumstances, plenary reviewjis appropriate. E.~., 
Taglianetti v. United States, 394 u.s. 316, n. 1 (~'l); 
Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (\'IC:R); Arnold v. North Carolina, 
376 u.s. 773 ( ,,Ct1). Respondents' remedy, therefore~lies 
'----·-__.., --· -- .. --- _.., __ _ 





in the filing of an out-of-t~e 
, 
can assess whether the cla~ed prejudice arisingfrom ouc 
decision in this case justifies the waiver of the time rule, 
and whether we should exercise our discretion to review . 
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